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Abstract 
This thesis is a critical stylistic analysis of the meanings of the lexemes „feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and 
„feminist‟ in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009. It uses the textual-conceptual functions set out in 
Jeffries (2010a) to investigate the linguistic contexts in which these lexemes occur within the data in 
order to assess to what extent the movement, the people who represent it, and things that are 
described as feminist are imbued with different textually constructed meanings. 
 The analysis tests previous studies‟ findings concerning portrayals of feminism and feminists 
in the media. Expanding on and responding to this research, this study reports on five main findings: 
 
 „Feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and „feminist‟ have positive, as well as negative, meanings. 
 „Feminism‟ and „feminists‟ are a western phenomenon, with different types in the past and 
present. 
 „Feminism‟ has a complex meaning, with no single, universal definition and a variety of types. 
 „Feminism‟ is presented as having undergone changes in meaning, as antonymous to other 
ideas and containing opposed meanings. 
 Portrayals of „feminism‟ are complex, with articles recognising and contesting different 
meanings of the lexemes. 
 
These findings both confirm and question previous studies, which have argued that feminism and 
feminists are portrayed negatively in newspaper texts. It provides linguistic evidence to support claims 
made by other non-linguistic studies of the same genre and time period: that portrayals of feminism 
are “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 49) and that they present feminism as consisting of approved 
and disapproved types (Dean, 2010).  
 I also discuss the lexemes „feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and „feminist‟ in  with regard to contested 
meaning, using critical stylistic tools to analyse how newspaper articles textually construct different 
meanings of the lexemes, and explicitly discuss and compare different definitions. The thesis argues 
that the analysis of textual meaning can be used to explore how the meanings of a lexeme or set of 
lexemes that “involve ideas and values” (Williams, 1983, p. 17) are constructed in a variety of ways 
through the linguistic context in which they occur. I also reflect on the usefulness of the textual-
conceptual functions in the manual analysis of a large dataset, identifying ways in which an analysis 
that seeks to provide as full as possible an account of the textual construction of meaning can 
produce findings not possible through other means of analysis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
As an undergraduate I had many arguments about gender politics. The words „feminism‟ and 
„feminist‟ would often appear in these arguments. Often, it seemed that it was differing ideas of what 
these words mean, rather than differences in political views, that caused disagreements. For 
example, one person might say „that‟s not feminist‟ to convey the idea that „that is against the idea of 
equal rights for women‟, but the other might understand this to mean „that does not fit with an ideal of 
a matriarchal society‟. 
 This sort of clash of definitions reflects wider discussion of what „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ 
mean in the twenty-first century. Popular feminist books such as Natasha Walter‟s Living Dolls: The 
Return of Sexism (2010) and Caitlin Moran‟s How to Be a Woman (2011) argue for the continuing 
importance of feminism, while blogs and campaigns such as The Everyday Sexism Project and No 
More Page 3 highlight issues that affect women in contemporary society. Against this backdrop, 
newspapers and other media contest the meanings of „feminism‟ and „feminist‟, and whether their 
meanings have changed over time. For example, a 2012 Netmums survey of women‟s attitudes to 
feminism, which itself debated the meaning of „feminist‟, resulted in discussion of the survey‟s results 
and the meaning of „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ across UK national newspapers and other media. This 
contestation of the meaning of „feminism‟ comes several decades after the feminist demonstrations of 
the 1960s and 1970s, such as the famous „bra-burning‟ protest at the 1968 Miss America pageant: in 
spite of its familiarity, „feminism‟ is a word that continues to defy simple definition.  
Existing studies of feminism in the media focus on whether the movement is portrayed in a 
positive or a negative light (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 
2011a, 2012), and the possible effects of these portrayals on readers (e.g. Callaghan et al., 1999, 
Lenart, 1996; Lind & Salo, 2002). Research finds that the movement and its advocates are portrayed 
negatively, and suggests that this results in people having negative attitudes towards them. However, 
little attention has been given to the words that denote the movement and the people involved. This 
study is concerned with how the meanings of „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ are constructed textually and 
how these meanings are contested in a particular section of the media, i.e. UK national newspapers in 
the 2000s.  
Section 1.1 discusses the aims of the thesis and the research questions that it answers. The 
remainder of the introductory chapter introduces the data that the investigation is based on and the 
approach that I use to analyse it. Section 1.2 discusses the data that I use and the reasons for the 
investigation‟s focus on UK national newspapers from 2000 to 2009. Section 1.3 then provides an 
overview of critical linguistic approaches that look at language and ideology and large sets of data, 
and discusses their limitations. This provides a foundation for section 1.3, which introduces critical 
stylistics and the ideas of textual and contested meaning on which the thesis is based, as well as 
contextualising my critical stylistic analysis of a dataset within the field of research that takes a similar 
approach to the analysis of bodies of data. Section 1.5 summarises the chapter and provides an 
outline of the structure of the thesis.  
17 
 
1.1 Aims and research questions 
The study is an investigation into textual meanings of the nouns „feminism‟ and „feminist(s)‟ and the 
adjective „feminist‟ (hereafter referred to collectively as „feminist/s/ism‟) in UK national newspapers 
between 2000 and 2009. The investigation involves the annotation and analysis of a dataset of 2,539 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ for defined linguistic features, and addresses the following research 
questions: 
 
1. What are the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the context of UK national newspapers, 
2000-2009? 
2. How is the meaning of „feminism‟ contested in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009? 
3. How is critical stylistics a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset? 
 
The research questions address the content of the data I investigate and the methodology that I use 
to annotate and analyse it. Question 1 addresses the fact that while previous studies have looked at 
how feminism and feminists are portrayed in the media (see section 2.2), there has been little 
research into the meanings of the words that denote the movement and its advocates. Specifically, 
this question is interested in the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the data - those meanings that 
can be accessed through a critical stylistic analysis of occurrences. This method of linguistic analysis 
and the concept of textual meaning are discussed in detail in section 1.4, which contextualises it 
against other critical linguistic approaches to analysis discussed in section 1.3. The investigation 
required to answer question 1 allows me to draw conclusions related to question 2, which 
acknowledges existing ideas about the meaning of „feminism‟ – that it is hard to define and that it has 
multiple, contested meanings (see discussion in section 2.1.2) – and assesses how they are reflected 
in the data. Question 3 is concerned with the methodological approach used to investigate the textual 
meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟, and how the manual critical stylistic annotation and analysis of a dataset 
is a fruitful and practical method for answering research questions such as 1 and 2. 
 The analysis of „feminist/s/ism‟ in this study requires a starting point against which textual 
meanings can be compared. I use the Oxford English Dictionary‟s (2015) definitions of the nouns 
„feminism‟ and „feminist‟ and the adjective „feminist‟ for this purpose: 
 
Feminism, n.: Advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, 
and economic rights of the female sex; the movement associated with this. 
Feminist, n.: An advocate or supporter of the rights and equality of women. 
Feminist, a.: Of, relating to, or advocating the rights and equality of women. 
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Occurrences of each of these lexemes in the dataset are analysed separately in chapters 5-7. This 
division reflects the fact that each lexeme has its own meaning and grammatical roles (Biber et al., 
2002, p. 15), i.e. uses of the noun that represents the movement are different to those of the noun 
that represents its advocates, and different again to those of the adjective, which attributes to 
someone or something the quality of being associated with the movement. The individual analysis of 
each lexeme also ensures that the study provides a full picture of textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
and therefore expands on existing linguistic research that focuses on „feminism‟ (Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012) and „feminism‟ and „feminist(s)‟ (Lind & Salo, 2002) in media texts (see 
discussion of research on feminism in the media in section 2.2). 
 
1.2 The ‘feminist/s/ism’ data 
The data for the study consists of UK national newspaper articles from the decade between 2000 and 
2009. This expands on previous studies of this genre and time period (see discussion in section 2.2.3) 
by focusing on newspaper data that covers the entirety of the first decade of the 2000s. This focus 
addresses Dean‟s (2010) concern that “analysis of the role of the print media in post-feminist 
discourse is a curiously neglected area” (p. 394) and builds on Mendes‟ (2011a) “snapshot” (p. 43) of 
the construction of feminism in newspapers in 2008. 
Previous studies suggest that the 2000s are an interesting period for investigation due to “a 
recent proliferation of discourse specifically about feminism in the British quality press” (Dean, 2010, 
pp. 394-395), in particular in The Guardian and inspired by Ariel Levy‟s book on women‟s sexuality, 
Female Chauvinist Pigs (2005). Mendes (2011a) also finds explicit discussion of the definitions and 
applications of „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ in her 2008 data. Media debate in the 2000s arose partly as a 
result of burgeoning interest in feminist activism, with Redfern and Aune (2010) noting that the 
decade saw “a staggering number of feminist organisations and campaigning groups […] formed in 
the UK” (p. 10). Redfern and Aune‟s (2010) study is itself one of a number of popular feminist 
publications (including Banyard, 2010; Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; Levy, 2005; Walter, 2010) to 
look at “the new feminist movement” (p. 17) and its significance in the new century. This interest in the 
movement and its (changing) meaning raises a question about whether „feminism‟ in the 2000s has 
various meanings, or whether newspapers discuss „feminism‟ as though it denotes a single 
“monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274) movement.  
One concern with the choice of newspapers is whether this genre remains an important 
source of information, especially in the light of declining circulation figures (see figure 1.1). However, 
Conboy (2010) notes that the advent of the internet has forced newspapers to embrace new 
technologies. The online success of newspaper titles such as The Guardian – and their new 
international reach - means that “the number of newspapers sold is not the same as the number of 
people who read a newspaper” (Baker et al., 2013, p. 257). For example, while figure 1.1 shows that 
The Guardian‟s print sales decreased from an average of 401,560 per day in January 2000 to 
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358,844 in January 2009, National Readership Survey figures show that its daily readership for print 
and online editions combined was 1.1 million at the end of this period
1
. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Print newspaper sales 2000-2009 through Audit Bureau of calculations
2
 
 
A related concern is how newspapers are edited and how their content is filtered, with limits 
on what is included and the extent to which a subject such as feminism is covered. However, these 
limitations are a strength as well as a weakness. Electronic repositories such as Nexis UK provide 
access to the contents of the range of national newspapers available in the UK: the genre is clearly 
defined and recognisable, and the researcher simply needs to ensure that the data is representative 
of the genre as a whole. The recognisability of national newspapers also has other benefits. For 
instance, Mendes (2011a) justifies her use of newspaper data by noting that their regularity and reach 
“give them potential for quickly disseminating timely information about the women‟s movement to 
millions each day” (p. 23). Not only does daily publication mean that newspapers reflect and respond 
to events quickly, but also that they feature texts of varying styles, including “news, features, 
editorials, comment, letters to the editor, advertisements and cartoons” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 23). 
Wardle (2004) expands on this by noting that newspapers “reflect the available discourses” (p. 7), 
including the positions of both the authorities and those most involved with stories. This characteristic 
also addresses the concern that they may not reflect the growing discussion of feminism online and 
                                                          
1
 From a report at http://www.mediaweek.co.uk/article/1006731/nrs-march-2010-standards-readership-surges-ahead-guardian-
independent [Accessed 27th September 2015] 
2
 Figures derived from reports at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/abcs [Accessed 27th September 2015] 
 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
4000000
The Sun
Daily Mail
Daily Mirror
Daily Telegraph
Daily Express
The Times
The Guardian
The Independent
20 
 
through other mediums: although they may not directly cover the same issues as, for example, 
feminist blogs, newspapers nonetheless reflect such genres. 
 A further reason for investigating newspapers is that they cover the spectrum of mainstream 
British politics (Evans & Schuller, 2015, p. 130). Previous studies have used this representativeness 
to compare portrayals of feminism in newspapers that approach the issue from different ideological 
standpoints, for example Dean‟s (2010) comparison of the “left-leaning and broadly pro-feminist” (p. 
391) The Guardian with The Times, which he deems “more conservative and ambivalent” (p. 391). In 
the present study, I focus on the range of textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ across publications, and 
seek evidence of how these meanings are contested: rather than drawing comparisons between 
publications or article types, I wish to uncover the range of meanings constructed within this genre 
and time period. For this reason, I investigate UK national newspapers‟ coverage of feminism as a 
whole, rather than making assumptions about the values and attitudes of particular newspapers or 
attempting to draw comparisons between the coverage provided by different publications. This 
approach also responds to the observations of previous studies that have compared different 
newspapers‟ articles on feminism. For example, Dean (2010) recognises that the range of writers who 
contribute to a single publication, such as The Guardian, makes it “nonsensical to conceptualise a 
single „Guardian position‟ on feminism” (p. 396), meaning that textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are 
also likely to vary within, as well as across, newspapers. Mendes (2011a, p. 9) goes further, arguing 
that attitudes towards, and meanings attributed to, feminism can vary within a single article. The 
sample analysis of a Daily Mail article in section 3.2 provides evidence for Mendes‟ (2011a) 
observation, demonstrating how an article from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data is purposefully structured to 
reflect different views of feminism. 
Chapter 4 provides further discussion of the newspapers that are included in the data and 
how I conducted the annotation of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. The remainder of chapter 1 discusses 
critical linguistic approaches (section 1.3) and the thesis‟s critical stylistic approach to the analysis of 
textual and contested meaning in a dataset (section 1.4). 
 
1.3 Critical linguistic approaches 
The present section contextualises the present study within previous critical linguistic research that 
looks at ideology in language and at large collections of data. Section 1.3.1 summarises the critical 
discourse analysis approach to language study, discussing its motivations and the data it looks at. 
Section 1.3.2 then introduces the critical stylistic approach to textual meaning, comparing it to critical 
discourse analysis and defining the tools of analysis used in the investigation of textual meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism‟. I then define contested meaning, observing how it has been studied in previous 
critical stylistic work (section 1.3.2.1) and describe the manual critical stylistic approach to the analysis 
of a dataset used in the thesis, noting how it helps address the limitations of other critical linguistic 
approaches to the analysis of language data (section 1.3.2.2). 
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1.3.1 Critical discourse analysis 
Research in the field of critical linguistics attempts to show up “the connections between language, 
power and ideology” (Fairclough, 1989, p.  5). Much of this work is carried out under the title of critical 
discourse analysis (CDA). CDA has its origins in the form of critical linguistics developed in the 1970s 
by scholars including Fowler (1996, p. 3), who wished to introduce a type of linguistic analysis that 
could uncover the ideologies that are implicit in discourse. The precise approaches taken in CDA 
vary. For example, Fowler (1991) notes that the linguistic methodology he employs is “essentially 
eclectic” (p. 69). However, what unites work in the field of critical discourse analysis is a commitment 
to “showing how social inequalities are reflected and created in language” (Pennycook, 2002, p. 41). 
Much work in CDA shares the belief that ideology is an inherent feature of language, even in 
texts which appear or aim to be „neutral‟ (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 8). Definitions of „ideology‟ within CDA 
vary, but there is a general consensus that the word refers to any beliefs that are shared by groups of 
people and constitute a particular view of the world (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 12). Written and spoken texts 
both reflect and shape our worldview (KhosraviNik, 2009, pp. 478-479), meaning that language has a 
role in how reality and society are constructed (Lukin, 2013, p. 424). Text producers may wilfully 
construct texts so as to help propagate a particular ideology, but all texts are ideological regardless of 
intention (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 3): they may or may not be ideologically manipulative, but they 
are always ideologically loaded (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 3). As a result of this belief, CDA studies analyse 
not only texts produced by powerful institutions such as governments, but also texts such as 
“swimming pool regulations […] and university guidelines on student enrolment” (Simpson, 1993, p. 
5). 
CDA holds that particular features of language – for example, nominalisation, modality and 
transitivity - are especially involved in the naturalisation of ideologies, whereby ideas about the world 
become common sense (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 9). Many of these features are covered by the grammar 
introduced by Halliday‟s Introduction to Functional Grammar (2004), which provides a means of 
looking at the different ways in which a text can create meaning (p. 3). By analysing the lexical and 
grammatical choices that a text producer makes, the analyst is able to provide an account of the 
ideologies present in a text (Hart, 2013, p. 402). Through the use of analytical tools such as 
transitivity, modality, nominalisation (discussed in chapter 3 below) – the analyst is able to access 
those ideologies that may exist below the level of a reader or hearer‟s awareness and therefore 
subliminally shape the recipient‟s worldview. This use of an approach that draws from different 
disciplines and methodologies has led practitioners to deem it a school of inquiry, rather than a 
precise method (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p. 5). 
 CDA‟s willingness to utilise an eclectic and undefined range of tools of analysis has attracted 
criticism. Widdowson (1998), for example, argues that CDA studies simply “take from theory whatever 
concept comes usefully to hand” (p. 137): there is no agreed set of tools of analysis, and so research 
in the field varies greatly in methodological approach. Without the rigorous application of a clearly-
defined means of analysis, CDA studies can appear incomplete – a study looking at the use of 
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nominalisations in a text may find that a text contains particular ideologies, but a study of modality in 
the same text might produce different, and perhaps countering, conclusions about the ideologies in 
the text. This can be a particular problem in light of how CDA studies tend to set out from a particular 
political position, aiming to investigate a perceived social problem (Al-Hejin, 2015, p. 20). If a 
researcher has identified a perceived problem before embarking on their analysis then there is the 
danger that they will pick those tools that yield findings which back up their suspicions, or that they will 
focus on those examples of language use that best fit their convictions. 
 
1.3.2 Critical stylistics and textual meaning 
Critical stylistics addresses concerns about the lack of rigour in existing critical linguistic approaches. 
It does this by providing a means of analysis that attempts to account for the range of ways in which 
texts produce textual meaning: the “provisionally complete list” (Jeffries, 2014 p. 412) of textual-
conceptual functions. 
Like other critical linguistic approaches, critical stylistics is “a method of finding the ideology in 
any text” (Jeffries, 2014, p. 410). In particular, it shares with other approaches an interest in how 
“ideology may be „naturalised‟ to the extent that it becomes „common sense‟” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 9) as 
a result of the use of language. Unlike previous critical linguistic approaches, however, critical 
stylistics makes use of a defined set of tools, which represent a synthesis of those previously used in 
stylistic approaches to the study of meaning in literary texts and those found in critical linguistic 
approaches such as CDA. Critical stylistics employs these tools to look at “the broader definition of 
style, which focuses on the choices a text producer makes” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 3). These choices are 
investigated by analysing textual-conceptual functions, which account for “the fact that texts can 
create specific types of meaning in a number of different ways” (2014, p. 409). 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the ten textual-conceptual functions (see section 3.1 for a 
more detailed account of each):  
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Textual-conceptual function Linguistic realisations 
Naming and describing Choice of nominal; modification of nominal through pre- 
and postmodifiers; nominalisation 
Representing actions/events/states Choice of transitivity process 
Negating Negation of a clause through negative particle; negation of 
a word through morphology; semantics and pragmatics 
Equating and contrasting Apposition; parallel structures; relational transitivity 
processes; syntactic frames 
Exemplifying and enumerating Lists indicating hyponymous or meronymous sense 
relations 
Prioritising Positioning of information in main or subordinate clauses; 
active and passive constructions 
Implying and assuming Presupposition and implicature 
Hypothesising Modality choices 
Presenting others‟ speech and 
thought 
Speech and thought presentation 
Representing time, space and 
society 
Deixis 
(Adapted from Jeffries, 2010a) 
Table 1.1: Critical stylistic framework of textual-conceptual functions 
 
The „conceptual‟ part of textual-conceptual functions refers to the way the tools “try to capture what a 
text is doing conceptually in presenting the world” (Jeffries, 2014, p. 409), and the „textual‟ part refers 
to “how the resources of the linguistic system are […] used to produce this conceptual meaning” (p. 
409). For example, Evans and Jeffries (2015) analyse the noun „choice‟ in terms of naming, finding 
that political manifestos frequently modify it through adjectives such as „parental‟ and „patient‟ (p. 
765): here, the textual resources of the linguistic system – the ability to make the reference of a noun 
more specific by premodifying it with an adjective – are used to produce a conceptual meaning, i.e. 
the idea of particular individuals (parents, patients) having “ownership” (p. 763) of a type of choice 
relating to public services. Evans and Jeffries (2015) demonstrate that the way in which „choice‟ is 
presented textually - through these and other aspects of naming – does something conceptually: it 
presents the idea of a choice in public services akin to the notion of „consumer choice‟ recognised in 
the commercial world (p. 770). 
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The textual-conceptual functions, then, allow the researcher to make clear links between what 
it is that a text is doing and how it is doing it (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 409), and to provide evidence for their 
interpretations. The use of textual-conceptual functions also makes critical stylistics distinct from 
previous critical linguistic approaches in that they are based on the recognition that a single feature of 
language can play a role in creating different types of textual meaning: for example, the analysis of 
transitivity can help to uncover the ways in which texts describe how someone or something interacts 
with the world (representations of actions/events/states) or reveal how texts present different entities 
as though they were equivalent with each other (equating). Further, critical stylistics accounts for the 
fact that a feature of language previously studied in critical linguistics – for example nominalisation – 
is just one of a number of realisations of a particular aspect of the way that texts produce meaning; in 
this instance, naming and describing, along with the other realisations - choice of nominal and pre- 
and postmodifiers. 
 I use the full range of the textual-conceptual functions outlined above to analyse textual 
meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ (Chapters 5-7). This allows me to gain as full as possible a picture of how 
newspaper articles textually construct the meanings of the lexemes. Through analysis of the textual-
conceptual functions, I show that „feminist‟, „feminist(s)‟ and „feminism‟ have both positive and 
negative meanings, and that „feminism‟ denotes a western phenomenon that has had different 
meanings at different times. I also find that the textual meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟ is complex, with no 
“single, unified and undifferentiated” (Jeffries, 2011, p. 43) meaning: „feminism‟ is a lexeme that can 
change meaning and contain different varieties that are opposed to each other. Analysis using the 
textual-conceptual functions is also useful for testing previous studies‟ arguments about how 
newspaper articles discuss meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ (see section 2.2), finding that writers approve 
of some types of feminism at the expense of others, support feminism from a “defensive position” 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 9), and contrast their own perceptions with those of others. Section 8.1.1 
summarises the analysis‟s findings concerning the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the data. 
 The remainder of section 1.3.2 discusses how the thesis uses critical stylistic analysis to look 
at contested meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ and how I use a manual approach to the analysis of a 
dataset in order to provide an overview of the textual and contested meanings of a large number of 
occurrences of the lexemes. The ten textual-conceptual functions are discussed in greater detail in 
section 3.1, and their role in the creation of textual meaning is demonstrated in a sample analysis of a 
text from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data in section 3.2. 
 
1.3.2.1 Critical stylistics and contested meaning 
The discussion above introduces the idea of textual meaning, and how the thesis uses this idea to 
investigate how texts construct the meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. The present section turns to the idea 
of contested meaning, which is the focus of the second research question and focuses more precisely 
on particular lexemes and how their meanings are actively contested in texts. The present study‟s 
approach to contested meaning builds on previous critical stylistic studies into the meanings of the 
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lexemes „choice‟ (Evans & Jeffries, 2015) and „terror‟ (Evans & Schuller, 2015). Each of these studies 
uses analysis based on the textual-conceptual functions to investigate how a particular genre 
constructs a lexeme‟s meanings in such a way as to acknowledge different possible perceptions or 
interpretations of their meanings. The present study investigates „feminist/s/ism‟ from a similar angle, 
and provides evidence that newspaper articles explicitly contest the lexemes‟ meanings. The 
discussion here looks at the roots of the notion of contested meaning, and at previous critical stylistic 
work that explores its presence in texts.  
The idea of contested meaning has its roots in Gallie‟s (1956) notion of the „contested 
concept‟. Gallie (1956) uses this term to refer to a range of concepts that are “essentially complex, 
and, chiefly for this reason, essentially contested” (p. 107) (Gallie‟s emphasis). In particular, he uses 
the idea of the contested concept to look at various definitions of art, arguing that “uniformity of 
judgement and appraisal, although so necessary in many fields of activity, is by no means necessary 
or even desirable in all” (Gallie, 1956, p. 114). The idea that it may not be desirable, let alone 
possible, to provide a single, uncontested definition of a concept has been the subject of previous 
discussion of feminism (see discussion in chapter 2). For example, Tuttle (1987) observes that there 
are “many individual definitions of feminism, and its fundamental meaning is in dispute” (p. 107), while 
Kornegger (2002, p. 13) argues that the lack of a universal definition makes the feminist movement, 
and the ideas that underpin it, difficult to attack. 
Gallie‟s (1956) work on contested concepts influenced subsequent linguistic work that 
focused more specifically on the meanings of lexemes themselves. The idea that certain lexemes 
have contested meanings is crucial to Williams‟ (1983) account of „cultural keywords‟, his term for 
those words – like „democracy‟ and „radical‟ - that “involve ideas and values” (Williams, 1983, p. 17). 
Durant (2008) observes that the meanings of these words are “actively contested” (p. 136) and, as 
such, cannot be satisfactorily captured by a dictionary definition, which cannot fully reflect historical 
developments or political changes. Williams (1983) investigates contestation of meaning by analysing 
keywords‟ “own internal developments and structures” (p. 23), looking, for example, at how the 
meaning of „democracy‟ has changed as a result of the practices involved in different times and 
places (pp. 93-98). However, Williams (1983) admits that his essays do not account for the fact that 
contested meaning is in part a result of “complex and (though variably) systematic properties of 
language itself” (p. 22). 
Critical stylistic research (Evans & Jeffries, 2015; Evans & Schuller, 2015; Jeffries, 2011; 
Jeffries & Walker, 2012) has sought to address these limitations through analyses based on the 
textual-conceptual functions. This type of analysis allows researchers to account for the “complex [...] 
and systematic properties of language” recognised by Williams (1983, p. 22). For example, Evans and 
Schuller‟s (2015) analysis of naming, hypothesising and assuming enables them to show how 
newspaper articles are able to use „terrorism‟ to describe a referent that does not fit standard 
definitions of the lexeme. Crucial here is the semantic distinction between the sense of a lexeme – the 
“abstract representation of what the referents of a word have in common” (Murphy, 2010, p. 36) – and 
its possible referents, i.e. “the set of things that it can refer to [...] in the world” (p. 35). Evans and 
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Schuller (2015) argue that analysis of “systematic properties of language” (Williams, 1983, p. 22) 
helps to show how the sense of a lexeme – „terror/ism‟ - can be extended so that it can be applied to 
unconventional referents. They find that naming, in particular, plays a crucial role in this process: 
rather than simply using the lexeme „terrorism‟ to refer to the attack, writers premodify it with 
adjectives such as „new‟ and „lone-wolf‟ (Schuller & Evans, 2015, pp. 143-144). This allows writers to 
“„update‟ readers‟ understanding of terrorism” (Schuller & Evans, 2015, p. 146): if the attack does not 
seem as clear a referent of „terrorism‟ as previous incidents, then this may be because it is a „new‟ 
type of referent; if the apparently individual and random nature of the attack does not seem to fit with 
the sense of „terrorism‟ as referring to a coordinated attack by an organised group, then that is 
because this is an example of a specific version of „terrorism‟ – „lone-wolf terrorism‟. In this way, 
writers are able to contest the meaning of „terrorism‟, opening it up to new interpretations. 
Previous critical stylistic studies have used a limited range of the textual-conceptual-functions 
to examine contested meaning: Evans and Schuller (2015) analyse naming, hypothesising and 
presupposing, Evans and Jeffries‟ (2015) study of „choice‟ focuses on naming, and Jeffries (2011) 
investigates „radicalisation‟ and „democracy‟ through naming, representing actions/events/states, and 
exemplifying and enumerating. This thesis is the first attempt to examine the contested meaning of a 
lexeme or set of lexemes using the full range of textual-conceptual functions. The comparatively large 
number of occurrences of the search term that are investigated – 2,539 occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
compared to, for example, 367 occurrences of „choice‟ in Evans and Jeffries (2015) – also enables 
me to pay particular attention to metalinguistic occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟: those where writers 
discuss “the linguistic expression, and not the thing it refers to” (Meyer, 2002, p.3) (see discussion in 
section 3.2.1). These occurrences are of particular interest for the investigation of contested meaning, 
and analysis in chapters 5-7 demonstrates how writers contrast differing perceptions of the lexemes‟ 
meanings, discuss the difficulty of providing an undifferentiated definition of „feminism‟, and present 
„feminist‟ as a label that can apply to a referent to a greater or lesser extent. Section 8.1.2 draws 
conclusions on how the lexemes‟ meanings are contested in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. 
The remainder of the present section discusses the manual approach to the analysis of a 
dataset that the investigation uses, and how the thesis addresses the third research question 
concerning how critical stylistic analysis is a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset. 
 
1.3.2.2 Critical stylistics and dataset analysis 
The present study uses the manual annotation and analysis of a dataset to investigate textual and 
contested meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. This approach builds on existing critical stylistic research 
(Coffey, 2013; Davies, 2008; Evans & Jeffries, 2015; Evans & Schuller, 2015; Jeffries & Walker, 2012; 
Nahajec, 2009, 2012; Tabbert, 2015). In particular, it represents a development of the methodological 
approach of Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015), each of which analyses the 
presence of between one and three textual-conceptual functions in a dataset of sentences that 
feature a particular lexeme or set of lexemes. The discussion here provides an overview of critical 
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approaches to the study of bodies of data, paying particular attention to previous studies that use 
critical stylistic methods and contextualising the approach of the thesis within this field. 
Much critical linguistic research is based on corpus-critical approaches that utilise techniques 
associated with corpus linguistics (CL), “the study of language based on examples of real life 
language use” (McEnery & Wilson, 1996, p. 1). CL utilises computer software to investigate large 
bodies of data. By uploading corpora to software programs such as WMatrix (Rayson, 2009) or 
AntConc (Anthony, 2009), researchers are able to gain statistical overviews of their collected texts, 
which then allow them to search and compare corpora for various linguistic features. These 
capabilities allow linguists to base their studies of linguistic patterns on a foundation of empirical 
evidence (Lee, 2008, p. 90), with the identification of patterns in a large dataset helping to validate 
findings (Baker & Levon, 2015, p. 2). This aspect of corpus-critical work has helped to deal with some 
of the limitations of critical linguistic approaches, which have tended to base their findings on a single 
text, or small selection of texts, that may not be representative of wider language use. 
Methods commonly used in corpus linguistic studies include keyness, collocation and 
concordance lines. These methods allow researchers to navigate large bodies of data, and to identify 
“entry points” (Mautner, 2007, p. 55) for analysis based on critical linguistic methods. Statistical tests 
for keyness allow researchers to find linguistic forms that are “statistically unusual relative to some 
norm” (Culpeper, 2009, p. 34), while overviews of collocations show up “the above chance frequent 
co-occurrence of two words” (Baker et al., 2008, p. 278). Concordance lines allow researchers to 
focus in on a particular search term, providing a list of all its occurrences in the contexts in which it 
appears (Baker, 2006, p. 71). These approaches have been used in previous critical stylistic studies 
(Coffey, 2013; Jeffries & Walker, 2012; Tabbert, 2015) as the basis for analysis that uses critical 
stylistic methods. For example, Coffey (2013) uses keyness, collocates and concordances as an 
“organisational aid” (p. 74), identifying statistically salient patterns in her data of women‟s magazines, 
which she then investigates though the textual-conceptual functions of naming, representing 
actions/events/states, equating and contrasting, and implying and assuming. This corpus-critical 
stylistic approach builds on previous corpus-critical linguistic work which uses corpus methods to 
provide an empirical foundation for qualitative analysis (Lee, 2008, p. 90). 
The investigation of „feminist/s/ism‟ is similar to corpus approaches in that it is based on an 
overview of linguistic features of the data, which are then used to produce statistical overviews that 
provide entry points for analysis. It differs from corpus-critical studies in that both the annotation and 
analysis stages are carried out manually. This approach builds on previous critical stylistic studies of 
datasets by Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015). Each of these investigations 
consists of two stages. The first stage consists of a manual annotation of a set of sentences that 
contain a particular lexeme, or set of related lexemes, for between one and three textual-conceptual 
functions: Evans and Jeffries (2015) annotate a dataset of sentences containing the lexeme „choice‟ 
for naming, and Evans and Schuller (2015) annotate a dataset of occurrences of „terror‟, „terrorist(s)‟ 
and „terrorism‟ for naming, hypothesising and assuming. The second stage then provides a more 
detailed study of the lexeme(s) in terms of these textual-conceptual functions, allowing the 
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researchers to “explore in-depth how particular lexical items are used in a particular discourse type or 
context” (Evans & Jeffries, 2015, p. 773). A key strength of these studies is that they are based on a 
thorough account of a single aspect of how texts construct the meaning of a particular lexeme or set 
of lexemes, something made possible by the focus on a relatively small set of data compared to that 
used in corpus studies (Evans & Jeffries, 2015, p. 773). 
 The present study builds on research by Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller 
(2015) by expanding the annotation and analysis stages to account for all ten of the textual-
conceptual functions identified by Jeffries (2010a). This means that the investigation is based on as 
full as possible a picture of how the lexemes are used in a particular genre and time period. The 
annotation stage provides a full annotation of every occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟ in its sentential 
context (see discussion in section 4.3). I then use this annotation to provide statistical overviews of 
the lexemes „feminism‟, „feminist‟ and „feminists‟, and adjectival „feminist‟ (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 
7.1), which provide a bridge to the analysis stage. These overviews are based on two of the textual-
conceptual functions – naming and representing actions/events/states – selected for their pertinence 
to a large percentage of occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ (see section 4.3 for further discussion), and 
provide entry points for the analysis, which draws on the full annotation of all occurrences in order to 
analyse textual meaning, drawing on the textual-conceptual functions that are most relevant and 
provide the greatest analytical insight. For example, the statistical overviews of naming and 
representing actions/events/states for „feminism‟ (see section 5.1) demonstrate that most occurrences 
of „feminism‟ are unmodified, and that the largest percentage appear in representations of states. This 
provides an entry point into the data, with the analysis looking at representations of states in which 
unmodified „feminism‟ occurs. Here, the textual meaning of „feminism‟ is analysed according to the 
pertinence of particular textual-conceptual functions to particular patterns, for example the analysis of 
speech presentation and implying to investigate the textual meanings of „feminism‟ in the „feminism is 
dead‟ structure (see section 5.2.2.2). 
 Although I do not use corpus methods to help navigate the data, the critical stylistic approach 
provides a similar foundation for the critical analysis of language. The statistical overviews provide 
similar entry points to those produced through the use of corpus tools, and the subsequent analysis is 
based on an annotation that accounts for a variety of features of language that cannot be searched 
for through corpus tools. For example, the textual-conceptual function of assuming and implying, 
which arises through pragmatic means rather than being identifiable through the presence of 
particular words or linguistic structures, requires a manual approach. The annotation also provides 
similar information to that provided by corpus tools, and in some cases provides a greater level of 
detail. The annotation of naming, for instance, provides a full overview of words that co-occur with 
„feminist/s/ism‟ in noun phrases: this allows me not only to see what words frequently occur in the pre- 
and postmodification of „feminist/s/ism‟ (and to focus on those that occur most frequently), but also 
provides a more detailed picture than that afforded by studies of collocation – it demonstrates how 
words co-occur (e.g. as premodifiers or postmodifiers), as well as the simple fact that they co-occur. 
The analysis stage then allows me to consider in greater detail those features of the data identified by 
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the annotation and statistical overviews as being of interest, utilising the full range of textual-
conceptual functions and accounting for how they interact to produce textual meaning. The use of the 
manual approach during both the annotation and analysis stages also allows me to remain close to 
the data throughout the investigation: by providing every occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟ with the same 
level of analysis in the initial annotation stage, I am able to gain a familiarity with the data that is not 
possible through the use of corpus methods, and treat all occurrences as equal. The annotation of 
every occurrence in its sentential context also goes beyond corpus studies that base their 
investigations on concordance lines: whereas these studies start out from a list of the occurrences of 
a search term within their context, my annotation provides not only the sentential context but also a 
much greater level of detail concerning linguistic features of that context. 
Chapter 4 explains how I annotated the „feminist/s/ism‟ data for the textual-conceptual 
functions. It provides particular detail on naming and representing actions/events/states, as the 
annotation of these textual-conceptual functions provides the foundation for the annotation of the 
remaining textual-conceptual functions and generates statistical overviews of each of the lexemes 
(see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). Chapters 5-7 report on the analysis I conducted based on these entry 
points, and allows me to answer the thesis‟s research question concerning how critical stylistics is a 
useful methodology for the analysis of a large dataset.  
 
1.4 Summary and outline of the thesis 
This chapter has introduced the thesis. It has discussed the aims of the study and stated the three 
research questions it answers. It has discussed critical linguistic approaches to the study of language 
and explained the methodological approach that I use to look at the textual and contested meanings 
of „feminist/s/ism‟ in a dataset of UK national newspapers. This methodological approach allows me to 
make five key findings about the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in UK national newspapers 
(2000-2009): 
 
 „Feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and „feminist‟ have positive, as well as negative, meanings. 
 „Feminism‟ and „feminists‟ are a western phenomenon, with different types in the past and 
present. 
 „Feminism‟ has a complex meaning, with no single, universal definition and a variety of types. 
 „Feminism‟ is presented as having undergone changes in meaning, as antonymous to other 
ideas and containing opposed meanings. 
 Portrayals of „feminism‟ are complex, with articles recognising and contesting different 
meanings of the lexemes. 
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The manual critical stylistic approach also enables me to show how the meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
are contested in the data. In particular, the investigation finds that metalinguistic discussion of the 
lexemes themselves both contests the meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ and acknowledges the fact that 
they are contested, and that the lexemes are discussed in terms of „rules‟ that enable their use, with 
the applicability of the meaning of „feminist‟ for particular referents debated. In addition to discussing 
textual and contested meaning in the data, I also focus on the usefulness of a critical stylistic 
approach for this type of analysis, finding that it allows the researcher to gain a rich overview of the 
textual construction of a large number of occurrences of a set of lexemes, enables the navigation of 
this data through statistical overviews, and aids in the analysis of how different features of language 
combine to create textual meaning. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the history of feminism and discusses different definitions 
of „feminism‟. It looks at existing research on feminism in the media, paying particular attention to 
other studies that have investigated UK national newspapers in the 2000s.  
 Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of the textual-conceptual functions outlined in section 
1.3.1 and a sample analysis of an article, demonstrating how the functions are involved in the 
construction of textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
 Chapter 4 details the process by which I sourced and collected the data. I explain how I 
divided the data according to word class and how I annotated each occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
according to the textual-conceptual functions. 
Chapters 5-7 present the results of the analysis of the data. Chapter 5 focuses on „feminism‟, 
chapter 6 looks at the use of the singular and plural forms of the noun „feminist‟, and chapter 7 looks 
at the people and things described by adjectival „feminist‟.  
 Chapter 8 summarises the findings of chapters 5-7 and discusses them in relation to the 
research questions outlined in section 1.1. I summarise the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in UK 
national newspapers between 2000 and 2009, and discuss how „feminism‟ has contested meanings in 
this context. I also comment on how the manual critical stylistic approach helps to shed light on these 
questions. Finally, I discuss limitations of the study and suggest possible avenues for future research 
that could build on the methodological and analytical work carried out in the investigation of textual 
meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
Chapter 1 set out the research questions concerning that the study aims to answer and introduced the 
methodological approach to the investigation of textual meanings of 'feminist/s/ism'. The present 
chapter reviews the existing research into portrayals of feminism in the media. It places the present 
study‟s investigation of the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ within the context of previous work, 
and identifies areas in which the present study fills gaps in the literature. 
Section 2.1 discusses the background of the feminist movement and observes debate about, 
and perceived changes in, the meaning of „feminism‟. Section 2.2 reviews the existing research on 
feminism in the media, paying particular attention to three studies of the subject in UK national 
newspapers in the 2000s: Dean (2010), Jaworksa and Krishnamurthy (2012), and Mendes (2011a, 
2012). Section 2.3 summarises the findings of previous studies, providing five frames that act as a 
benchmark for my own analysis. These frames allow me to demonstrate how my own findings 
compare to those of previous studies. Section 2.4 concludes the literature review and discusses how I 
test previous studies‟ findings in the sample analysis in chapter 3 and the full dataset analysis in 
chapters 5-7. 
 
2.1 Feminism and ‘feminism’ 
The discussion below provides a summary of the history of feminism as a movement and the origins 
and meanings of the lexeme „feminism‟, building on the outline drawn in section 1.2. Drawing on 
feminist literature, I discuss the question of whether it is possible to identify a precise definition of 
„feminism‟. I also provide an overview of how the denotative meaning of „feminism‟ has been 
perceived to change over time and the connotative meanings that have been attributed to it. 
 
2.1.1 Origins and history of feminism 
Feminism is most often described as a movement, a belief and/or an outlook concerned with women‟s 
rights and relations between the genders. The movement/belief/outlook account is summarised by 
Kelly (1982), who defines feminism as: 
 
 “A movement […] in opposition to male defamation and mistreatment of women” (p. 67). 
 “A belief that the sexes are culturally, and not just biologically, formed” (p. 67). 
 “An outlook that transcended the accepted value systems of the time by exposing and 
opposing […] prejudice and narrowness” (p. 67). 
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The idea of feminism as a belief and outlook – and therefore something personal and individual – has 
lead writers such as Rowbotham (1972, p. 16) to argue that it is hard to define, and that the origins of 
feminism can be traced back as far as the beginnings of women's rejections of male dominance. 
However, feminism as it is recognised today is generally perceived to have its origins in the „first 
wave‟ movement of the 1800s. Scharff (2011) observes the three periods conventionally recognised 
by the waves metaphor: 
 
 First wave, 1800s – “the fight for women‟s political citizenship” (p. 463). 
 Second wave, 1960s – “the women‟s movement that gained renewed momentum” (p. 463). 
 Third wave, 1990s - “young women‟s critical and diverse engagements with second wave 
feminism” (p. 463). 
 
First wave feminism is most commonly associated with the campaign for suffrage (Mendes, 2012, p. 
556). This campaigning led to women being granted voting rights around the world, and laid the 
groundwork for second wave feminism. The second wave extended the aims of the movement in an 
attempt to secure greater freedoms for women, including “equal rights, pay and sexual and 
reproductive freedom” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 140).   
Walby (2011, p. 55) argues that the second is the most recognisable of the waves, coinciding 
as it did with a burgeoning mass media which reported on feminist demonstrations and broadcast the 
idea of feminism around the western world. Media portrayals during this period – in particular those of 
the feminists who protested at the 1968 Miss America pageant - resulted in what Hinds and Stacey 
(2001) call “the mythical, and most persistent, icon of second-wave feminism: the bra-burner”. At the 
other end of the waves metaphor, third (and subsequent) waves are defined according to the ways in 
which they respond to the aims and beliefs of the second wave by “rejecting the need and use of a 
singular, united feminist movement” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 557). Mendes (2011a, p. 145) suggests that 
it is at this point that the meaning of „feminism‟ becomes contested, with much debate within feminism 
concerning what feminism means and who can call themselves „feminist‟ in the twenty-first century.  
Some scholars question the division of feminism into waves. Feminists including Muriel Fox 
argue that there is no third wave, as the issues associated with the second wave of the 1960s and 
1970s have not been solved (from interview, Mendes, 2011a, p. 132). Conversely, writers such as 
Cochrane (2013) contend that a third wave has come and gone, and that a fourth wave is now 
identifiable in campaigns such as No More Page Three and blogs such as the Everyday Sexism 
Project. Moran (2011) provides one way of dealing with these differing points of view, suggesting that 
it may be preferable to think of feminism as "an incoming tide" (p. 14) rather than a series of individual 
waves. Other writers observe a split between feminism and „post-feminism‟. Genz and Brabon (2009) 
note in their study of post-feminism that this derivational form of causes confusion due to the 
"complex if not contradictory" (p. 3) connotations of the „post‟ prefix. For many, including Faludi (1991, 
33 
 
pp. 14-15), those connotations are purely negative, evoking „anti-feminism‟ and a backlash against 
the goals of feminism. Genz and Brabon (2009, p. 3) recognise that „post-feminism‟ is often used in 
this way in the media, for example in stories about the death of feminism. For others, the connotations 
are less negative: post-feminism is a belief that the aims of feminism have already been achieved, 
rather than a lack of belief in the aims of feminism (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 163). Mendes (2011a) 
recognises that both accounts of post-feminism are found in newspaper coverage of feminism, with 
some uses of 'post-feminism' and 'post-feminist' referring to “those who avidly disavow feminism” (p. 
8) and others to “those who embrace the feminist identity but want to separate themselves from the 
Second Wave” (p. 8). „Post-feminism‟ also has ramifications for how people understand „feminism‟: it 
raises the question of where 'feminism' ends and „post-feminism‟ begins, as well as shifting attention 
away from an understanding of what „feminism‟ itself means (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 79).  
The present study of textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ takes as a benchmark the Oxford 
English Dictionary (2015) definition of „feminism‟ noted in section 1.1. Kelly‟s (1982, p. 67) account of 
the movement, belief and outlook aspects of feminism also provides a helpful means of considering 
how „feminism‟ is used in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. The analysis in chapters 5-7 also reflects on how 
the first, second, third and possible other waves are discussed, and considers the textual meanings of 
„post-feminist/s/ism‟ in the newspaper articles analysed. 
 
2.1.2 Origins and definitions of „feminism‟ 
The word „feminism‟ is relatively new compared to the span of Western political thought that spawned 
the movement (Beasley, 1999, p. xiii). Feminist writers such as Freedman (2007, p. xi) note that while 
„feminism‟ was coined as recently as the nineteenth century, the „woman question‟ and debate about 
women‟s rights has been an important debate in Western culture since the fifteenth century. The 
Oxford English Dictionary (2015) observes the word‟s roots in the French „feminisme‟, which was 
used in the nineteenth century to denote early French suffragists such as Hubertine Auclert 
(Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 51). „Feminism‟ and „feminist‟ first appeared in English in the late 
1800s, the OED (2015) noting its first known appearance in Athaeneum in 1895: “her intellectual 
evolution and her coquettings with the doctrines of „feminism‟ are traced with real humour”. In 
America, „feminism‟ is thought to have first appeared in print in 1906 in an article about the suffragist 
Madeleine Pelletier (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000, p. 51). However, „feminist‟ was not immediately 
used to describe the movement for women‟s rights; „women‟s liberationist‟ was favoured in the 1960s, 
before „feminist‟ and „feminism‟ became popular as a means of referring to all those committed to the 
cause of women‟s rights (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000, p. 51). 
 Definitions of „feminism‟ vary. Moseley and Read (2002) observe that feminism is “never 
available in some pure or unmediated form” (p. 234). Difficulties in defining „feminism‟ go back as far 
as 1913 and writer Rebecca West‟s (1913) famous quote that “I myself have never been able to find 
out precisely what feminism is: I only know that people call me a feminist whenever I express 
sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat” (p. 5). The successes of the second wave of the 
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1960s and 1970s, and the media attention that it received, did not necessarily result in a clearer 
definition: the Encyclopaedia of Feminism, published in 1987, notes that “there are many individual 
definitions of feminism, and its fundamental meaning is in dispute” (Tuttle, 1987, p. 107). However, 
many feminist writers argue that the lack of a clear definition is not a weakness. For example, Mendes 
(2011a, p. 140) suggests that the complexity of „feminism‟ reflects the fact that feminism is an 
ideology with a wide span across time and place, with different priorities in different locations and 
periods. Some feminists make this complexity part of their definitions: Kornegger (2002), for example, 
defines feminism as “a many-headed monster which cannot be destroyed by singular decapitation” (p. 
13), making a virtue out of the non-universal nature of feminism. 
 While there is disagreement about the denotative meaning of „feminism‟, connotative 
meanings are recognised throughout feminist literature. Walters (2005, p. 3) notes that „feminism‟ has 
always had negative connotations, and that the word was strictly pejorative until it was claimed by 
campaigners and came to replace „women‟s liberation‟ in the 1960s and 1970s. This shift, Walters 
(2005) suggests, reflected a greater concentration on “problems specific to women in their 
reproductive and social roles” (p. 3). Walby (2011) argues that the negative connotations of „feminism‟ 
persist, in particular those relating to “separatism, extremism, men-avoiding lesbianism” (p. 3). 
„Feminist‟ is also seen to carry negative connotations: Walters (2005, p. 3) recalls that, during the 
1960s and 1970s, „feminist‟ was often seen as synonymous with pejorative terms for women such as 
„man-hater‟, „harridan‟ and „witch‟, while Baumgardner and Richards (2000, p. 50) argue that many 
still consider it to be as unappealing as other offensive terms for women, such as „cunt‟ and „bitch‟. 
Feminist writers argue that these negative connotative meanings discourage people from using 
„feminist‟ to describe themselves, blaming them for what is called the „I‟m not a feminist, but…‟ 
phenomenon, whereby people (particularly young women) preface sentiments that suggest support 
for women‟s rights with a disclaimer (Walby, 2011, p. 3). Levy (2006) suggests that another aspect of 
the rejection of „feminism‟ is the willing adoption of other words that are associated with the 
movement, but that are deemed to carry less of a stigma. She notes that while „feminism‟ has “fallen 
further and further out of favour” (Levy, 2006, p. 86), words such as „liberation‟ and „empowerment‟ 
have become increasingly popular. Walby (2011, p. 3) goes as far as to suggest that words such as 
„gender equality‟, „equal opportunities‟ and „diversity‟ have come about as a means to label feminist 
ideas without having to use the word, and that the media‟s caricaturing and ridiculing of feminists has 
played a vital role in this shift.  
 
2.2 Feminism in the media 
The present section turns to previous studies of how feminism is portrayed in the media. Section 2.2.1 
looks at the motivations for previous studies, before section 2.2.2 provides an overview of the findings 
of existing research. Section 2.2.3 focuses on three studies that are of particular pertinence to the 
present study due to their focus on a similar genre and time period: Dean (2010), Jaworska and 
Krishnamurthy (2012) and Mendes (2011a, 2012). These three recent studies are notable for the fact 
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that they provide a generally less pessimistic view of the way feminism and feminists are discussed in 
the media than older studies. 
 The discussion in the present section provides the foundation for the five frames provided in 
section 2.3, which provide a benchmark for my own analysis of textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
 
2.2.1 Significance of media portrayals of feminism 
Much research on feminism in the media is motivated by the belief that the way in which it is 
discussed affects readers‟ own views (Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 211). For example, Gill (2007) contends 
that the media is where “most feminism in the West now happens” (p. 40) and is therefore central in 
shaping readers‟ perceptions of it. Many feminist scholars consider this to be a problem, believing that 
feminism is portrayed negatively by those who write in the media, and that journalists are in turn 
responsible for „feminism‟ having become “a dirty word” (Douglas, 1994, p. 165). Surveys of people‟s 
responses to feminism have found some evidence for these claims. For example, Buschman and 
Lenart‟s (1996) survey of 544 college students aged between 18-22 years old finds that only 17% 
consider themselves to be feminists. Further, they observe that even those who are supportive of 
feminism have negative perceptions of it based on “stereotyping of the movement in popular 
discourse” (Buschman & Lenart, 1996, p. 72). Callaghan et al.‟s (1999, p. 172) study of 4,000 Scottish 
men and women also finds that respondents, regardless of whether or not they are sympathetic to 
feminism, perceive the movement and its advocates in a negative light, labelling them „unreasonable‟, 
„ugly‟ and „aggressive‟. This leads the researchers to argue that negative media portrayals of 
feminism in the media are “the major reason for the reluctance of young women to identify with 
feminism” (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 172).  
Studies of people‟s identification with feminism such as Buschman and Lenart (1996), 
Callaghan et al. (1999) and Zucker (2004) take as read what the latter calls “the overwhelmingly 
negative portrayal of feminism and feminists by the popular media” (p. 425). Faludi (1991) suggests 
that this treatment of feminism leads to “an endless feedback loop that perpetuates and exaggerates 
its own false image of womanhood” (p. 9), while Redfern and Aune (2010) note that media stories 
tend to focus on young women‟s lack of feminism, meaning that “the more we hear the „fact‟ that 
people aren‟t feminists, the more it seems a self-fulfilling prophecy” (p. 3). However, as Jaworska and 
Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 403) note, although many studies hold allegedly negative media portrayals of 
feminism responsible for people‟s distaste for feminism, there has been little attempt to answer the 
question of whether portrayals are as negative as is assumed.  
Sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 review studies that have sought to answer the question of whether 
media portrayals of feminism are indeed negative. I also use this discussion to argue for the 
importance of the present study‟s approach of using a critical stylistic analysis to investigate how the 
textual meanings of the lexemes „feminism‟, „feminist‟ and „feminist(s)‟ themselves are constructed in 
media texts. 
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2.2.2 Studies of media portrayals of feminism 
Much existing work on feminism in the media takes the form of general surveys (for example 
Callaghan et al., 1999; Rhode, 1995) and cultural analysis (e.g. Chaudhuri, 2000; Hinds & Stacey, 
2001; Schaffer, 1998). Other studies (including Danner & Walsh, 1999; Lind & Salo, 2002) employ 
content analysis - a means of analysing texts for “meanings, symbolic qualities, and content” 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 486). A small number of studies employ techniques drawn from corpus linguistics 
and critical discourse analysis: Lind and Salo (2002) use “co-word analysis” (p. 216) to look at words 
that occur frequently alongside search terms including „feminism‟ and „feminists‟ in a corpus of US 
radio and television news reports, and Marling (2010) uses a corpus of data from the Estonian 
newspaper Postimees to look at the “lexical framing” and “collocational and contextual position” (p. 
12) of „feminism‟.  
Mendes (2012) notes that the majority of research finds that feminism “has been 
misrepresented, distorted or constructed as „deviant‟” (p. 556). For example, Callaghan et al. (1999) 
argue that even relatively positive portrayals from the late twentieth century depict feminism as 
“tangential to the lives of contemporary women and […] mired in bitterness, silliness and anti-male 
dogma” (p. 163). Accounts of feminism in the early twenty-first century such as Redfern and Aune 
(2010) contend that negativity is a part of newspaper coverage of feminism regardless of a 
publication‟s political orientation: left-wing journalists complain about young women‟s lack of 
feminism, while those with a right-wing perspective “complain that „feminism has gone too far‟” (p. 1). 
This tendency has been noted not just in Anglo-American studies, but also in studies of newspapers 
in nations including Estonia, where Marling (2010) observes that even positive references to the 
movement “get drowned out in the general off-hand dismissal of the philosophy and practice of 
feminism” (p. 15). 
 Much writing on feminism in the media contends that feminism is portrayed as though it were 
no longer relevant. McRobbie (2009) refers to this as “an undoing or dismantling of feminism” (p. 8) 
that portrays feminism as something that is no longer necessary. This focus on feminism‟s alleged 
redundancy is identified in overviews such as Rhode (1995), which observes that since the 1970s the 
media has portrayed feminism as “dead, dying, or permanently disabled” (p. 691). Scholars including 
Christie (1998, p. 213) suggest that the recurrence of „feminism is dead‟ stories reflects the media‟s 
natural tendency to favour stories about events – for example, the supposed end of a movement – 
over stories about ideas and political debate. Rhode (1995) expands on this, arguing that the media‟s 
appetite for “dramatic events, startling sound bites, and „good visuals‟” (p. 692) leads them to focus on 
feminists who are relatively extreme in their political views. The argument here is that the media 
portrays feminism as either conclusively dead or as having already achieved emancipation, and 
therefore become irrelevant (Christie, 1998, p. 213); those who still align themselves with the 
movement are considered “radical, unbalanced, unattractive and inimical to family values” (Callaghan 
et al., 1999, p. 164). In some cases, Mendes (2011b) suggests, famous feminists themselves are 
brought in to legitimise „feminism is dead‟ stories, with articles using them to “reinforce the 
movement‟s downfall” (p. 492). 
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 Previous studies suggest that feminists‟ „extremity‟ is in part communicated through the 
consistent use of terms such as „radical‟ and „militant‟. These words are deemed to be inherently 
negative when used to describe the movement and its advocates. For example, Danner and Walsh‟s 
(1999) study of newspaper reports on the UN‟s 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women observes 
that attendees referred to as „radical feminists‟ are portrayed as “unfeminine, irrelevant, undignified 
and trivial” (p. 72), while Marling (2010) argues that the frequent collocation of „feminism‟ with „radical‟ 
in her corpus is evidence of a “semi-compulsory link between feminism and aggression” (p. 13). The 
present study aims to avoid the kind of assumptions about positive/negative connotations of 
adjectives such as „radical‟ and „militant‟ made by studies such as Danner and Walsh (1999), which 
bases its argument that feminists are presented as “unfeminine, irrelevant, undignified and trivial” (p. 
72) on the fact that conference attendees tended to be referred to as „radical feminists‟. They provide 
little evidence for this „general‟ characterisation and do not make clear whether it is the result of 
frequent use of the adjective „radical‟, other linguistic features of the texts, or the researchers‟ own 
interpretation of the texts‟ portrayals of feminists. Similarly, although Marling (2010) backs up her 
argument concerning a link between feminism and aggression with the evidence that „militant 
feminism‟ is “the most frequent collocation in the corpus” (p. 12), she does not provide either statistics 
or textual analysis to demonstrate that this collocation is necessarily negative. Instead, there is an 
assumption that „militant feminism‟ is one of a number of phrases associated with feminism “that carry 
a strongly negative connotation” (Marling, 2010, p. 12). The analysis of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the present 
study avoids these interpretative leaps by providing a thorough analysis of the textual meaning of 
occurrences, rather than simply categorising examples of, for instance, „radical feminist‟ as inherently 
negative (for example, see the discussion of „radical feminism‟ in section 5.4.2.3). 
Previous studies also highlight articles‟ differentiation of feminists from „real‟ women (Schaffer, 
1998, p. 321). Some researchers (for example Hinds & Stacey, 2002; Scharff, 2011; Taylor, 2003) 
observe that this is achieved through the portrayal of feminism and femininity as “mutually exclusive” 
(Scharff, 2011, p. 460), although it has also been suggested that more recent coverage discusses a 
“potential compatibility between the previously polarised categories of feminism and femininity” (Hinds 
& Stacey, 2001, p. 153). Other studies such as Rhode (1995) note that reporters construct the 
feminists/real women distinction in their coverage of protests, in which they provide the most radical 
quotes from feminists and contrast them with the views of “„regular‟ women on the street” (p. 701). 
Lind and Salo (2002) provide the strongest evidence of this distinction in their finding that feminists 
are more likely than women to appear in “agency frames” (p. 221) that reflect “an active individual 
having strength, capability, a voice, leadership, power” (p. 221). Lind and Salo‟s (2002) comparison of 
„women‟ and „feminists‟ provides evidence that feminists are portrayed as doing different things to 
„regular‟ women, a portrayal that believe is not entirely negative: those described as „feminists‟ have 
“more agency and are less victimised” (p. 225) than ordinary „women‟. However, similar to Danner 
and Walsh (1999) and Marling (2010), Lind and Salo‟s (2002) means of reaching conclusions as to 
whether portrayals are positive or negative is based on an impressionistic methodology: their findings 
- such as the observation that “feminist references appear within an agency frame proportionally more 
often than do references to women” (p. 221) - are based on the pairing of words such as „activist‟ and 
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„leader‟ with „feminist(s)‟ and „feminism‟, but there is little explanation of what constitutes „agency‟ and 
why this is the case, or of whether the textual context in which the word pairs appear reveals anything 
more specific about the presentation of feminists or anything that might contradict the patterns that 
are suggested by the word pairs alone. Nonetheless, Lind and Salo‟s (2002) observations are backed 
up by other studies. For example, North (2009) suggests that the media tends to concentrate on 
individuals rather than the movement itself, with a particular focus on “a small group of „superstar‟ 
media spokeswomen” (p. 743), a phenomenon that Baumgardner and Richards (2000, p. 55) suggest 
implies that the pronouncements of a small number of figures are taken as representative of all 
feminists. The present study tests these observations through critical stylistic analysis of who „feminist‟ 
and „feminists‟ represent in context. As well as looking at the kinds of words with which „feminist/s/ism‟ 
commonly occur, the analysis of, for example, the kinds of events, actions and states that feminists 
are represented as being involved in tests the argument that „feminists‟ denotes agency. 
 Other studies recognise changes in the way in which feminists are portrayed in the media. 
The distinctions they find between, for example, “the monstrous outsiders of the 1960s and 1970s” 
(Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 155) and more recent types of feminist are pertinent to the present study, 
as the twenty-first century vantage point of the data provides evidence of different types of feminism 
and feminist from different periods of time. Schaffer (1998) suggests that the absence of any evidence 
of bra-burning in the 1990s led to a new portrayal of 1990s feminists as a “vindictive, puritanical and 
punishing new generation of „feminazis‟” (p. 322) who were distinct from the „bra-burners‟ of the 
second wave. Hinds and Stacey (2001), in their cultural analysis of 400 UK national newspaper 
articles from 1968 to 2001, also note a move away from radical feminists, although they suggest that 
the 1990s brought portrayals of “the incorporated Ms” (p. 155) who represents a “reconciliation 
between feminism and femininity” (p. 169). The present study‟s analysis of the way different types of 
„feminist‟ and „feminists‟ are named and described tests these observations of apparent divisions in 
the reference of „feminist(s)‟. In particular, analysis of ways in which the nouns „feminist‟ and 
„feminists‟ are modified provides a more through account of types of feminist than studies such as 
Hinds and Stacey (2001), in which the analysis is based on “a rather uneven selection [of newspaper 
articles] that came to the attention of the research assistant” (p. 156) and which focuses on “three 
iconic figures, constituted in different ways through a set of discursive moves” (p. 156). While these 
“discursive moves” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 156) may relate to some of the features of language 
analysed in the present study, the investigation here provides a detailed analysis of textual meaning 
in a representative dataset, rather than basing its findings on sections of texts selected and 
interpreted according to preconceptions about cultural figures. 
 The studies discussed here use different approaches to focus on various parts of the media. 
However, they are helpful to the present study in that they suggest possible areas of interest in the 
data. The remainder of section 2.2 provides an account of three recent studies that focus on the same 
genre and time period as the present study, and that are less pessimistic in their conclusions 
concerning portrayals of feminism and feminists. Section 2.3 then draws on the totality of the studies 
reviewed in the present chapter in order to produce five frames that reflect common patterns found in 
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previous studies, and which provide a benchmark for the analysis of textual meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism‟. 
 
2.2.3 Studies of UK national newspapers in the 2000s 
Dean (2010), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) and Mendes (2011a, 2012) all investigate feminism 
in UK national newspapers in the 2000s. Each uses a different methodological approach to look at 
newspaper data, and each investigates whether the findings of previous studies are reflected in texts 
from the 2000s. In sections 2.2.3.1 to 2.2.3.3 I look at the approach and findings of each in turn. 
 
2.2.3.1 ‘Domestication’ in The Guardian and The Times 
Dean‟s (2010) study is motivated by the lack of previous research into “the role of print media in post-
feminist discourse” (p. 394), i.e. discussion of feminism in newspapers after the second wave of the 
1960s and 1970s. The study is a discourse analysis that tests Dean‟s (2010) conviction that media 
portrayals of feminism are not wholly positive or negative, but instead mixed, and that „feminism‟ in 
this context consists of different types. In particular, he focuses on evidence of a process of 
„domestication‟, whereby articles support a politically moderate contemporary feminism at the same 
time as dismissing an excessively political feminism synonymous with the past (Dean, 2010, p. 393). 
Dean‟s (2010) study is restricted to “the British quality press” (p. 391), specifically The 
Guardian and The Times. These newspapers are selected for their differing political perspectives, The 
Guardian aligning with the left-wing and The Times with the right-wing (Dean, 2010, p. 35). This limits 
the scope of the study, and the fact that the dataset comprises 49 Guardian articles and only 19 
Times articles means that it does not provide a balanced comparison of the two newspapers. Further, 
Dean (2010) selects his data by searching for „feminism‟ in each newspaper‟s online search engine 
and then choosing articles which “have as their main referent an issue directly relevant to feminism 
and/or gender relations, and which explicitly refer to feminism at least once” (p. 395) (Dean‟s 
emphasis). It is not specified what constitutes a „main referent‟, leaving the impression that pertinent 
data may have been excluded. Although the present study does not make comparisons between 
newspapers, the data used provides a more balanced reflection of discussion of feminism across the 
range of UK national newspapers, based on a more objective approach to the selection of articles 
(see the discussion of data collection in chapter 4). 
Dean (2010) provides a “comparative analysis” (p. 395) of The Guardian and The Times, 
identifying “specific issues or themes” (p. 396) in each. For example, he finds that although Guardian 
articles often support the aims of feminism, they often begin with “the invocation of a popular 
repudiation of feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 396) which the writer proceeds to argue against, while Times 
articles discuss feminism as though it existed mainly in the 1970s (p. 399). Some of Dean‟s (2010) 
claims – such as his observation that, in The Times, feminism “hovers uncertainly around the fringes 
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of the articles, usually without being addressed head on” (p. 399) – are difficult to test, and the data is 
a means of demonstrating the presence of domestication, rather than the basis for a detailed 
investigation of what „feminism‟ means in the two newspapers.  
Dean‟s (2010) focus on domestication provides evidence of “an uneasy oscillation between a 
bold affirmation of feminism, on the one hand, and a disavowal of some of its (perceived) less 
palatable dimensions” (p. 397). This oscillation can be seen, for example, in the way that different 
types of feminism are discussed through what Dean (2010) terms “binary oppositions” (p. 402), which 
contrast reasonable types of feminism with more radical types. Dean (2010) suggests not only that 
feminists are contrasted with other women (as observed by the studies discussed in section 2.2.2), 
but that contrasts are drawn between different feminists. These arguments are pertinent to the 
present study in that they observe how feminism and feminists are linguistically constructed in the 
data: through qualifiers that denote different types of feminism, and through contrasts that emphasise 
differences between them. The present study‟s emphasis on the textually constructed meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ allows me to shed more light on these observations, with the emphasis on analysing 
the meanings of particular occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ rather than on determining which articles 
affirm feminism and which repudiate it. 
 
2.2.3.2 A corpus study of ‘feminism’ in UK newspapers 
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) study investigates the search term „feminism‟ in corpora of UK 
and German national newspapers from 1990-2009. Their study is motivated by a lack of previous 
linguistic research on feminism in the media (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 402), and uses a 
corpus linguistic methodology to investigate collocates of „feminism‟, i.e. those words that occur 
statistically most often in the company of the search term. By looking at collocation profiles of 
„feminism‟, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) investigate whether newspaper portrayals of 
feminism are as negative as previous studies claim them to be (p. 403). 
 Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) study is the most rigorous of the three 2000s studies in 
terms of how the data is collected. Their UK newspaper corpus consists of articles from each of the 
national UK newspapers during the period 2000-2009, providing a thorough overview of the genre 
and period under investigation. However, similar to Dean (2010), Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) 
only include articles in which feminism is “the primary topic” (p. 406), i.e. articles in which it appears in 
the headline or opening paragraph. Although their criteria for selecting articles is more clearly defined 
than Dean‟s (2010), it still invites the question of what data may have been excluded – especially 
considering that the study uses computer-based, rather than manual, analysis to analyse its data. The 
use of manual analysis in the present study means that the quantity of data is necessarily limited in 
comparison to that of Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012). However, the data collection process 
includes those articles in which the search terms occur statistically most frequently, rather than 
making distinctions based on at which points in articles „feminist/s/ism‟ occurs. This approach ensures 
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that articles in which „feminist/s/ism‟ occurs frequently, but not necessarily in the headline and/or 
opening paragraph, are included. 
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) analysis uses computer software to produce a list of 
collocates before focusing on several frequent lexico-grammatical patterns – „of feminism‟, „feminism 
is‟ and „feminism and‟ (p. 415) – and the adjectives that occur most frequently alongside „feminism‟. 
This analysis leads the researchers to observe the presence of five frames used in portrayals of 
feminism: 
 
 “Feminism is strongly historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). 
 “Feminism is often negatively framed as a movement that did not achieve much” (p. 417). 
 “There is a tendency to see feminism as a commodity” (p. 417). 
 Feminism has “a number of collocates associated with sexuality, particularly with 
homosexuality” (p. 417). 
 “Feminism is firmly located in Western countries” (p. 417). 
 
These frames are impressionistic, as they are largely based on the frequent occurrences of certain 
collocates. For example, the claim for the second of the five frames is based on “the frequent 
occurrence of words such as dead, failure and post-” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417): while 
the evidence of these collocates alone might suggest that feminism “is finished” (p. 417), a more 
detailed qualitative analysis of the collocates in context would allow the researchers to make more 
confident claims concerning the veracity of these frames. The annotation and analysis stages of the 
present study (chapters 4 and 5-7) provide a more detailed account of the textual context of each 
occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟, and demonstrate that findings based on statistics alone can be 
misleading. For example, the analysis of „feminism‟ (chapter 5) shows that although „dead‟ does 
indeed occur frequently in the context of „feminism‟, this is often negated in propositions such as 
„feminism is not dead‟ (see section 5.2.3).  
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) frames provide evidence of recurrent themes in the 
way „feminism‟ is used in newspapers. Their observations of the ways in which „feminism‟ is modified 
by adjectives – for example, to present differences between „new feminism‟ and „old feminism‟ (p. 
421) – and used in lexico-grammatical patterns such as „feminist is‟ propositions provides statistical 
evidence for some of the claims made in previous studies (see section 2.2.2). Of particular note are 
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) observations about references to „new feminism‟: they note that 
while the adjectives „changing‟ and „new‟ frequently premodify „feminism‟, such instances are often 
surrounded by scare quotes, indicating that the idea of a new feminism is “treated ironically, or its 
existence [...] questioned” (p. 416). This leads the researchers to conclude that regardless of what 
time period newspapers discuss, “the discourse prosody of the search term feminism tends to be 
rather negative” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). The present study expands on Jaworska 
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and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) observations concerning media portrayals of feminism by using a wider 
range of means of qualitative analysis to look at the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟.  
 
2.2.3.3 A content- and critical discourse analysis of UK newspapers 
Mendes‟ study of feminism in UK national newspapers consists of a book-length analysis (2011a) of 
UK and American newspapers between 1968 to 1982 and in 2008, and an article (2012) discussing 
differences in portrayals of feminism in each period. Her work on newspaper articles in the 2000s is 
motivated by a lack research into post-feminism and the third wave (Mendes, 2012, p. 556), and aims 
to “interrogate what is quietly assumed to be true” (2011a, p. 3), i.e. that representations of feminism 
in the media are generally negative.  
Mendes (2012) selects newspapers that cover a “range in ideology” (p. 558), from the 
relatively right-wing Daily Mail and Times to the relatively left-wing Guardian and Daily Mirror. Like 
Dean (2010), Mendes (2011a, 2012) makes assumptions about different newspapers‟ ideologies and 
analyses only a small selection of the newspapers available, placing limits on the reliability of her 
findings. The methodological approach draws on content analysis, which is used to “explore broad 
patterns of coverage”, and critical discourse analysis, which detects “embedded ideologies” (2011b, p. 
486). Mendes (2011b) describes how CDA analyses “the relationship between language, social 
practice, ideology and power” (2011b, p. 486), but provides no clear linguistic methodology: the 
analysis involves “taking an overall look at the article, assessing which ideologies were prioritised, 
whom the discourse served, what it revealed about the society in which it was produced, and how it 
helped/hindered the movement and its goals” (2012, p. 559). 
Mendes (2012) notes changing trends in the way feminism is portrayed during the two time 
periods. She observes an emphasis on „newness‟ in 2008, noticeable in a “shift in feminism‟s „enemy‟” 
(p. 561): whereas older stories draw an opposition between radical and non-radical feminists, newer 
stories contrast second wave feminists with third wave feminists. Mendes (2012) observes that the 
second wave is “derided as „retro‟ or „old-school‟” (p. 561), while the third wave is described using 
terms such as „modern‟, „fun‟ and „sexy‟ (p. 561). Further, she finds evidence of a “„lifestyling‟ of 
feminism” (2011a, p. 560): while the 2008 data demonstrates that coverage still discusses political 
matters and women‟s rights, it also focuses on “„softer‟ issues such as fashion, leisure and popular 
culture” (p. 560). These findings hint at the focus on “the new, choice and girlpower” (Taylor, 2003, p. 
182) identified in previous studies (for example Farrell, 1995; Rhode, 1995; Taylor, 2003) and are 
investigated more thoroughly in the present study through the analysis of textual-conceptual functions 
(chapters 5-7). For example, analysis of the way in which different feminists are named and described 
provides evidence of the division of „feminism‟ into old and new varieties, while analysis of contrasting 
and the representation of actions, events and states shows how differences between these varieties 
are emphasised. 
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Mendes (2011b, p. 284) concludes her analyses of data from the 2000s by observing that 
there were more positive portrayals than found by previous studies. However, she also notes her 
concern that even when articles portray feminism positively, their support is often “launched from a 
defensive position, for example, arguing how feminism had not harmed society, or was still needed” 
(2011a, p. 10). This tendency has also been noted by Marling (2010), who finds that even pro-
feminism articles refer to it “in negative grammatical constructions, for example, denying the narrowly 
feminist intent of gender equality policies” (p. 15). The present study‟s analysis of the meaning of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ finds evidence to support these claims, in particular through the analysis of instances 
where the lexemes „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ themselves are explicitly discussed. 
 
2.3 Frames in media portrayals of feminism 
The present investigation builds on the previous studies discussed in section 2.2 by analysing a 
dataset of occurrences of „feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and „feminist‟ using the textual-conceptual functions 
introduced in section 1.4. To test the convictions of previous research, I use a set of five frames 
similar to those identified by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 417). These frames are based on 
common patterns that previous studies have identified in how feminism is portrayed in the media, and 
provide a benchmark for the analysis in chapters 5-7. The five frames are: 
 
1. Positive/negative portrayals. 
2. Geographical and temporal placement. 
3. Universality/complexity. 
4. Changes and oppositions. 
5. Complexity of portrayals. 
 
The „Positive/negative portrayals‟ frame reflects differences in previous studies‟ conclusions 
concerning how feminism is portrayed. There is a consensus among the studies discussed in section 
2.2.2 that newspapers portray feminism in a negative light, but two of the more recent studies 
discussed in section 2.2.3 - Dean (2010) and Mendes (2011a, 2012) - contend that portrayals are in 
fact more mixed. In particular, my own analysis addresses several patterns of negativity found in 
previous studies: the notion that feminism is dead or irrelevant (Callaghan et al., 1999; Christie, 1998; 
Rhode, 1995), the association of feminism with political extremity and stereotypes such as a lack of 
femininity and homosexuality (Callaghan et al., 1999; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012), people‟s (particularly young women‟s) rejection of feminism (Redfern & Aune, 
2010; Walby, 2011), and the use of quotes from feminists themselves to dismiss feminism (Mendes, 
2011b, p. 492). 
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 The „Geographical and temporal placement‟ frame is based on previous studies‟ findings 
concerning where and when feminism is portrayed as existing. In terms of geography, research 
suggests that feminism is portrayed as a largely western phenomenon (Baumgardner & Richards, 
2001; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012), while temporally it is located firmly in the past – in particular 
around the time of the second wave of the 1960s and 1970s (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 
2012). On the other hand, recent research suggests that there is also a renewed emphasis on more 
contemporary forms of „new feminism‟ (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 
2011a, 2012), albeit that this concept is often treated with a degree of scepticism by writers (Jaworska 
& Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 416). 
 The „Universality/complexity‟ frame recognises two differing opinions in the existing literature: 
that feminism is portrayed as a single, universal movement (Callaghan et al., 1999; Douglas, 1994), 
or that it is portrayed as complex, consisting of different varieties (Dean, 2010; Mendes, 2011a, 2012). 
Studies that argue that feminism is portrayed as in some way universal argue that feminism is 
perceived as “monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274) and that a small number of well-known feminists 
are taken as representative of the whole movement (Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 79). On the 
other hand, studies that argue that feminism is portrayed as complex point to the fact that the 
movement is described as dividing into different types (Dean, 2010) and that it is defined according to 
what it is not rather than what it is (Marling, 2010), with coverage suggesting uncertainty about what 
feminism means and who can be a feminist (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132). 
 The „Changes and oppositions‟ frame stems from previous studies‟ observations of how 
newspapers portray shifts in what constitutes feminism over time, and oppositions not only between 
feminism and other bodies (for example between feminists and other women), but also within 
feminism itself. In particular, studies note a move from the second wave to the third wave, and from 
feminism to post-feminism (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a). 
Oppositions are drawn between feminists aligned to these different varieties of feminism, as well as 
between more and less politically-inclined feminists in general (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012). Oppositions are also noted between feminists and other 
people, including non-feminist women (Lind & Salo, 2002; Rhode, 1995; Taylor, 2003). 
 The final frame, „Complexity of portrayals‟, draws on the findings of the studies of 2000s 
newspapers discussed in section 2.2.3. While these studies contend that media portrayals of 
feminism are not as negative as previous studies have suggested, they also observe that support for 
particular types of feminism is connected to a dismissal of other types (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012), that positive portrayals of feminism tend to come from a 
“defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10), and that articles are often presented as an argument 
with a hypothetical, less supportive individual (Dean, 2010, p. 397), with an emphasis on the 
repudiation of popular negative perceptions of feminism rather than the putting forward of more 
positive ideas about it. 
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2.4 Summary 
This literature review has provided an account of the denotative and connotative meanings attributed 
to „feminism‟ in feminist literature, demonstrating that the lexemes under investigation are considered 
to have contested meanings. The overview of previous studies of feminism in the media in section 2.2 
demonstrates that most research finds that feminism is portrayed in a negative light, and that much 
existing research considers this to be a cause of people‟s lack of understanding of, and support for, 
feminism (Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Callaghan et al., 1999; Lind & Salo, 2002). However, as section 
2.2.3 demonstrates, several 2000s-based studies have contended that not all media portrayals of 
feminism are necessarily negative (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 
2012) and that there is evidence of some support for feminism in UK national newspapers in the 
2000s. 
 The five frames listed in section 2.3 reflect the findings of previous studies, and provide a 
benchmark for the findings of the present study. Looking at, for example, the way the meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ are constructed through the textual-conceptual function of contrasting allows me to 
explore in greater depth the argument that newspapers tend to portray feminists in opposition to other 
women (Lind & Salo, 2002; Rhode, 1995; Taylor, 2002). In chapter 3, I provide a full account of the 
textual-conceptual functions used in the present study and a sample analysis, which demonstrates 
how the functions interact to construct textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ and how the meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ in a specific newspaper article relate to the frames outlined in section 2.3. 
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Chapter 3: The textual-conceptual functions and a sample 
analysis 
This chapter provides a more detailed explanation of the critical stylistic textual-conceptual functions 
introduced in chapter 1, and a critical stylistic analysis demonstrating how they work to construct 
textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in a sample article. Section 3.1 discusses each of the ten 
functions that I use in the annotation and analysis of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data (chapters 4 and 5-7) and 
provides examples of how each helps to uncover textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. Section 3.2 
provides an in-depth analysis of how the textual-conceptual functions constructions construct the 
meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in one of the 240 articles represented in the „feminist/s/ism‟ dataset, 
highlighting instances where the functions interact. This introduction serves as a foundation for the 
discussion of the annotation of the textual-conceptual functions in chapter 4. 
 
3.1 The textual-conceptual functions 
This section outlines each of the ten textual-conceptual functions identified by Jeffries (2010a). For 
each of the functions, I provide a model of the different ways in which it can be realised linguistically, 
and discuss how it functions in texts to play a role in the textual construction of meaning.  
 
3.1.1 Naming and describing 
Naming and describing (naming hereafter) looks at the ways in which language allows a text producer 
to describe a referent (Jeffries, 2010a, pp. 17-18). Jeffries (2007) suggests that names used to make 
reference are “one of the potentially most influential choices any writer makes” (p. 63), with the choice 
that a text producer makes between, for example, „protestor‟ and „rioter‟ telling the reader something 
about their attitude toward a referent (Beaton-Thome, 2013, p. 381). Reisigl and Wodak (2001) refer 
to noun choices as “referential strategies” (pp. 44-46), arguing that they influence readers‟ 
perceptions of those referred to. 
Jeffries (2010a, p. 19) recognises the capacity of the noun phrase to contain additional 
information about a referent beyond the choice of head noun. Text producers are able to „package up‟ 
opinions and assumptions about a referent in pre- and postmodification of a head noun, presenting 
assumptions about and opinions of the referent as inherent to the referent, and making them difficult 
to argue with (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 19). For example, a writer may describe how „the radical feminists 
demonstrated‟, thereby packaging up the referents‟ radical quality and placing the focus of the clause 
on the verbal element - the fact of their having demonstrated (adjectival transformations are 
discussed in section 3.1.6 below). This aspect of naming – where certain qualities are assumed to be 
true – is related to the idea of the existential presupposition, in which the referent of a definite noun 
phrase is presupposed to exist (see the discussion of assuming in section 3.1.7 below). Naming, 
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however, looks at the contents of all noun phrases, whether definite – for example „the radical 
feminist‟ - or indefinite, e.g. „a radical feminist‟. 
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the different ways in which texts name and describe 
referents, with examples from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data: 
 
Linguistic 
realisation 
Examples 
Noun choice Woman / feminist / bra-burner 
Noun phrase 
modification 
Odd, demented, man-hating feminists (Telegraph 01c) 
Feminists all over the world (Independent 08b) 
The seventies bra-burning feminists who fought for women's right to be equal 
(Express 05a) 
Feminists, these so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females 
(Express 03a) 
Nominalisation The practical application of feminism (Telegraph 01c) 
(Adapted from Jeffries, 2010a, p. 20) 
Table 3.1: Linguistic realisations of naming 
 
Most obviously, adjectives that premodify a noun – for example “Odd, demented, man-hating 
feminists” (Telegraph 01c) – package up assumptions about qualities that the referent has, such as 
being “odd”, “demented” and “man-hating”. Postmodification via prepositional phrases (“feminists in 
this country” (Mirror 02b)) and relative clauses (“feminists who want men to be like women” 
(Independent 00a)) allow for recursion via the embedding of prepositional phrases and relative 
clauses, and apposition - where two adjacent noun phrases are presented as equivalent (Biber et al., 
1999, p. 638) – provides two descriptions of a single referent, for example “feminists, these so-called 
24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females” (Express 03a). Other means of premodification allow 
for further detail to be provided through enumerators and quantifiers („many‟, „two‟, „first‟) and 
determiners („a‟, „the‟, „his‟).  
A further linguistic realisation of naming used in critical linguistic studies (for example Fowler 
et al., 1979; Kuo & Nakamura, 2005; van Dijk, 1991) is nominalisation, which focuses on “the 
transformation of a process (an action) into a noun (a name, or nominal)” (Richardson, 2007, p. 241), 
as in “the practical application of feminism” (Telegraph 01c). Nominalisations omit tense and often do 
not indicate an agent or patient (Fairclough, 2001, p. 103): this process of reification means that 
“processes and qualities assume the status of things” (Fowler, 1991, p. 80) (Fowler‟s emphasis). By 
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referring to “the defeat of „first-wave‟ feminism” (Independent 06b) rather than asserting that „“first-
wave” feminism was defeated‟, a text producer presents what might be contentious and arguable as 
definite and tangible. 
The different realisations of naming are important in the construction of textual meaning, 
whether through the choice of a particular head noun that has specific connotations – for example 
„fugitive‟ or „leaker‟ to refer to a whistle-blower (Branum and Charteris-Black, 2015, p. 14) – or the use 
of particular adjectives embedded within a noun phrase, e.g. the use of noun phrases such as „the 
new terrorism‟ to help journalists categorise a recent crime as terrorist (Evans & Schuller, 2015). In 
the present study, the analysis of naming allows me to investigate the way writers pick out particular 
types of feminism and feminist – e.g. new and old, political and non-political (see section 5.4.2) – and 
what people and things are attributed the quality of being feminist through the packaging up of 
adjectival „feminist‟ into references to them (see chapter 7). 
  
3.1.2 Representing actions/events/states 
Representing actions/events/states focuses on the verbal element of the clause, in which the choice 
of verb affects how readers and hearers see the information provided (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 37). The 
present study uses Halliday‟s (2004) model of transitivity to analyse how „feminist/s/ism‟ is 
represented in actions, events and states. Transitivity looks at how the “goings-on” (Halliday, 2004, p. 
101) of reality are expressed in the clause, and demonstrates how “speakers encode in language 
their mental picture of reality” (Simpson, 1993, p. 88). This mental picture is labelled the „process‟, 
and consists of up to three components: the process (expressed by the verb phrase), the participants 
involved (expressed by noun phrases), and the circumstances of the process (expressed by adverbial 
and prepositional phrases). These components are found in examples of material action processes, in 
which something is done or something happens (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 40): 
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Material process Participant roles Example 
Intention (MAI) Actor, process, goal Feminists (actor) burnt (process) their bras (goal) to 
challenge restrictive ideas (circumstance) (Times 08c) 
Supervention 
(MAS) 
Actor, process The radical feminist Andrea Dworkin (actor) died (process) 
(Times 06c) 
Event (MAE) Actor, process The feminist pendulum (actor) has swung (process) (Sun 
02c) 
Intention (MAI) Actor, process, 
goal, recipient 
They (actor) gave (process) feminism (recipient) a kick up 
the backside (goal) (Sun 06c) 
 
Table 3.2: Material action transitivity process types 
 
The material action intention process involves a process, participants and circumstances, with the 
process enacted wittingly by the actor, while the supervention process depicts a process that simply 
happened rather than being consciously enacted. Lack of intention is even more pronounced in the 
event process, in which the actor is inanimate. A further possible participant is the recipient, fulfilled 
by “feminism”, which receives “a kick up the backside” (Sun 06c). 
Verbalisation processes (V) involve actions enacted through language (Halliday, 2004, p. 
171), and are realised by verbs of speech and written communication: 
 
Participant roles Example 
Sayer, process, 
verbiage 
“Dworkin pretends to be a daring truth-teller” (verbiage), wrote (process) the 
feminist (sayer) (Mail 05a) 
Sayer, process, 
verbiage, target 
She (sayer) once described (process) fellow feminist Gloria Steinem (target) as 
“a female chauvinist boar” (verbiage) (Mail 00b) 
Sayer, process, 
verbiage, receiver 
Leon (sayer) bizarrely tells (process) feminist Laurie (receiver): “feminism 
doesn‟t exist” (verbiage) (Mirror 09c) 
 
Table 3.3: Verbalisation transitivity process types 
 
50 
 
Up to five different roles can be fulfilled in verbalisation processes: sayer (similar to the actor in a 
material action process), process (a verb of speech or writing), verbiage (a report of what was said), 
target (the source of praise, blame, etc.) and receiver (the person to whom the verbiage is directed).  
Mental processes describe processes of sensing, and are therefore more “internalised” 
(Simpson, 1993, p. 91): 
 
Mental process Example 
Perception (MP) Feminists (senser) saw (process) toplessness (phenomenon) as a struggle for 
women to do what they liked (Sun 09a) 
Reaction (MR) Feminists (senser) don‟t like (process) men (phenomenon) (Guardian 07a) 
Cognition (MC) Feminists (senser) imagined (process) how technology could soon free women 
(phenomenon) (Times 01b) 
 
Table 3.4: Mental transitivity process types 
 
Mental processes involve the roles of senser (similar to actor/sayer), process and phenomenon (the 
person or thing being perceived, reacted to or thought about). 
Relational processes differ from the other process types in that they describe states, rather 
than actions or events: 
 
Relational process Example 
Intensive (RI) Feminism (carrier) is a force for good (attribute) (Express 09a) 
Possessive (RP) Feminism (carrier) clearly has an image problem (attribute) (Independent 09c) 
Circumstantial (RC) Feminism (carrier) was at a crossroads (attribute) (Times 04b) 
 
Table 3.5: Relational transitivity process types 
 
Relational intensive processes express a relationship of equivalence between one thing and another, 
relational possessive processes a relationship of possession between a possessor and possessed, 
and relational circumstantial processes a relationship between a carrier and a circumstance such as 
location. Similar to relational processes are existential processes (E), which feature „there‟ in subject 
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position, followed by the copula verb and a complement, for example “there are different types of 
feminism” (Independent 06a). 
 The analysis of representing actions/events/states enables the researcher to look at how 
textual meaning is created through depictions of how referents interact with the world. For example, 
Mulderrig (2003) analyses New Labour education policy documents, finding that material action 
processes present the government as active (actors), while pupils are merely beneficiaries (goals and 
recipients). The predominance of particular types of process can also result in the impression of much 
or little activity, static descriptions of scenes, etc. (Jeffries, 2014, p. 413). In the present study, the 
statistical overviews of processes involving „feminist/s/ism‟ allows me to identify interesting patterns in 
the data, for example the fact that „feminist‟ tends to be represented in relational processes (see 
section 6.1). This in turn allows me to explore patterns in the data including definitions of „feminism‟ 
(see section 5.2.1), while analysis of the kinds of actions in which „feminist(s)‟ plays an active role 
allows me to question previous studies‟ claims about the kinds of things that feminists are portrayed 
as doing (for example the analysis of material action processes in which „radical feminists‟ is the actor 
in section 6.3.3.1).  
 
3.1.3 Negating 
Negating looks at a textual practice which involves the presentation of “non-existent versions of the 
world” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 106). Prototypically, negating attaches itself to the verb in a clause, 
presenting the reader with a picture of what is not the case, for example in “feminism is not an 
exclusive club” (Guardian 01c).  Much of negating‟s potential for creating meaning relies on the 
“cognitive processing” (Nahajec, 2009, p. 125) through which a reader determines why they are being 
told about something that is not the case, rather than something that is the case. For example, a 
reader may infer that a writer is telling them what feminism is not rather than what it is in order to 
imply something about what people other than the writer think about feminism (section 3.1.7 below 
discusses the relationship between negating to implying). 
 There are a variety of forms of negating, all of which “put into the mind of the reader a 
different world where that situation is reality” (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 111). Nahajec (2012) represents the 
first concerted attempt to draw up a typology of negating, outlined below: 
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Syntactic Morphological Semantic Pragmatic 
Not 
No 
None 
Nothing 
No-one 
Nobody 
Nowhere 
Never 
Neither… nor 
Un- 
In- (il-, im-, ig-, ir-) 
Non- 
Dis- 
De- 
A- (an-) 
Ex-  
-less 
-free 
 
Peripheral forms 
Anti- 
Contra- 
Counter- 
Quasi- 
Semi- 
Pseudo 
Absent 
Lack 
Avoid 
Omit 
Fail 
Forget 
Refuse 
 
Almost 
Nearly 
 
Peripheral forms 
Barely 
Hardly 
Scarcely 
Few 
Little 
Conditional constructions 
If you had x, then y 
 
Modals 
You should have 
I wish you had 
 
Grammaticalised metaphors 
Out of 
Ruled out 
Left out 
Beyond me 
Short of 
Apart from 
 
Expletive forms 
Fuck all 
Diddly squat 
Bugger all 
Jack shit 
 
Structural forms 
Too x to y 
(Adapted from Nahajec, 2012, p. 129) 
Table 3.6: Typology of negating 
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The various syntactic forms of negating reverse the polarity of a clause, for example in “nobody cares 
about „feminism‟ now” (Mail 03a), “feminism never meant the degradation of women” and “neither 
Stoller nor Henzel takes a second-wave feminist approach” (Guardian 05a). Negating can also be 
built into a word‟s morphology, usually in the form of a prefix. Different prefixes demonstrate the range 
of meaning that is possible through negating: for example, „anti-feminist‟ suggests opposition to the 
idea of feminism, while „non-feminist‟ suggests a lack of feminism. 
Semantic and pragmatic forms of negating are harder to identify, as they are not based on a 
finite range of forms. Semantic forms present the idea of absence or lack of action (Jeffries, 2010a, 
pp. 108-109), for example in “feminism fails to bring a fairer deal for women” (Mail 02b), which can be 
understood as negative in a similar way to semantic forms by rephrasing using syntactic forms, for 
example as „feminism does not bring a fairer deal for women‟. Like semantic forms, pragmatic forms 
do not feature overt markers, but can also be understood on analogy with prototypical negators 
(Nahajec, 2012, p. 161): a commonly observed form of pragmatic negating is the past tense 
conditional „if… then‟ structure, which implies that the situation being described did not happen 
(Nahajec, 2012, p. 161) („if… then‟ structures are discussed further in relation to hypothesising in 
section 4.3.8 below), while expletive negators such as „fuck all‟ and „jack shit‟ have become 
“grammaticalised” (p. 161) to the point where they function as negators. The „feminist/s/ism‟ data does 
contain examples of pragmatic negating such as “if you had a feminist world, [then] you wouldn‟t have 
a hierarchical world” (Times 07c). However, due to the small number of such examples, and the 
difficulty of pinning down exactly what forms should be included or excluded, I have not included 
pragmatic forms of negating in the study. 
 
What is common to all forms of negating is that they have the effect of presenting the idea of 
a lack. They also all put into the reader‟s mind “both the negated and the positive proposition” 
(Jeffries, 2014, p. 416). Studies such as Hidalgo Downing (2002) investigate how texts such as 
poems use this function of negating to create an “alternativity […] understood in terms of the 
departure from expected patterns of experience” (p. 131). The analysis of negating in the present 
study allows me to account for how writers create alternative ideas about the meaning of „feminism‟, 
for example by denying the idea of it as a movement that no longer exists (see, for example, the 
discussion of the „feminism is not dead‟ structure in section 5.2.2.2). The analysis of negating is also 
crucial in allowing me to look at the kinds of things that the articles deem cannot be described by the 
word „feminist‟, for example the ideas and beliefs described by the negated derivational form „anti-
feminist‟ (see section 7.4.3). 
 
3.1.4 Contrasting 
Equating and contrasting looks at how texts present different entities as either equivalent to each 
other or opposed to each other (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 51). Equating is realised through the apposition of 
noun phrases and through relational processes. Because I look at these linguistic forms as part of the 
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annotation of naming (see section 3.1.1 above) and of representing actions/events/states (section 
3.1.2), I concentrate here on contrasting, which is realised through syntactic frames of opposition. 
The linguistic study of opposition has its roots in lexical semantic work on relations of 
antonymy between “words that could be intuitively recognised as opposites” (Jones, 2002, p. 1). 
Studies such as Jones (2002) recognise that antonyms commonly occur in particular syntactic frames 
– for example „either X or Y‟ - which emphasise a relationship of opposition between two elements. 
The use of antonyms in these frames – for example „either left or right‟, „between love and hate‟ – 
solidifies our perception of them as opposites. The use of conventional antonyms such as left/right 
and love/hate in syntactic frames may be of little ideological interest, but Davies (2012) notes that 
syntactic structures that usually house conventional opposites such as bad/good can create new 
opposites “that rely on the context of their production and consumption for their oppositional status” 
(pp. 41-42). A number of studies have outlined typologies of syntactic frames in which opposites can 
occur (Davies, 2008; Jeffries, 2010a, 2010b; Jones, 2002; Mettinger, 1994). The present study uses 
Davies‟s (2012) typology: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
Type Syntactic frames Example Function 
Negated 
opposition 
X not Y; Not X, Y Ladettism is simply a 
stereotype of adolescent 
vulgarity, not a product of 
feminism (Mail 04b) 
One element is 
emphasised over the 
other  
Transitional 
opposition 
X turns into Y; X 
becomes Y 
Women‟s liberation 
became feminism 
(Guardian 00a) 
One element becomes 
the other 
Comparative 
opposition 
More X than Y; X is 
more A than Y 
The scramble of actors to 
[...] seemed to smack more 
of a celebrity bandwagon 
than a feminist movement 
(Guardian 04a) 
One element is measured 
against the other 
Replacive 
opposition 
X rather than Y; X 
instead of Y; X in 
place of Y 
I am an egalitarian rather 
than a feminist 
(Independent 01b) 
One element is preferred 
to the other 
Concessive 
opposition 
X but Y; despite X, Y; 
while X, Y; Although 
X, Y; X, yet Y 
Feminism has succeeded, 
partly. But so has 
individualism (Mirror 03a) 
One element is presented 
as surprising in light of 
the other 
Explicit 
opposition 
X contrasted with Y; 
X opposed to Y; The 
difference between X 
and Y; X against Y 
Our brand of feminism is 
different from what has 
gone before (Independent 
09c) 
The oppositeness of two 
elements is explicitly 
stated 
Parallelism He likes X, she likes 
Y; Your house is X, 
mine is Y 
The apparent decline of 
feminism and the rise of 
the sexualised society are 
connected (Times 09c) 
Repetition of a linguistic 
structure emphasises the 
oppositeness of two 
elements 
Binarised 
opposition 
Either X or Y Strong independent 
female role model, or 
34DD feminist caricature 
for blokes? (Independent 
01a) 
Presents a choice 
between two elements 
(Adapted from Davies, 2012, pp. 49-51) 
Table 3.7: Typology of syntactic frames of opposition 
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 What is common to the different syntactic frames of opposition is that they construct new 
opposites, which in context are treated as akin to antonyms. This makes contrasting of particular 
interest to the study of a particular lexeme or set of lexemes, as looking at their appearance in 
constructed oppositions provides a fuller picture of the meanings with which they are imbued: in the 
annotation and analysis of „feminist/s/ism‟, apposition and relational intensive processes 
demonstrates what is presented as equivalent to the lexemes, while oppositional structures 
demonstrate what is presented as contrasting with them. 
Davies (2012) notes that news texts “regularly use constructed binaries as part of their 
rhetorical armoury” (p. 70). This is demonstrated by his investigation of newspapers‟ portrayals of 
trade unions, which construct oppositions between extremists and „regular‟ members of the public in 
order to portray unions in a negative light (Davies, 2008). As noted in section 2.2, previous studies of 
feminism in the media (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworka & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a) 
have found similar binaries in news coverage of feminism. The present study analyses contrasting in 
order to look at how binaries are constructed linguistically, and also to investigate the types of things 
and people with which feminism and feminists are presented as contrasting. These include contrasts 
between old and new feminisms which not only present feminism as something complex which 
divides into different types, but also demonstrate how writers express their preference for one certain 
types over others (see, for example, the analysis of „old feminism‟ and „new feminism‟ in section 
5.4.2.2). 
 
3.1.5 Exemplifying and enumerating 
Exemplifying and enumerating concerns the two means of presenting lists in English. Exemplification 
is evident where items are used to provide examples of a category, and where no claim is made for 
comprehensiveness. Examples of exemplifying consist of a list of similar linguistic items (such as 
noun phrases), and their status as examples is made explicit by a phrase such as „for example‟, as in 
“Many of Showalter‟s candidates for places in the „feminist intellectual heritage‟ would be selected by 
all: Mary Wollstonecraft, Charlotte Perkins Gilman […] and Simone de Beauvoir, for example” (Times 
01a). Enumerating involves thorough, itemised lists, which are presented as though they are 
comprehensive (Jeffries, 2014, p. 414), for example in “the Church is intent on aligning itself against 
gays, feminists and North London Lefties” (Independent 07c). What is notable about this example of 
enumeration is that it does not make an explicit claim to be complete; rather, the lack of an 
exemplifying phrase such as „for instance‟ simply gives the impression of comprehensiveness. 
 Our tendency to view lists of three or more items such as “gays, feminists and North London 
lefties” as in some sense complete has been recognised by scholars such as Beard (2000), who 
notes that the three-part list “is embedded in certain cultures as giving a sense of unity and 
completeness” (p. 38). Jeffries (2007) notes that three-part lists are common in women‟s magazines, 
with their use providing a sense of “reassuring” (p. 125) completeness even though the three items 
may simply reiterate a single point, or have been plucked at random. In the present study, 
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exemplifying and enumerating are of interest for the way they “create categories and category 
members” (Jeffries, 2007, p. 120) of which „feminist/s/ism‟ is a member. As Jeffries (2007, p. 120) 
notes, the way in which lists – whether they serve an exemplifying or enumerating function – draw a 
connection between members of a list (for example, types of people against home the Church is 
aligned) has a similar effect to the sense of equation achieved through relational intensive processes 
and apposition. This is of particular interest in the investigation of other adjectives with which „feminist‟ 
frequently occurs in lists, for example in the use of lists to help construct the idea of  things and 
people that are either „new/young/modern‟ and „feminist‟ or „early/old/original‟ and „feminist‟ (see 
section 7.5). 
 
3.1.6 Prioritising 
Prioritising takes into account how the structure of a clause serves to foreground some information 
while backgrounding other information (Jeffries, 2014, p. 415). Jeffries (2010a, p. 87) notes that there 
is a range of ways in which information can be prioritised in English sentences, each of which has the 
effect of making some parts of a sentence more prominent than others. Jeffries (2010a, p. 80) 
focuses on three ways in which elements may be prioritised in English: through the arrangement of 
information structure, transformations in clause structure, and subordination. The present study bases 
its annotation and analysis of prioritising on these three forms of prioritising. 
 Analysis of the information structure of a sentence involves looking at a sentence and 
distinguishing which is the last compulsory element, which carries the focus of a sentence. For 
example, in the sentence “feminism was at a crossroads” (Times 04b), the adverbial is the last 
compulsory element, carrying the focus; if fronting is used to rearrange the sentence to produce “at a 
crossroads was feminism”, then “feminism” becomes the focus of the clause. The focus of the 
information structure can also be changed through clefting, whereby a certain element is placed in the 
focal position through an „it is…‟ or „it was… structure, placing the focus on the clausal complement, 
for example in “it is feminism which loses its power” (Guardian 02a). 
 Transformations in English relate to the underlying structure of a sentence. This underlying 
structure can be changed in a number of ways that change the focus of a sentence. Jeffries (2010a, 
pp. 84-85) observes two particular transformations that are of interest to the present study. Adjectival 
transformations, which involve the placing of an adjective within a noun phrase, are one of the 
aspects of naming discussed in section 3.1.1 above: the transformation from predicative to attributive 
position allows a text producer to place the focus on other parts of the clause, for example in the shift 
from “Feminists are angry [and] don‟t like men” (Guardian 07a) to „Angry feminists don‟t like men‟. 
Passive transformations involve a shift from an active to a passive sentence structure, which makes 
the subject of a sentence disposable (Jeffries, 2010, p. 84), for example in the change from “feminists 
have driven women into a corner” (Times 03a) to „women have been driven into a corner by 
feminists‟. 
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 The third means of changing the focus in an English sentence is subordination. This concerns 
the way in which something that is at a higher syntactic level receives a greater degree of focus than 
those at a lower level. As Jeffries (2010, p. 86) notes, placing something at a lower level makes it less 
open to questioning, as with the clause concerning feminism in “I was fascinated by that period 
because it was a society where feminism and lesbianism were starting to emerge” (Sun 03b). In this 
example, the clause in which “feminism and lesbianism” is the subject comes at a low level of the 
clause structure: there is a main clause (“I was fascinated by that period”) with an optional adverbial 
clause (“because it was a society”) in which the complement is postmodified by a relative clause with 
“feminism and lesbianism” as the subject. 
 The present study looks at how prioritising is used to assume certain information about 
„feminist/s/ism‟. There are overlaps with the textual-conceptual functions of naming and assuming and 
implying. For example, the analysis of „feminist‟ looks at how prioritising is used to assume the 
feminism of particular speakers through postmodifying relative clauses: in examples such as “Katha 
Pollitt – who is the author of several books on feminism […] – welcomes the book” (Independent 01c), 
the fact of an individual‟s feminism is assumed, and places the significance of what they say in a 
certain light (if someone who writes about feminism says this, then the welcome must be significant) 
(see section 5.4.1). 
 
3.1.7 Implying and assuming 
Implying and assuming relates to the pragmatic notion of implying and the semantic notion of 
presupposition, respectively. Both implicature and presupposition are means of communicating 
meaning beyond that which is explicitly stated in a proposition. Presupposition has a range of 
recognisable triggers, while the inference of an implied meaning depends on the reader or hearer‟s 
realisation that a speaker or hearer has communicated an „additional‟ meaning by saying something 
that, on the surface, appears to be in some way uncooperative. 
 Presuppositions divide into existential presuppositions, which arise from definite noun 
phrases, and logical presuppositions, which arise from an open-ended range of triggers. The former 
arise from noun phrases such as “the result of the triumph of cultural feminism in academe” 
(Independent 00b), where the existence of the referent is presupposed by the use of the definite 
determiner (Jeffries, 2014, p. 415). Existential presuppositions can be seen as a particularly powerful 
type of naming: not only do they package up assumptions about a referent (see discussion in section 
3.1.1 above), but they also assume its existence. Levinson (1983) provides a list of triggers of logical 
presuppositions, which involve “aspects of surface structure” (p. 179) that give rise to assumed 
meanings. The annotation of presupposition in the present study takes into account five of these, 
recognised in Jeffries‟ (2010a, pp. 94-98) overview of assuming. Table 3.8 describes these triggers 
using examples from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data: 
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Proposition Trigger Assumed meaning 
I [..] started getting into feminism 
(Guardian 07a) 
Change of state 
verb 
The writer was not into feminism before 
I […] realise that the apparent 
decline of feminism and the rise of 
the sexualised society are connected 
(Times 09c) 
Factive verb The apparent decline of feminism and 
the rise of the sexualised society are 
connected 
It is feminism […] that is being 
blamed (Times 09a) 
Cleft sentence That blame is being apportioned 
Don‟t start singing a requiem for 
feminism quite yet (Mail 03a) 
Iterative word Feminism has been claimed before 
The feminist writer […] was as 
ambitious as any bright twenty-
something (Times 03c) 
Comparative 
structure 
Any bright twenty-something was 
ambitious 
 
Table 3.8: Typology of presupposition triggers 
 
Implying is based on Grice‟s (1975) pragmatic concept of implicature, whereby an implied 
meaning arises when one or more of the maxims of quality (say what you believe to be true), quantity 
(make your contribution as informative as is required), relation (be relevant) or manner (be clear) is 
flouted, i.e. broken in a way that it is assumed the reader/hearer will understand. These maxims form 
the cooperative principle, which assumes that, ordinarily, a speaker or writer will abide by the principle 
to “Make your conversational contribution such as is required at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1975, pp. 41-58). Because 
we assume that people ordinarily abide by this principle, we are able to interpret flouts of the maxims 
as somehow abiding by the principle, and therefore infer an implied meaning. Table 3.9 provides 
examples of each kind of implicature from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data: 
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Proposition Maxim 
flouted 
Implied meaning 
Feminists […] are all man-hating, 
humourless warthogs (Mail 03b) 
Quality Feminists are not warthogs, but must be 
similar to them in some respect 
I‟m just not sure what feminism means 
now (Mail 06b) 
Quantity The writer is sure about what feminism meant 
previously 
As a feminist with many good friends, I 
resent Ms Lessing saying: “Feminists 
enjoy hating men” (Express 01a) 
Relation The writer‟s status as a feminist with friends 
disproves Lessing‟s perception of feminists 
Feminism is not dead (Guardian 07c) Quantity/ 
relation/ 
manner 
Feminism is alive (quantity, relation), and this 
is a surprising fact (manner) 
 
Table 3.9: Flouts of the Gricean maxims 
 
These examples provide evidence that implicature is more pragmatic than semantics – implicatures 
do not arise from particular words or structures, but from an interaction of language, context and our 
expectations of cooperation (Grice, 1975). “Feminism isn‟t dead” (Mail 02a) also demonstrates the 
difficulties of ascertaining which maxim is being flouted: a negated proposition can be considered a 
flout of quantity and manner (explaining what is not the case is less informative than explaining what 
is the case, and is more vague and obscure) (Leech, 1983, p. 101) or relation, as no “positive 
information” (Nahajec, 2009, p. 113) is added to the discourse. 
 Implying and assuming are crucial to a full understanding of textual meaning as they allow the 
analyst to account for meanings that are communicated implicitly, as well as explicitly. Assumed and 
implied meanings are relatively „hidden‟ (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 102), and so their analysis is important for 
a full account of how a text is likely to affect a reader‟s understanding of what is being discussed. For 
example, Coffey (2013) analyses the use of presuppositions and implicatures in women‟s magazines, 
and finds that implicatures are used to emphasise “the idea of male dominance in relationships” (p. 
207). The analysis of assuming and implying in the present study allows me to explore, for example, 
how articles construct „feminism‟ as something malleable that can undergo changes in meaning (see 
section 5.2.4) and how writers not only explicitly define certain types of feminism, but in doing so 
produce implied meanings about the existence and nature of other feminisms (section 5.3). 
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3.1.8 Hypothesising 
Hypothesising is based on modality, “the degree of commitment with which a speaker vouches for a 
proposition” (Fowler, 1986, p. 57). Modality can be realised through a variety of linguistic forms, 
including auxiliary verbs (“you think feminism is a dirty, outmoded word” (Mail 09b)), auxiliary modal 
verbs (“feminists might have been too idealistic about female solidarity” (Times 00c)), adverbs 
(“Bindel‟s brand of feminism is definitely woman-biased” (Independent 07a), adjectives (“I'm just not 
sure what feminism means now” (Mail 06b)) and conditional structures (“if that's feminism in the Year 
2000 [then] I, for one, am going to forget it” (Sun 00b)). Each form demonstrates the text producer‟s 
level of belief in the proposition expressed (Fowler, 1991, p. 64). Note that propositions containing no 
modality are also possible, as in the categorical assertion “the French feminists are very feminine” 
(Times 02a). 
 The different modal forms contribute to four modal systems, recognised by Simpson (1993, p. 
47). Epistemic modality signals the degree to which a text producer considers a proposition to be true, 
for example in “this might be the core battle in modern feminism” (Guardian 05a), with perception 
modality as a subcategory in which modal forms relate to human perception (Simpson, 1993, p. 50), 
e.g. “feminism clearly has an image problem” (Independent 09c). The deontic and boulomaic systems 
reflect the desirability of a proposition being true, the former reflecting degree of commitment – for 
example “a new version of feminism should offer a lot more than history lessons” (Times 08b) – and 
the latter wishes and desires, e.g. “feminists may have feared that a focus on motherhood risked 
driving women back into full-time domesticity” (Independent 01a). 
 Hypothesising is an important aspect of the construction of textual meaning as it enables the 
reader or hearer to access the text producer‟s views of what is being discussed. For example, 
Fairclough (1989, p. 129) observes how newspaper articles tend to present information as categorical 
assertions, without modality, presenting what may be conjecture as though it were fact. Jeffries (2007) 
also reflects on this tendency for writers to express a high degree of certainty, for example in women‟s 
magazines‟ use of strongly certain epistemic modality to discuss matters to do with personal health. In 
the present study, the analysis of hypothesising highlights instances where writers express their 
beliefs about the meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟, whether it is their uncertainty about the lexemes‟ 
meanings or their views on how „feminism‟ ought to be understood (see, for example, the discussion 
of epistemic modality in relation to old and new varieties of feminism in section 5.4.2.2). 
 
3.1.9 Presenting others‟ speech, thought and writing 
The analysis of presenting others‟ speech, thought and writing look at how text producers quote 
others. There is necessarily a question of faithfulness when representing others‟ speech and 
thoughts. For example, written speech presentation cannot capture intonation, and we can never 
have direct access to others‟ thoughts (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 130). Text producers can also be 
manipulative when deciding how directly quotes of speech and thought should be presented. 
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Short (2007, p. 225) recognises the categories of speech presentation below, from least to 
most direct. Note that the examples are all based on one example from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data: this 
is an example of direct speech, which represents the „norm‟ for speech presentation as it is the 
closest to an accurate representation of what was said and who said it (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 134) The 
examples of free indirect speech and free direct speech each include a contextualising sentence (in 
brackets), as they are difficult to illustrate out of context: 
 
 Narrator‟s presentation of voice (NV) – „A feminist spoke‟. 
 Narrator‟s representation of a speech act (NRSA) – „A feminist interjected‟. 
 Indirect speech (IS) – „A feminist asked if they should be talking about that‟. 
 Free indirect speech (FIS) – „(A feminist was worried.) Should they be talking about that?‟. 
 Direct speech (DS) – “„Should we be talking about this?‟ interjects a fellow feminist” 
(Independent 03b). 
 Free direct speech (FDS) – „(A feminist was worried.) Should we be talking about this?‟ 
 
Short (2007, p. 227) observes that there are equivalent categories for the presentation of writing, with 
verbs that denote writing – for example „wrote‟, „record‟, „put down‟ – taking the place of verbs that 
denote speech. In the annotation and analysis of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data, I look at the presentation of 
others‟ writing in addition to that of speech and thought as laid out in Jeffries (2010a, pp. 130-145). 
Because thought presentation is at best approximate, the less direct types of thought 
presentation are considered the most faithful, as they the inevitable distance between the text 
producer and the thinker. Indirect thought presentation is considered the „norm‟, as it represents the 
narrator‟s attempt to represent what was thought, without making a strong claim for faithfulness of 
language (Jeffries, 2010a, pp. 134-135). Note that examples of narrator‟s representation of thought 
and narrator‟s representation of a thought act can look unusual, as thought is not usually reported in 
this way. As with the examples of speech presentation, contextualising sentences are included to help 
illustrate the free forms: 
 
 Narrator‟s presentation of thought (NRT) – „Feminists thought hard‟. 
 Narrator‟s representation of a thought act (NRTA) – „Feminists believed‟. 
 Indirect thought (IT) – “Feminists believed that men and women were the same” (Mail 02a).  
 Free indirect thought (FIT) – „(Feminists had many opinions about gender relations.) Men and 
women were the same‟. 
  „Feminists had views on the similarity of men and women‟. 
 Direct thought (DT) – „Feminists believed “Men and women are the same”‟. 
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 Free direct thought (FDT) – „(Feminists had many opinions about gender relations.) Men and 
women are the same‟. 
 
Previous critical stylistic studies have used models of presenting others‟ speech, thought and 
writing to look at how words and thoughts are attributed to people, and the potential for portraying 
sayers, writers or thinkers in ideological ways. For example, Tabbert (2015, p. 102) looks at news 
reports of criminal cases, and how the presentation of authoritative parties‟ speech is used to 
construct offenders. Previous studies of feminism in the media, while not using a linguistic approach 
to speech presentation, have found that the way in which individuals are quoted helps to present 
feminism and feminists in a certain light, whether through the use of quotes from „extreme‟ feminists 
that serve to put a distance between „normal‟ people and feminists (Rhode, 1995, p. 701) or the use 
of pessimistic quotes from renowned feminists in order to reinforce a negative view of feminism 
(Mendes, 2011b, p. 492). In the present study, analysis of the presentation of speech, thought and 
writing helps to show how particular understandings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are attributed to particular 
groups (for example in the discussion of the „I am not a feminist, but‟ phenomenon in section 6.2.3.1) 
and how the meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are used to present particular views on gender politics and 
related matters in a particular light (see section 6.2.4.1). 
 
3.1.10 Representing time, space and society 
Representing time, space and society is based on deixis, which involves those words whose 
reference depends on the context in which they are used. These include words for place (“Feminism 
here is dead” (Mail 03a), “it‟s time for those feminists to step aside” (Times 08a)), time (“we need 
feminism now” (Guardian 01a), “She has missed the point about feminism today” (Independent 08a)), 
person (“we don‟t need feminists” (Express 03a), “I don‟t believe in feminism” (Telegraph 08c)) and 
social relations (“So long Ms Steinem, hello Mrs Realist” (Times 00b)). Many deictic words are either 
proximal or distal, allowing the text producer to construct the idea of things that are close – for 
example “my feminism” (Guardian 04a), “these feminists” (Telegraph 00c) - or far away, e.g. “their 
feminism” (Mail 08c), “those feminists” (Times 02a). Tense is also deictic in nature, with the tensed 
verb in a sentence demonstrating whether something is being presented as proximal or distal, for 
example in “feminism is alive” (Guardian 06a) and “feminism was a mistake” (Telegraph 06c). 
 The choices that a text producer makes in respect to different deictic words are important as 
they not only place the speaker or writer themselves in a particular position, but also potentially the 
hearer or reader. Generally, we expect that a text producer occupies what is called the „deictic centre‟ 
of a text, with the deictic choices they make reflecting this positioning: a text producer is likely, for 
example, to use „I‟ to refer to themselves and „that‟ (rather than „this‟) to refer to something far away. 
As readers and hearers, we are capable of deictic projection, placing ourselves in the position of the 
text producer as we hear or read a text (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 149). Deictic projection leads us, for 
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example, to feel close to people that a text producer refers to as „these feminists‟, or distant from a 
belief referred to as „their feminism‟. The present study uses the analysis of representations of time, 
space and society to look, for instance, at how articles construct different, personal varieties of 
feminism (see section 5.3) and place certain types of feminist and feminism in the present or past 
(see, for example, the analysis of tense in relation to „radical feminists‟ in section 6.3.3.1). 
 
3.2 A sample analysis – ‘Is Feminism Dead?’ 
Section 3.1 outlines the textual-conceptual functions used in the investigation, and provides 
indications of how they are used to analyse the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. The present 
section provides a sample analysis of one of the newspaper articles from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. 
This analysis provides a more detailed picture of how the textual-conceptual functions are involved in 
the construction of textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. In particular, the analysis shows how different 
textual-conceptual functions can interact to create specific meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ and how a 
critical stylistic analysis can demonstrate that the meanings of a set of lexemes are contested in a 
particular text. The analysis also reflects on instances where there is evidence for or against the 
frames relating to how feminism is portrayed in the media discussed in section 2.3. 
 The sample text is called „Is Feminism Dead?‟, and was published in the Daily Mail in 2003 
(the full text is reproduced in the appendices, appendix 1). I selected this article in part because of its 
format: rather than providing a news story relating to feminism or a single writer‟s views on the 
subject, the article consists of ten different writers‟ responses to the question posed in the headline. 
This format, in which different writers or women are asked for their opinions on feminism, is used in a 
number of articles in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. In itself, it is evidence of the fact that feminism is 
contested in the data, and therefore is a suitable choice for a sample analysis of the different textual 
meanings attributed to „feminist/s/ism‟. In „Is Feminism Dead?‟, each writer is introduced with a short 
description of their credentials – for example, “Ann Leslie, the Daily Mail‟s award-winning chief foreign 
correspondent, is married with a daughter” – accompanied with a summary of their response to the 
question of whether or not feminism is dead, headed with either „Yes‟ or „No‟. The „Yes‟s and „No‟s are 
evenly split, with journalists Ann Leslie and Lynda Lee-Potter, gap year student Anna Stothard, writer 
Chrissy Iley and magazine editor Marcelle D‟Argy Smith arguing that feminism is dead, while 
journalists Jenni Murray, Bel Mooney and Samantha Norman, author Kathy Lette and magazine editor 
Cristina Odone argue that feminism is not dead. 
In the introduction to her analysis of articles from the Daily Mail, Mendes (2012) suggests that 
the newspaper‟s “conservative” and “populist” (p. 558) nature is likely to result in negative portrayals 
of feminism. However, the fact that „Is Feminism Dead?‟ gives equal space to contrasting views 
suggests that this is an example of a newspaper article that is not straightforwardly negative or 
positive about feminism. Rather, the format and the differing views that are presented provide 
evidence for another of Mendes‟ (2011a) observations about how feminism is discussed in 
newspapers: that it is often “contradictory [...] within the same newspaper or article itself” (p. 9). The 
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use of an analysis using the textual-conceptual functions also demonstrates that the way the „Yes, 
feminism is dead‟ and „No, feminism is not dead‟ writers portray feminism is more subtle and complex 
than the simple „Yes‟/„No‟ headings might suggest. 
The analysis here, like that of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data in chapters 5-7, uses the textual-
conceptual functions of naming and representing actions/events/states to provide entry points. The 
full range of textual-conceptual functions is then used to fully analyse individual occurrences of 
„feminist/s/ism‟. I also use the sample analysis to explain the idea of „metalanguage‟ (Meyer, 2002, p. 
3) and the means by which I distinguish different types of naming that apply to occurrences of 
„feminist/s/ism‟: unmodified occurrences, occurrences with minimal modification, and occurrences with 
detailed modification. I first of all analyse occurrences of metalanguage (section 3.2.1), which are 
particularly pertinent to the study of the textual meaning of the lexemes under investigation, before 
looking at occurrences pertaining to the different types of naming (sections 3.2.2 to 3.2.5). 
 
3.2.1 „Feminist/s/ism‟ as metalanguage 
An overview of how „feminist/s/ism‟ is named in the article highlights occurrences of metalanguage. 
These are occurrences where a writer discusses “the linguistic expression, and not the thing it refers 
to” (Meyer, 2002, p. 3). Examples of metalanguage are of particular relevance to this study, as they 
are instances where writers explicitly discuss, and contest the lexemes themselves. Some examples 
of metalanguage can be found through the analysis of the textual-conceptual function of naming, i.e. 
those where „feminist/s/ism‟ occurs alongside an appositive noun phrase such as „the term‟ or „the 
word‟, for example in “The word „feminist‟ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution; now, I‟m 
afraid, the very word makes most of us yawn” (Leslie – „Yes‟). In this instance, Leslie uses 
metalanguage to discuss the connotative meanings of „feminist‟: through a relational possessive 
process, she represents a state in which “The word „feminist‟” had the quality of having “the exciting 
smack of revolution”. The representation of a particular time is also pertinent here, with Leslie 
presenting this (positive) state as having only existed in the past through the use of the past tense 
and the distal deictic marker of time “those days”. This distancing is further emphasised by the 
following subordinate clause, starting with “now”. Here, the textual-conceptual function of contrasting 
is used to construct an opposition between the positive, past connotations of „feminist‟ and 
contemporary, negative reactions to it: the proximal deictic marker of time “now” acts as an opposition 
trigger, and – in combination with the use of the present tense – contrasts „feminist‟‟s past and 
present, less exciting connotations. Whereas the old meaning of „feminist‟ is represented in a state in 
which it is attributed a positive quality, the modern meaning is represented in an action, as the actor in 
a material action process of making people yawn. Leslie‟s use of proximal person deixis – the first 
person plural in “most of us” also has a powerful effect, presenting this proposition as one that applies 
to the majority of readers. 
 Occurrences of metalanguage are also identifiable through the use of scare quotes. This type 
of metalanguage in „Is Feminism Dead?‟ also presents „feminist/s/ism‟ as something to be wary of, or 
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as something that is vague and unclear. The undesirability of „feminism‟ is made most starkly clear by 
D‟Argy Smith („Yes‟), who opens her argument with the observation that “Of course nobody cares 
about „feminism‟ now”. In this instance, it could be argued that the scare quotes indicate D‟Argy 
Smith‟s scepticism about the existence of feminism - a feature of newspaper articles previously 
observed by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) – rather than being an instance of a reference to the 
lexeme itself. Here, the interaction of the textual-conceptual functions of representing 
actions/events/states and negating presents „feminism‟ in a particular (negative) light: „feminism‟ is the 
phenomenon in a mental reaction process of caring, and the negation of the sensor – “nobody” –
portrays „feminism‟ as something that people, without exception, have a negative reaction to. The 
textual-conceptual function of representing time plays a similar role to that which it plays in the Leslie 
example above: the negative observations being made about „feminist/s/ism‟ are located in the 
present through the deictic time expression “now”, limiting the scope of the proposition to the present 
day. Further, the use of “now” creates an implied meaning: because D‟Argy Smith only provides 
information about people‟s reactions to „feminism‟ in the present day, there is a flout of the maxim of 
quantity (Grice, 1975) that implies that people‟s opinions of feminism may have been more favourable 
in the past. 
The other instance of metalanguage among the „Yes‟ responses comes in Leslie‟s response. 
Her argument opens with a famous quote from early 20
th
 century writer Rebecca West, who observed 
that “people call me a „feminist‟ whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat 
or a prostitute” (see discussion in section 2.1.2). This quote – from 1913 - demonstrates that the 
perception that the meaning of „feminist‟ is vague is not new. Again, analysis of the textual-conceptual 
function of representing actions/events/states is informative: West is the target of a verbalisation 
process, in which „feminist‟ itself is the verbiage. It is the adverbial clause detailing the circumstances 
in which this process of calling occurs that is crucial to the textual meaning of „feminist‟: West does 
not provide a definition of „feminist‟, and so the reader is left to infer something about the word‟s 
meaning from the fact that it used to note a difference between a woman and a doormat or prostitute. 
As with the Leslie and D‟Argy Amith examples, the textual-conceptual function plays a part in creating 
additional meaning: the vagueness of West‟s account of what „feminist‟ means flouts the maxim of 
manner (Grice, 1975), resulting in the implicature that „feminist‟ simply denotes someone who has 
their own thoughts and a sense of independence. Leslie uses the West quote to underline the fact 
that „feminist‟ no longer has this meaning: “But that was in 1913 and she wasn‟t even allowed to vote”. 
Here, a combination of the textual-conceptual functions of contrasting and implying produces another 
argument for the irrelevance of „feminist/s/ism‟ today: “But” triggers a concessive opposition, with the 
following clause subverting the expectations set up by the first (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745), and the 
contents of this second clause flout the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) – „feminist‟ had a meaning 
when women like West suffered greater oppression, but the comparative lack of oppression today 
means that „feminist‟ no longer has any meaning. 
The final occurrence of metalanguage in „Is Feminism Dead?‟ is from Lette‟s „No‟ response. 
Lette critiques the derivational form „post-feminist‟, with the textual-conceptual functions of contrasting 
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and implying again interacting to present a cynical impression of the meaning of a particular form of 
„feminist/s/ism‟. After detailing statistics that show that women do more housework than men, Lette 
argues that “any woman who calls herself a „post-feminist‟ has kept her Wonderbra and burnt her 
brains”. Central to the textual meaning of „post-feminist‟ here is the contrast that is drawn between 
“Wonderbra” and “brains”: that these should be considered opposites in this context is clear from the 
near antonymous processes in which they are the goal – burning and keeping. This contrast in turn 
produces the implied meaning that those who use the term „post-feminist‟ are foolish. This meaning 
occurs as a result of a flout of the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975): Lette does not explicitly say that 
post-feminists are foolish, but the contrast between an item that symbolises consumerism and 
sexuality on the one hand, and the organ associated with intellectualism on the other, implies that 
post-feminists favour frivolity over political thought. The reader‟s understanding of this contrast – 
between the superordinates of „consumerist‟ and „intellectual‟, „good‟ and „bad‟ – partly depends on 
their knowledge of the kinds of activism that feminists were infamously involved in, such as the 
alleged burning of bras at the 1968 Miss America pageant. Like the other examples of metalanguage 
from the „Yes‟ responses, the textual meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟ that Lette creates presents the idea 
of a feminist past and a less feminist present: unlike the other examples, Lette is ambivalent about 
„post-feminist‟, rather than the more familiar „feminist‟. 
 
3.2.2 Unmodified „feminist/s/ism‟ 
Unmodified occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ are those to which no pre- or postmodification is attached. 
These occurrences are of interest to the investigation of the meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ as – by not 
specifying a specific variety or group - they present „feminism‟ as a universal and feminists as a 
homogenous group. The way the other textual-conceptual functions construct the textual meanings of 
unmodified „feminist/s/ism‟ are therefore of interest in relation to the contrasting arguments that 
newspaper articles portray feminism as either “monolithic” (Douglas, 1994, p. 274) or “fragmented” 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 49).  
 The analysis below uses the textual-conceptual function of representing actions/events/states 
as a foundation. This function allows me to look at how, through representations of states, writers 
provide their own definitions of „feminist/s/ism‟ and acknowledge the contestability of these definitions 
(section 3.2.2.1). I then turn to an analysis of representations of actions, showing how material action 
processes present „feminism‟ as a force that has had negative effects. 
 
3.2.2.1 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the representation of states 
Where unmodified „feminist/s/ism‟ is represented in a state, writers ascribe definitions and qualities to 
it. These relational processes also provide evidence of the contestation of the meaning of 
„feminist/s/ism‟. The definitions attributed to „feminism‟ resemble the OED (2015) definition quoted in 
section 1.1: “Advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and 
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economic rights of the female sex; the movement associated with this”. For example, Lee-Potter 
(„Yes‟) uses the textual-conceptual function of presenting speech to quote a famous feminist‟s 
definition of feminism that emphasises the idea of feminism as a belief (Kelly, 1982, p. 67), observing 
that “As writer Marilyn French says: „Feminism is a belief that women matter as much as men do‟”. 
This definition also focuses on the significance of the relationship between men and women to 
feminism, with the comparative structure – “women matter as much as men do” – producing the 
assumed meaning that men matter through a logical presupposition: French‟s definition observes that 
men‟s importance is assumed, and seeks to make a case for women‟s equality in this respect. 
Mooney‟s („No‟) definition also emphasises the idea of feminism as a belief and as something 
primarily concerned with relations between the sexes: “To me, feminism means simply knowing the 
sexes are equal, that men and women have to work together in mutual respect to create a better 
world”. With “To me”, Mooney acknowledges the contestability of the meaning of „feminism‟: the 
adverbial plays a hypothesising role, and the proximally deictic “me” limits the applicability of this 
definition to Mooney alone, acknowledging that others may have different definitions. 
 Stothard‟s „Yes‟ response also provides a definition of feminism, and the interaction of the 
textual-conceptual functions of representing actions/events/states and contrasting demonstrates the 
contestability of „feminism‟. Stothard argues that “Feminism should not be about the pressure to have 
everything at once, but about the freedom to choose what you want”. Here, the two different states in 
which feminism is represented are contrasted through the negated opposition frame – „should not be 
X, but Y‟ - drawing a contrast between an unsatisfactory conception of what feminism is about and a 
more approved one. This contrast is strengthened by the near antonymous “pressure” and “freedom”, 
as well as the deontically modal “should”, which not only shows that Stothard has a preference for 
one definition over the other, but that her approach to the definition of „feminism‟ is a prescriptivist 
one. There is also an interaction of the textual-conceptual functions of representing society and 
implying in Stothard‟s assertion that “Feminism doesn‟t mean so much to my generation”. Like the 
Mooney definition, this example uses an adverbial that contains person deixis to limit the applicability 
of a proposition concerning feminism to a particular group of people – in this case, Stothard (who is 
nineteen years-old) and people of a similar age. The lack of any information about what feminism 
might mean to other generations results in a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), with the 
reader left to infer that feminism may have been more meaningful to previous generations. The 
textual-conceptual functions of prioritising and contrasting also play a role in explaining Stothard‟s 
perception of feminism in the subordinate clause, in which a negated opposition underlines the fact 
that feminism‟s goals have been accomplished: “not because we don‟t think it‟s important, but 
because our equality – at least in this country – has already been established”. The because-
clause here not only provides an explanation for the attitude of Stothard‟s generation, but the negated 
clause serves as a defence against the perception that this generation is simply apathetic. 
 „Feminism‟ also appears as a carrier in the „Yes‟ responses of Iley and D‟Argy Smith. The 
textual-conceptual function of contrasting is used by Iley to compare different perceptions of feminism, 
in her observation that “Feminism sounds more like a medical condition than cause”. Here, the 
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attribute features a comparative „more X than Y‟ opposition, measuring one opposite – “a medical 
condition” – against another, “cause” (Jones, 2002, p. 76). In this instance, the plane of difference 
(Davies, 2008, p. 185) on which the opposites are placed at different ends would appear to be one of 
„advantageousness to one‟s health‟, with a medical condition being at the less advantageous end 
and cause at the more advantageous end. D‟Argy Smith also attributes a negative quality to 
feminism, directly addressing the headline question in her categorical assertion that “Feminism is 
dead”. However, this example demonstrates that while writers do portray feminism as dead (as noted 
by previous studies, for example Callaghan et al., 1999; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995), this does not 
necessarily mean that writers‟ perceptions of feminism are negative: D‟Argy Smith again uses 
contrasting, with the concessive opposition trigger at the start of the next sentence – “But” – 
contrasting the unfortunate fact of feminism‟s death with her perception of this event - “But I grieve in 
silence”. The material action process of grieving is clearly a negatively evaluative one; the meaning of 
“in silence” is less obvious. D‟Argy Smith may mean that she chooses not to be vocal and 
demonstrative about her grief, or that she is grieving alone. The latter interpretation depends on the 
inference of an implied meaning brought about through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), 
as D‟Argy Smith does not explain what other people are doing in response to feminism‟s passing. 
Either way, the use of “But” to contrast the representation of a state in which feminism is dead with 
the representation of an action in which the writer is grieving demonstrates that, in this particular 
instance, a writer is presenting feminism‟s demise as something regrettable. 
 
3.2.2.2 Unmodified ‘feminist/s/ism’ in the representation of actions and events 
Neither „feminist‟ not „feminists‟ occurs as an actor in any material action processes in „Is Feminism 
Dead?‟ However, „feminism‟ does appear as the actor in representations of actions and events. These 
occurrences are difficult to classify in terms of whether they are material action intention processes 
that involve an animate actor or - given the fact that „feminism‟ is not a sentient being – material action 
event processes in which the actor is an inanimate entity, with the action being one that simply 
unfolds, rather than one put into motion by an animate actor. This blurring of the transitivity categories 
creates the effect of feminism as in some way alive, and able to act on the world as a united body. 
„Feminism‟ is the actor in two material action processes in Iley‟s „Yes‟ response. The first 
instance is in a material action process in which Iley observes how “feminism created its own glass 
ceiling – women who are not supportive of each other and are much more competitive than men”. 
Although creating is usually an intentional process, in this instance it would seem to be a supervention 
process, as the goal – a metaphorical glass ceiling stopping women from achieving what they might - 
is clearly negatively evaluative. The second instance in Iley‟s article has feminism as the actor in a 
process of teaching: “Feminism has also taught us that not having it all makes us feel guilty, and that 
„trying to have it all‟ gives us at best a headache and at worst a breakdown”. The person deixis “us” 
refers anaphorically to “women” in the previous sentence, and the lesson being taught here seems 
salutary at best: as a woman, you are doomed either to feel guilty or to suffer some form of ill health. 
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The third process in which „feminism‟ is the actor is again negatively evaluative: Lette („No‟) observes 
that “men are claiming that feminism has passed its amuse-by date”. While Lette‟s response is pro-
feminist („No, feminism is not dead‟), this example demonstrates how writers invoke others‟ 
repudiations of feminism: in this instance, Lette uses the textual-conceptual function of presenting 
speech to observe negative perceptions of feminism (note the use of the inclusive noun “men” and 
indirect speech presentation to summarise the views of a large portion of the world‟s population). The 
unfamiliarity of the phrase “amuse-by date” also brings about an implicature through a flout of the 
maxim of manner (Grice, 1975): men not only see feminism as irrelevant, but also as no longer even 
having the quality of being amusing in its irrelevance. 
The material action processes in which unmodified „feminism‟ is an actor highlight one way in 
which writers can construct a particular textual meaning of „feminism‟: representing what is usually 
seen as a movement, belief or outlook (Kelly, 1982, p. 67) as an entity that actively brings about 
actions and events creates the sense of feminism as some sort of force. The goals that result from 
these actions and events are either negative or distressing, reinforcing the idea of feminism as a 
movement that either did not achieve much, or that in places even did harm. 
 
3.2.3 „Feminist/s/ism‟ with minimal modification 
In the present study, „minimal modification‟ is used to refer to the modification of a head noun through 
determiners – for example „the‟, „his‟, „Britain‟s‟ - and/or predeterminers, e.g. „first‟, „one of‟, „three‟. 
Occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ with minimal modification pick out a particular feminism, feminist or 
group of feminists, for example „the feminist‟, „her feminism‟, „some of the feminists‟. 
Occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ with minimal modification in „Is Feminism Dead?‟ take the form 
of „a feminist‟. As noted in the analysis of unmodified „feminism‟ in actions and events (see section 
3.2.2.2 above), „feminist‟ does not appear as an actor in representations of actions and events. 
Instead, it appears in representations of states that concern whether or not a particular individual is a 
feminist. These occurrences reflect a characteristic of media portrayals of feminism observed by 
Mendes (2011a, p. 132): anxiety about who can or cannot be a feminist. „A feminist‟ occurs as the 
carrier in relational processes, and there are no occurrences in which someone‟s feminism is 
presented as straightforward and incontestable. This is most clearly the case where negating is used 
to reverse the meaning of a proposition, as in Murray and Mooney‟s „No‟ responses. In each instance, 
the textual-conceptual function of speech presentation attributes words that express uncertainty about 
the speaker or hearer‟s feminist credentials to someone else: Murray observes that “for 30 years I‟ve 
been hearing women say: „I‟m not a feminist, but didn‟t like it when they sacked me when I was 
pregnant‟”, while Mooney recalls how “a newspaper editor asked me: „You‟re not a feminist, you?‟” 
Murray‟s observation fits with previous studies‟ (for example Walby, 2011) detection of the „I‟m not a 
feminist, but‟ construction in media portrayals of feminism, while the interrogative used by Murray‟s 
editor demonstrates others‟ uncertainty about who is a feminist. These examples demonstrate how 
even pro-feminist writers discuss others‟ uncertainty or lack of enthusiasm concerning feminism. This 
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is also notable in the closing sentence of Murray‟s „No‟ response, in which she says that “The older 
and wiser among us can only wait for the day when they‟re finally forced to say, „Yes. I am a feminist. 
And proud of it‟”. Again, speech presentation presents someone else discussing who is or is not a 
feminist. Importantly however, in this instance the speech occurs at a low level of the clause structure, 
and is purely hypothetical. The “day” when people say this is the goal in a material supervention 
process of waiting for something, with the actor being “The older and wiser among us”: this – in 
particular the use of the proximal person deixis “us”, which brings the “older and wiser” among the 
readers onside – contrasts with the “they” who may one day declare themselves to be feminist, which 
refers cataphorically to “the young” in a previous sentence. Here, again, the idea of a split between 
generations is presented: the “older and wiser” understand the significance of feminism, while “the 
young”, at present, do not. 
Other examples emphasise the idea of people being uncertain about who the „feminist‟ label 
can be applied to. A couple of these are discussed in relation to metalanguage (section 3.2.1), in the 
Rebecca West quote about the circumstances in which she is called a „feminist‟ (Leslie – „Yes‟) and 
Lette‟s („No‟) sceptical comments about people who describe themselves as a „post-feminist‟. In a 
further example from Leslie‟s response, the categorical assertion in her statement that “Every woman 
is a feminist these days” displays a complete certainty about the feminism of all those referred to in 
the carrier element. However, the subsequent optional adverbial makes it clear that this is not Leslie‟s 
perception of things, but rather that of the writer Natasha Walter: “according to the author of The New 
Feminism, a dreary book I had to review not long ago, which tried to breathe life into the dead corpse 
of feminism as an ideology”. This adverbial attributes the sentiment of the main clause to Walter, and 
the complex way in which Walter is named makes it clear that Leslie is cynical about the veracity of 
this point of view: Walter is denoted by the noun “author”, which is postmodified by the prepositional 
phrase “of The New Feminism”, which in turn is presented as equivalent with the appositive noun 
phrase starting with “a dreary book”. The amount of (negative) detail packaged up into the noun 
phrase that refers to Walter demonstrates how naming can be used to package up a lot of 
assumptions and opinions about a referent, and how this information can in turn affect the meaning of 
the main proposition of a sentence – in this case, that „feminist‟ does not in fact apply to all women.  
 
3.2.4 „Feminist/s/ism‟ with detailed modification 
The present study uses „detailed modification‟ to refer to the use of premodifying adjectives (for 
example „radical‟, „new‟, „feisty‟), appositive noun phrases (e.g. „the word feminist‟) and postmodifying 
prepositional phrases („of the second wave‟, „in the 1960s‟) and relative clauses („who fought for 
women‟s rights‟, „which is based on ideology‟) in addition to the types of minimal modification 
discussed in section 3.2.3 above. Note that occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ with detailed modification 
are likely to present feminism and feminists as more various than unmodified occurrences or 
occurrences with minimal modification, picking out specific types and varieties (Dean, 2010). Naming 
itself is of greater ideological interest in cases of detailed modification: the packaging up of detailed 
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information into the noun phrase allows writers to present assumptions and opinions about feminism 
and feminists as inherent to the referent. 
Leslie‟s reference to Natasha Walter‟s The New Feminism (discussed in section 3.2.3 above) 
is among a number of examples of detailed modification where the writers package up negative views 
of, and stereotypes about, feminism and feminists. The majority of these occurrences appear in the 
„Yes, feminism is dead‟ arguments. For example, Leslie‟s reference to The New Feminism includes 
the noun phrase “the dead corpse of feminism as an ideology”. This example demonstrates the 
overlap between the textual-conceptual functions of naming and assuming: the use of the definite 
determiner “the” produces an existential presupposition about the contents of the noun phrase – the 
corpse is assumed to exist. The postmodification specifies that it is the ideological side of feminism 
that is dead, and Leslie also uses contrasting to present the idea of a gap between older, ideological 
feminists and younger, more care-free women: “[Natasha Walter] condescendingly put them right, 
informing young women that they shouldn‟t feel they‟re not feminists just because they like men and 
push-up bras – unlike her own feminist mother, who believes that even depilatories are ideological”. 
Here, a concessive opposition is created by the trigger “unlike”, which emphasises the gap between 
ideologues and non-ideologues. Leslie‟s preference for the non-ideologues is made clear by the 
detailed naming of Walter‟s mother who, Leslie claims, “believes that even depilatories are 
ideological”: “even” here triggers a logical presupposition – if Natasha Walter‟s mother deems even 
depilatories to be ideological, then presumably she deems anything to be ideological. 
 Leslie also emphasises the idea of feminism as something old and overtly political in other 
instances of naming. She notes that “the Equal Opportunities Commission study discovered that we 
think of the ideological feminism of the past as „old-fashioned‟ and „man-hating‟”. There is another 
existential presupposition here, which assumes that this type of feminism exists (or at least existed at 
one point), and the characterisation of it as “old-fashioned” and “man-hating” is the phenomenon in a 
mental reaction process of „thinking of‟, thereby emphasising people‟s negative perceptions of 
feminism through the representation of actions/events/states. The assertion is leant extra strength by 
the fact that the person deixis “we”, an inclusive plural pronoun, is the senser in the mental 
process/thinker in the presentation of thought – Leslie assumes that the reader will be onside with her 
view of “the ideological feminism of the past”. Leslie once more uses naming to package up ideas 
about irrelevance and extremity in her observation that “Surely [...] that puritanically bossy period of 
feminism only now exists in Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto, „personed‟ by covens of ageing 
Speculum Sisters who still believe that shaving one‟s armpits is a betrayal of the Revolution”. Here, 
the first noun phrase produces an existential presupposition that a “bossy” type of feminism exists; 
further, this type of feminism is portrayed as the existent in an existential process, with the adverbial 
placing it in “only” one place – “Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto”. This second noun phrase 
produces another existential presupposition, and a significant amount of information is packaged up 
about the kind of people – the negatively evaluative “covens” – who occupy such a place. The 
absurdity that this type of feminism could still exist is underlined through the textual-conceptual 
function of hypothesising, with the epistemic adverb “Surely” expressing Leslie‟s high level of 
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confidence about the irrelevance of this type of feminism, and also through a logical presupposition in 
the second noun phrase, triggered by “still”: it is assumed that the “covens” have for some time 
believed that “shaving one‟s armpits is a betrayal of the Revolution”, a belief that Leslie considers 
foolish. Lee-Potter also speculates as to the origins of negatively stereotyped feminists, suggesting 
that “The most aggressive feminists, I suspect, came from families where there was a domineering 
father and a disappointed, defeated mother”. This proposition also uses hypothesising, with the modal 
verb “suspect” conveying Lee-Potter‟s degree of confidence about the proposition, itself a relational 
circumstance process speculating on the type of home life that this type of feminist grew up with. 
There is also an implied meaning here – Lee-Potter does not make the relevance of this speculation 
clear, thereby flouting the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) to imply that one only grows up to be 
feminist in an aggressive way if one has grown up in unhappy circumstances. 
 Other occurrences of detailed modification portray contemporary feminism as something that 
is difficult to define, or that possibly does not even exist. Stothard‟s „Yes‟ response includes two 
references to the concept of a „new‟ feminism. Like instances observed by Jaworska and 
Krishnamurthy‟s (2012, p. 416) study of UK newspapers, these demonstrate the writer‟s suspicions 
that this is a dubious concept. Stothard‟s response opens with the observation that “There are subtle 
anomalies in the way men and women are viewed, but 21st-century feminism no longer has much to 
fight about”. Here, the premodification of „feminism‟ posits the existence of a particular feminism 
attached to a particular, contemporary, point in time. However, both the negation of the state in which 
this new type of feminism is represented – a relational possessive process of (not) having “much to 
fight about” – and the contrast through the concessive opposition triggered by “but”, which notes that 
the sentiment of this proposition is surprising in light of the existence of gender inequalities, 
emphasise the irrelevance of this new feminism. A further meaning comes about through the textual-
conceptual function of assuming, with the iterative trigger “no longer” presupposing the idea that 
feminism did once have something to fight about, thereby drawing a line between the importance of 
an older feminism, and the lack of importance of the newer variety. Stothard also notes that the boys 
at her sixth form “seemed justifiably confused as to their role in this new „comfortable feminism‟”: here, 
quotation marks are used to create an effect of ironic distancing, and the placing of this type of 
feminism subordinate to the complement “confused” emphasises the difficulties of understanding what 
this type of feminism means. 
 A final example appears in Norman‟s „No‟ response, in which she notes her position in a 
feminist lineage: her grandmother was “a pre-feminist” in a time before feminism, and her mother was 
“one of the first bona fide feminists”. However, Norman ruefully concedes that this “leaves me, I 
guess, a post-feminist feminist in less well-defined territory”. This example demonstrates how different 
textual-conceptual functions interact to produce a specific meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟. First of all, the 
use of “post-feminist” to premodify “feminist” creates the seemingly contradictory idea of a type of 
feminist who exists subsequent to the time of feminism, while the postmodification – “in less well-
defined territory” – underlines the elusive nature of this type of feminist. The textual-conceptual 
function of implying is again crucial to how writers construct different meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟: 
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Norman does not specify what territory this territory is less-defined than, and so the reader is left to 
infer that this is a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), with Norman drawing a comparison with 
the relatively defined territory occupied by her mother and grandmother‟s generations. Norman‟s 
confidence about contemporary feminism is also evident in her use of the textual-conceptual function 
of hypothesising, with the epistemically modal “I guess” modalising the proposition in which she 
attributes to herself the quality of being “a post-feminist feminist”: Norman herself is not certain that 
this is the type of feminist that she is. Finally, the textual-conceptual function of contrasting 
emphasises the comparison between Norman on one side, and her grandmother and mother on the 
other. Norman‟s grandmother and mother each appear as carriers in relational processes, in which 
they are attributed the qualities of being “a pre-feminist” and “one of the first bona fide feminists” 
respectively: these representations of states are placed in parallel with the relational process in which 
Norman herself is the carrier, serving to emphasise the differences between the generations. The 
relationship of antonymy between “pre-feminist” and “post-feminist”, and the fact that Norman‟s 
mother‟s feminist credentials are described as “bona fide” (and, through a flout of the maxim of 
relation (Grice, 1975), therefore somehow more „real‟ than Norman‟s) enhances the idea of different 
possible meanings of „feminist‟. This particular example powerfully demonstrates how even pro-
feminist articles express uncertainty about what feminism means in the 21
st
 century, and about who 
can be a feminist. 
 
3.2.5 Concluding remarks 
The sample analysis of „Is Feminism Dead?‟ has demonstrated how the textual-conceptual functions 
construct textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. For example, the analysis of naming identifies different 
types of feminism and feminists, the analysis of representing actions/events/states identifies instances 
where writers provide definitions of „feminist/s/ism‟, and the analysis of contrasting and presenting 
time, space and society highlights occurrences of explicit contestation of the lexemes‟ meanings. The 
identification of occurrences of metalanguage was also useful in identifying places in the data in which 
the writers explicitly discuss denotative and connotative meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
 The sample analysis also demonstrates the usefulness of the textual-conceptual functions of 
naming and representing actions/events/states as entry points for a critical stylistic analysis that 
employs the full range of functions. Naming is pertinent to all occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟, while 
representing actions/events/states is pertinent to the vast majority (with the exception of rare 
occurrences that do not occur in a clause). Having identified, for example, unmodified occurrences of 
„feminism‟, it was then possible to look at how feminism as an entirety is represented in different types 
of processes, for example relational processes that provide definitions. I then used a full analysis to 
demonstrate, for example, how Stothard constructs a particular textual meaning of „feminism‟ which 
contests other definitions, in this instance through the use of hypothesising, negating and contrasting 
in addition to naming and representing actions/events/states. The analyses of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data 
in chapters 5-7 deal with a far greater amount of data, and so sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1 provide 
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statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states, identifying entry points for the 
full analysis of „feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and adjectival „feminist‟. 
 Critical stylistic analysis is also shown to be able to provide linguistic evidence for and against 
previous studies‟ perceptions concerning the way feminism is portrayed in newspaper articles. Many 
of the findings in the analysis are pertinent to the frames outlined in section 2.3. For instance, the 
analysis of contrasting showed how constructed oppositions create contrasts between old and new 
types of feminism and feminist, and radical and non-radical types of feminism and women, while the 
analysis of naming and presenting time, space and society showed that political strands of feminism 
are placed in the past, while new types of feminism are treated as somehow vague. Full analysis 
utilising the range of textual-conceptual functions also provided linguistic evidence for the idea that 
feminism is portrayed as complex, for example in the way naming, representing actions/events/states, 
contrasting and hypothesising in Norman‟s argument emphasise the idea of different types of feminist 
in different ages, with some easier to define than others. 
 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter has described each of the textual-conceptual functions set out by Jeffries (2010a) and 
has detailed the different ways in which they are linguistically realised in texts. The sample analysis in 
section 3.2 demonstrated how each of the functions plays a role in constructing the textual meanings 
of „feminist/s/ism‟ in an article taken from the data, and the usefulness of naming and representing 
actions/events/states to provide entry points for a full critical stylistic analysis. 
In chapter 4, I explain how I collected the data and built datasets, before describing the 
process by which I annotated these for each of the ten textual-conceptual functions. This annotation 
then serves as the foundation for the analysis in chapters 5-7. 
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Chapter 4: Collection and annotation of the data 
This chapter explains how I sourced and collected the „feminist/s/ism‟ data, and how I annotated it 
according to the textual-conceptual functions outlined in chapter 3. The requirement for the data was 
that it should be both representative and manageable. The data had to cover the period between 
2000 and 2009 and the range of UK national newspapers, with an ample amount of data to represent 
each year and each newspaper. A representative dataset ensures that the investigation offers a more 
thorough picture of „feminist/s/ism‟ in newspaper articles than existing studies of the period (see 
discussion in section 2.2). The dataset also had to be of a manageable size, so that the annotation of 
the textual-conceptual functions would not be too time-consuming and would form a clear and 
accessible foundation for the subsequent analysis (chapters 5-7).  
Section 4.1 discusses the source of the data and how I selected data that was as 
representative as possible. Section 4.2 describes how and why I divided the „feminist/s/ism‟ data into 
five datasets corresponding to word class, before section 4.3 explains the process by which I 
annotated the datasets for the textual-conceptual functions introduced in chapter 3. I also discuss how 
I dealt with problems concerning the extent to which I could analyse each occurrence of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ during the annotation process, for example decisions on what level of clausal analysis 
to use when annotating transitivity processes. 
 
4.1 Collection of the data 
The discussion below provides a description of the data source that I selected (section 4.1.1) and an 
explanation of how I selected the data that makes up the „feminist/s/ism‟ data (section 4.1.2). 
 
4.1.1 Selection of the data source 
The data source for the study is Nexis UK, a searchable electronic repository available through 
LexisNexis. Nexis UK (Nexis hereafter) allows the researcher to search for particular search terms in 
various types of corpora, including newspaper corpora
3
. This has made it a popular resource for 
corpus linguistic studies of newspaper data (for example Baker & Levon, 2015; Branum & Charteris-
Black, 2015; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012).  
 The Nexis corpus „UK Publications‟ includes data for eight of the ten top-selling UK national 
newspapers in the National Readership Survey (NRS) figures for the final month of the period under 
investigation – December 2009
4
: 
 
                                                          
3
See http://www.lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis for more information on Nexis UK. 
4
 See http://www.nrs.co.uk/toplinereadership.html. 
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 The Daily Mail (The Mail hereafter). 
 The Express. 
 The Guardian. 
 The Independent. 
 The Mirror. 
 The Sun. 
 The Telegraph. 
 The Times. 
 
The two titles from the NRS list that are not available are The Daily Star and The Daily Record. The 
former is a red-top tabloid similar to The Sun, and the latter focuses specifically on Scottish issues. 
With the exception of these omissions, the newspapers available through Nexis cover the main titles 
available to readers across the UK through 2000-2009. 
Data covering the entirety of 2000-2009 is available for seven of the eight newspapers. The 
exception is The Telegraph, for which data covering the period from 1
st
 January 2000 to 30
th
 October 
2000 is not available. However, the data available for the remainder of The Telegraph in 2000 does 
include articles on feminism, and so it is still possible to gain a picture of The Telegraph‟s coverage of 
feminism in 2000. Of the eight newspapers, Nexis includes Sunday editions for all except The Sun, 
which during the period under investigation was represented on a Sunday by The News of the World. 
In line with previous research on press portrayals of particular groups (for example Kim, 2014), I 
decided to include all editions and sections in the data. Therefore, articles relating to feminism from 
sports, finance sections and fashion supplements are included in the data, providing as broad as 
possible a picture of the impression of feminism that each newspaper would have given its readers. 
 
4.1.2 Selection of the data 
I used Nexis‟s wildcard option – „feminis!‟ - to find data covering the newspapers‟ use of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ between 2000 and 2009. This brought up results that included not only the root forms 
„feminism‟ and „feminist‟, but also words formed by the addition of morphemes in word-final position, 
for example „feminisms‟ and „feministing‟. However, the wildcard search does not pick up on variations 
formed by adding morphemes to the beginning of the word. This meant that variations such as „anti-
feminist‟ were recognised by Nexis (which treats the hyphen as a space), while unhyphenated 
variations („antifeminist‟) were not. It is possible, therefore, that articles that contain uses of 
unhyphenated derivational forms were not identified by Nexis, and are therefore not included in the 
data. However, where unhyphenated forms do occur in the articles in the data, I include them so as to 
give as full as possible an overview of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the texts. 
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The data comprises three articles per newspaper per year, in order to ensure that all 
newspapers and the entirety of the period under investigation are represented. I used Nexis to order 
search results according to relevance, ranking the results “according to greatest frequency and 
relevancy of terms” (Lexis Nexis, 2012, p. 16). This meant that those articles in which the search term 
occurred most frequently in relation to total number of words appeared at the top of the results. I also 
used Nexis‟s „duplicate options‟ setting to ensure that reproductions of the same article would not 
appear in the results. Performing each search – for example „feminis!‟ in The Mail from 1
st
 January 
2003 to 31
st
 December 2003 – in turn, I found that selecting the three most relevant articles from each 
newspaper and year (240 articles in total) provided me with 2,539 occurrences of the search term. 
This fell within my expectations of what would be manageable. It also allowed for future alterations: if, 
during the annotation and analysis stages, I found that the amount of data was too great, I could 
revisit the Nexis relevance results and remove the third most relevant article for each year of each 
newspaper from the data, resulting in a smaller and more manageable amount of data.   
I downloaded the results of each search into individual Word files – for example Mail 03, 
which contained the three most relevant Mail articles from 2003 (including „Is Feminism Dead?‟, 
analysed in section 3.2) - and provided a code for each article within each file, e.g. Mail 03a („Is 
Feminism Dead?‟), Mail 03b („Sorry, But Warthogs Have You Beat, Guys‟) and Mail 03c („Girlyvision‟). 
This resulted in a total of 80 files, one for each year of each newspaper. I then used Word‟s search 
function to search for the segment „feminis‟, allowing me to find all occurrences of „feminism‟, 
„feminist(s)‟ and derivational forms such as „post-feminist‟ and „anti-feminism‟. I placed each sentence 
in which „feminist/s/ism‟ occurred into an Excel file, and labelled each sentence according to the 
newspaper and article it appeared in, and the date of publication. This ensured that I could easily find 
any contextual information that I might need during the annotation and analysis stages. I also labelled 
occurrences according to their placement in an article (for example headline, photo caption, main 
body), whether they were part of the title of a book, magazine, etc. (e.g. in the book title The New 
Feminism), and if they were from a passage of reported speech (e.g. “National Public Radio asks if 
she‟s the „new face of feminism‟” (Guardian 08a)). 
At this stage it was possible to gain an overview of how much of the data was drawn from 
each newspaper and each year. Figure 4.1 shows how the 2,539 occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ are 
distributed across the eight newspapers: 
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Figure 4.1: Total occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ per newspaper 
 
Although the focus of the study is not on differences between the various newspapers‟ coverage of 
feminism, figure 4.1 provides an early result. It shows that a greater proportion of occurrences are 
from the broadsheets (The Guardian, The Independent, The Telegraph and The Times) than the 
tabloids. This accords with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012, p. 409) finding that „feminism‟ in the 
Bank of English reference corpus occurs more in broadsheets than tabloids. The predominance of 
The Guardian also reflects its status as “probably the only mainstream publication in the UK that 
frequently tackles questions to do with the current state of feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 396). This could 
be seen to make the study unbalanced, with the balance in favour of the broadsheets. However, I 
argue that the fact that different newspapers account for varying proportions of the data reflects the 
relative levels of attention that each newspaper gives to feminism: a reader‟s understanding of the 
meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟ would be more influenced by the broadsheets than the tabloids were they 
to read all the newspapers in the data. 
 The data also provides a snapshot of coverage across the decade. Figure 4.2 shows how 
many occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ were taken from each year: 
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Figure 4.2: Total occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ per year 
 
The number of occurrences fluctuates between 166 in 2005 and 342 in 2009. Because of the way in 
which I gathered data (selecting articles with the most occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ in comparison to 
total words), figure 4.2 does not show trends in coverage of feminism and feminists across the 
decade. It does, however, demonstrate that there is a spread of data representing the whole of the 
decade. 
 
4.2 Creation of the datasets 
The discussion here describes how I annotated the data for word class, providing an overview of 
„feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and adjectival „feminist‟ in the data, before using this annotation to divide the 
data into five separate datasets. 
 
4.2.1 Annotation of word class 
The first stage of annotation was to label each occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟ for word class. In the 
case of „feminist‟, I looked at each sentence in order to determine noun and adjectival occurrences. I 
also annotated occurrences of „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ that functioned as a determiner – e.g. 
“feminism's battles” (Express 01b) – in the belief that there may be differences between the way that 
„feminism‟ and „feminist‟ are used as nouns and the way that they are used as determiners. This 
annotation was informed by Biber et al.‟s Longman Grammar (1999), which “describes the actual use 
of grammatical features in different varieties of English” (p. 4); its descriptions of typical grammatical 
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features of newspaper language proved especially helpful during the annotation and analysis stages 
(see, for example, the discussion of „block language‟ in section 6.1). 
 In some cases, I returned to the original data files in order to determine word class. 
Occurrences that were difficult to categorise included those in minimal sentences, e.g. “Feminine vs 
Feminist” (Mail 01b). Here, I categorised „feminist‟ as an adjective on the grounds that it is 
coordinated with an adjective, and words coordinate with others of the same class (Biber et al., 1999, 
p. 68). For occurrences that appeared in scare quotes - e.g. “you can take any quality you think I have 
and apply it to „feminist‟” (Times 02c) - I used a substitution test, determining that, in this example 
from Times 02c, „feminist‟ is a noun as substituting it would require a noun or noun phrase in order for 
the proposition to still make sense. 
In some instances, „feminism‟ occurs in compound noun phrases such as “feminism drive” 
(Sun 09b), “feminism jungle” (Mail 03c) and “feminism bandwagon” (Guardian 06c). I annotated these 
occurrences as nouns on the basis that they are more akin to noun + noun compounds such as „bar 
code‟ or „lamp post‟ than to adjective + noun compounds such as „real estate‟ or „greatcoat‟ (Biber et 
al., 1999, p. 326). Conducting a test for stress patterns also suggested that each occurrence carries 
initial stress, a characteristic of noun compounds such as „heart attack‟ (Biber et al., 1999, p. 590), 
reinforcing the impression of each of these occurrences as a noun, e.g. “the Americans who were first 
into the feminism jungle appear to have emerged on the far side” (Mail 03c). 
Before beginning the annotation of the textual-conceptual functions, I divided the 2,539 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ into five datasets based on word class. Three of the datasets account 
for the different possible noun forms – „feminism‟, „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ – and the other two for 
adjectives and determiners. This division reflects the fact that „feminism‟ as a phenomenon, the 
people represented by „feminist(s)‟, and things described as „feminist‟ are discussed in different ways, 
as well as the fact that the different grammatical roles that each word class plays necessitates 
different approaches to annotation. The five datasets also included related derivational forms, as 
occurrences of these were either compound nouns (as described above) or derived nouns or 
adjectives formed with prefixes that do not result in a change of word class. For example, I included 
occurrences of „anti-feminism‟ in the feminism dataset, and noun and adjectival occurrences of „post-
feminist‟ in the feminist and adjectives datasets. 
 
4.2.2 Statistical overview of word class 
The creation of separate datasets for different word classes provides an initial impression of the 
make-up of the data. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of „feminist/s/ism‟ into nouns, adjectives and 
determiners:  
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Figure 4.3: Total number of nouns, adjectives and determiners in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data 
 
Figure 4.3 shows that the majority of occurrences (1,841) are nouns, with 673 adjectives and 25 
determiners. „Feminism‟ accounts for slightly over half (996) of noun occurrences. There are then 410 
occurrences of „feminist‟ and a slightly greater number of occurrences of plural „feminists‟ (435). 
 Table 4.1 details the derived nouns and adjectives contained in each dataset: 
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Dataset Derivational 
forms/total 
occurrences 
Derivational forms 
Feminism 15/996 Post-feminism (x 7), anti-feminism (x 3), feminism bandwagon, 
feminism drive, feminism jungle, feminism lessons, feminism tag 
Feminist 13/410 Post-feminist (x 5), arch-feminist (x4), pre-feminist, pro-feminist, proto-
feminist, uber-feminist 
Feminists 10/435 Post-feminists (x 8), anti-feminists (x 2) 
Adjectives 82/673 Post-feminist (x 33), anti-feminist (x 13), pro-feminist (x 11), pre-feminist 
(x 5), non-feminist (x 3), un-feminist (x 3), feminist-inspired (x 2), post-
post-feminist (x 2), pseudo-feminist (x 2), anarcho-feminist, feminist-
driven, feminist-like, feminist-run, feminist-sounding, paleo-feminist, 
proto-feminist, uber-feminist 
 
Table 4.1: Derivational forms in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data 
 
The majority of derivational forms are adjectival, and account for 12% of the adjectives dataset. This 
may be the result of the greater adaptability of adjective forms to occur in derived forms. It is notable 
that the most frequent prefix for derivational forms in each dataset is „post-‟. This corresponds with 
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012, pp. 416-417) finding that „post-‟ frequently modifies „feminism‟ 
and „feminist‟ in UK national newspapers, a finding that in turn leads them to suggest that “feminism is 
often framed as a thing of the past” (pp. 416-417). Mendes (2012) also comments on „post-‟ forms, 
suggesting that they present the idea of feminism as “„dead‟ or redundant” (p. 554). The frequency of 
„post-‟ in my own data, allied with findings from previous studies (see discussion of post-feminism in 
section 2.1.1), indicates that analysis of these forms is necessary for a full understanding of the 
textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ (see, for example, the discussion of adjectival „post-feminist‟ in 
section 7.4.1). Negating is also a feature of the prefixes – „anti-‟, „non-‟, „un-‟ - in table 4.1, highlighting 
the role of derivation in presenting the idea of antithetical forms of feminism and feminists (see 
discussion of negated derivational forms of adjectival „feminist‟ in section 7.4.3).  
 The remainder of chapter 4 describes the process by which I annotated the five datasets 
using the textual-conceptual functions. 
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4.3 Annotation of textual-conceptual functions 
The present section explains how I annotated the datasets using the ten textual-conceptual functions 
outlined in chapter 3. I discuss the annotation of naming and of representing actions/events/states in 
particular detail, reflecting the fact that the annotation of these textual-conceptual functions provides 
the foundations for the annotation of the other eight functions: for example, I base the annotation of 
negating on the annotation of representing actions/events/states, rather than returning to the 
sentences selected during the data collection process discussed in section 4.1.2. 
 The attention I afford to naming and representing actions/events/states also reflects the role 
these textual-conceptual functions play in providing a foundation for the analysis. Each of the 2,539 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ is of interest in terms of naming, whether it is modified or not modified: 
modified occurrences are of interest for the way they package up information about, and perceptions 
of, feminism and feminists (see the discussion of naming in section 3.1.1), while unmodified 
occurrences are of interest for the way they represent feminism and feminists as universals. Similarly, 
the majority of occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ are part of at least one transitivity process (see section 
4.3.2.2), and are therefore represented as involved in an action, event or state. By contrast, the other 
textual-conceptual functions apply to fewer occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟, and are therefore less 
central in how textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are constructed. As noted in section 3.2, I also use 
naming and representing actions/events/states to provide entry points for the analysis of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ (see sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). 
 
4.3.1 Annotation of naming 
I annotated naming for each of the five datasets. The following discussion explains the process I used 
for nouns, adjectives and determiners. 
 
4.3.1.1 Nouns 
I annotated each noun occurrence according to both the full noun phrase in which it occurs and the 
noun phrase in which it is head, with the detailed annotation of pre- and postmodification focusing on 
the latter, for example “traditional feminists” rather than “some especially restless demons that afflict 
traditional feminists” (Independent 01a). This reflects the fact that the annotation of full noun phrases 
would be complex and result in an annotation that would be difficult to analyse. Table 4.2 provides a 
snapshot of how I annotated naming in the noun datasets: 
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Sentence/phrase Full phrase Phrase 
[…] to turn the attacks on new feminists is 
totally misguided (Sun 01a) 
new feminists new feminists 
The march of the new feminists 
(Independent 09b) 
the march of the new feminists the new feminists 
But I think that there are some especially 
restless demons that afflict traditional 
feminists […] (Independent 01b) 
some especially restless demons 
that afflict traditional feminists 
traditional feminists 
 
Table 4.2: Annotation of „feminist/s/ism‟-headed noun phrases 
 
The focus on noun phrases in which „feminist/s/ism‟ is the head highlights one of the problems of 
annotating textual-conceptual functions in a large collection of data. If the intention is to focus on a 
particular word, then dealing with all noun phrases in their entirety may prove impractical. In this case, 
I decided to use a consistent approach to naming across the data that would maintain a strong focus 
on the object of study – „feminist/s/ism‟ - and the way it is packaged up in noun phrases. 
The annotation of pre- and postmodification reflects the structuring of noun phrases: any 
premodifiers, followed by the head noun, and then any postmodification. The columns preceding the 
form column account for the different possibilities in the way a head noun can be premodified: 
predeterminers (for example „some of‟, „all of‟), determiners (e.g. „her‟, „Britain‟s‟), further 
predeterminers (e.g. „first‟, „three‟) and adjectives (e.g. „fellow‟, „crazy‟). I included quantifying 
collectives such as „generation of‟ and „bunch of‟ in the predeterminer column, as they perform a 
similar function to other forms noted by Biber et al. (1999, p. 248) such as „a number of‟ and „a couple 
of‟: 
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The fringe of odd, demented, 
man-hating feminists 
(Telegraph 01c) 
 The fringe 
of 
odd demented man-
hating 
feminists 
First-wave, capital-letter 
(Telegraph 05b) 
   First-
wave 
capital-
letter 
 feminists 
One of Britain‟s first 
feminists (Sun 01a) 
One of Britain‟s first    feminists 
 
Table 4.3: Annotation of premodification of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
 
 I also categorised premodifying adjectives in order to gain a more detailed picture of the 
different ways in which „feminist/s/ism‟ is described. To do this, I used Biber et al.‟s (1999, pp. 508-
509) distinction between descriptors – adjectives that tend to be gradable, and that denote features 
like colour, age and size – and classifiers, which tend to be non-gradable and place referents into 
categories. This distinction is useful for looking at how the textual meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟ is 
constructed, and for testing previous studies‟ (Dean, 2010; Jarowska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; 
Mendes, 2012) claims that newspaper articles have a tendency to divide feminism into different 
varieties (see section 2.3). Biber et al. (1999) split descriptors and classifiers into smaller semantic 
groupings, reflecting the roles that different types of adjectives fulfil. Table 4.4 provides a summary of 
these groupings, with examples from the „feminist/s/ism‟ data: 
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Descriptors 
Size/quantity/extent Extreme, big, deep 
Time Early, new, old 
Evaluative/emotive Bad, better, phoney 
Miscellaneous/descriptive Lazy, bad, hairy-armed 
Classifiers 
Relational/classificational/restrictive 21-st century, contemporary, second-wave 
Affiliative American, French, Muslim 
Topical/other Lipstick, radical, pro-sex 
(Adapted from Biber et al., 1999, pp. 508-509) 
Table 4.4: Semantic groupings of adjectives 
 
This means of grouping adjectives is not perfect, for the reason that some adjectives defy simple 
categorisation. For example, an adjective such as „aggressive‟ clearly plays a describing, as opposed 
to a categorising, role, but it is difficult to determine whether it ought to be classified as a 
miscellaneous/descriptive descriptor or – considering its negative connotations – evaluative/emotive 
descriptor. Other adjectives – for example „militant‟, „radical‟, „traditional‟ – could be perceived as 
descriptors or classifiers: miscellaneous/descriptive descriptors that draw attention to a certain quality 
of the referent, or topical/other classifiers that reflect a particular subject area or the referent‟s 
relationship to a noun, e.g. „militancy‟, „radicalism‟ or „tradition‟. I categorised such occurrence as 
classifiers, due to the fact that attributive uses (those being looked at in this annotation) tend to carry 
a greater sense of classification than predicative uses, which note a particular aspect of the referent, 
for example in „the feminist is radical‟. The frequent occurrence of adjectives such as „militant‟, 
„radical‟ and „traditional‟ in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data further suggested that these are recognised types 
of feminist. These semantic groupings provide a means of gaining an impression of the ways in which 
„feminist/s/ism‟ is premodified – for example, demonstrating that particular noun forms frequently 
occur with adjectives relating to time or affiliation (see, for example, the analysis of adjectives that 
premodify „feminists‟ in section 6.3.3.3) – and further analysis in chapters 5-7 looks in greater detail at 
these classifications. 
The annotation of post-modification captures postmodifying prepositional phrases and relative 
clauses in a single column: 
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Phrase Form Postmodification 
Liberal feminists such as Naomi Wolf 
(Telegraph 05a) 
feminists such as Naomi Wolf 
One of the pioneering feminists of our time 
(Mail 09a) 
feminists of our time 
Those feminists who are not satisfied with 
claiming equality with the other sex, but must 
be acknowledged as superior (Times 02a) 
feminists who are not satisfied with claiming 
equality with the other sex, but must be 
acknowledged as superior 
 
Table 4.5: Annotation of postmodification of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
 
The placing of postmodification in a single column reflects the fact that breaking some prepositional 
phrases and relative clauses down further into constituent parts would be arduous and produce an 
elaborate annotation. 
The annotation of naming of nouns also accounts for apposition: 
 
Sentence Form Apposition 
And who better to open their eyes than specialists - feminists - 
who study this reality? (Times 03a) 
feminists specialists 
Whoever coined the phrase „post-feminism‟ should be shot 
(Independent 04c) 
Post-feminism The phrase 
 
Table 4.6: Annotation of appositive noun phrases and coordinates 
 
Appositive noun phrases such as those in “feminists, these so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-
booted females” (Express 03a) have equivalent status, sharing the same referent (Biber et al., 1999, 
p. 638). Apposition is not included in Jeffries‟ (2010a) account of the textual-conceptual function of 
naming, which treats apposition as a linguistic realisation of the equating function. However, I include 
it in the annotation of naming as noun phrases used in apposition with „feminist/s/ism‟ - such as “these 
so-called 24-carat, ball-breaking, bovver-booted females” – provide further detail about the referent, 
packaging information up in the noun phrase in a similar way to other forms of pre- and 
postmodification.  
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4.3.1.2 Adjectives 
As with the annotation of nouns, the annotation of adjectives is based on the noun phrase, detailing 
the full phrase in which „feminist‟ occurs and the phrase in which a noun that is premodified by 
„feminist‟ is the head: 
 
Full phrase Phrase 
Feminist art (Guardian 07b) feminist art 
Julie Bindel, a feminist campaigner and journalist (Guardian 
05c) 
feminist campaigner and journalist 
More of a need for feminist activism than ever (Guardian 09a) feminist activism 
 
Table 4.7: Annotation of phrases containing adjectival „feminist‟ 
 
The annotation accounts for occurrences where „feminist‟ is a premodifier of a head noun – for 
example “feminist art” (Guardian 07b) - and occurrences where it acts as a clausal complement, e.g. 
“the movies were feminist” (Mail 08b). Where „feminist‟ is part of a complement, the full phrase and 
phrase columns detail the adjective phrase used, e.g. „feminist‟ or „anti-feminist‟. The head noun and 
subject columns annotate the elements described by premodifying and complement occurrences of 
„feminist‟: 
 
Sentence Form Head noun Head noun Subject 
Julie Bindel, a feminist campaigner 
and journalist, admitted being 
infuriated (Guardian 05c) 
feminist campaigner journalist  
This generation is truly post-feminist 
(Telegraph 01b) 
post-feminist   This generation 
I‟m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist 
(Sun 06b) 
feminist   I [Beth Ditto] 
 
Table 4.8: Annotation of head nouns and subjects modified by adjectival „feminist‟ 
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Where the subject consists of just a pronoun – for example “I” in “I‟m fat, lesbian and blatantly 
feminist” (Sun 06b) - I used the original data files to provide detail about the referent in the subject 
column, e.g. “I [Beth Ditto]”: 
 
Sentence Coordinate Coordinate Form Head noun Subject 
Lads, bras and other burning 
feminist issues (Independent 
00b) 
burning  feminist issues  
I‟m fat, lesbian and blatantly 
feminist (Sun 06b) 
fat lesbian feminist  I [Beth Ditto] 
 
Table 4.9: Annotation of adjectival coordinates of „feminist‟ 
 
This annotation ensures that the overview of complement occurrences of „feminist‟ provides the same 
level of detail to that of premodifier occurrences. Adjectives that coordinate with „feminist‟ are also 
annotated and categorised according to their semantic grouping (see discussion in section 4.3.1.1 
above). 
 
4.3.1.3 Determiners 
As with the annotation of adjectives, the annotation of determiners accounts for the form of each 
occurrence (for example „feminism‟s‟, „feminists‟‟) and the (noun) phrase in which it occurs, for 
example “feminism‟s demise” (Mail 09b). The annotation focuses on the head noun being premodified 
by a determiner form of „feminism‟ or „feminist‟: 
 
Form Phrase Head noun 
Feminism‟s feminism‟s demise (Mail 09b) demise 
Feminists‟ the feminists‟ hate list (Times 03c) hate list 
Feminists‟ radical feminists‟ disapproval of a catalogue of explorations 
(Independent 06b) 
disapproval 
 
Table 4.10: Annotation of determiner occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
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I did not record any further detail for determiners as they do not coordinate with other words of their 
class. The majority of the small number of occurrences (25) also carry little pre- or postmodification. 
Although a phrase like „the liberal feminism of the Sixties‟ attitude towards men‟ could hypothetically 
occur, modification of the majority of occurrences is limited to determiners and predeterminers, the 
one exception being “radical feminists‟ disapproval” (Independent 06b). Accordingly, the annotation 
focuses on who or what is described as belonging to „feminist/s/ism‟. 
 
4.3.2 Annotation of representing actions/events/states 
The annotation of representing actions/events/states followed the same process for each dataset. The 
division of the data into different datasets makes particular sense in the case of representing 
actions/events/states as the concept of „feminism‟ plays a different type of role in transitivity 
processes to the people referred to by „feminist(s)‟, and a different role again to the people and things 
described by adjectival „feminist‟. 
 In the following discussion, section 4.3.2.1 discusses how I decided precisely what data to 
annotate before section 4.3.2.2 explains how I carried out each part of the annotation. 
 
4.3.2.1 Selection of the data 
The decision as to what data to annotate was less straightforward in the case of representing 
actions/events/states. Whereas with naming there was a choice to make between annotating full noun 
phrases or just those of which „feminist/s/ism‟ was the head noun, for transitivity processes the 
decision as to what unit of language to focus on was more complicated. For complex sentences such 
as “I was fascinated by that period because it was a society where feminism and lesbianism were 
starting to emerge” (Sun 03b), a full annotation would have to account for the main clause (“I was 
fascinated by that period”), the adverbial clause (“because it was a society […]”) and the 
postmodifying relative clause (“where feminism and lesbianism were starting to emerge”). However, 
accounting for all of this detail would require a complex annotation. The annotation of representing 
actions/events/states therefore focuses on the immediate clause, e.g. “feminism and lesbianism were 
starting to emerge”, while I used the annotation of prioritising (see section 4.3.6 below) to highlight 
those occurrences that appear at a lower clause level and therefore needed to be taken into account 
when performing the analysis of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
The focus on the immediate clause means that the annotation misses some detail. However, 
it does provide a concise overview of the types of process in which „feminist/s/ism‟ is involved and the 
roles it plays. In much previous research that uses transitivity analysis, there is a lack of clarity 
regarding what analysis focuses on. For example, Lukin‟s (2013) study of the word „war‟ in a corpus of 
TV news reports that cover the 2003 invasion of Iraq observes that “four percent of instances of the 
lexical item „war‟ enter into a transitive configuration as the Agent of some impactful process” (p. 436). 
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However, it is not clear how the terminology „impactful process‟ relates to a model of transitivity, and 
Lukin (2013) neglects to give an account of how this figure was reached: for example, Lukin does not 
state whether all levels of a clause were taken into account, or just the immediate clausal context of 
each occurrence of „war‟. Similarly, Mautner (2007) looks at transitivity patterns in “a 100-line sample 
of elderly as an attributive adjective” (p. 62) in her study of „elderly‟ in the Wordbanks Online corpus, 
noting that “just over a quarter of instances (26) include a material process with an elderly Actor” (p. 
62). Again, it is unclear which levels of clause structure are being taken into account, or in what other 
types of process the search term appears. The analysis in the present study is built on a thorough 
annotation of the immediate clausal context of every occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟ that occurs in a 
clause. There are some drawbacks to this approach. For example, the annotation of the sentence “I 
don't think you can blame feminism for that” (Guardian 08b) focuses on the subordinate clause “you 
can blame feminism for that”, which expresses a proposition that is at odds with that expressed by the 
full sentence. However, the annotation of prioritising (see section 4.3.6 below) allowed me to take the 
wider clausal context into account during the analysis stage, for example in the analysis of the 
„feminism is dead‟ pattern (see section 5.2.2.2).  
 
4.3.2.2 Annotation of transitivity processes 
The annotation of transitivity processes details the clause being focused on and the process it 
expresses. It separates out the verb that expresses a process, the process type, and the role that 
„feminist/s/ism‟ fulfils. Where a predicate contains coordinated verbs, the annotation includes each 
verb, with the process and role columns accounting for each process expressed. For post-predicate 
infinitive clauses such as “Germaine Greer, author of the seminal Sixties feminist tome The Female 
Eunuch, is hoping to cause a new wave of scandal” (Express 03c), I use the post-predicate verb in 
the annotation (“cause”), as this expresses the vital process, whereas the controlling verb (“hoping”) 
simply provides information about perception, intention or modality (Biber et al., 1999, p. 693): 
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Feminists are blamed for 
a large number of wrongs 
(Express 09b) 
feminists are blamed 
 
blame MC Phenomenon   
Why, then, should any 
feminist want to stand up 
for a bunch of stuffy 
judges [...] (Independent 
00c) 
should any feminist 
want to stand up for 
a bunch of stuffy 
judges 
stand up MAI Actor   
Feminists still proclaim 
that a woman with power, 
is per se, better news 
than a man (Independent 
04b) 
Feminists still 
proclaim that a 
woman with power 
is, per se, better 
news than a man 
proclaim V Sayer   
Anti-feminism in both 
theory [...] and reality [...] 
is new and growing 
(Independent 00b) 
Anti-feminism in both 
theory [...] and reality 
[...] is new and 
growing 
is / grow RI Carrier MAE Actor 
 
Table 4.11: Annotation of clause, verb, process and role 
 
Some sentences in the data do not contain a verb, such as the subheading “A very unlikely 
feminist” (Mail 09a). In instances where there was no clause to annotate, I left the clause column 
blank. However, I did annotate examples such as “Radical feminist who condemned pornography and 
dismissed men as moral cretins” (Telegraph 05a), where I could annotate the process expressed in 
the relative clause (for this example, I treated the relative pronoun “who” as the subject). In other 
sentences, a verb is elided, e.g. “Berry No Feminist” (Mirror 02c). I felt that readers would easily be 
able to interpret an intended predicator in such examples, and so annotated the clause using the 
assumed predicator, e.g. the copula verb „to be‟, which expresses a relational intensive process 
between a carrier - Halle Berry - and an attribute, a lack of feminism. 
In the case of cleft sentences, there is more than one possible process that could be 
annotated. For example, “it is feminism which loses its power” (Guardian 02a) could be annotated for 
either the cleft structure “it is feminism” - containing a dummy pronoun, the copula verb and an object 
- or the relative clause “which loses its power”, where the relative pronoun refers anaphorically to 
94 
 
“feminism”. The former interpretation would identify a relational intensive process with a carrier (“it”) 
and an attribute (“feminism”), whereas the latter would identify a material action process with an actor 
(“feminism”), a process (“loses”) and a goal (“its power”). As the purpose of clefting is simply to focus 
on a particular element in a clause (see the discussion of prioritising in section 3.1.6), the annotation 
here focuses on the unclefted clause (see section 4.3.6 below for an explanation of how the 
annotation of prioritising accounts for the focusing function of clefting). Similarly, I annotated wh-
clauses according to the unclefted form of the clause: for example, for “what feminist supporters have 
recently denounced as troglodytic misogyny in media portrayals of Hillary has in fact been a function 
of her own strange sexual accommodations” (Telegraph 08a), I focus on “feminist supporters have 
recently denounced […] a function”. Again, the important meaning of the cleft is the underlying clause, 
and it is this aspect of the cleft structure that provides the most accurate impression of what 
„feminist/s/ism‟ is „doing‟ in terms of the representation of actions/events/states. 
In some instances, it was difficult to decide which process type a particular clause expressed. 
Halliday (2004) notes that the process types are “fuzzy categories” (p. 172), and this makes the 
description of a large collection of clauses difficult: some occurrences do not fit neatly into one 
process type. The majority of difficult cases in the data involve verbs that express processes which 
could be interpreted as either material action or mental processes, or as material action or 
verbalisation processes, such as those below: 
 
Clause Verb Process Role 
Those thousands of women who dismissed the notion of 
feminism in 2006 (Mail 02a) 
dismiss MC Phenomenon 
I would identify myself as a feminist (Mirror 03b) identify MC Circumstance 
Lanzmann was roundly booed by radical feminists 
(Independent 08b) 
boo V Sayer 
The Spice Girls were accused by feminists of betraying 
women (Express 06c) 
accuse V Sayer 
 
Table 4.12: Annotation of ambiguous transitivity processes 
 
Using only the context provided by the clause, it is difficult to know how to annotate these examples in 
terms of transitivity processes. They demonstrate the validity of Matthiessen‟s (1995) observation that 
the process types “correspond to regions in a continuous space” (p. 1874) rather than “categorically 
different options” (p. 1874). “Dismiss” and “identify”, then, might exist at the boundaries between the 
mental and verbalisation process types, and “boo” and “accuse” at the boundary between 
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verbalisation and material action processes. In order to annotate these examples according to 
process type, I focused on the textual meaning being created in each instance. This reflects Halliday‟s 
(2004) emphasis on “the contribution made by different process types in the construction of 
discourse” (p. 174): annotating transitivity processes is not a case of assigning verbs to categories, 
but of looking at the meaning created by the transitivity process in context. Therefore, I annotated 
“accused” in “the Spice Girls were accused by feminists of betraying women” (Express 06c) as a 
verbalisation process, as the adverbial “of betraying women” gives an indication of what was said. 
Where the context did not provide a strong impression of which type a process should be assigned to, 
I considered what type of activity, at a minimum, was required in each: for example, „identifying‟ 
something must at least involve some sort of mental process, and so I annotated “I would identify 
myself as a feminist” (Mirror 03b) as such. 
My focus on textual meaning also meant that the same verb could express different types of 
transitivity process in different sentences. For example, I annotated “blame” as expressing a 
verbalisation process in “Fay Weldon […] blamed them for binge-drinking, „sluttishness‟ and happy-
slapping” (Sun 07a) as the adverbial clause contains a piece of reported speech (“sluttishness”), but 
as the expression of a mental process in “Doyle seems to blame feminism for the problems that men 
and women have” (Telegraph 02b), where the lack of speech presentation and the modal auxiliary 
verb “seems” suggest that the writer is making an assumption about Doyle‟s views. In such instances 
it was important to prioritise contextual information over the semantics of a particular verb. In the 
Doyle example, the mental process in the next sentence – “She thinks that successful career women 
let the bullying tactics they might employ in the boardroom spill over into the bedroom” – further 
suggests that the annotation of “blame” as expressing a mental process is correct. 
This method of annotating processes is not perfect. However, I applied it consistently, 
realising that such decisions highlight one of the problems with the model of transitivity. This 
annotation also allowed me to produce statistical overviews of the relative use of different transitivity 
processes in each of the datasets, providing entry points for the analysis in chapters 5-7 (see sections 
5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). It is also important to note that the possible participant roles in each of the different 
types of process are not dissimilar. For example, while a process such as that expressed in “you 
cannot judge a Barbie doll, or a feminist” (Guardian 09b) could be annotated as either a material 
action, verbalisation or mental process, the role played by „feminist‟ is similar in each interpretation: 
whether it is considered a goal, a target or a phenomenon, in each it is the thing being affected by the 
process described by the verb. The important point here is that the subsequent analysis, regardless of 
how the process was annotated, looks at the textual meaning attaching to „feminist‟, which in each 
case is the passive object of the clause. 
 
4.3.3 Annotation of negating 
The annotation of negating is based on the clauses selected for the annotation of transitivity 
processes. As well as using the clause column to find instances of negating, I consulted the sentence 
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column in order to identify examples that occurred in non-clauses, ensuring that I did not exclude 
instances such as “a very unlikely feminist” (Mail 09a). I placed examples in a negating column, with 
type and form columns detailing the specifics of each instance: 
 
Negating Type Form 
Is that really anti-feminist? (Mail 08b) Morphological - adjective anti-feminist 
There has not been a single influential feminist book 
(Times 09b) 
Syntactic not 
Producing sympathetic reports of feminism‟s „failure‟ to 
win mass support (Independent 03c) 
Semantic - noun failure 
 
Table 4.13: Annotation of types and forms of negating 
 
I took care to identify instances of negating from the potentially open-ended range of semantic 
negators. The majority of instances that I found are included in Nahajec‟s (2012) typology (see 
section 3.1.3), with the only exceptions being instances of „false‟ and „phoney‟, for example in “the 
false prophets of feminism” (Guardian 04c) and “Marriage of a Phoney Feminist” (Mail 00a). I labelled 
these occurrences as examples of semantic negation as they are forms that “realise an absence” 
(Nahajec, 2012, p. 212) (of Gloria Steinem‟s lack of feminist credentials and the veracity of the 
“prophets of feminism” respectively). They also have a similarly negative meaning to the prefix 
„pseudo‟, listed as one of the morphological negators in Nahajec‟s (2012) typology. 
The annotation of negating only goes so far in the detail it provides. For example, while 
“failure” is listed in the form column, the more detailed analysis presented in chapters 5-7 is 
necessary to explain the significance of this negative form in relation to the relevant occurrence of 
„feminism‟. However, by cross-referencing the details captured here with the annotation of transitivity 
processes, it is possible to gain a detailed picture of negating in the data. Given that the proportion of 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ that are affected by some form of negating is also relatively small (379 
of 2,539 occurrences, or 14.9%), the type and form details provide a good basis for the analysis of 
this feature of the data. 
 
4.3.4 Annotation of contrasting 
I consulted the data files in order to provide a full picture of contrasting, as opposition can occur 
across sentences. This meant I could include parallel structures such as “the feminism I subscribe 
to takes this as a given. The feminism I reject tells me that having a child changes nothing” 
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(Independent 07a), where a contrast is created between elements that play the same role in adjacent 
sentences. 
It was necessary to place some limits on what I annotated. The annotation accounts for those 
instances of opposition where „feminist/s/ism‟ is contrasted with another noun phrase, adjective or 
determiner, e.g. “feminism has been replaced by narcissism” (Times 09b), but does not account for 
other oppositional structures where „feminist/s/ism‟ is not directly contrasted with something else, for 
example “it does this not to assert that men are the new oppressed and women the new 
oppressors, but to try and do away with the very dualism in Western culture on which crude – 
i.e. successful - feminism has been based” (Independent 02b). This level of annotation allowed me 
to account for the most significant uses of contrasting: those which present another element as having 
the opposite meaning to „feminist/s/ism‟ itself. 
The annotation details the oppositional structure and the type of opposition, with additional 
columns containing the contrasted elements, i.e. the „feminist/s/ism‟-based element and the 
contrasted element: 
 
Contrasting Type „Feminist/s/ism
‟ 
Not „feminist/s/ism‟ 
These women are individualists, not feminists 
(Guardian 09a) 
Negated feminists individualists 
Feminism has become a dirty word (Express 
04a) 
Transitional Feminism a dirty word 
The feminism I subscribe to takes this as a 
given. The feminism I reject tells me that 
having a child changes nothing […] 
(Independent 07a) 
Parallelism The feminism I 
subscribe to 
the feminism I reject 
 
Table 4.14: Annotation of contrasting 
 
During the annotation I made one addition to Davies‟s (2012) typology of opposition (discussed in 
section 3.1.4). Davies (2012) suggests that “the coordinator and is unlikely to generate novel 
oppositions. It can only frame those that already have canonical oppositional status” (p. 68). However, 
I argue that examples of „X and Y‟ frames, while not as common as other oppositional structures, 
suggest that there is a case for seeing it as a possible frame. The Mail 01a headline “The Feminist 
and the Housewife” is one example: while many readers may conceive feminist activism and 
housewifery as contrasting, it would be hard to argue that they are canonical opposites, as Davies 
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(2012, p. 68) suggests is necessary for „X and Y‟ frames. The main body of the article, though, makes 
it clear that the feminist of the headline (the “radical feminist” Wendy Robertson) and the housewife 
(her daughter, Debora, who is described as “a middle-class, conservatively dressed housewife”) are 
to be seen as opposites, with “The Feminist and the Housewife” implying a relation of contrast similar 
to that in „the X and the Y‟ fable titles such as „The Tortoise and the Hare‟ (Leech & Short, 2007, p. 
314). What is clear is that the text is creating a textual meaning of contrast through the „X and Y‟ 
frame – the main body of the article and assumptions about the connotations that readers can be 
expected to have for „feminist‟ and „housewife‟ mean that a new opposition is constructed through the 
„X and Y‟ frame. I therefore include coordinated opposition as a type of oppositional structure in the 
annotation and analysis. 
 
4.3.5 Annotation of exemplifying and enumerating 
The annotation of exemplifying and enumerating provides an overview of noun phrases with which 
„feminism‟ and „feminist(s)‟ occur in a list, and adjectives with which adjectival „feminist‟ occurs in a 
list. The annotation details all occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ that occur in a set of two or more similar 
structures, for example the noun phrases „feminism‟, „diversity‟ and „gay and lesbian rights‟ in the 
Guardian 08b sentence “Four well-known activists [...] discuss the cultural changes they have seen 
over the last 40 years in feminism, sexuality, politics - and men”. The form and other element columns 
account for the different items with which „feminist/s/ism‟ occurs in a list: 
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Exemplifying / enumerating Form Other 
element 
1 
Other 
element 
2 
Other 
element 
3 
Type 
A different blogger [...] invites 
people to contribute articles [...] 
„radical feminism‟, for instance, or 
„1970s feminism and what it 
means today‟ (Guardian 06b) 
„radical 
feminism‟ 
„1970s 
feminism 
and what 
it means 
today‟ 
  Exemplifying 
All these ideas that I had thought 
were the left - feminism and 
diversity and gay and lesbian 
rights - were suddenly very chic 
(Guardian 00c) 
feminism diversity gay and 
lesbian 
rights 
 Enumerating 
Four well-known activists [...] 
discuss the cultural changes they 
have seen over the last 40 years 
in feminism, sexuality, politics - 
and men (Guardian 08b) 
feminism sexuality politics men Enumerating 
 
Table 4.15: Annotation of exemplifying and enumerating 
 
The type column classifies occurrences of listing according to whether they are instances of 
exemplifying or enumerating. This accounts for the pragmatic effects of the different lists in which 
„feminist/s/ism‟ occurs. For example, the phrase “for instance” in “„radical feminism‟, for instance, or 
„1970s feminism and what it means today‟” (Guardian 06b) makes it an explicit example of 
exemplifying, whereas the four-part list in Guardian 08b (“feminism, sexuality, politics – and men”) 
suggests a literally complete list, and the three-part list in Guardian 00c (“feminism and diversity and 
gay and lesbian rights”) suggests a list that is, at least symbolically, complete (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 70). 
 
4.3.6 Annotation of prioritising 
The annotation of prioritising takes into account key aspects of how texts prioritise particular bits of 
information over others. It focuses on where „feminist/s/ism‟ appears in the clause structure of a 
sentence, and accounts for the aspects of prioritising described in section 3.1.6, including cleft 
sentences, passive constructions and the placing of information in adverbials: 
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Sentence Clause position Prioritising 
It was the feminists who really hated the idea of 
women‟s fiction (Telegraph 07a) 
Main clause Information structure - 
cleft sentence 
Any reference to feminism is censored 
(Independent 07b) 
Main clause Transformation - 
passive 
Wolf was a student when feminism was at a 
crossroads (Times 04b) 
Subordinate clause Adverbial 
Many of these women who are feminists, don‟t 
actually think they are (Mail 03a) 
Relative clause Subordination 
People keep telling me that feminism is dead 
(Guardian 03b) 
Subordinate clause Subordination 
 
Table 4.16: Annotation of prioritising 
 
The clause position column identifies occurrences that appear at a higher or lower level of the clause 
structure, and the prioritising column accounts for the type of prioritising involved (see discussion in 
section 3.1.6) This annotation is helpful as it augments the information provided by the clause column 
in the annotation of representing actions/events/states (see section 4.3.2 above); taking this column 
into account during the analysis made it clear where „feminist/s/ism‟ occurred at a lower level and how 
this might affect the textual meaning of „feminist/s/ism‟ in these instances (see, for example, the 
discussion of the „feminism is dead‟ structure in section 5.2.2.2). 
 
4.3.7 Annotation of implying and assuming 
The annotation of implying and assuming is similar to that for contrasting, in that it was necessary to 
go beyond the immediate clausal context in order to find examples of implying. This was particularly 
the case for examples of flouts of the maxim of quality: simply looking at the sentences compiled in 
the datasets would not provide a full overview of all instances where a writer says something that they 
believe to be false. This particular textual-conceptual function is an example of how a manual 
annotation of texts is required to produce a full account of how textual meaning is created, as certain 
types of implicature cannot be captured through corpus tools. 
 The annotation of assuming accounts for instances of existential and logical presuppositions, 
while the annotation of implying accounts for flouts of the maxims of Grice‟s (1975) co-operative 
principle. Table 4.17 provides a snapshot of how I annotated instances of existential and logical 
presupposition: 
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Assuming and implying Type Trigger Assumed/implied meaning 
Their feminism was based on 
the belief that women were 
different from men (Mail 08c) 
Existential 
presupposition 
Definite 
determiner – 
„the‟ 
Referent exists 
„Feminist‟ has become a 
derogatory term (Times 09a) 
Logical 
presupposition 
Change of state 
– „become‟ 
„Feminist‟ was not a 
derogatory term before 
I‟m certainly not an active 
feminist anymore (Mail 06b) 
Logical 
presupposition 
Iterative word – 
„anymore‟ 
Subject was an active 
feminist before 
 
Table 4.17: Annotation of assuming 
 
I based the annotation of existential presuppositions on the annotation of naming (see section 4.3.1), 
which includes a column detailing the full noun phrase in which each occurrence of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
appears. This allowed me to capture not only examples of definite noun phrases in which 
„feminist/s/ism‟ is the head – for example “her feminism” (Telegraph 06b) - but also examples of wider 
noun phrases in which „feminist/s/ism‟ is part of the pre- or postmodification of the head, e.g. “the 
writings of the leading liberationist feminist Rosemarie Tong” (Independent 06c). The annotation also 
details the trigger that gives rise to a presupposition and the assumed meaning that results. 
As observed in the discussion of assuming in section 3.1.7, the range of logical 
presupposition triggers is open-ended. The annotation therefore focuses on those that are observed 
in Jeffries‟ (2010a, pp. 95-98) account of triggers: change of state verbs, factive verbs, cleft 
sentences, iterative words and comparative structures. The trigger and assumed/implied meaning 
columns again account for the word or structure that gives rise to the presupposition – for example 
„become‟, „anymore‟ – and the meaning that is presupposed as a result. 
I annotated examples of implicature in the same annotation, noting which maxim was flouted 
to produce a particular implicature, and summarising the implied meaning created in each instance: 
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Assuming and implying Type Trigger Assumed/implied meaning 
Feminists, let me remind you, are 
all man-hating, humourless 
warthogs (Mail 03b) 
Implicature Quality Feminists are in some respect 
similar to warthogs 
Feminism isn‟t dead Implicature Quantity/ 
relation/ 
manner 
Feminism is alive (although this 
may be somehow surprising) 
 
Table 4.18: Annotation of implying 
 
Implying is by its nature more tricky than the other textual-conceptual functions to detect and to 
explain. Some implicatures, such as that produced by “feminism isn‟t dead” (Guardian 07c) arise from 
the use of a particular structure, such as a negated clause (see the discussion of the relationship 
between negating and implying in section 3.1.7), but others, such as that in Mail 03b, do not. What 
inference the writer intends the reader to make in any particular case is also not clear-cut. Therefore, 
it is possible that the „feminist/s/ism‟ data contains instances of implicatures that were intended by 
writers, but which I have missed in my annotation, and also that my interpretation of implied meanings 
does not match precisely those intended by writers. The implied meanings captured in the 
assumed/implied meaning column, therefore, capture as accurate as possible an impression of 
implied meaning in the data, rather than a definitive account. 
 
4.3.8 Annotation of hypothesising 
I annotated hypothesising in the data by consulting the sentence column and the clause column in the 
annotation of representing actions/events/states (section 4.3.2). This means that the annotation of 
hypothesising not only accounts for modality within the immediate textual context of „feminist/s/ism‟, 
but also modality in the wider clausal context:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
103 
 
Sentence Modal form Category 
You are probably a feminist (Express 09a) Adverb – „probably‟ Epistemic 
A new version of feminism should offer a lot more than 
history lessons (Times 08b) 
Auxiliary verb – 
„should‟ 
Deontic 
I think feminism is about reawakening people (Guardian 07a) *Lexical verb – „think‟ Epistemic 
 
Table 4.19: Annotation of hypothesising 
 
The annotation of hypothesising notes the modal form attached to an occurrence of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ and the category of modality involved (note that categorical assertions are not 
annotated). The examples that are of greatest interest to the present study are those where modality 
affects the clause in which „feminist/s/ism‟ occurs, for example in “You are probably a feminist” 
(Express 09a). However, it was also important to account for instances of modality that occur outside 
the immediate clausal context, as an annotation that did not account for this would provide a 
misleading impression of the data. For example, ignoring the fact that “feminism is about reawakening 
people” (Guardian 07a) is subordinate to the clause “I think” would give the impression that what is 
stated as merely a conviction was in fact stated as a fact, through a categorical assertion. As such, I 
used an asterisk to mark those occurrences of modality – as in Independent 01a - that occur at a 
higher clausal level. 
 
4.3.9 Annotation of presenting others‟ speech, thought and writing 
For the annotation of presenting others‟ speech, thought and writing, I searched through the sentence 
column. This allowed me to identify instances where „feminist/s/ism‟ is either the subject doing the 
saying, thinking or writing – for example “leading modern feminist Helen Wilkinson [...] said: „To turn 
the attacks on new feminists is totally misguided‟” (Sun 01a) - or where „feminist/s/ism‟ is part of what 
is being said, thought or written, e.g. “Camille Paglia once called Wolf „the Dan Quayle of feminism‟” 
(Guardian 01b). I then consulted the initial labelling of the data, in which I observed all occurrences of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ that are a part of reported speech, thought or writing (see section 4.1.2 above). This 
allowed me to account for occurrences where the reporting clause in a piece of speech, thought or 
writing presentation occurs outside of the immediate sentence, for example in “Rowbotham says she 
finds younger women mysterious [...] „There's a dying down of feminism as politics‟” (Guardian 00a). 
 The annotation of presenting speech, thought and writing uses the models from Short (2007) 
summarised in section 3.1.9. It was necessary to provide multiple levels of annotation for some 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟, in order to fully account for the different types of speech, thought 
and/or writing presentation attached to them: 
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Sentence S/T/W 
presentation 
Verb Position S/T/W 
presentation 2 
Verb Position 
I resent Ms Lessing 
saying: “Feminists 
enjoy humiliating 
men” (Express 01a) 
DS Say Speech DT Resent Thought 
Feminist Maureen 
Dowd writes: “If 
Gloria Steinem had 
had a crystal ball 
[...]” (Guardian 06a) 
DW Writes Writer    
Feminists believe 
that women should 
have the right to 
control their lives 
(Mail 00c) 
IT Believe Thinker    
 
Table 4.20: Annotation of presenting speech, thought and writing 
 
Table 4.20 shows how I annotated each occurrence of speech, thought and writing presentation 
according to the type of presentation involved, the verb that reports a piece of speech, thought or 
writing, and whether „feminist/s/ism‟ is part of the sayer/thinker/writer or what is being 
said/thought/written. The example relating to Doris Lessing shows how I annotated those occurrences 
where, for example, the presentation of speech (e.g. “Ms Lessing saying „Feminists enjoy humiliating 
men” (Express 01a)) is embedded within the presentation of thought (e.g. “I resent Ms Lessing 
saying...”). In such cases, the annotation towards the left deals with the lowest level of speech, 
thought or writing presentation (for example what Doris Lessing is supposed to have said), with higher 
levels branching out towards the right, e.g. the article writer‟s thoughts about what Lessing is 
supposed to have said. 
 
4.3.10 Annotation of representing time, space and society 
The annotation of representing time, space and society focuses on the use of person, place and time 
deixis, as well as tense, in the clauses identified in the annotation of representing 
actions/events/states (see section 4.3.2 above). An attempt to take full sentences into account – with 
105 
 
different tenses and multiple uses of the small number of deictic expressions – would be unwieldy, 
resulting in an uninformative annotation. Therefore, the focus is on the immediate clausal context: 
 
Clause Time Place Person Tense 
Feminism here is dead (Mail 03a)  here  Present simple 
She was the stereotype of the Millie Tant feminist 
(Guardian 05c) 
  She Past 
She has missed the point about feminism today 
(Independent 08a) 
today  She Present perfect 
 
Table 4.21: Annotation of representing time/space/society 
 
The aim of this annotation is to provide an overview of how deicitic expressions present 
„feminist/s/ism‟ in time, space and society. In particular, the detailing of the tense of clauses helps to 
provide an overview of how „feminist/s/ism‟ is positioned in time.  
 
4.4 Summary 
This chapter has explained how I collected the „feminist/s/ism‟ data and annotated it according to 
each of the ten textual-conceptual functions. This annotation provides the foundation for the analysis, 
in particular through the statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states (see 
sections 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1). I now provide the results of my analysis of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the data: 
chapter 5 analyses the feminism dataset, chapter 6 investigates the feminist and feminists datasets, 
and chapter 7 focuses on the adjectives dataset. 
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Chapter 5: The feminism dataset 
In this chapter I analyse the data in the feminism dataset. The analysis addresses the study‟s three 
research questions: 
 
4. What are the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the context of UK national newspapers, 
2000-2009? 
5. How is the meaning of „feminism‟ contested in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009? 
6. How is critical stylistics a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset? 
 
Section 5.1 discusses statistical overviews of naming and representing actions/events/states. These 
overviews provide entry points for the analysis, which uses the annotation of the full range of textual-
conceptual functions described in chapter 4 in order to look at textual meanings of „feminism‟. The 
analysis focuses first of all on unmodified occurrences of „feminism‟ (section 5.2), before analysing 
occurrences with minimal modification (section 5.3) and detailed modification (section 5.4). 
 I use the Oxford English Dictionary (2015) definition of „feminism‟ - “advocacy of equality of 
the sexes and the establishment of the political, social, and economic rights of the female sex; the 
movement associated with this” - as a benchmark for the analysis of textual meanings. The analysis 
also responds to the five frames discussed in section 2.3: 
 
6. Positive/negative portrayals. 
7. Geographical and temporal placement. 
8. Universality/complexity. 
9. Changes and oppositions. 
10. Complexity of portrayals. 
 
The analysis of textual meaning addresses each of these frames. In particular, I find evidence that: 
negative textual meanings of „feminism‟ are contested by writers, different types of „feminism‟ are 
located in different time periods, „feminism‟ is presented as having multiple and ambiguous meanings, 
contrasts are drawn between different varieties, and portrayals of „feminism‟ are complex, with writers 
explicitly contesting meanings of „feminism‟. 
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5.1 Statistical overview of the feminism dataset 
I used the annotation of naming discussed in section 4.3.1 to produce a statistical overview of how 
„feminism‟ is named in the feminism dataset. Unmodified occurrences have no modification, minimally 
modified occurrences are modified by determiners and/or predeterminers, and occurrences with 
detailed modification are modified by some or all of determiners, predeterminers, premodifying 
adjectives, appositive noun phrases, and postmodifying prepositional phrases or relative clauses: 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Statistical overview of naming in the feminism dataset 
 
Figure 5.1 shows that the majority of occurrences of „feminism‟ (71%) are unmodified. This suggests 
that „feminism‟ tends to be treated as a universal in the articles, as though it were “monolithic” 
(Douglas, 1994, p. 274). Where „feminism‟ is modified, just 6% of occurrences are modified through 
minimal modification, and the remaining 23% through more detailed modification.  
The overview of representing actions/events/states is based on the annotation of transitivity 
processes (see section 4.3.2). Figure 5.2 shows the types of processes in which „feminism‟ occurs: 
 
708 
58 
230 
No modification
Minimal modification
Detailed modification
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Figure 5.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminism dataset 
 
Relational processes account for the greatest number of process types in which „feminism‟ occurs 
(42%), meaning that „feminism‟ appears more often in representations of states than in 
representations of actions or events. This result is unsurprising in light of the fact that „feminism‟ refers 
to a concept, rather than an animate being. However, material action processes account for nearly as 
many processes featuring „feminism‟ (40%). While material action processes are perceived as the 
prototypical means of expressing meaning through a clause (Jeffries, 2010a, p. 40), the high 
percentage of this type of process is surprising given that „feminism‟ refers to a concept, belief or 
outlook that cannot act as an agent or be acted on, at least in a literal sense. 
The analysis below uses these statistical overviews as entry points. The high percentage of 
occurrences of unmodified „feminism‟ and the prominence of relational processes leads me to begin 
the investigation by analysing the representation of feminism as a whole in states (section 5.2). 
Section 5.3 investigates the relatively small number of occurrences of „feminism‟ with minimal 
modification, looking at how they divide feminism into different types. Section 5.4 concludes the 
analysis by looking at how assumptions about feminism are built into references to it, investigating 
how different varieties of feminism are represented in actions and states. 
 
5.2 Unmodified ‘feminism’ 
The present section focuses on those occurrences of „feminism‟ that have no pre- or postmodification. 
These occurrences are of particular interest as they present „feminism‟ as standing for the concept or 
movement as a whole. This means that the way textual meaning is created through the other textual-
399 
65 91 
413 
21 
Material action
Verbalisation
Mental
Relational
Existential
109 
 
conceptual functions is pertinent in a particular way – the types of actions, events and states that 
„feminism‟ is presented in, for instance, represent the way feminism as a whole interacts with the 
world. 
 Figure 5.2 shows that „feminism‟ occurs more often in relational processes than in other types 
of processes (413 processes, accounting for 42% of the total in the feminism dataset). The majority of 
these are relational intensive processes (355 processes, accounting for 86% of relational processes), 
which define a carrier in terms of an attribute, e.g. “feminism is a strange ideology” (Independent 03a). 
I here focus on the 156 of these relational intensive processes in which unmodified „feminism‟ is the 
head noun in the carrier role. This means that I do not include occurrences such as “the latest US 
fashion in feminism is the silliest since burning your bra” (Express 01b) – where “fashion” is the head 
– in the analysis. This focus allows me to hone in on the processes in which a universal conception of 
„feminism‟ is being defined, a focus which directly approaches the first research question which this 
study seeks to answer, concerning the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
 The analysis below looks at four different structures among these 156 processes. Section 
5.2.1 looks at „feminism means/does not mean X‟, in which a definition of „feminism‟ itself is provided. 
Section 5.2.2 and section 5.2.3 discuss processes that use the copula verb „to be‟, looking at 
„feminism is X‟ and „feminism is not x‟ respectively. Finally, section 5.2.4 focuses on the „feminism 
becomes X‟ structure, which not only expresses a relational intensive process but also uses 
contrasting to portray feminism as having undergone a transition. The discussion shows that writers 
attribute a variety of textual meanings to „feminism‟, both through their own glosses of the word and 
through the use of speech and thought presentation and social deixis to attribute particular meanings 
to particular groups, as well as the use of contrasting to present the idea of changes in what 
constitutes feminism. The meaning of „feminism‟ is also explicitly contested in the articles: a variety of 
textual-conceptual functions - notably implying, negating and representing time, space and society - 
are used to argue with certain perceptions about the meaning of „feminism‟, such as the idea that 
feminism is dead. This contestation demonstrates the complexity of portrayals of „feminism‟: a key 
part of writers‟ portrayals involves the dismissal of others‟ perceptions.  
 
5.2.1 „Feminism means/does not mean X‟ 
21 of the 156 processes in which unmodified „feminism‟ is a carrier use the verb „mean‟. These 
„feminism means/does not mean X‟ processes account for a relatively small proportion of the total 
processes. However, they are of particular interest as they provide writers‟ definitions of the lexeme 
itself. The analysis focuses on the 12 of the 21 processes that feature a wh-complement clause (Biber 
et al., 1999, p. 683) – „what feminism means‟ – before turning to the remaining 9 processes. It shows 
that while some of the meanings attributed to „feminism‟ align with the OED (2015) definition, the 
meaning of „feminism‟ is presented as something complex, with different meanings for different people 
and different times. The definitions also demonstrate how the meaning of „feminism‟ is contested, in 
particular through the use of implying to evoke the idea of different definitions.  
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 Table 5.1 comprises the 12 occurrences of the „what feminism means‟ complement clause: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 02a By the time I was old enough to understand what „feminism‟ meant it was 
already a dirty word […] 
Express 02a We asked five female writers to tell us what feminism means to them in 2002 
Guardian 01c As we begin the 21st century, what does feminism mean to us?  
Guardian 01c […] men and women gathered in February 1914 to talk about „what feminism 
means to me‟ 
Guardian 09a We all also differ in terms of what feminism means to us 
Independent 08a But what did we mean by feminism?  
Independent 08a “This isn‟t what we meant by feminism”, she informed us 
Independent 08a This isn‟t what we meant by feminism 
Mail 06b I‟m just not sure what feminism means now 
Telegraph 03c Just such a responsive glitter, I am sure, came to the eye of many a listener to 
the Woman‟s Hour debate, „What Does Feminism Mean to You?‟ […] 
Times 07b […] young women today have no concept of what feminism once meant 
Times 08c Women now have to decide for themselves what they mean by feminism […] 
 
Table 5.1: Occurrences of „what feminism means‟ clauses 
 
These clauses demonstrate ways in which „feminism‟ is treated as complex, and ways in which its 
meaning is contested. What is notable in many of the examples is how the presentation of society 
portrays „feminism‟ as having particular meanings for particular people, for example in “what feminism 
means to them” (Express 02a), “what feminism means to me” (Guardian 01c) and “what feminism 
means to us” (Guardian 09a). The use of person deixis in each instance not only restricts these 
definitions to particular groups of people, but also produces a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 
1975): by only explaining what „feminism‟ means to a particular person or group of people, they imply 
that „feminism‟ has other meanings for other people. The idea of „feminism‟ having different meanings 
for different people is made more explicit in Guardian 09a and Independent 08a. In Guardian 09a, 
“what feminism means” is described as something that “differ[s]” for the subject, “we”: it is not clear 
whether the first person plural pronoun is being used inclusively or exclusively, but either way the 
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possibility of different, contested meanings of „feminism‟ is portrayed. In Independent 08a, the 
relational process in which “what we meant by feminism” is the attribute is negated, with the writer 
distancing themselves from the meaning of „feminism‟ represented by “this”: again, the idea of 
differing meanings of „feminism‟ is portrayed. 
 The Independent 08a occurrences also demonstrate how „feminism‟ is complex in terms of 
having different meanings at different times. While the main clause portrays the present through the 
use of the present tense – “This isn‟t” – the wh-complement clause uses the past tense – “what we 
meant by feminism”, evoking the idea of differing meanings divided by time. The wh-complement 
clause is also in the past tense in Times 07b, which attributes a lack of knowledge of the meaning of 
„feminism‟ to “young women today”. Here, the deictic time expression “today” hones in on a particular 
generation of women in the present, and the thing that is attributed to them is negated – they have “no 
concept of what feminism once meant”: the generation gap is emphasised by the past tense of the 
wh-complement clause and the time adverbial “once”, presenting the idea of some lost meaning of 
„feminism‟. Other examples of time deixis and adverbials focus on contemporary meanings of 
„feminism‟, although they also underline its ambiguity. For example, the deicitic time expression “now” 
in Mail 06b and Times 08c presents contemporary meanings of „feminism‟: however, the main clause 
in Mail 06b is a negated representation of a state in which the writer presents themselves as uncertain 
about the contemporary meaning of „feminism‟, while the combination of a mental process of deciding 
and the deontic modal “have” in Times 08c emphasises the idea that a new generation of women has 
to decide on its own meaning for the word. The idea of different meanings for different times is also 
emphasised by adverbials of time in Express 02a – “what feminism means to them in 2002” – and 
Guardian 01c – “As we begin the 21
st
 century, what does feminism mean to us?” Similar to the use of 
person deixis, these uses of time deixis produce an additional implied meaning through a flout of 
quantity (Grice, 1975): „feminism‟ must mean/have meant something different at another time. 
 The remaining „feminism means X‟ processes express greater confidence about what 
„feminism‟ means: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 01c For Marie Jenny Howe […] feminism meant a “changed psychology, the 
creation of a new consciousness in women” 
Guardian 07a Feminism means having the balls to confront the stereotypes 
Independent 08a Or feminism means shouting, “leave him, Tarquin. He ain‟t worth it”, before 
bundling your fella into a cab 
Independent 08a But feminism means something different to women now 
Mail 03a To me, feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal, that men and 
women have to work together in mutual respect create a better world 
Mail 03a Feminism doesn‟t mean so much to my generation, not because we don‟t 
think it‟s important, but because our equality - at least in this country - has 
already been established 
Mail 06b Feminism can mean a lot of things to a lot of people 
Mail 08c Feminism never meant the degradation of women 
Times 09b Feminism means no fun or make-up, anger and hating men 
 
Table 5.2: Remaining occurrences of „feminism means X‟ 
 
The personal nature of definitions of „feminism‟ is again evident in adverbials that attribute particular 
definitions to particular people: “for Marie Jenny Howe” (Guardian 01c), “to women now” (Independent 
08a), “to me” (Mail 03a), “to my generation” (Mail 03a) and “to a lot of people” (Mail 06b). The difficulty 
of providing a clear definition is also explicitly acknowledged in Independent 08a and Mail 06b, in 
which the attributes are the vague “something different” and the open-ended “a lot of things to a lot of 
people”. Other attributes are more detailed in the definitions they provide, and accord with the OED 
(2015) definition of „feminism‟: Guardian 01c and Mail 03a observe the importance of women and 
equality between the sexes, while Guardian 07a is more allusive in its acknowledgement of the 
significance of gender with its definition of „feminism‟ as “having the balls to confront the stereotypes”, 
with “balls” denoting a body part and attitude usually associated with maleness. 
 The definitions provided by Independent 08a, Mail 08c and Times 09b depend on implied 
meanings. Each provides what is ultimately a positive interpretation of what „feminism‟ means, but 
does so by linking „feminism‟ with negative attributes. In Mail 08c, the use of litotes - a double 
negative “to achieve an ironic effect” (Beaton-Thome, 2013, p. 387) – produces the implied meaning 
that „feminism‟ is about a positive attitude to women through the use of the syntactic negation of the 
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proposition, with “never” cancelling out the idea that feminism meant “the degradation of women”. 
This implied meaning can be seen as resulting from either a flout of the maxim of manner (the writer 
could state what they mean more clearly) or quantity (the writer does not say anything about what 
feminism actually is) (Grice, 1975): the reader is not told anything about what „feminism‟ did mean, but 
is left to infer that it meant the opposite of “degradation”. 
In Independent 08a and Times 09b, flouts of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) produce 
implied meanings of „feminism‟. Each relies on the wider context for its correct interpretation, 
demonstrating the importance of looking beyond the sentence in which „feminism‟ occurs. 
Independent 08a‟s definition is in the context of a discussion of why it is hypocritical that women 
should be expected to remain sober in order to take care of drunk men, causing the writer to suggest 
that „feminism‟ means stopping men from getting into fights. The Times 09b definition appears in a 
discussion of the writer‟s opinions about young women who claim not to care about feminism, and 
represents what they perceive „feminism‟ to mean (“no fun or make-up, anger and hating men”), a 
perception that the writer clearly does not share. This example demonstrates the complexity of textual 
meaning. The sentence can be interpreted as a flout of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975), as the 
writer means the opposite of what they are saying; however, the wider context means this definition of 
„feminism‟ could be read as part of the free presentation of direct thought, following the previous 
sentence - “The only feminist they can think of is Julie Bindel. Feminism means no fun […]” Here, the 
second sentence could be interpreted as a phenomenon of the mental process “think” in the first 
sentence, which is attributed to “they” (younger women). This example supports the argument that it 
is important to look at the wider context to interpret textual meaning – not doing so would result in a 
mistaken impression of the textual meaning of this occurrence of „feminism‟. These examples also 
demonstrate how writers argue with “an imagined interlocutor” (Dean, 2010, p. 397): writers use 
thought presentation and implying to present definitions which they then argue against, contesting the 
meaning of „feminism‟. 
 
5.2.2 „Feminism is X‟ 
The analysis here looks at the 102 occurrences of unmodified „feminism‟ that fulfil the role of carrier in 
a relational process using the copular verb in a „feminism is X‟ structure. To make the discussion of a 
large quantity of occurrences of „feminism‟ manageable, the analysis is divided according to the type 
of grammatical entity that fulfils the role of attribute: section 5.2.2.1 looks at noun phrases (33 
occurrences), section 5.2.2.2 at adjective phrases (42), section 5.2.2.3 at prepositional phrases (18) 
and section 5.2.2.4 at wh-complement clauses (9). 
Some of the occurrences below correspond to the OED and Kelly (1982, p. 67) definitions of 
„feminism‟, in particular occurrences that appear in „feminism is about‟ structures. However, „feminism‟ 
is also presented as complex. Whereas the analysis of the „feminism means/does not mean X‟ 
structures discussed in section 5.2.1 showed that feminism is presented as dividing into different 
personal varieties, the „feminism is X‟ structures demonstrate how writers attribute different meanings 
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to different people, but then contest these definitions. In particular, thought presentation and deictic 
expressions for representing time and society are used to attribute particular (mis)understandings of 
what „feminism‟ means to particular people, and to suggest that certain understandings of feminism – 
in particular that it is dead – are misguided. 
 
5.2.2.1 ‘Feminism is [noun phrase]’ 
The X element is a noun phrase in 33 of the 102 „feminism is X‟ structures. The nature of these 
attributes is varied. Many of the head nouns correspond to Kelly‟s (1982, p. 67) definition of „feminism‟ 
as a “movement” (Guardian 06c, Mail 06a), “belief” (Guardian 03c, Mail 03a) and outlook (“idea” in 
Telegraph 05c, “ideology” in Independent 03a, “mindset” in Mail 03c). In other definitions the head 
noun of the attribute – „name‟, „word‟ – highlights that it is the lexeme „feminism‟ itself that is being 
discussed. In these instances, the definitions are negative. However, similar to the instances of 
implying and thought presentation discussed in section 5.2.1, these show how writers contend with 
the (alleged) perceptions of others. In particular, thought presentation is used to attribute negative 
perceptions to others. 
Table 5.3 comprises the examples of „feminism is [noun phrase]‟ in which the attribute is 
„word‟ or „name‟: 
  
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 04a Young women today could be forgiven for thinking that feminism was little more 
than the name given to an interminable media debate about how to get your 
work/life balance right 
Independent 00b In a climate in which feminism counts as the F-word unless its politics have 
received an egalitarian makeover (as post-feminism or power feminism), 
Whelehan‟s book ought to be welcomed 
Mail 09b You think feminism is a dirty, outmoded word we don‟t need any more? 
Telegraph 08c She found that increasingly the most important thing to girls is how sexually 
attractive they are to men and, that for many young women, feminism is a dirty 
word 
  
Table 5.3: Occurrences of „feminism is a word/name‟ 
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Taken in isolation, each of the clauses in table 5.3 portrays „feminism‟ as having a negative meaning. 
Independent 00b equates it with „fuck‟, Mail 09b and Telegraph 08c use the premodifiers “dirty” and 
“outmoded”, and Guardian 04a uses the negatively evaluative “interminable”. However, the use of 
thought presentation makes it clear that these are negative connotative meanings, and that these 
meanings exist for people other than the writers themselves. In Guardian 04a and Mail 09b the 
proposition that „feminism‟ is “the name given to an interminable media debate” or “a dirty, outmoded 
word” is presented as the thought of others – “Young women” and “You” respectively. The attribution 
of this thought to “You” in the rhetorical question in Mail 09b is particularly noteworthy: this is a 
pertinent example of a writer arguing with an imagined interlocutor (Dean, 2010, p. 397), in this 
instance by making an assumption about the readers‟ own thoughts about „feminism‟. 
 Telegraph 08c does not use thought presentation, but the adverbial “for many young women” 
performs a similar role to a reporting clause, restricting the applicability of “feminism is a dirty word” to 
this particular group. Similar to Guardian 04a and Mail 09b, it attributes a particular understanding of 
„feminism‟ to a particular group. Telegraph 08c differs slightly in that negative meanings of „feminism‟ 
are attributed to a “climate”, the head noun of a noun phrase in which “feminism counts as the F-
word” is part of the postmodification. This example is also significant for the way it prioritises 
information: the climate is part of an adverbial of place, contextualising the main clause, which states 
that Imelda Whelehan‟s book Overloaded “ought to be welcomed”. The deontically modal “ought” in 
the main clause – which lacks a subject – strongly suggests that Overloaded should be seen as a 
good thing, and the adverbial presents the reason why, i.e. because „feminism‟ is seen negatively. 
These examples demonstrate the “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9) from which support for 
feminism often comes: while the writers themselves do not attribute negative meanings to „feminism‟, 
they do make observations of others‟ negative perceptions, using these to argue in favour of more 
positive perceptions. 
 
5.2.2.2 ‘Feminism is [adjective phrase]’ 
X is an adjective phrase in 42 of the 102 „feminism is X‟ structures. A total of 48 adjectives are used to 
fill the attribute role in these relational processes. The most common theme concerns whether 
feminism is „alive‟ or „dead‟, with these antonyms – and synonyms of „dead‟ – accounting for 17 of the 
48 adjectives. This accords with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) finding that the adjective 
„dead‟ occurs frequently to the right of the „feminism is‟ structure (p. 416), and suggests that feminism 
is portrayed negatively and as a thing of the past – if it is dead, then it cannot be relevant today. 
However, as with the „feminism is [noun phrase]‟ examples, writers frequently attribute negative 
perceptions of „feminism‟ to others through thought presentation. Negating and hypothesising are also 
used to question the validity of the view that feminism is dead. 
Table 5.4 comprises the „feminism is alive/dead‟ structures: 
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Structure Occurrences 
„Feminism is alive‟ Guardian 06a, Mail 06a 
„Feminism is dead‟ Guardian 03b (x 2), Guardian 05a, Independent 03a, Mail 02a (x 2), 
Mail 03a, Mail 03b (x 2), Times 03a 
„Feminism is redundant‟ Guardian 03b, Times 03a 
„Feminism is over‟ Guardian 07a 
„Feminism is finished‟ Independent 03c, Mail 03b 
 
Table 5.4: Occurrences of „feminism is alive/dead‟ 
 
There are two occurrences of „feminism is alive‟ against a total of 15 occurrences of „feminism is 
dead/redundant/over/finished‟. This suggests a grim diagnosis of feminism‟s health. However, the 
wider context reveals a more complicated picture. Seven of the 15 pronouncements of feminism‟s 
death appear in the presentation of speech/thought/writing, distancing the writer from responsibility for 
the proposition‟s accuracy: 
 
 “People keep telling me that feminism is dead” (Guardian 03b). 
 “A report ordered by the Equal Opportunities Commission suggests that feminism is dead” 
(Times 03a). 
 “Feminism is finished, The Guardian announced last week” (Independent 03a). 
 “Time magazine ran an article asking, „Is Feminism Dead?‟” (Guardian 05a). 
 “Who says feminism is dead?” (Guardian 03b). 
 “It‟s strange, isn‟t it, to be told that feminism is dead” (Mail 03a). 
 “Everyone thinks feminism is over” (Guardian 07a). 
 
In these occurrences, various others are presented as saying and thinking things about feminism and 
its apparent death. Only Guardian 05a uses a direct report of speech, quoting the title of a Time 
magazine article to observe a trend for articles questioning feminism‟s status (notable in the Mail 03a 
article discussed in section 3.2) noticed by previous studies of feminism in the media (for example 
Kamen, 1991; Redfern & Aune, 2010; Rhode, 1995). A further two „feminism is dead‟ structures are 
attributed to others, one through being the phenomenon in a mental perception process of hearing – 
“it‟s strange to hear that feminism is finished” (Mail 03b) – and another through a nominalisation of 
announcements by unspecified sayers - “such stern condemnation has already inspired a rash of 
announcements that feminism is dead” (Independent 03a).  
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 Six other „feminism is dead‟ structures are either defeased or modalised through negating or 
hypothesising. Mail 02a argues that even though the feminist writers Doris Lessing and Fay Weldon 
are not as “man-hating” as formerly, “it doesn‟t mean feminism is dead”, negating the proposition of 
feminism‟s death in the main clause, while Guardian 03b uses a conditional „if… then‟ structure to 
make it clear that feminism would only be redundant in particular circumstances – “if women and men 
[…] were free, equal human beings, [then] feminism would be redundant”. Times 03a (“is feminism 
redundant?”), Mail 02a and 03a (“is feminism dead?”) and Guardian 03b (“who says feminism is 
dead?”) all use interrogative structures to question feminism‟s status, rather than to outright announce 
its death. 
 The remaining „feminism is dead‟ structure occurs at the beginning of the Mail 03b article, 
„Sorry, But Warthogs Have You Beat, Guys‟. In this instance, the writer is flouting the maxim of quality 
(Grice, 1975) to imply that feminism is, in fact, alive – a position made clear in some of the quotes 
noted above, including “it‟s strange to be told that feminism is dead after reading those loving obits of 
Katharine Hepburn”. This article, in particular, makes a point of linking the ideas of feminism and 
death, and then denying the association. However, as Lind and Salo (2002) observe, the linking of 
ideas such as „feminism‟ and „death‟ – even if the association is negated – still produces the “net 
effect” (p. 217) of an association between the two. These examples arguing against negative ideas 
about „feminism‟ also demonstrate Mendes‟ (2011a) point that when newspapers feature support for 
feminism, it is “often launched from a defensive position, arguing how feminism has not harmed 
society” (p. 9). 
 
5.2.2.3 ‘Feminism is [prepositional phrase]’ 
The attribute is a prepositional phrase in 18 of the 102 „feminism is X‟ structures. The use of a 
prepositional phrase as a complement means there is greater variety in the grammatical realisations 
of the attribute – how-clauses, non-finite verb phrases and noun phrases. These definitions of 
feminism portray „feminism‟ as having a positive meaning. Like the definitions of „feminism‟ in articles 
in Dean‟s (2010) study, they emphasise the importance of gender equality. Some also hint at what 
Mendes (2011a, pp. 10-11) calls the „lifestyling‟ of feminism, whereby self-improvement is prioritised 
over a more collectivist ideology.  
 The 18 occurrences of „feminism is about X‟ are compiled below: 
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Publication Feminism is about… 
Express 08a women being free to do what they wanted 
Guardian 06b sisterhood 
Guardian 06a a multiplicity of voices, growing louder and louder online 
Guardian 07a reawakening people to the fact that there are still big problems 
Guardian 09a women choosing how to behave and having the same rights and freedoms to 
behave badly as men do 
Independent 01a how male domination has to be replaced by female domination 
Independent 07a real sisterhood […] 
Independent 07a everything in the world, a vision of how the world can be 
Mail 01a having choices 
Mail 01a loving yourself as a woman 
Mail 09a being the best you can be for you 
Mirror 07c equality - for men and women in the workplace AND at home 
Sun 02b having the power to do whatever you want to do with your life 
Sun 04a (x 2) being proud of yourself, your body and your sexuality 
Telegraph 03c how gender precludes you from doing nothing 
Times 00a choice 
Times 05a securing for females the potential to be chief executives, prime ministers and 
merchant bankers while functioning as wives and mothers as well 
 
Table 5.5: Occurrences of „feminism is about X‟ 
 
Many of these definitions, like the noun phrase attributes discussed in section 5.2.2.1, correspond to 
the OED (2015) definition of „feminism‟ as “advocacy of equality of the sexes and the establishment of 
the political, social, and economic rights of the female sex”. Guardian 09a, Mirror 07c, Telegraph 03c 
and Times 05a, in particular, draw attention to relationships between men and women, and the 
importance of women being treated the same as men, while others fall onto the „individualist‟ side of 
the individualist/collectivist divide observed by Mendes (2011a, p. 159). Guardian 06b and 
Independent 07a, in particular, allude to the idea of a collectivist feminism in their definitions of 
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feminism as being about “sisterhood”, while the emphasis on “choice” in other definitions – for 
example the explicit uses of “choice(s)” and “choosing” in Guardian 09a, Mail 01a and Times 00a – 
reflects Taylor‟s (2003, p. 182) suggestion that modern media conceptions of feminism use „choice‟ to 
symbolise the importance of individual freedom. This sense of individualism is also constructed 
through the use of person deixis, with the second person singular “you” and “yourself” used in the 
representation of states which are beneficial for the individual: “loving yourself as a women” (Mail 
01a), “having the power to do whatever you want to do with your life” (Sun 02b), “being proud of 
yourself, your body and your sexuality” (Sun 04a). In these examples, the representation of states, 
rather than actions, is symbolic of a focus on the self rather than on collective action. Of particular 
note is Mail 09a, in which feminism is not only described as being about “being the best you can be”, 
but the adverbial contextualises this state through the adverbial “for you”, further emphasising the 
importance of the individual. 
 
5.2.2.4 ‘Feminism is [wh-complement clause]’ 
Nine attributes in „feminism is X‟ structures appear in wh-complement clauses in post-predicate 
position. Whereas the other „feminism is X‟ structures discussed in section 5.2.2 present the idea of 
different feminisms for different people or times, and argue against particular conceptions of 
„feminism‟, the „feminism is [wh-complement clause]‟ occurrences reflect uncertainty about what 
exactly feminism is. 
Table 5.6 comprises each of the nine occurrences: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 01b Trying to call this a feminist issue is an embarrassing and complete failure to 
recognise what feminism is really about 
Express 03a Writer Rebecca West memorably said: “I have never been able to find out precisely 
what feminism is” 
Express 09b The writer Rebecca West memorably said: “I have never been able to find out 
precisely what feminism is” 
Guardian 01a We had arrived hoping to learn more about what feminism was […] 
Guardian 06b They don‟t know what feminism is all about 
Guardian 08b But I didn‟t know what feminism was 
Mail 03b All this simply reflects our confusion about what feminism is 
Mail 06b […] I don‟t think many people my age have a true understanding of what feminism 
even is 
Mail 09a Working with HGB changed my attitude towards what feminism is 
 
Table 5.6: Occurrences of „what feminism is‟ 
 
In each wh-complement clause, it is the definition or nature of feminism that is being 
questioned. This reflects a concern noted in Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) study regarding 
“what feminism really is” (p. 418) and is evidenced by the use of negating. In the Rebecca West quote 
cited in Express 03a and 09b (and discussed in the sample analysis in section 3.2), the predicator “to 
find out” postmodifies the complement “able”, which itself is negated by the adverb “never”, 
emphasising West‟s inability to understand what feminism is. In Guardian 06b and 08b, the predicator 
“know” is negated, attributing a lack of knowledge of feminism to the subjects, while in Mail 06b the 
knowledge of “people my age” is modalised by the verb in the main clause, “to think”, which is 
negated to express the writer‟s doubts. „What feminism is‟ is also part of the postmodification of larger 
noun phrases that stress confusion: “an embarrassing and complete failure to recognise what 
feminism is really about” (Express 01b), “our confusion about what feminism is” (Mail 03b). 
Elsewhere, “attitudes towards what feminism is” are placed after the predicator “to change” (Mail 09a), 
portraying feminism as mutable. In the remaining occurrence, the writer explains that “we had arrived 
hoping to learn more about what feminism was, or had been, before the „post‟ kicked in” (Guardian 
01a). While the prefix „post-‟ can have different meanings (see section 2.1.1), in this instance its use 
in the circumstance “before the „post‟ kicked in” suggests that feminism is “historical and no longer 
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current” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 411). Overall, the wh-complement clauses present 
„feminism‟ as referring to something that is too complex for certain people to understand. 
 
5.2.3 „Feminism is not X‟ 
The „feminism is not X‟ structure occurs 24 times. Although this is a much smaller number than the 
102 occurrences of „feminism is X‟, the use of negating in these examples provides evidence that 
„feminism‟ is often described according to what it is not (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000, p. 61). 
Strikingly, 11 of the 24 „feminism is not X‟ structures are part of the presentation of speech, with 
female writers defining what feminism is not, for example “„feminism has never been dead – it‟s just 
that the media has been lazy‟, says Andi Zeisler, the founding editor of Bitch” (Guardian 07c). In 
particular, writers and those whose speech is being presented argue against the idea that feminism is 
dead (see the analysis of „feminism is [adjective phrase]‟ in section 5.2.2.2 above), with the use of 
negating enabling them to argue against this common perception. Contrasting is also used to expand 
on the ideas that are negated, as a means for writers to present feminism in a more positive light. 
 In each of the „feminism is not X‟ structures, a proposition is negated. However, in many 
occurrences the effect is that, ultimately, something positive is said about „feminism‟. This is most 
obvious in the examples below, each of which contests the idea that feminism is dead:  
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 07c […] there‟s a groundswell of new feminist magazines, which are evidence not 
just that feminism isn‟t dead, but that it‟s thriving 
Guardian 07c Feminism has never been dead – it‟s just that the media has been lazy […] 
Independent 08a […] feminism isn‟t dead yet 
Mail 02a Feminism isn‟t dead, it‟s simply lying dormant 
 
Table 5.7: Occurrences of „feminism is not dead‟ 
 
The „feminism is not dead‟ structures are a form of litotes, with their meaning depending on a double 
negative (Beaton-Thome, 2013, p. 387) and a flout of manner and/or quantity (Grice, 1975) (see 
discussion of the „feminism does not mean X‟ structure in section 5.2.1). In „feminism is not dead‟, the 
semantically negative „dead‟ is negated by the syntactic negation of the proposition („not‟, „never‟), 
resulting in an implied positive meaning – that feminism is alive. However, the linking of ideas such as 
„feminism‟ and „death‟ – even if the association is negated – will still cause readers to associate the 
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two (Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 217). As a result, the state of being dead, or at least of enjoying only 
dubious health, is part of the textual meaning of „feminism‟ in this context. 
 Eight of the 24 „feminism is not X‟ structures demonstrate an awareness of this problem, with 
the writer or speaker expanding the structure into a „feminism is not X, feminism is Y‟ structure that 
allows them to contrast a negative perception of what „feminism‟ means with a more positive one. This 
use of contrasting allows writers to argue against others‟ negative perceptions of feminism. Table 5.8 
lists the X and Y coordinates in these instances of negated opposition:  
 
Publication Feminism is not Feminism is 
Guardian 01b a rigid set of given positions, an agenda, an 
ideology 
radical […] a premise of freedom 
Guardian 03b cool the realm of middle-aged nostalgia 
for youth 
Guardian 07c dead thriving 
Guardian 09a about chiding other women, or establishing 
yet another set of standards for women to 
be judged against 
a social justice movement 
Guardian 09b scary or a fringe movement a movement for the good of all 
society 
Mail 02a dead lying dormant 
Mail 03a about the pressure to have everything at 
once 
about the freedom to choose what 
you want 
Times 09b about rights or social advances shopping 
 
Table 5.8: Occurrences of „feminism is not X, feminism is Y‟ 
 
Two of the „feminism is not dead‟ structures are expanded to produce a contrast with what feminism is 
– either the near antonymous thriving (Guardian 07c) or the less obviously positive lying dormant 
(Mail 02a). The latter example demonstrates the power of contrasting to construct new opposites. 
Ordinarily, „dormant‟ might be seen as residing nearest the „dead‟ end of the “plane of difference” 
(Davies, 2008, p. 185) between the conventional opposites „alive‟ and „dead‟. Here, however, dead 
and dormant are opposites, with the latter taking on a more positive evaluative meaning than would 
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ordinarily be the case: at least there is the promise of feminism being conscious and fully alive again 
at some point in the future. 
 In other instances, negated opposition is used not just to try to undermine the connotations of 
death attached to „feminism‟, but also to stress connotations of freedom and inclusivity. Each of these 
constructed oppositions can be traced to more conventional superordinate opposites: the contrasts 
between a rigid set of given positions, an agenda, an ideology and radical […] a premise of 
freedom (Guardian 01b), and about the pressure to have everything at once and about the 
freedom to choose what you want (Mail 03a) both have connotations of the more conventional 
limited/free, while establishing yet another set of standards and a social justice movement 
(Guardian 09a), and a fringe movement and a movement for the good of all society (Guardian 
09b) both relate to the antonyms exclusivity/inclusivity. Again, there is the sense of writers and 
speakers having to create a positive meaning for „feminism‟ by first of all arguing against negative 
connotations (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9). 
 The remaining two examples from table 5.8 appear to provide more negative definitions of 
what feminism is. However, each discusses „feminism‟ from the point of view of others, again arguing 
support for feminism from a defensive position (Mendes, 2011a, p. 10). Times 09b‟s rights or social 
advances/shopping opposition occurs in the following passage: 
 
 “[…] the language of women's liberation was ransacked by companies trying to flog us stuff. 
 Suddenly feminism wasn't about rights or social advances, but shopping” 
 
The exact meaning of the „feminism wasn‟t about X, but Y‟ opposition can only be understood in the 
context of the previous sentence, in which “the language of women‟s liberation” (here synonymous 
with „feminism‟) is the goal in a material action process of ransacking by “companies trying to flog us 
stuff”. It is not that the writer thinks „feminism‟ equates with shopping, but that in this particular context 
they believe that it does. Similarly, a negative view of „feminism‟ – “not cool” – is presented as the 
perception of others through an adverbial phrase in Guardian 03b: 
 
“[…] for women of my generation (I'm a child of the 70s), feminism is supposedly not cool. It‟s 
the realm of middle-aged women nostalgic for lost youth” 
 
This example demonstrates the importance of a consideration of the full range of ways of creating 
textual meaning. The contextualisation of the state – “feminism is supposedly not cool” – being 
represented with the circumstance “for women of my generation” limits the validity of the proposition 
as applying to only a certain group of people, while the modal adverb “supposedly” allows the writer to 
hypothesise about the likeliness of feminism not being cool – this is only something that is supposed 
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by some. In each of these examples, writers make use of contrasting to acknowledge and then 
subvert others‟ perceptions of feminism. 
 
5.2.4 „Feminism becomes X‟ 
The analysis of „feminism is not X, feminism is Y‟ (see section 5.2.3) demonstrates that contrasting is 
used to argue against the idea of feminism‟s death. Unmodified „feminism‟ also appears in contrasts 
that portray changes in feminism. The present section analyses the eight instances of unmodified 
„feminism‟ that appear in a „feminism becomes X‟ structure. These occurrences involve a transitional 
opposition, whereby feminism is presented as changing from one state to another (Davies, 2012, p. 
62). These occurrences are of particular interest in light of Davies‟s (2012) contention that transitional 
oppositions do not “assert, express a preference for, compare, or demonstrate the unexpectedness of 
one state or opinion over another” (p. 62), but rather neutrally portray a change of state. The eight 
cases of „feminism becomes X‟ are notable for the fact that they consistently portray the element that 
is being transitioned into as negative. 
The eight occurrences of „feminism becomes X‟ are compiled in table 5.9: 
 
Publication X element Y element 
Express 04a (x 2) feminism a dirty word 
Guardian 00a women‟s liberation feminism 
Independent 04a feminism a way to make the women repulsed by a war-obsessed 
Prime Minister, vote for him again after all 
Mail 01b feminism a term of abuse 
Mail 06a feminism a career option 
Mail 06b feminism a „dirty word‟ 
Times 02b feminism the Establishment 
 
Table 5.9: Occurrences of unmodified „feminism‟ in transitional oppositions 
 
By presenting „feminism‟ as the thing being transitioned from, the articles express the idea of 
„feminism‟ as something that has passed, in accordance with studies that argue that newspapers 
place feminism in the past (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 
2012). However, these examples of transitional opposition suggest that „feminism‟ has become 
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something negative or unexpected, going against Davies‟s (2012, p. 62) contention that this type of 
opposition frame presents neutral changes. This is demonstrated by examples of metalanguage: 
 
 “Feminism has become a dirty word” (Express 04a x 2). 
 “Feminism has become a term of abuse” (Mail 01b). 
 “Feminism had become a „dirty word‟” (Mail 06b). 
 
These examples express a transition of pejoration in the meaning or connotations of „feminism‟. They 
also accord with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012, p. 416) finding that „dirty word‟ appears 
recurrently to the right of the „feminism is a/the‟ structure. By looking at the wider context, it is possible 
to see that each is also part of the writer‟s presentation of speech, which is attributed to either a 
feminist writer (Erica Jong in Express 04a, Naomi Wolf in Mail 01b) or a worker for a feminist 
organisation (Amy Pratt of Womankind Worldwide in Mail 06b). Jong goes on to say that “young 
women today are reacting: rebelling, really, against their mothers‟ generations”, while Pratt notes that 
“a lot of us believe equality has been achieved”: rather than expressing a distaste for „feminism‟, they 
are bemoaning what they see as the pejoration of the word. Wolf‟s sentiments are more conflicted, 
and her verbiage is an example of the discussion of possible alternatives to „feminism‟: “feminism 
has become a term of abuse, almost. Maybe I would like to be called something else”. The contrasts 
do not note the cause of the transitions they portray, the changes apparently having occurred of their 
own accord. This is partly a result of the use of the relational intensive verb „become‟, which presents 
a change as “unfolding „inertly‟, without an input of energy” (Halliday, 2004, p. 211). As examples of 
the explicit discussion of „feminism‟, these transitional oppositions suggest that the word has 
undergone a shift in meaning, and that this has been a process of pejoration. 
 Other transitions are also negative, for example Independent 04a‟s suggestion that feminism 
may have become a way to make the women repulsed by a war-obsessed Prime Minister vote 
for him again after all. This example relies on Grice‟s (1975) maxim of relation in order to be 
interpreted correctly: readers are likely to infer from their own knowledge of „feminism‟ – and the fact 
that it is portrayed as having preceded the Y element – that this transition represents a narrowing 
down from something larger or more substantial. Other examples also portray unexpected transitional 
oppositions: “feminism became a career option”, “feminism has become the Establishment” 
(Times 02b). The surprising textual meaning in each instance – that „feminism‟ could be associated 
with words like “career option” and “the Establishment” – is a result of the interaction of the 
representation of a state and the expression of a contrast: the relational intensive process expresses 
a relationship of equivalence between a carrier and an attribute, with the two defining each other; 
however, the transitional opposition treats them as X and Y elements, with a shift from one to the 
other. 
 In the one instance where feminism is the Y element which is being transitioned into, 
Guardian 00a emphasises a transition in the state of feminism itself: “women‟s liberation became 
feminism, a quite different politics that soon splintered into a maelstrom of competing 
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arguments and identities”. This particular opposition is counterintuitive, portraying what might 
usually be seen as synonyms as though they are antonyms (although feminist writers such as Greer 
(2000, p. 2) observe a distinction between the two). The fact that an appositive noun phrase packages 
up the idea of „feminism‟ having splintered suggests that the Y element is the „bad‟ superordinate, 
giving the impression that a formerly positive and pure movement has been watered down. This also 
accords with Greer‟s (2000) view of the shift between „women‟s liberation‟ and „feminism‟, in which 
she laments that “what none of us noticed was that the ideal of liberation was fading out with the 
word” (p. 2). 
 
 
5.3 ‘Feminism’ with minimal modification 
58 occurrences of „feminism‟ are minimally modified through determiners and/or predeterminers. 
These occurrences account for 6% of the total in the dataset (figure 5.1). This is a relatively small 
section of the dataset, but these occurrences are of interest as they refer to particular types of 
feminism, thereby presenting it as “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 49). The discussion of „feminism‟ 
with minimal modification here focuses on 27 of the 58 occurrences, each of which uses determiners 
to package up the idea of a feminism that belongs to a particular individual or group, e.g. „my 
feminism‟. These occurrences are similar to the „feminism means/does not mean X‟ structures 
discussed in section 5.2.1 in that they present feminism as something that is complex and “deeply 
individual and personal” (Mendes, 2012, p. 559). The following analysis of „individual feminism‟ looks 
at the two most common transitivity process roles among the 27 occurrences: carriers in relational 
processes (11 occurrences) and actors in material action processes (eight occurrences). 
 Where individual feminism is a carrier, the premodification of „feminism‟ marks it out as a 
particular type and the relational process provides a definition of this particular strand of feminism. 
Table 5.10 comprises the 11 occurrences of individual feminism as a carrier: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 03a […] her feminism was a very serious matter 
Guardian 03a […] her feminism was very much rooted in intellectualism 
Guardian 09b My feminism is about realism, looking at the issues and choices that face us 
every day […] 
Guardian 09c Time for a good scrap about what our feminism really is 
Independent 07a Bindel‟s brand of feminism is definitely woman-biased […] 
Independent 07a King‟s feminism, as portrayed in this soundbite, is a feminism that can only be 
signed up to at the point when there‟s no need for feminism any more 
Mail 01a So my feminism never became an issue […] 
Mail 04a Her new brand of feminism, then, is in part a personal crusade 
Mail 08c […] their feminism was based on the belief that women were different from 
men and worthier than them 
Mail 09a HGB‟s brand of feminism is totally non-judgmental 
Telegraph 06b Her feminism was straightforward: women should have equal rights with men - 
equal pay, equal opportunities for employment and promotion - and maternity 
leave 
 
Table 5.10: Occurrences of individual „feminism‟ in relational processes 
 
In each occurrence in table 5.10, a particular type of feminism is defined. However, the fact that 
naming is used to portray the idea of feminism as something that can belong to individuals – “my” 
(Guardian 09b), “Bindel‟s” (Independent 07a), etc. – means that each process also implies something 
about other types of feminism. For example, Mail 09a‟s assertion that “HGB [Cosmopolitan editor 
Helen Gurley Brown]‟s brand of feminism is totally non-judgemental” flouts the maxim of quantity 
(Grice, 1975): the use of the determiner “HGB” acknowledges that there are other types of feminism, 
but it is only Brown‟s particular brand that is defined in the relational process. The reader is left to infer 
that other people‟s brands of feminism are judgemental. This demonstrates the potential of naming to 
give rise to textual meaning – the packaging up of propositions about a referent into the noun phrase 
means that the proposition itself gives rise to implied meanings about other possible carriers. In this 
way, each of the relational processes in table 5.10 defines „feminism‟ as something complex: not only 
does the naming acknowledge the individual nature of feminism, but the definitions of these 
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feminisms imply that, for example, while one brand of feminism might be “woman-biased” 
(Independent 07a), others are not. 
 The occurrences of individual feminism as an actor in material action processes are more 
explicit about the existence of different types of feminism. These processes are also notable for the 
way they define feminism as something malleable that can change over time: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 03a […] my mother‟s feminism never made me feel uncomfortable or different 
Guardian 03a […] my mum‟s feminism has mellowed, but I don‟t think she has any regrets 
Guardian 04a […] my feminism just slipped from my head into my body […]  
Guardian 04a Ensler‟s brand of feminism has evolved since The Vagina Monologues 
Guardian 05c Dworkin‟s feminism often came into conflict with the more compromising theories 
of others, such as Naomi Wolf 
Mail 09a I think HGB‟s inclusive brand of feminism has outlasted all the others […] 
Mail 09a What has HGB‟s „bare your bra rather than burn it‟ kind of feminism ever done for 
you? 
Sun 09a My sort of feminism tried hard to demystify women‟s bodies […] 
 
Table 5.11: Occurrences of individual „feminism‟ as an actor in material action processes 
 
The idea of feminism as something changeable is expressed in several material action supervention 
processes. These are processes where something “just happens” (Simpson, 1993, p. 89), without any 
intention on the part of the actor. Particular types of feminism are presented as having “mellowed” 
(Guardian 03a), “slipped” between parts of the body (Guardian 04a) or “evolved” (Guardian 04a). In 
these examples, feminism is not only something that differs depending on who possesses it, but that 
can change involuntarily over time. Other material action processes make explicit the existence of 
different types of feminism, and present them as contradictory (Mendes, 2011a, p. 9). For example, 
Mail 09a acknowledges the existence of multiple feminisms, naming Helen Gurley Brown‟s own brand 
and, more generally, “all the others”: the former is the actor, and presented as having “outlasted” the 
goal of the process – “all the others”. This presents the idea of multiple feminisms which vary in terms 
of longevity. Guardian 05c focuses on feminist writer Andrea Dworkin‟s type of feminism, which is 
presented as the actor in the process “came into conflict”, with “the more compromising theories of 
others” as the goal. This example again presents the idea of conflict between different types of 
129 
 
feminism. The naming of theories as “more compromising” further suggests the idea of stricter and 
more lenient types of feminism, reflecting Dean‟s (2010) observation of “a reasonable/moderate 
feminism and an excessive or overly radical feminism” (p. 402). 
 
5.4 ‘Feminism’ with detailed modification 
I now turn to occurrences of „feminism‟ that are modified by premodifying adjectives, appositive noun 
phrases and post-modifying prepositional phrases and relative clauses. This level of modification 
allows writers to package up a greater amount of information into „feminism‟-headed noun phrases. 
230 occurrences of „feminism‟ carry detailed modification (figure 5.1), accounting for 23% of 
occurrences in the feminism dataset. The analysis below is divided into two parts: section 5.4.1 
focuses on the modification of „feminism‟ through appositive noun phrases, and section 5.4.2 on the 
adjectives that occur in the premodification of „feminism‟. The discussion of apposition shows how 
feminism and the lexeme „feminism‟ itself are discussed in the data, finding that the word is often 
portrayed as somehow problematic, while the analysis of adjectives shows how feminism is divided 
into different varieties reflecting different time periods and levels of political commitment. 
 
5.4.1 „Feminism‟ with appositive noun phrases 
There are 24 occurrences of apposition in the feminism dataset. The analysis here disregards four 
occurrences that relate to Natasha Walter‟s The New Feminism, as they are specifically about a book 
rather than feminism itself. I first of all focus on eight occurrences of metalanguage, before looking at 
the remaining 12 occurrences, which use apposition to “provide background information” (Biber et al., 
1999, p. 639) about feminism. The analysis finds that portrayals of feminism and „feminism‟ are 
mixed: they are equated with other things that are both positive and negative, while some examples 
address problems related to the word „feminism‟, for example that while the concepts underlying 
„feminism‟ are valuable, the lexeme itself is perceived to be undesirable. 
Table 5.12 comprises the eight metalinguistic occurrences of „feminism‟ in appositive noun 
phrases, where „feminism‟ is presented as equivalent to another noun phrase headed by either „word‟, 
„term‟ or „phrase‟:  
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Publication Sentence 
Express 09a The term feminism needs to be redefined for the present age 
Guardian 06a It‟s the word feminism that is the problem 
Independent 01a When testing questions for her study, Can Do Girls, respondents advised her 
to remove the word „feminism‟ because they were uncomfortable with it 
Independent 04c Whoever coined the phrase „post-feminism‟ should be shot 
Independent 09a Most women my age don‟t like the word feminism and don‟t choose to identify 
as feminists 
Mail 09a […] I can hear the rustle of disdain once more as the words feminism and 
HGB are mentioned in the same sentence 
Telegraph 09b Ever tried saying the word „feminism‟ without a sneer?  
Times 09a But then I got tetchy all over again about losing the word feminism […] 
 
Table 5.12: Metalinguistic occurrences of „feminism‟ in appositive noun phrases 
 
The discussion of „feminism‟ in these examples is notable for the fact that there are no clear accounts 
of the denotative meaning of the lexeme. Guardian 06a is the only instance in which „feminism‟ 
appears in the representation of a state, with a relational intensive process presenting it as equivalent 
to “the problem”. The problematic nature of „feminism‟ is underlined by the use of the definite 
determiner – the problem, not just a problem – and the use of a cleft structure, which places the focus 
on “the word feminism” and serves to presuppose the content of the relative clause, i.e. that the word 
is indeed “the problem”. The notion of „feminism‟ itself being in some way problematic or undesirable 
occurs throughout the sentences in processes in which „feminism‟ fulfils a passive role in mental, 
verbalisation and material action processes. In Independent 09a, “the word „feminism‟” is a 
phenomenon that women “don‟t like”. The verbalisation processes in Telegraph 09b and Mail 09a are 
more complex presentations of people‟s negative reactions to „feminism‟. The rhetorical question in 
Telegraph 09b implies that „feminism‟ is undesirable through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 
1975): no answer to the question “ever tried saying the word „feminism‟ without a sneer?” is provided, 
leaving the reader to infer that this is not possible. It is not clear whether the implicature is that it is not 
possible to say „feminism‟ without sneering at the word or that something about the word itself causes 
a speaker‟s face to become contorted: in either case, it is implied that „feminism‟ has negative 
connotations. Mail 09a presents it as incompatible with another word, “HGB” (referring to 
Cosmopolitan editor Helen Gurley Brown). Here, the mentioning of the two words together is 
presented in an adverbial and is the cause of “the rustle of disdain” that the writer can hear. This 
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example demonstrates that what „feminism‟ represents is deemed to be incompatible with what 
certain figures such as Brown represent, providing evidence for Mendes‟ (2011a) observation of 
conflict over “who could be called a feminist” (p. 158).  
Where „feminism‟ is the goal in a material action process, its undesirability is made clear 
where its removal is being advised (Independent 01a) and where it “needs to be redefined for the 
present age” (Express 09a). The latter example presents the idea of „feminism‟ as something 
malleable, and the adverbial “for the present age” reflects Dean‟s (2010) observation that feminism is 
“temporally situated in the past” (p. 401); the idea of „feminism‟ being “redefined” leaves open the idea 
that it may be possible to adapt it and make it suitable for the present. The final two examples, from 
Times 09a and Independent 04c, show „feminism‟ in a more positive light. „Feminism‟ again appears 
in an adverbial in Times 09a, where the possibility of its loss is the cause of the writer‟s having 
become “tetchy”, while Independent 04c highlights the complexity of the derivational form „post-
feminism‟: “the phrase „post-feminism‟” is the goal in a material action process of coining, and the 
proposition of the main clause is that the actor in this process – “whoever” – ought to be shot. This 
condoning of violence against someone who has coined a feminist term might appear to represent 
another example of hostility towards „feminism‟. However, the writer‟s opinions about misogynist 
denouncements of Big Brother contestants make it clear that he or she is sympathetic towards 
feminism, and that this is an instance in which a writer considers the term „post-feminism‟ to be 
synonymous with the disavowal of feminism, rather than symbolic of a more contemporary wave of 
feminism (Mendes, 2011a, p. 8). 
The remaining examples of apposition present feminism as equivalent with the contents of 
other words and phrases: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00a Women‟s liberation became feminism, a quite different politics that soon splintered 
into a maelstrom of competing arguments and identities 
Guardian 00c […] all these ideas that I had thought were the left - feminism and diversity and 
gay and lesbian rights - were suddenly very chic 
Guardian 06a She‟s part of what is called „pro-sex feminism‟, a movement that doesn't see what 
is wrong with having sexuality and sexual attractiveness as part of the message 
Guardian 06b Each carnival […] is hosted by a different blogger, who invites people to contribute 
articles on current events or a general theme: „radical feminism‟, for instance, or 
„1970s feminism and what it means today‟ 
Guardian 07b This was followed a few weeks later by Global Feminisms, an exhibition […] 
Guardian 08a It‟s like some dystopian future... feminism without any feminists 
Mirror 03a I don‟t care what we call it - Feminism, Girl Power, even Margery - but we still 
need some word that says that women don't always get an even deal 
Telegraph 01c Vindictiveness has always been an element in any reform movement, whether it is 
socialism, liberalism or feminism 
Times 07c And feminism, another out-of-favour concept, holds the solution […] 
Times 08b […] feminism should be taught in schools: a „reinvigorated‟ feminism that is 
designed to appeal to young women […] 
Times 09a If […] it is feminism - a movement designed to make women equal in status to 
men; the only movement in the past 2,000 years specifically and solely dedicated 
to making women happy - that is being blamed for making women unhappy [then] 
we‟re going to have to do some serious rebranding […] 
 
Table 5.13: Remaining occurrences of „feminism‟ in appositive noun phrases 
 
These examples of apposition present feminism in a variety of ways. Times 07c and Telegraph 01c 
are sceptical in their portrayals of feminism, likening it to other concepts and movements that are in 
some way undesirable. The former places „feminism‟ in apposition with the negatively evaluative noun 
phrase “another out-of-favour concept”, in which the iterative “another” presupposes that other, similar 
concepts (that are not in favour) also exist. Telegraph 01c places feminism in a list with “socialism” 
and “liberalism”, which are all portrayed as equivalent with “any reform movement”; this in turn 
postmodifies “an element”, which is presented as equivalent with “vindictiveness” through the 
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representation of a state. These examples reflect previous studies‟ findings that feminism is presented 
as “tangential to the lives of contemporary women and [...] mired in bitterness” (Callaghan et al., 1999, 
p. 163). 
 Other relations of equivalence involving feminism are less negative. Guardian 06a places a 
particular variety of feminism – “pro-sex feminism” – in scare quotes; the gloss provided by the 
appositive noun phrase – which emphases the importance of sexuality to this variety – reflects 
previous studies‟ observations of portrayals of more contemporary, “sexy” types of feminism (Mendes, 
2012, p. 561). Times 09a uses the sense of equivalence provided by apposition to define „feminism‟ in 
a positive way in keeping with the OED (2015) definition, placing the emphasis on equality between 
the sexes (Dean, 2010): “a movement designed to make women equal in status to men; the only 
movement in the past 2,000 years specifically and solely dedicated to making women happy”. 
However, the hypothesising „if... then‟ structure observes that, in spite of these merits, feminism is 
being “blamed for making women unhappy”. The writer makes their own support for feminism clear in 
the „then‟ clause – “we‟re going to have to do some serious rebranding”. Here, the use of the proximal 
person deixis “we” as the actor and the strong deontic modality of “have to” provide a sort of rallying 
cry for the “rebranding” of feminism: if people view feminism negatively, then it is important that 
people work together to change that perception. 
The Times 09a example is also notable for “rebranding”, in which the iterative trigger “re-” 
presupposes that feminism has been branded before, and emphasises the need for change. The idea 
of „feminism‟ having somehow changed, or needing to be changed, is found in a number of the 
examples in table 5.13. Times 08b and Mirror 03a, like Times 09a, use iterative triggers to emphasise 
the idea of feminism‟s continuing importance. In Times 08b, deontic modality - “should” - emphasises 
the importance of teaching feminism, and in particular “a „reinvigorated‟ feminism that is designed to 
appeal to young women”. Here, the “re-” prefix presupposes that feminism has lost its invigoration, 
and that – as Times 09a suggests – while feminism itself may have fallen out of favour, the ideas that 
it denotes are still important. Mirror 03a goes further, emphasising the importance of feminist ideas 
over the importance of the words that are used to represent them. Here, „feminism‟ is listed alongside 
other possible names for “it” – “Girl Power” and “Margery” – and the writer uses the negation of a 
mental reaction process (“I don‟t care what we call it”) to emphasise that the name used is 
inconsequential. However, this apathy is contrasted with the next clause through a concessive 
opposition, observing “but we still need some word that says that women don‟t always get a fair deal”: 
apathy about word form is contrasted with the necessity for a word that has the sort of meaning 
associated with „feminism‟, with the iterative trigger “still” presupposing that this need has existed in 
the past, and emphasising that it still exists today.  
 
5.4.2 „Feminism‟ with premodifying adjectives 
This section provides an overview of the 161 adjectives used in the premodification of occurrences of 
„feminism‟, categorising them according to Biber et al.‟s (1999, pp. 508-509) distinction between 
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descriptors and classifiers (see section 4.3.1.1) and looking at the most frequently occurring 
adjectives. This overview allows me to draw some early comparisons to the findings of previous 
studies, before the analysis in sections 5.4.2.1 to 5.4.2.3 looks in greater depth at frequently occurring 
combinations of adjectives and „feminism‟. 
Figure 5.3 shows how the adjectives that premodify „feminism‟ are divided according to Biber 
et al.‟s (1999, pp. 508-509) distinction between different types of descriptors and classifiers: 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify „feminism‟ 
 
Classifiers (55%) account for a slightly higher proportion of the adjectives than descriptors (45%). The 
most common subcategories are time descriptors (27% of all adjectives) and topical/other classifiers 
(30%). The prevalence of time descriptors may reflect Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) finding 
that feminism is “heavily historicised through frequent references to past decades and the history of 
the movement” (p. 413), while the use of topical/other classifiers – those that describe referents “in 
relation to other referents” (Biber, et al., 1999, p. 508) – reflects Dean‟s (2010, p. 402) observation 
that feminism is frequently divided into different types, for example old/new and reasonable/radical. 
The impression that time is an important aspect of the premodification of „feminism‟ is 
supported by the raw figures for premodifying adjectives that occur most frequently in the feminism 
dataset: 
 
1 
44 
8 
19 
21 
19 
49 
Size/quantity/extent descriptor
Time descriptor
Evaluative/emotive descriptor
Miscellaneous descriptor
Relational/classificational/
restrictive classifier
Affiliative classifier
Topical/other classifier
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Adjective No. of occurrences 
New 25 
Modern(-day) 12 
Radical 10 
Second-wave 9 
American, old(-style) 6 
Western(-style), third-wave 5 
Socialist 4 
British, contemporary, lipstick, 
Power, traditional 
3 
 
Table 5.14: Most frequently occurring adjectives that premodify „feminism‟ 
 
The prominence of the time descriptor „new‟ is interesting in light of Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s 
(2012, p. 416) finding that it is a common collocate of „feminism‟, a result that itself lent weight to 
previous‟ studies convictions concerning how newspaper articles frequently invoke “a new and 
„glamorous‟ feminism” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 394) in order to dismiss the feminism(s) of previous 
generations. The presence of „modern(-day)‟, „contemporary‟ and „old(-style)‟ in the list supports the 
impression that portrayals of this division also appear in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. „Second-wave‟ and 
„third-wave‟, which I classify as relational classifiers that delimit “the referent of a noun […] in relation 
to other referents” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 509), add to the impression of different groups of feminists 
divided by time.  
Previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Lind & Salo, 
2002) have noted that „feminism‟ frequently co-occurs with „radical‟, „socialist‟ and other adjectives 
that denote political movements. „Radical‟ and „socialist‟ – topical/other classifiers that pinpoint a 
particular type of feminism – are also prominent here, occurring ten and 4 times respectively. Other 
topical classifiers – „lipstick‟, „power‟, „traditional‟ – also evoke the idea of different feminisms that are 
politicised to varying degrees. Finally, „American‟, „Western(-style)‟ and „British‟ suggest an Anglo-
Saxon bias previously identified in Jaworska & Krishnamurthy‟s (2012, p. 411) finding that collocates 
associate feminism with the West.  
The following analysis of „feminism‟ and premodifying adjectives focuses on the patterns 
identified here: discussion of feminism in terms of the waves metaphor (described in section 2.1.1), 
the emphasis on new and old varieties of feminism, and references to the political nature of feminism. 
The discussion finds evidence not only that „feminism‟ has contested meanings, but that different 
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types of feminism are frequently placed in opposition to each other (as with the individual varieties 
discussed in section 5.3). In particular, while second wave and political varieties of feminism are 
located in the past, the articles compare them favourably to newer varieties, which are seen to be 
vague. This contrast provides evidence for Dean‟s (2010) observations concerning domestication, 
whereby a radical feminism is placed in the past, and a more moderate feminism located in the 
present. However, the analysis of textual meaning demonstrates that the articles do not necessarily 
favour newer varieties over older ones. 
 
5.4.2.1 ‘First/second/third wave feminism’ 
The waves metaphor is used in the premodification of 15 occurrences of „feminism‟. There are nine 
instances of „second wave‟, five of „third wave‟ and just one of „first wave‟. The acknowledgement of 
different „waves‟ of feminism underscores its contested meaning, as something that has different 
meanings at different times. The analysis here demonstrates that where premodification picks out the 
second wave, it presents „feminism‟ as “historical and no longer current” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 
2012, p. 411). This effect is achieved through the use of other modification and the tense of states, 
actions and events in which „feminism‟ occurs, e.g. “the new idolatry of shiny careerism promulgated 
by the second-wave feminism of the late 1960s” (Telegraph 08a). There is also evidence that while 
the third wave is marked out as different to the second wave, the exact meaning of this particular 
feminism is ambiguous (Mendes, 2012, p. 556). 
  The one occurrence of „first-wave feminism‟ is placed firmly in the past in the nominalisation 
“the defeat of „first-wave‟ feminism in America in the late 19
th
 century” (Independent 06b). The use of 
a nominalisation reifies the idea of this wave of feminism having passed, and the postmodifying 
prepositional phrase “in the late 19
th
 century” emphasises our distance from it. The use of scare 
quotes around „first-wave‟ implies that this original wave is also ambiguous from a 21
st
 century 
vantage point. This historicising of feminism is also evident in the use of naming and tense in the nine 
references to „second wave feminism‟: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00b The former editor of Ms magazine was one of over 200 activists interviewed by 
Susan Brownmiller for In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution, her account of the 
birth of second-wave feminism in America 
Guardian 01a Sheila Rowbotham, a pioneer of second-wave feminism, has admitted that 
“none of it is as simple as we thought back then” 
Guardian 03a The experience piqued my interest in speaking to people who had grown up 
with politicised mothers during the heady days of second-wave feminism 
Guardian 06a The creeping silence on feminism matters - particularly for younger women 
who did not experience even third-wave, let alone second-wave, feminism 
Guardian 06b As with second-wave feminism, this online movement is open to the 
accusation that it simply represents privileged white women 
Independent 00b All are rightly „lamented‟ for […] their recourse, often under the guise of irony, 
to „retro–sexism‟ - as Whelehan calls nostalgia for gender relations before 
second-wave feminism 
Independent 01a It‟s also true that second-wave feminism didn‟t risk focusing on childbirth and 
motherhood because the emphasis had to be on competing in the workplace 
Telegraph 08a […] she identified with the new idolatry of shiny careerism promulgated by the 
second-wave feminism of the late 1960s […] 
Telegraph 09c It may make you wonder what happened to the passion of second-wave 
feminism […] 
 
Table 5.15: Occurrences of „second wave feminism‟ 
 
Telegraph 08a and Independent 00b place „second-wave feminism‟ in the past through different uses 
of postmodifying phrases. The former packages up the historical connotations of this wave in the 
postmodifying prepositional phrase “of the late 1960s”, while the latter places it in the postmodification 
of the head noun “nostalgia”, again highlighting its historical nature. In Guardian 00b, the apposition of 
“her account of the birth of second-wave feminism in America” with the head noun “Memoir” also 
places the second-wave in the past. In other instances, the tense of representations of actions, events 
and states involving second-wave feminism historicise it, for example in “second-wave feminism didn‟t 
risk focusing on childbirth and motherhood” (Independent 01a). Uncertainty about what followed (or 
did not follow) the second-wave is also implied. For example, in Telegraph 09c, “it” refers 
cataphorically to “the gender debate”, which causes the senser in the subordinate mental process to 
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wonder “what happened to the passion of second-wave feminism”. Here, the past tense of the wh-
clause places the second-wave in the past, and the rhetorical question form flouts the maxim of 
manner (Grice, 1975), creating the implicature that this wave – and its associated “passion” – has 
disappeared, with no indication of what, if anything, has replaced it. In Guardian 01a, the glossing of 
the sayer, Sheila Rowbotham, as “a pioneer of second-wave feminism” through an appositive noun 
phrase gives the reader the contextual information for interpreting her verbiage, that “none of it is as 
simple as we thought back then”. This example demonstrates the extent to which ideas packaged up 
into noun phrases can enable readers to interpret propositions that may otherwise prove difficult: the 
information in the appositive noun phrase allows the reader to understand that the distal time deixis 
“then” refers to the time of the second-wave of feminism. Here, „feminism‟ is not only attached to the 
past, but is characterised as something too simple to apply today. 
 The third wave is not historicised in the same way. The one exception is from Guardian 06a, 
where the third-wave and the second-wave both occur in a relative clause that postmodifies “younger 
women”, who are the phenomenon in a process of not experiencing: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 05a This, says Stoller, is one of the fundamental issues on which third-wave 
feminism differs from its precursors 
Guardian 05a This isn‟t to say that a new respect for craft is the beginning and end of 
American third-wave feminism […] 
Guardian 06a The creeping silence on feminism matters - particularly for younger women 
who did not experience even third-wave, let alone second-wave, feminism 
Guardian 09a “Third-wave feminism is pluralistic, strives to be multi-ethnic, is pro-sex and 
tolerant of other women‟s choices”, she said 
Independent 06a Meg Sanders, 46, a writer from Stratford-upon-Avon, said a „third-wave 
feminism‟ was needed to follow the suffragette movement and the 1970s 
movement 
 
 Table 5.16: Occurrences of „third wave feminism‟ 
 
The other sentences here differentiate the third wave from the second and also define it as 
ambiguous. For example, in Independent 06a “a „third-wave‟ feminism” is the phenomenon in a 
mental process of needing, with the adverbial contextualising this need temporally – “to follow the 
suffragette movement and the 1970s movement”. The use of scare quotes to refer to the third-wave 
suggests that it is also hard to identify (although note that it appears in the verbiage of a verbalisation 
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process, and so this may be reported speech). The Naomi Wolf quote from Guardian 09a uses a 
relational process to explicitly attribute the possibility of multiple meanings to the third wave: “third-
wave feminism is pluralistic”. The relational process here also gives rise to an implicature about other 
waves of feminism through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the third-wave is pluralistic, 
but if this needs to be spelled out then previous waves must not have been. Differentiation from 
previous waves is more explicit in Guardian 05a, in which a quote from feminist magazine founder 
Debbie Stoller uses a relational process to note that “third-wave feminism differs from its precursors”. 
Here, the anaphoric “this” in the main clause refers back to Stoller‟s discussion of sexuality, thereby 
presenting the third and second waves as differing in terms of their treatment of this subject. This 
accords with Mendes‟ (2011a, p. 557) observation that the third-wave is defined by the way it 
responds to the second. Guardian 05a provides little in the way of a definition of third wave feminism, 
but seeks to defease possible assumptions about it. This is done through the negation of a 
verbalisation process which makes a proposition about the third wave, equating it with “a new respect 
for craft”. Again, an implied meaning arises from a flout of quantity (Grice, 1975): “new” emphasises 
that this respect for craft was not a feature of the second wave. 
 
5.4.2.2 ‘Old/new feminism’ 
„New‟ and „old(-style)‟ are used in the premodification of 25 and six occurrences of „feminism‟, 
respectively. Previous studies of feminism in UK newspapers in the 2000s (for example Dean, 2010; 
Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) have observed how articles distinguish 
between old and new feminisms. Mendes (2012) finds evidence that the former is “derided as „retro‟ 
or „old-school‟” (p. 561) while the latter is “„modern‟, „fun‟ and „sexy‟” (p. 561). Dean (2010) believes 
that this is a conscious strategy on the part of writers, who define „feminism‟ according to its 
temporality in order to repudiate old feminism while approving a “less excessive feminism in the 
present” (p. 393). However, as hinted at by the analysis of „third wave feminism‟ in section 5.4.2.1, the 
analysis below suggests that older feminisms, while placed firmly in the past, are presented as less 
ambiguous than newer varieties, which the articles find difficult to define. 
Table 5.17 comprises the six occurrences of „old(-style) feminism‟: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 09a Old-style feminism was important 
Express 09a Any of us who have ever taken the Pill, considered having an abortion, held a 
managerial job, bought a house or voted have a lot to thank old feminism for 
Guardian 01a We need the old feminism back [...] 
Guardian 09a [...] it uses the language of old-style feminism to betray the movement‟s ideals 
Independent 01a [...] I have learnt how little we understand about both the failures and successes 
of old feminism 
Mail 04a There was so much that was repressive about the old feminism 
 
Table 5.17: Occurrences of „old(-style) feminism‟ 
 
Each of the articles referring to „old(-style) feminism‟ notes a contrast between it and newer ideas of 
feminism. The textual-conceptual function of contrasting itself performs this role, with parallelisms 
casting different feminisms in a relationship of opposition. The two occurrences from Express 09a 
appear in the following passage, with the opposed elements highlighted: 
 
“That is because feminism in the Noughties has changed. Old-style feminism was 
important. Any of us who have ever taken the Pill, considered having an abortion, held a 
managerial job, bought a house or voted have a lot to thank old feminism for”. 
 
Feminism in the Noughties and old-style feminism are both subjects in adjacent clauses, with the 
modifiers “in the Noughties” and “old-style” emphasising that this parallelism is presenting them as 
opposites and that at least two types of feminism, defined by their place in time, are possible. The 
older feminism is also defined more positively, occurring as the carrier in a relational intensive 
process which attributes to it the quality of importance, although this significance is placed in the past 
through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the past tense states something that was the 
case about “old-style feminism”, but does not go on to explicitly say anything about its present (lack 
of) importance. Taken in context, there appears to be a further implied meaning: while the newer 
feminism appears in an apparently neutral process of having changed, the fact that the older feminism 
is singled out as the important one flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), implying that this 
change is negative. The impression of the older feminism as the better of the two is emphasised by 
the following sentence, in which “old feminism” is the receiver in a verbalisation process of thanking. 
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The fact that the proximal person deixis “us” is the sayer in this process also brings the reader onside, 
enhancing the impression of old feminism as important to everyone. 
 While Express 09a implies that new feminism is less important than old feminism, Guardian 
01a is more explicit in its condemnation of the former: 
 
“We don't need a new feminism that gives us equality at work and leaves our private 
selves in crisis. We need the old feminism back […]” 
 
The parallelism here arises from the placement of new and old feminisms in adjacent clauses in which 
it is the phenomenon in a mental process of needing. New feminism‟s comparative lack of desirability 
is made clear through the syntactic negation of the mental process in which it appears. The naming of 
the two feminisms emphasises the difference in desirability: the newer feminism is indefinite, while the 
older feminism is definite, and its existence presupposed by the use of the definite determiner, 
thereby presenting the former as ambiguous and the latter as definable and dependable. Further, the 
newer form is postmodified by a relative clause that defines it through another constructed opposition 
between public life and private life: while new feminism may have positive effects for public life, it 
leaves “our private selves in crisis”. 
 Mail 04a also marks a contrast between time periods, although in this instance it is old 
feminism that is aligned with the negative superordinate: 
 
“There was so much that was repressive about the old feminism - having to wear overalls 
and worrying all the time that men were trying to humiliate you. It was all too bound up with 
anger and rage. But my generation don't need to believe that we should be the same as men 
in every way, because we know that we're not.” 
 
Here, the old feminism is the carrier in relational processes in which it is attributed the qualities of 
being repressive and angry. This is contrasted with my generation (the naming of which, notably, 
does not use „feminism‟), which is the senser in a mental process where the phenomenon counteracts 
the ideas associated with the old feminism. These ideas are associated with old feminism through a 
flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): the beliefs are not explicitly attributed to the old 
feminism, but because it is being contrasted with my generation, the implicature is that the old 
feminism does believe “that we should be the same as men”. 
 As with Mail 04a, the remaining occurrences place feminism in the past, but without 
contrasting it with a newer form of feminism. Guardian 09a discusses Jezebel, a website for young 
women, and argues that “it uses the language of old-style feminism to betray the movement‟s ideals”. 
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Here, Jezebel is the actor in material processes of using and betraying, with “old-style feminism” the 
goal in each: while feminism is being placed in the past through naming, it is the newer phenomenon 
– Jezebel - that is presented negatively, as being exploitative. In Independent 01a, old feminism‟s 
location in the past is emphasised through an adverbial which contextualises a process of learning 
about old feminism: “through my 23-year-old son and his many female friends, I have learnt how little 
we understand about both the failures and successes of old feminism”. This example demonstrates 
how adverbials enable writers to make implicatures, as a flout of relation (Grice, 1975) arises from the 
fact that the reasons why the writer was able to learn this as a result of her son are not explicitly 
stated; instead, the use of the premodifier “23-year-old” and coordination with “his many female 
friends” serves to imply the existence of a distance between youth and the ability for the sexes to 
befriend each other and old feminism. 
Nine of the 25 occurrences of „new feminism‟ relate to Natasha Walter‟s book The New 
Feminism. As noted in the discussion of appositive noun phrases (see section 5.4.1), this could be 
seen to detract from the impression that „new feminism‟ is prominent in the dataset. However, the fact 
that newness is frequently packaged up into references to „feminism‟ affects the meaning of 
„feminism‟, imbuing it with the meaning of something temporal and changeable, as “a movement in 
flux, always in need of a re-make” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 416). In the analysis here, 
however, I concentrate on the 16 examples of „new feminism‟ that do not relate to Walter‟s book. 
These examples are compiled in table 5.18: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 02a What Is the New Feminism? 
Guardian 00b She has little time for the new, mainstream feminism [...] 
Guardian 01a We don't need a new feminism that gives us equality at work 
Guardian 05b […] the media always look for the „new sexy feminism‟ [...] 
Guardian 06a New Feminism 
Mail 03a The poor boys seemed justifiably confused as to their role in this new „comfortable 
feminism‟ […] 
Mail 04a Shopping Is the New Feminism 
Mail 04a [...] shopping is not only the new sex but the new feminism 
Mail 09b SOS for a New Feminism 
Mail 09b [...] what we all really need now […] is our very own brand of New Feminism 
Mail 09b The new feminism, it seems, still has an awfully long way to go 
Telegraph 06a It is to do with „new feminism‟ 
Telegraph 06a [...] how is the new feminism different from the old objectification 
Telegraph 06a I suppose this new feminism can be seen as part of a continuum [...] 
Telegraph 06a There is going to be a Guardian debate on the meaning of the new feminism [...] 
Times 09a „New Feminism‟ would just make everyone think of New Labour‟s busted flush 
 
Table 5.18: Occurrences of „new feminism‟ 
 
A feature of the naming of new feminism is the use of scare quotes. This aspect of the presentation of 
new feminism is also observed by Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 416), who see it as 
evidence that new feminism is either treated ironically or its existence treated as questionable. The 
occurrences in the feminism dataset back up this impression, although scare quotes are used to 
achieve quite different effects. In Mail 03a, “this new „comfortable feminism‟” (previously discussed in 
the sample analysis in section 3.2) is part of the adverbial, given as the cause of young men‟s 
confusion. Here, the premodification of „feminism‟ with the proximal deictic marker “this” evokes an 
idea being presented for close inspection, and its merits questioned. Guardian 05b questions the very 
existence of new feminism, with Sheila Jeffreys – described in the article as a “radical feminist” – 
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presenting new feminism as the goal in a material action process of looking. Again, naming is 
important in determining what is being implied about „new feminism‟: in this instance, the sheer length 
and detail of the postmodification of “new sexy feminism” (a flout of the relation of quantity (Grice, 
1975)) suggests that this feminism is being treated with suspicion – it is a confection that allows the 
media to act in the ways described in the postmodification, rather than something that actually exists. 
In the case of Times 09a, “New Feminism” is metalanguage in a material action process in which the 
term makes people think of “New Labour‟s busted flush”. Here, it is the term “New Feminism” itself 
that is being questioned, the proposition being that the use of the adjective „new‟ would cause people 
to equate it with New Labour, itself glossed as a “busted flush”. 
 Telegraph 06a also treats „new feminism‟ as suspect. In the article‟s opening paragraph, the 
writer notes that his “feeling of alienation […] is to do with „new feminism‟”. Again, there is the sense 
of this being an instance of metalanguage, its equation with alienation through a relational intensive 
process suggesting that the writer is wary of it. New feminism is the subject of this article, entitled „Am 
I the Last True Feminist?”, and a total of four occurrences of “new feminism” combine to create a 
feeling of uncertainty about the phenomenon. This is clear in the writer‟s use of a rhetorical question 
to ask “how is the new feminism different from the old objectification […] the treatment of women as 
sex objects?” Here there is a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): no answer is supplied, and 
so the reader is left to infer that “the new feminism” and “the old objectification” are not different. 
Elsewhere, the writer uses hypothesising to sound a note of caution about new feminism: 
 
“I suppose this new feminism can be seen as part of a continuum that began with the militant 
feminists of the 1970s, the ones who said there was no need for men, and progressed to the 
„lipstick feminism‟ of Natasha Walter - she who argued that it was acceptable for women to 
want to be feminine. There is going to be a Guardian debate on the meaning of the new 
feminism at London's City University tomorrow night and that might shed some light on this.” 
 
In the first instance, “this new feminism” is the phenomenon in a mental process of seeing, which is 
modalised by the auxiliary verb “can” in the immediate clause and the modal verb “suppose” in the 
main clause, in which the writer is the senser. The writer continues, constructing a transitional 
opposition between the militant feminists of the 1970s, the ones who said there was no need for 
men on the one hand, and the „lipstick feminism‟ of Natasha Walter - she who argued that it was 
acceptable for women to want to be feminine on the other. Here, the writer explicitly discusses a 
similar idea to Dean‟s (2010, p. 393) concept of domestication, whereby radical feminism is placed in 
the past and a newer feminism is presented as being less political. Similar to the examples of 
apposition discussed in section 5.4.1, appositive noun phrases are used to provide detailed, difficult to 
contest arguments about both old and new feminisms. Finally, the writer observes that “there is going 
to be a Guardian debate on the meaning of the new feminism”, drawing attention to „the new 
feminism‟ as metalanguage by placing it in the postmodification of “meaning”. However, the writer‟s 
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uncertainty is underlined further by the coordinated clause, which refers anaphorically to the debate: 
“that might shed some light on this”. Again, a modal auxiliary – “might” - is used to hypothesise about 
new feminism; in this instance, to express uncertainty about the likelihood of its meaning being 
defined. 
 The attention afforded to the idea of „new feminism‟ is evidenced by article headlines in Table 
5.18: “What Is the New Feminism?” (Express 02a), “New Feminism” (Guardian 06a), “Shopping Is the 
New Feminism” (Mail 04a), “SOS for a New Feminism” (Mail 09b). The Mail 04a and 09b articles, like 
others discussed here, present the idea of new feminism as questionable or hard to define. Mail 04a, 
in particular, demonstrates the importance of looking at occurrences in context, as they do not in fact 
describe a new feminism but rather the fact that it has been succeeded by shopping: “Shopping Is the 
New Feminism”, “shopping is not only the new sex but the new feminism”. Here, there is a flout of the 
maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): a proposition is made about shopping, but if shopping is the new 
feminism, then the question is raised as to what feminism now is – the implicature being that shopping 
has made it redundant. Mail 09b‟s “SOS for a New Feminism”, on the other hand, presents the idea of 
new feminism as desirable, but still ambiguous. The naming in the headline itself, with “New 
Feminism” postmodifying “SOS”, presents the idea of a new feminism as desirable – it is something 
that could save our souls. However, the use of the indefinite determiner “a” makes it clear that there is 
no concrete form of new feminism to which to point. Elsewhere in the article, new feminism is the 
phenomenon in a mental process of needing – “what we all really need now […] is our very own brand 
of New Feminism”. Again, new feminism is desirable (it is needed, and the plural pronoun “we” brings 
the reader onside), but vague: the premodification of new feminism – “our very own brand of” – 
implies that other brands exist, but that they are not suitable for „us‟. The article‟s anxiety about new 
feminism is summed up in its final sentence, which reflects on an 11 year-old boy‟s preference for his 
mother to be a “stay-at-home mum” by concluding that “the new feminism, it seems, still has an 
awfully long way to go”. This relational possessive process neatly summarises the impression given of 
new feminism in the dataset – that although it is often seen as something desirable, it is also not 
sufficient in any recognisable, existent form. 
 
5.4.2.3 ‘Radical/socialist feminism’ 
Of the list of adjectives that most frequently premodify „feminism‟ (table 5.14), „radical‟ and „socialist‟ 
evoke previous studies‟ (for example Dean, 2010; Lind & Salo, 2002; Marling, 2010) findings that 
newspapers present feminism as a movement that has “a strong sense of extremism” (Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 410). However, all four occurrences of „socialist feminism‟ in the dataset, and 
seven of the ten occurrences of „radical feminism‟, appear in a single newspaper - The Guardian. 
While the present study does not seek to make comparisons between the newspapers in the data, 
this gives the impression that „feminism‟ does not have as strong a political sense across newspapers 
as previous studies have suggested. The analysis here focuses on „socialist feminism‟ and „radical 
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feminism‟ in The Guardian, finding that while these political varieties of feminism are indeed placed in 
the past, they are presented as having had more substance than other varieties that have followed. 
 One occurrence of „socialist feminism‟ appears in Guardian 03a, in which a writer reminisces 
about the relationships of his mother, feminist writer Cora Kaplan: “she built up friendships with a 
group of women who became a hugely influential part of socialist feminism”. The remaining three 
occurrences, from „Sheila Rowbotham: Trailblazer of Feminism‟ (Guardian 00a), are of greater 
interest for the way they present this political type of feminism, describing it as changeable and as 
distinct from ordinary „feminism‟. The article discusses how Rowbotham‟s work is being “rediscovered 
by a new generation”, and observes a process by which this type of feminism has come to be seen as 
undesirable. A relational intensive process attributing the quality of “no longer being sexy” to socialist 
feminism contextualises this state through the adverbial “by the early 1980s”, presenting socialist 
feminism as something that can be more or less desirable at different times. A similar process is 
described in “what happened to Sheila Rowbotham was what happened to socialist feminism: both 
were suddenly considered unfashionable, dull”. Here, the combination of the mental process of 
considering and the adverb “suddenly” makes explicit the fact that feminism‟s fashionableness is 
changeable. Feminism and socialist feminism are also separated out in the observation that “in these 
places [non-European countries] feminism and socialist feminism are not only about body politics but 
about bread-and-butter issues”. Here, feminism is presented as something complex through the use 
of naming, an adverbial and contrasting: the coordination of feminism and socialist feminism 
presents them as somehow separate (there is standard „feminism‟, and then another type of 
feminism), and the attribute in the relational intensive process uses a „not only X but Y‟ opposition 
frame to construct body politics and bread and butter issues as opposites, while acknowledging 
that feminism and socialist feminism are about both. This is significant in light of the adverbial “in 
these places”, which contextualises the proposition within a certain place: a flout of the maxim of 
quantity (Grice, 1975) means that the reader is left to infer that feminism and socialist feminism are 
each only about one or the other in other places (Europe). In this one sentence, then, different textual-
conceptual functions combine to present the meaning of „feminism‟ as fragmented (Mendes, 2011a, p. 
9), consisting of different types which are about different things, and which vary across countries. 
 Table 5.19 comprises the seven occurrences of „radical feminism‟ in The Guardian: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
147 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00b Susan Brownmiller rode a wave of radical feminism that hit the US in the 60s. 
Now she is revisiting the revolution 
Guardian 00b […] it charts the history of a wave of radical activism […] and is a salute to a kind 
of radical feminism that seems almost perverse in this safe, self-contained era 
Guardian 00b […] radical feminism was, and remains, the only movement to make women‟s 
bodies the site of political struggle 
Guardian 04a A therapeutic emphasis on „inner spirit‟ is a very long way from the radical 
feminism Ensler grew up with in the 1960s and 70s […] 
Guardian 05b The idea that radical feminism was a phenomenon of the 1970s exasperates her 
[…] 
Guardian 05c Andrea Dworkin was always more famous for being Andrea Dworkin than 
anything else. Never mind her seminal works of radical feminism 
Guardian 06b Each carnival (usually on the first and third Wednesday of the month) is hosted by 
a different blogger, who invites people to contribute articles on current events or a 
general theme: „radical feminism‟, for instance […] 
 
Table 5.19: Occurrences of „radical feminism‟ in The Guardian 
 
Radical feminism in The Guardian is “situated in the past” (Dean, 2010, p. 401). However, the 
sentences in table 5.19 do not provide evidence for Dean‟s (2010) assertion that this distancing 
enables writers to present the idea of “a more moderate, less excessive feminism in the present” (p. 
393). Instead, there is a suggestion that there has been no adequate replacement. This is the case in 
the three occurrences from „Look Back in Anger […]” (Guardian 00b). The title of the article uses 
parallelism to contrast the US in the 60s with now, and this constructed opposition underlines the 
fact that radical feminism existed in the 1960s, and can only be revisited (for example, by Susan 
Brownmiller) in the present day. In the main body of the article, a relational intensive process defines 
radical feminism as “the only movement to make women‟s bodies the site of political struggle”. Here, 
the quantifying adjective “only” makes it clear that no other type of feminism – or other movement 
generally – has had this quality. The naming of radical feminism also differentiates it from anything 
contemporary in the postmodifying relative clause “that seems almost perverse in this safe, self-
contained era”. Again, a time adverbial contextualising a proposition in the here and now presents 
radical feminism as something from the past; however, there is little here to indicate that it is the 
previous generation‟s type of feminism that is being derided. 
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 Guardian 05b precedes Sheila Jeffreys‟ complaint about “new sexy feminism” (discussed 
above in section 5.4.2.2). Here, Jeffreys takes issue with the idea that radical feminism only existed in 
the past. This idea is nominalised and portrayed as the actor in a material action process of 
exasperating Jeffreys, who goes on to dismiss the idea of a newer version of feminism: there is no 
need for radical feminism to be succeeded by an alternative variety. In Guardian 04a, the „X is a long 
way from Y‟ frame creates a contrast between a therapeutic emphasis on „inner spirit‟ and the 
radical feminism Ensler grew up with in the 1960s and 70s. Again, however, it seems that radical 
feminism is being favoured here: the use of scare quotes around “inner spirit” suggests that the 
former element is being treated ironically, and the adjectives that premodify each head noun – 
therapeutic/radical – evoke a superordinate trivial/serious opposition, which itself suggests a 
bad/good opposition. In these examples, radical feminism, rather than being repudiated in favour of a 
more moderate, less politically-involved feminism, is presented as something of substance that has 
not been adequately replaced by more lightweight alternatives. 
 
5.5 Summary 
The analysis of textual meanings of „feminism‟ in this chapter has demonstrated that its meanings are 
contested, and that critical stylistic analysis using the textual-conceptual functions finds evidence for 
and against the findings of previous studies of portrayals of feminism in the media. 
 One of the key contentions of previous studies of feminism in the media is that it is portrayed 
negatively, for example through announcements of the death of feminism (for example Callaghan et 
al., 1999; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995) and the stereotyping of feminism as overtly political (e.g. 
Callaghan et al., 1999; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012). The analysis 
found evidence of these patterns in the feminism dataset: analysis of the representation of states 
showed that „feminism‟ is connected with the adjective „dead‟, and the overview of adjectives that 
premodify „feminism‟ found premodifiers that denote political action. However, closer analysis 
presented a more complex picture: writers attribute the idea that feminism is „dead‟ to others through 
the presentation of speech, arguing with this perception of the movement, while the packaging up of 
feminism‟s political nature appeared largely in one newspaper – The Guardian – and was compared 
favourably to more moderate forms of feminism. The analysis of contrasting, in particular, showed 
how the meanings of „feminism‟ are contested through comparisons between more and less political 
feminisms. 
   The analysis of premodifying adjectives denoting location showed that „feminism‟ is 
presented as something that, as previous studies (for example Baumgardner & Richards, 2001; 
Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) suggest, exists primarily in the west. The temporal location of 
„feminism‟ is less clear cut. The first and second waves of feminism are historicised through a variety 
of means, including naming and the representation of time, but the overview of premodifying 
adjectives showed that articles are also concerned with „new feminism‟. Initially, the presence of the 
„feminism is dead‟ structure in the analysis of unmodified occurrences suggested that „feminism‟ is 
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placed in the past in this very firm way, but the different ways in which writers contest this perception 
of feminism – for example through negating and the presentation of others‟ speech and thought – 
demonstrated that feminism is presented as an ongoing concern. 
 The high percentage of occurrences of „feminism‟ that are unmodified, and their frequent 
occurrence in relational processes that attribute to them meanings that resemble the OED (2015) 
definition, suggested that feminism is presented as a universal, with a single identifiable meaning. 
However, closer analysis using the textual-conceptual functions demonstrated that, even where 
„feminism‟ is unmodified, meanings are attributed not only to particular times, but also particular 
groups and individuals. The adjectives used to premodify „feminism‟ also showed that feminism is 
divided into different types along political/non-political and collectivist/individual lines, reflecting 
Dean‟s (2010) notion of domestication, whereby articles favour a modern, non-political feminism over 
an older, political feminism. 
 „Feminism‟ is also presented as a lexeme that can change meaning. In many instances, the 
articles observe how it has picked up negative connotations over time, or show their support for the 
underlying meanings of „feminism‟ in spite of their concerns about the word itself. The different types 
of feminism are also placed in opposition to each other, with writers discussing their relative merits. 
The textual-conceptual function of contrasting showed how oppositions between different varieties are 
linguistically constructed, with political feminisms‟ existence in the past contrasted with newer 
feminisms that are extant. Analysis of these contrasts demonstrated that while more political 
feminisms may be located temporally in the past, their political nature is often favoured by writers, 
who deem „new‟ feminism to be comparatively hard to define. 
 Analysis using the textual-conceptual functions also provided evidence for some of the 
observations made by previous studies about the nature of portrayals of feminism in the 2000s. 
Writers use the presentation of speech to cite or create interlocutors who have negative perceptions 
of feminism (Dean, 2010, p. 397), and proceed to argue against their convictions that, for example, 
feminism is dead. Where feminism and „feminism‟ are defined, writers also make use of negating and 
implying to construct meanings: these methods of discussing feminism demonstrated how writers 
show their support for feminism by contesting the meanings that others attribute to „feminism‟. 
 Chapter 6 now turns to an analysis of „feminist‟ and „feminists‟, looking at the textual meaning 
of the lexemes that refer to those who represent the feminist movement. 
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Chapter 6: The feminist and feminists datasets 
In this chapter I analyse the textual meanings of the nouns „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ in the data. My 
analysis is based on the annotation of textual-conceptual functions for the feminist and feminists 
datasets discussed in chapter 4. It addresses the three research questions stated in section 1.1 
concerning textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟, how these meanings are contested, and how analysis 
of the textual-conceptual functions can help to investigate these meanings. 
The analysis proceeds from the identification of patterns in a statistical overview of naming 
and representing actions/events/states (see section 6.1 below). Section 6.2 focuses on the feminist 
dataset, before section 6.3 turns to the feminists dataset. Section 6.4 concludes the analysis by taking 
a closer look at differences in how singular „feminist‟ and plural „feminists‟ are represented in actions, 
events and states. 
 I use the Oxford English Dictionary (2015) definition of „feminist‟ – “an advocate or supporter 
of the rights and equality of women” – as the benchmark for the analysis of textual meanings. The 
analysis also relates my findings to the five frames discussed in section 2.3. The analysis of 
„feminist(s)‟ finds, like the analysis of „feminism‟ (see chapter 5), that meanings are contested, with 
articles making distinctions between various types of feminist, discussing different perceptions of the 
meaning of „feminist‟, and contrasting positive and negative views of feminists. 
 
6.1 Statistical overview of the feminist and feminists datasets 
This section provides a statistical overview of naming and representations of actions, events and 
states in the feminist (section 6.1.1) and feminists (section 6.1.2) datasets. It identifies noteworthy 
statistical results, and indicates how the analysis of the feminist (section 6.2) and feminists (section 
6.3) datasets explores them. 
 
6.1.1 Statistical overview of the feminist dataset  
The analysis of the feminism dataset showed that although the majority of occurrences of „feminism‟ 
are unmodified (see section 5.1), these occurrences do not necessarily present „feminism‟ as 
universal. The statistical overview of naming in the feminist dataset, by itself, suggests that the 
articles present different types of feminist, rather than portraying feminists as “all alike” (Douglas, 
1991, p. 274): 
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Figure 6.1: Statistical overview of naming in the feminist dataset 
 
98% of occurrences of „feminist‟ are modified. 58% of the total occurrences are minimally modified 
and 40% have detailed modification. This may simply reflect the fact that „feminist‟ refers to an 
individual person, and so uses of a generic form of „feminist‟ are unlikely („feminism is good‟ would be 
unmarked, whereas „feminist is good‟ would be marked). The small number of unmodified 
occurrences is therefore of interest, due to their unusual nature. The genre may suggest that these 
are likely to be examples of block language, which is used in newspaper headlines (e.g. „FEMINIST 
CAUSES UPROAR‟) to “strip language of all but the most information-bearing forms” (Biber et al., 
1999, p. 263). Section 6.2.1 tests this impression. 
Surprisingly, a statistical overview of the transitivity processes in which „feminist‟ occurs 
suggests that those who represent the movement are represented much more frequently in states 
than in actions: 
 
8 
238 
164 No modification
Minimal modification
Detailed modification
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Figure 6.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminist dataset 
 
Over half (53%) of the processes in which „feminist‟ appears are relational processes. While it is not 
surprising that metalinguistic occurrences of „feminist‟ – such as “„feminist‟ has become a derogatory 
term” (Times 09a) – would appear in relational processes, figure 6.1 shows that these unmodified 
occurrences account for a small portion of the feminist dataset: most occurrences of „feminist‟ are 
modified, picking out a particular referent, and so it is surprising that such a small percentage of 
overall occurrences appear in representations of actions and events. A point of comparison here is 
Coffey‟s (2013, p. 159) overview of process types in which male agents occur in a corpus of women‟s 
magazines. Coffey‟s (2013) findings are more in line with what might be expected for an animate, 
human referent: male referents appear most often in material action processes (30% of the total), with 
relational processes accounting for 27% (p. 159), leading her to conclude that “magazine writers are 
mostly engaged in presenting men‟s actions and states of being” (p. 160). While methodological 
differences between Coffey‟s (2013) study and the present study make direct comparisons difficult, 
the statistics for „feminist‟ suggest that individual feminists in the newspaper data are less active than 
the men in Coffey‟s (2013) corpus of women‟s magazines, with a greater emphasis on states of being. 
 The statistical overview presented here provides entry points for the analysis of „feminist‟. 
Section 6.1 opens the analysis with an investigation of the small number of occurrences of unmodified 
„feminist‟, which are interesting as uses of metalanguage where writers discuss the lexeme itself 
through representations of states. Sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 investigate the overlap between the most 
prominent type of modification - minimal modification – and the most common type of transitivity 
process, the relational process, looking at „the feminist‟ and „a feminist‟ in turn. Section 6.2.4 
73 
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concludes the analysis of „feminist‟ by looking at occurrences with detailed modification and how they 
are represented in actions, events and states. 
 
6.1.2 Statistical overview of the feminists dataset 
Unsurprisingly, a much higher percentage of occurrences of „feminists‟ (42%) than „feminist‟ (2%) are 
unmodified. This may simply be due to the grammar of the form – plural countable nouns such as 
„feminists‟ can be “zero article” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 261), with no determiner:  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Statistical overview of naming in the feminists dataset 
 
A greater percentage of occurrences of „feminists‟ (58%) than „feminism‟ (29%) (see section 5.1) are 
modified, adding to the impression that the people involved in the movement are more likely to be 
described in detail and divided into types. As with the naming of singular „feminist‟, a large proportion 
of occurrences have detailed modification, again suggesting that a lot of information about feminists is 
built into references to them. 
The apparently small proportion of material action processes in the feminist dataset contrasts 
with the corresponding statistics for the feminists dataset: 
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Figure 6.4: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the feminists dataset 
 
Material action processes account for 37% of processes featuring „feminists‟, compared to 18% of 
processes in which „feminist‟ occurs. This suggests that feminists as a group are portrayed as more 
“action-oriented” (Bloor & Bloor, 2004, p. 112) than individuals. The feminists dataset also contains a 
greater proportion of mental processes than the feminist dataset, a striking result given that it is easier 
to (convincingly) present the thoughts of individuals than of groups.  
 The analysis of „feminists‟ begins by looking at unmodified occurrences (section 6.3.1), in 
particular looking at the overlap with representations of states in order to investigate how feminists as 
a whole are defined. Section 6.3.2 turns to „feminists‟ with minimal modification, focusing on the 
frequent occurrences of „the feminists‟ in representations of actions, before section 6.3.3 concludes 
the analysis of the feminists dataset by looking at the types of adjectives that are used to premodify 
those occurrences with detailed modification, investigating what different groupings of feminists are 
recognised in the data. Section 6.4 concludes the analysis of „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ by providing a 
more fine-grained statistical overview and comparison of material action and mental processes in the 
feminist and feminists datasets, commenting on the roles that the singular and plural forms play in 
these process types. 
 
6.2 The feminist dataset 
The analysis of the 410 occurrences of „feminist‟ in the feminist dataset is based on the statistical 
overview of naming and representing actions/events/states (see section 6.1 above). I first of all 
discuss the small number of occurrences of unmodified „feminist‟ in the dataset, before looking at 
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minimally modified occurrences, focusing first of all on the four occurrences of „the feminist‟ before 
looking at the way „a feminist‟ – which accounts for 214 of the 238 minimally modified occurrences of 
„feminist‟ - is used in relational processes. I complete the discussion of the feminist dataset by looking 
at occurrences of „feminist‟ with detailed modification, focusing on the use of apposition and 
premodifying adjectives in the naming of individual feminists.  
 
6.2.1 Unmodified „feminist‟ 
Only eight of the 410 occurrences of „feminist‟ are unmodified. This statistic may reflect the fact that 
„feminist‟ is a singular noun and therefore tends to require a determiner to pick out a particular 
referent. It might be assumed that these eight occurrences are examples of „block language‟, typical 
of newspaper headlines where “communicative needs strip language of all but the most information-
bearing forms” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 263). Examples of block language are found in newspaper 
headlines in the „feminist/s/ism‟ data, for example in the removal of a determiner in „March of 
Feminism?‟ (Mail 06b) and the lack of a subject in „Lay Off Men‟ (Sun 01a). However, only one – 
„Feminist‟ (Sun 04c) - is from a headline, subheading or caption. While this example refers to an 
individual - the author, who discusses his apparent credentials as a feminist (“I‟m a feminist and I‟m all 
in favour of women snooker referees”) - the remaining seven are examples of metalanguage, referring 
to the lexeme itself. These occurrences discuss the complexity of „feminist‟, and demonstrate the 
repudiation of negative views of it. Writers address the issue of the meaning of „feminist‟ in an indirect 
way, for example by hypothesising about possible meanings or implying the validity or invalidity of 
particular meanings. The analysis therefore demonstrates why an analysis that utilises the range of 
textual-conceptual functions is crucial for a full understanding of the textual meaning of a lexeme in 
context. 
Table 6.1 comprises the seven metalinguistic occurrences of „feminist‟ that are analysed in 
this section: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 03a But, don‟t worry, „feminist‟ will do 
Express 09a When challenged by friends or your boyfriend or husband asking you what 
„feminist‟ means […] we need to have a clear answer 
Independent 03a „Feminist‟ is too political and provocative a sign for most of us to bother with the 
hassle of hanging it round our necks 
Mail 06a Then we‟ll know why it matters to tick the box marked „feminist‟ 
Mirror 04c And that word is not feminist 
Times 02c “I suppose you can take any quality you think I have and apply it to feminist”, she 
says, laughing 
Times 09a If „feminist‟ has become a derogatory term, then I would like to purposely start 
using it for its shock value - in the same way rappers use „n*****‟ 
 
Table 6.1: Metalinguistic occurrences of „feminist‟ 
 
Mirror 04c discusses „feminist‟ in terms of other words with which it does (not) belong. To understand 
the textual meaning of „feminist‟ here, it is necessary to look at the wider context: 
 
“I wouldn't be surprised if half the audience watching Life Begins were men. And like her 
lover, think Maggie is „fun, fresh, feisty and another word beginning with F‟. And that word is 
not feminist.” 
 
The clause “that word is not feminist” demonstrates how negating can function to create implied 
meanings. As noted in the discussion of „feminism means/does not mean x‟ structures (section 5.2.1), 
examples like this can be seen as a flout of one or more of the maxims of quantity, manner and 
relation (Leech, 1983; Nahajec, 2009). In this instance, the proposition that “that word” is not X does 
not give the reader sufficient information about actuality (quantity), is ambiguous (manner), and is not 
clearly relevant (relation). While it is not clear what the “word beginning with F” might be, part of the 
implied meaning is that „feminist‟ does not belong in the company of positively evaluative words such 
as “fun, fresh, feisty”. Therefore, if „feminist‟ does not belong with these words, then people to whom 
the adjective does apply are not fun, fresh or feisty. 
Express 03a provides an example of how complex discussion of the meaning of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ is, with the writer citing a negative definition of „feminist‟ in order to argue against it. 
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Express 03a and the remaining examples argue for a more positive understanding of „feminist‟ than 
the Mirror 04c example above: 
 
“What do you call a woman who hates men? There isn‟t a word for it, is there? But, don‟t 
worry, „feminist‟ will do. Because you can be sure if anyone calls you a feminist these days, 
they mean it as an insult.” 
 
Here, „feminist‟ is presented as equivalent with „misandrist‟: the definition of „feminist‟ arises from a 
verbalisation process in which the process of calling one thing another results in a relationship of 
equivalence between the two - „you (sayer) call (process) a woman who hates men (target) a 
“feminist” (verbiage)‟. This appears to be a negative definition of „feminist‟. However, the because-
clause in the following sentence provides context, and attributes it to people other than the writer 
through a presentation of speech in which the sayer - “anyone” - might call the target - “you” - a 
feminist. The wider context, in which the writer claims to be “proud of feminism”, makes it clear that 
she does not agree with the „hatred of men‟ definition. In this context, the example is a flout of the 
maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) – the writer is in fact implying that while other people think „feminist‟ 
means „a woman who hates men‟, they themselves do not believe this to be true. This sense of a 
writer arguing with others‟ perceptions is enhanced by their use of social deixis: “you”, which is used 
to address the reader, is more proximal than the “they” who are using „feminist‟ in an insulting way, 
creating the sense of an unspecified group who do not understand „feminist‟ in the right way. 
 Independent 03a uses a similar “invocation of a popular repudiation of feminism” (Dean, 
2010, p. 396) to argue against negative perceptions of „feminist‟. The relational intensive process 
“„feminist‟ is too political and provocative a sign for most of us to bother with the hassle of hanging it 
round our necks” attributes a negatively evaluated quality to „feminist‟: being a political and 
provocative sign may not be a bad thing, but the intensifier “too” makes it clear that these qualities are 
more extreme than is desirable. However, the next sentence uses the concessive opposition trigger 
“but” to create a contrast with a feminist writer‟s definition of feminism: 
  
“But return to Marilyn French's definition of feminism – „the belief that women matter as much 
as men do‟ - and it becomes clear that feminism, in essence, is actually a modest enough 
proposal, and one that only misogynists of both sexes would take issue with.” 
 
Here, contrasting is used to argue against a negative view of „feminist‟: feminism is “a modest enough 
proposal”, and so „feminist‟ should not be considered “too political and provocative a sign”. This allows 
the writer to repudiate a negative view. However, that such support for feminism is based on initial 
accounts of negative views may serve to keep negative stereotypes in readers‟ minds. 
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 Other examples address the issue of whether or not it is important that „feminist‟ should have 
a universal definition. Times 02c asks Playboy editor Christie Ann Hefner whether or not she is a 
“feisty feminist”, to which she replies “I suppose you can take any quality you think I have and apply it 
to „feminist‟”. Hefner flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), as she does not provide the expected 
„yes‟ or „no‟ answer to the question: the implied meaning is that „feminist‟ is appropriate for her, as 
“any quality you think I have” can be applied to it. This material action process, where „feminist‟ is the 
recipient of “any quality”, presents it as a word that can be valid for different reasons, with „feminist‟ 
status resulting from different qualities. Express 09a, conversely, expresses concern about the idea of 
„feminist‟ having an open definition: 
 
“When challenged by friends or your boyfriend or husband asking you what „feminist‟ means 
[…] we need to have a clear answer.” 
 
The wh-complement clause is a relational intensive process that leaves the definition of „feminist‟ 
open (see the discussion of „what feminism means‟ clauses in section 5.2.1). In this instance it is also 
the verbiage in a verbalisation process of asking, and the writer‟s use of the plural pronoun “we” and 
deontically modal “need” presents the idea of a “clear” definition as essential to everyone, the reader 
included. Both Times 02c and Express 09a present „feminist‟ as having a complex meaning, but 
express opposing views as to the desirability of this complexity. 
 The remaining occurrences of unmodified „feminist‟ focus on the importance of the lexeme 
and on other words with which it does or does not belong. Mail 06a contextualises „feminist‟ in 
women‟s lives: 
 
“She thinks of herself as living in an equal world on equal terms with her husband […] That‟s 
all very well [...] until injustice, harassment, or poor wages knock on our own door. Then we‟ll 
know why it matters to tick the box marked „feminist‟.” 
 
„Feminist‟ is here presented as a goal in a material action process of ticking, or not ticking, a box. The 
writer uses a variation of the „if… then‟ hypothesising structure („when X happens, then Y will happen‟) 
to highlight the conditions which will make identifying as a „feminist‟ matter. In this way, the writer 
makes an argument common in feminist literature – that (young) women are not feminists, although 
they ought to be – and phrases it in terms of the importance of the word „feminist‟ itself. Times 09a 
also uses a conditional structure to make an argument for the use of „feminist‟: 
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“If „feminist‟ has become a derogatory term, then I would like to purposely start using it for its 
shock value - in the same way rappers use „n*****‟.” 
 
Here, „feminist‟ appears in both a relational intensive process and a constructed opposition. The 
relational intensive process presents „feminist‟ as equivalent to “a derogatory term”, while the 
transitional opposition triggered by “become” highlights that this equivalence has come about as the 
result of a process. This relates to the presentation of „feminist/s/ism‟ as having undergone a process 
of pejoration, discussed in section 2.1.2. In this instance, the interaction of textual-conceptual 
functions presents this pejoration as unimportant: the hypothesising „if… then‟ structure stresses that 
if „feminist‟ has become derogatory, then the writer would like to use it for its shock value. Again, 
negative perceptions of „feminist‟ are acknowledged, only to be subverted. 
 The statistical overview of naming in the feminist dataset (see section 6.1) showed that there 
are only a small number of unmodified occurrences of „feminist‟ (2% of the total occurrences of 
„feminist‟). However, analysis of these occurrences has demonstrated how critical stylistic annotation 
and analysis can help to identify areas of the data that, although minor in terms of frequency, shed 
light on interesting patterns in how the object of study is constructed linguistically. In the case of 
unmodified „feminist‟, a small section of the data has provided pertinent examples of how articles both 
contest and discuss the contestation of the meaning of „feminist‟. This section was identified through a 
statistical overview based on textual-conceptual functions, and which accounts for detailed 
information about the linguistic context of occurrences. The significance of the findings here for the 
investigation into textual and contested meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ also demonstrates the veracity of 
Coffey‟s (2013) point that occurrences that are statistically infrequent can “have more ideological 
impact that those with a higher statistical significance” (p. 29): the analysis of unmodified „feminist‟ 
shows that the ways in which it is discussed in the data is likely to have a particularly strong effect on 
readers‟ impressions of the meanings of the lexemes. 
 
6.2.2 „Feminist‟ with minimal modification – „the feminist‟ 
There are only four occurrences of „the feminist‟ in the feminist dataset. However, they are of interest 
for the way they allow writers to discuss differences between different types of feminism, and different 
perceptions about who is (not) a feminist. The use of the definite article in „the feminist‟ evokes the 
idea of an archetypal feminist, and writers compare this figure to other figures – „the housewife‟ and 
„the post-feminist‟. These examples show how writers use comparisons with other lexemes – 
„housewife‟, „post-feminist‟ – to textually construct the meaning of „feminist‟. 
 Table 6.2 comprises the four occurrences of „the feminist‟: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 02c FEMINIST, POST: One who uses the hard-won equality of the feminist to advocate a 
woman‟s right to wear lippy and always be on a diet, yet not be called an airhead 
Guardian 05a […] there is something about the kind of discourse it invites that I think is ultimately 
political – an emphasis on the fellowship of women that […] fell out of favour with the 
rather lame 1990s concept of the postfeminist 
Guardian 08a […] you can‟t open a newspaper or turn on the television without running across a 
piece about how the Republican vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin, is not just 
a feminist, but the feminist – a sign that all is right in the US when it comes to gender 
equality 
Mail 01a The Feminist and the Housewife 
 
Table 6.2: Occurrences of „the feminist‟ 
 
The headline of Mail 01a refers to feminist Wendy Robertson (“The Feminist”) and her daughter, 
Debora (“The Housewife”). This example provides an argument for the possibility of an „X and Y‟ 
frame of coordinated opposition (see discussion in section 4.3.4): although the “Feminist” and 
“Housewife” elements are coordinated in a way that usually denotes some sort of similarity, the 
context of the article – which contrasts the differing lifestyle choices and political views of mother and 
daughter – makes it clear that they are being presented as opposites. This example is a boundary 
case in discussion of whether an „X and Y‟ frame can present an opposition between non-
conventional opposites (Davies, 2012, p. 68): while feminist/housewife are not conventional 
opposites, readers will be aware of the fact that the two have contrasting connotations – for example 
independence/dependence, career-oriented/home-oriented – and therefore infer that the two are 
to be seen as opposites. The use of definite reference for “Feminist” and “Housewife”, and the stylistic 
similarity of the headline to the names of fables such as „The Tortoise and the Hare‟, helps the writer 
to say something about the meaning of „feminist‟: if the feminist is antonymous to the housewife, then 
the meaning of „feminist‟ must be opposed to that of „housewife‟. 
 Guardian 02c and 05a compare the idea of „the feminist‟ to the idea of „the post-feminist‟. 
Guardian 02c is a mock encyclopaedia of what the article calls “The gender war”. It uses naming to 
powerful effect, with the glossary style meaning that the apposition of the noun phrases “FEMINIST, 
POST” and “one who uses […]”, and the relative clause in the postmodification of “one”, allow the 
writer to package up a lot of information about what they consider a post-feminist to be. While this 
example does not use contrasting, a comparison is nonetheless made between post-feminists and the 
archetypal feminist through a material action process in which the former “use” the equality won by 
the latter. This marks a clear distinction between the figure of the feminist – who won equality – and 
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the post-feminist, who merely takes advantage of these achievements. Guardian 05a is also 
unfavourable about post-feminism. Here, “the post-feminist” postmodifies the noun phrase “the rather 
lame concept”: the post-feminist is a concept, rather than a real person, and one that is negatively 
evaluated through the adjective “lame”. As with Guardian 02c, while there is no constructed 
opposition there is the sense of post-feminism being compared to feminism, a sense that derives from 
a material action event processes in which the actor - “an emphasis on the fellowship of women” - 
falls out of favour, with the circumstantial element – the concept of the post-feminist – providing the 
reason for this. These Guardian comparisons of „the feminist‟ and „the post-feminist‟, like those 
between older and new feminisms discussed in section 5.4, present the former as having more 
substance than the latter. 
The final Guardian example contrasts the archetypal figure of the feminist with the then US 
Republican vice-presidential candidate, Sarah Palin. Here, „the feminist‟ occurs as an attribute in a 
relational intensive process in which Palin is the carrier. The use of definite reference emphasises 
Palin‟s feminist status. However, this example demonstrates the importance of looking at the wider 
context in order to determine textual meaning. Although apposition is used to present an equivalence 
between “running across a piece” about Palin‟s feminism on the one hand and the health of gender 
equality in the US on the other, the context – “the Wall Street Journal calls it „Sarah Palin Feminism‟. I 
call it well-spun garbage” – makes it clear that the writer is flouting the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975): 
the fact that Sarah Palin is being presented as „the feminist‟ is a sign that all is not right for gender 
equality in the US. Like the other „the feminist‟ examples, Guardian 08a presents the meaning of 
„feminism‟ as contested: the meaning of „feminist‟ is something that the writer and members of the 
media in the US disagree on. 
 
6.2.3 „Feminist‟ with minimal modification - „a feminist‟ 
„A feminist‟ accounts for 214 of the 238 occurrences of minimally modified „feminist‟. It most often 
occurs in relational processes (145 of 214 occurrences), reflecting the tendency for occurrences of 
„feminist‟ in general to appear in relational processes (see figure 6.3). This focus best allows me to 
approach the research question regarding the textual meaning of „feminist‟ in the data, as relational 
processes represent states in which „feminist‟ plays a role. 
 The analysis focuses on the 141 of the 145 relational processes in which „a feminist‟ is either 
an attribute (131) or a carrier (10). These 141 processes are broken down further into different 
lexicogrammatical structures: „I am/become a feminist‟, „X is/becomes a feminist‟, the non-finite clause 
„to be/being/become a feminist‟, „you are/become a feminist‟ and „a feminist is/has‟. The analysis 
discusses each structure in turn, starting with the most frequently occurring structure and ending with 
the least frequently occurring: 
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Figure 6.5: Occurrences of „a feminist‟ in relational processes 
 
The fact that „I‟ is the most frequent carrier suggests that writers place an emphasis on their own 
status as feminists, while „you are/become a feminist‟ suggests an additional focus on the reader. The 
analysis of these structures is helpful in exploring whether the data contains evidence of discussion 
concerning “who could be called a feminist” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 158). In particular, the analysis shows 
that writers present the idea of a definition of „feminist‟ that involves rules concerning things you must 
or must not do in order to be a feminist. However, analysis using the textual-conceptual functions 
demonstrates that writers contest this idea, emphasising that „feminist‟ has a broad and inclusive, 
rather than narrow and exclusive, meaning.  
 
6.2.3.1 ‘I am/become a feminist’ 
„I am/become a feminist‟ occurs 48 times. Prominent among these occurrences is the use of negating, 
which is found in 18 of the 48 structures. At first sight, this suggests that writers frequently deny that 
the sense of „feminist‟ applies to them. However, closer analysis demonstrates that negating at a 
higher clausal level, and the use of speech presentation to attribute „I am not a feminist‟ to others, is 
used to argue for the wide applicability of „feminist‟. 
In four occurrences of the „I am not a feminist‟ structure, the writer makes a statement about 
their own lack of feminism: 
 
48 
35 
28 
20 
11 3 
I am/become a feminist
X is/becomes a feminist
To be/being/become a feminist
You are/become a feminist
A feminist is/has
Circumstance
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Publication Sentence 
Express 04a I got criticised for it but I didn‟t see why I couldn‟t be a feminist and like sex and 
men and wear make-up and heels 
Independent 08b If being a feminist is to want to be a „man like any other‟, as Beauvoir did, then 
I am definitely not a feminist 
Times 08b I can‟t remember a moment when I wasn‟t a feminist 
Times 09c I object to the lap-dancing club down the road but I‟m not a feminist, I‟m just a 
prude 
 
Table 6.3: Occurrences of „I am not a feminist‟ 
 
Of these, only Times 09c categorically asserts „I am not a feminist‟. In Express 04a and Times 08b, 
the negated proposition is subordinate to negation at a higher level: in the former, the writer‟s not 
being a feminist is the phenomenon in a negated mental process of seeing, while in the latter it is the 
phenomenon in a negated mental process of remembering. Independent 08b contextualises a 
possible lack of feminism through the use of a conditional „if… then‟ structure, in which „I am not a 
feminist‟ only applies in circumstances where a hypothetical understanding of what it means to be a 
feminist applies. Consideration of the wider context, then, demonstrates that the „I am not a feminist‟ 
structure is not actually used by writers to deny their feminism in these instances.  
The remaining 14 occurrences of „I am not a feminist‟ are similar in that they are not 
admissions of a lack of feminism. Instead, they involve the discussion of what Walby (2011) terms 
“the phenomenon of the person who states „I‟m not a feminist, but…‟” (p. 3). „I am not a feminist‟ is 
either part of the presentation of a general group‟s speech – for example “„I‟m not a feminist, no‟, most 
women will say” (Times 09a) – or nominalised as a stock phrase, reifying its status as a common 
phenomenon, e.g. “the phrase „I‟m not a feminist‟ is always intriguing” (Mail 02c). These uses 
exemplify what Dean (2010, p. 396) recognises as articles‟ invocation of negative perceptions about 
feminism, which are then argued against. Examples such as “the young women who tell researchers 
„I‟m not a feminist‟ have benefited immeasurably from its achievements” (Independent 03c) allow the 
writers to point out problems with this attitude: in this instance, a relational possessive process is used 
to present women who use the phrase as owing a debt to feminism. This has important ramifications 
for the meaning of „feminist‟ in the data: contesting someone else‟s insistence that „feminist‟ does not 
apply to them serves to extend the possible application of the word, communicating to readers the 
idea that the meaning of „feminist‟ may apply to them, even if they themselves are not convinced that 
it does. 
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6.2.3.2 ‘X is/becomes a feminist’ 
The 34 occurrences of „X is/becomes a feminist‟ demonstrate the complexity of „feminist‟: a variety of 
figures fulfil the „X‟ element, both recognised feminist figures such as Germaine Greer (Mirror 05b) 
and Julie Bindel (Independent 07a), and less obvious candidates such as Jordan (Times 09a) and 
“my boss at Nuts” (Times 09c). Nine of the 34 occurrences of „X is/becomes a feminist‟ also feature 
hypothesising and/or interrogative structures. While some demonstrate uncertainty about whether 
„feminist‟ can apply to particular individuals, strong epistemic modality is used to deny the idea of a 
restrictive definition of „feminist‟ 
 Table 6.4 comprises the nine modalised or interrogative occurrences of „X is/becomes a 
feminist‟: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 04c Is the Pope a feminist? 
Guardian 06c But can a man ever really be a feminist?  
Guardian 09b Barbie can be a feminist, too 
Guardian 09b […] a woman could make many traditionally feminist choices […] but she could 
equally well choose to do none of these and still be a feminist 
Guardian 09c […] she‟s just tweeted about how she can be a feminist and still have a leg wax 
Independent 09a […] as long as women‟s decisions are real choices, then she can be a feminist 
whatever those decisions are 
Mail 09a How can a woman who has spent 45 years telling us how to please a man in bed 
possibly be a feminist?  
Times 07a Is she a feminist? 
Times 08c Is Carrie Bradshaw a feminist? 
 
Table 6.4: Modalised and interrogative occurrences of „X is/becomes a feminist‟ 
 
Guardian 04c and 06c, Mail 09a, and Times 07a and 08c are all examples of relational processes that 
have an interrogative structure, meaning that uncertainty is expressed about whether the meaning of 
„feminist‟ can be attributed to the individuals concerned. The modalised occurrences are more positive 
about the possibility of their carriers being feminist. For example, the use of the additive adverbial „too‟ 
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in “Barbie can be a feminist, too” (Guardian 09b) shows that “the current proposition is being added to 
a previous one” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 780). Here, „too‟ acts as an iterative trigger, giving rise to the 
presupposition that there has been or will be “some earlier or later occurrence of the process” 
(Jeffries, 2010a, p. 97): not only can „feminist‟ be applied to others, but it can also be applied to 
Barbie. Guardian 09b and Independent 09a also use epistemic modality, presenting the idea that 
„feminist‟ can apply to different types of women. In these examples, writers take issue with 
perceptions of the requirements that someone needs to fulfil in order for „feminist‟ to fit them. 
Guardian 09c uses a constructed opposition to contrast a woman who does not make 
traditionally feminist choices with a feminist. Davies (2012) does not list „still‟ among the possible 
triggers of concessive opposition, but it here works in the same way as triggers such as „but‟ to 
“subvert expectations set up in one of the clauses” (p. 58): while it might be expected that not making 
traditional feminist choices would mean that one is not a feminist, the constructed opposition suggests 
that the two are not in fact antonymous. A similar point about women‟s decisions and being a feminist 
is made in the conditional „as long as... then‟ structure in Independent 09a: the one condition for 
„feminist‟ status is that women‟s decisions are “real choices”. In both instances, writers argue against 
a prescriptive understanding of „feminist‟, where part of the lexeme‟s meaning is that the individual 
must make particular sorts of choices. The emphasis on „choice‟ also reflects Taylor‟s (2003, p. 182) 
observation that modern media portrayals of feminism focus on the idea of individual choice. 
 
6.2.3.3 ‘To be/being/become a feminist’ 
„To be/being/become a feminist‟ accounts for 28 of the 145 relational processes under discussion. 
Like „X is/becomes a feminist‟ structure (see section 6.1.3.2 above), these structures focus on the 
idea of rules that may be attached to „feminist‟. However, these rules are often argued against in the 
wider context, in particular through the representation of states. The analysis focuses on the seven of 
the 28 structures that occur within a larger relational process and those that fulfil the role of 
circumstance in processes, with both types of occurrence exemplifying the discussion of „feminist‟ 
rules. 
 Table 6.5 comprises occurrences of „to be/being/become a feminist‟ that appear in relational 
processes: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 09b Being a feminist does not mean you hate men 
Guardian 01b […] she writes that she felt it was “dangerous” to be a feminist when her baby 
was young […] 
Guardian 07b […] I think there is still the perception that being a feminist means hating men […] 
Independent 08b If being a feminist is to want to be a „man like any other‟, as Beauvoir did, then I 
am definitely not a feminist 
Times 08a […] it is possible to be both a model and a feminist 
Times 08c Whatever being a feminist entails, I‟m pretty sure that it forbids concurring with 
avuncular men who make statements that confuse you 
Times 08c Because back then, going by the archive footage, it was easy to be a feminist 
because it was fun 
 
Table 6.5: Occurrences of „to be/being/become a feminist‟ in relational processes 
 
Four of the processes use the „to be/being/become a feminist‟ structure to discuss the relationship 
between feminism and men. Dean‟s (2010, p. 399) analysis of The Guardian suggests that articles 
seek to present feminism as men-friendly, and this is the case in Express 09b and Guardian 07b. 
Express 09b uses a negated relational intensive process to deny that being a feminist requires hatred 
of men, while the perception that this is a requisite for being a feminist is nominalised in the existential 
process in Guardian 07b. This existential process is the phenomenon in a mental process of thinking, 
with the writer – who elsewhere calls this perception “a cliché” - as senser. Both deny the accuracy of 
a common perception of requirements attached to „feminist‟, while Times 08a coordinates “a model” 
and “a feminist” in the attribute to assure the reader that being one does not preclude being the other. 
This is another example of a defeased opposition, with the coordination of two elements – “a model” 
and “a feminist” – simultaneously acknowledging the perception of them as opposites and bringing 
them together. 
 Independent 08b and Times 08c also relate feminism to men. In Independent 08b a 
conditional „if… then‟ structure stipulates a condition – being a feminist means wanting to be like men 
- under which the writer would not be a feminist. Here, the use of hypothesising presents the rules 
attached to „feminist‟ as unclear. The same textual-conceptual function has a similar effect in Times 
08c, in which „being a feminist‟ is the carrier in a relational process in which it is attributed “whatever”. 
In the wider clausal context, the writer uses the epistemically modal “pretty sure” to state their level of 
confidence that „being a feminist‟ means not permitting men to have power over women. These 
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examples are both more uncertain and more complex in the way they present the relationship 
between being a feminist and men: while the use of hypothesising downplays the writers‟ certainty, 
the former presents the idea of being like men as undesirable and the latter presents the idea of 
concurring with a certain type of man as undesirable.  
Where „to be/being/become a feminist‟ is a circumstance, the process states a rule attached 
to „feminist‟: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 07a I don‟t think you have to pass a test to be a feminist 
Guardian 09b These feminisn‟ts, as I call them, are put off precisely because they feel that to be a 
feminist you are expected to look a particular way and sign up to a very specific set 
of beliefs 
Mail 06b Society thinks that to be a feminist you have to dress a certain way and be a certain 
way, but that‟s not true 
Times 02c The idea then that to be a feminist you shouldn‟t wear make-up was a silly idea 
Times 08a In the past, you had to subscribe to a whole set of beliefs to be a feminist, including 
how you should look and behave 
 
Table 6.6: Occurrences of „to be/being/become a feminist‟ as circumstances 
 
The sentences in table 6.6 are examples of the repudiation of perceptions about feminism (Dean, 
2010). Each of the underlined rules is either negated or contextualised and thereby called into 
question. “You have to pass a test” in Guardian 07a is subverted by the negated mental process of 
thinking in the main clause, while “you have to dress a certain way and be a certain way” in Mail 06b 
is placed in a constructed opposition with the cataphoric “but that‟s not true”, negating the existence of 
this rule. Times 02c and 08a do not deny rules quite so clearly, but their use of the past tense (and 
the time adverbial “in the past” in Times 08a) suggests that these rules no longer exist, and the idea 
of the rule “you shouldn‟t wear make-up” (Times 02c) is attributed the quality of being “a silly idea”. In 
Guardian 09b, the rule “you are expected to look a particular way” is not negated or historicised, but it 
is the phenomenon in a mental process of feeling, where the senser is “they”, referring cataphorically 
to “feminisn‟ts”, the writer‟s term for people who say “I‟m not a feminist but…” While the attachment of 
„to be/being/become a feminist‟ to rules gives the impression that „feminist‟ has certain expectations 
attached, analysis of the wider context demonstrates that articles repudiate these ideas. 
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6.2.3.4 ‘You are/become a feminist’ 
The „you are/become a feminist‟ structure occurs 20 times. These occurrences are similar to „to 
be/being/become a feminist‟ in that they present the idea of requirements that must be met for the use 
of „feminist‟ to be applicable. Again, however, analysis of interrogatives and hypothesising shows how 
writers argue against perceptions about what „feminism‟ and „feminist‟ mean. The defeasing of rules is 
especially pertinent in the case of „you are/become a feminist‟, as this particular use of social deixis 
serves to involve the reader. By addressing the reader directly in this way, the writers are able to 
reassure them about what being a feminist does and does not entail. 
 Table 6.7 comprises the eight interrogative occurrences of „you are/become a feminist‟: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 09a So are you a feminist? 
Express 09a […] when your girlfriends ask, “You‟re a feminist aren‟t you? What does it mean 
and am I one?” we need to have a clear answer 
Guardian 07a Can you be a feminist and go to a lap-dancing club? 
Guardian 07a How did you become a feminist? 
Independent 03a Can you only be a feminist if the people you put first - your children - are girls? 
Independent 07a Surely the real question should be not „why are you a feminist?‟ but „why aren't 
you one?‟ 
Mail 03a Years ago a newspaper editor asked me: “you‟re not a feminist, you?” with such 
distaste in his voice you‟d have thought he was accusing me of child abuse 
Times 01a It bores me still to be on the receiving end of the pathetic question, „you're not 
really a feminist, are you?‟ 
 
Table 6.7: Interrogative occurrences of „you are/become a feminist‟ 
 
These interrogatives show how articles attempt to “define what feminism is and who can appropriate 
this label” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132). Four of the eight (Mail 03a, Times 01a and the two examples 
from Express 09a) focus on the question of whether an individual is a feminist; three of these use tag 
questions to indicate that the askers have preconceptions about what a feminist is and whether 
particular individuals fit the definition. Independent 07a is a „why‟ question, suggesting that choosing 
whether or not to be a feminist is optional, while Guardian 07a asks a „how‟ question, presenting 
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feminism as something that a person has to attain in some way. This idea of rules or standards that 
are attached to being a feminist is also put across in Guardian 07a and Independent 03a, which use 
hypothesising in the form of the epistemically modal „can‟. The use of the interrogative to frame the 
coordination of “be a feminist” and “go to a lap-dancing club” in Guardian 07a leaves open the 
question of whether or not these elements are opposite to each other or share some sort of 
characteristic, while Independent 03a demonstrates uncertainty about what possibilities „feminist‟ 
allows through an „if… then‟ structure.  
 A total of eight of the „you are/become a feminist‟ structures feature hypothesising. These 
occurrences use modal forms to repudiate the idea that the label „feminist‟ precludes certain 
behaviours and preferences: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 09a [...] you are probably a feminist without realising it 
Guardian 06a I think you can be a strong, sexy woman and still be a feminist 
Guardian 07a But, yes, you can do it and still be a feminist 
Independent 07a [...] you don‟t have to be a feminist to understand that King‟s definition is just 
too blandly inclusive 
Independent 09c What we need to get across is that you can be feminine and a feminist 
Mail 09a Her attitude was that you could be a feminist and appear naked in Playboy 
Mail 09a You could be a feminist and cook your man's every meal […] 
Times 08a Yes, you can wear lipstick and be a feminist 
 
Table 6.8: Modalised occurrences of „you are/become a feminist‟ 
 
Independent 07a negates deontic modality in its discussion of Labour politician Oona King‟s definition 
of „feminism‟, assuring the reader that being a feminist does not provide insight that non-feminists do 
not have access to, while Express 09a uses the epistemically confident “probably” to assure the 
reader that they are likely to be a feminist, thereby presenting „feminist‟ as something that can apply 
to someone even if they are not aware of it. 
The remaining six occurrences are all similar in that the meanings created by different textual-
conceptual functions combine to assure readers that „feminist‟ can apply to those who enjoy 
seemingly incongruous activities. Each uses the second person pronoun to address the reader 
directly, with a relational intensive process attributing the quality of being „a feminist‟ to the reader. 
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Hypothesising is also evident in each, with the epistemic/deontic modal auxiliary verbs „can‟ and 
„could‟ assuring the reader that it is possible or allowable to be a feminist and to be or do something 
else. The coordination of two actions/states/events or qualities demonstrates how writers coordinate 
two elements that could be seen as contrasting (for example being feminine and being a feminist 
(Independent 09c)), but defease the possible opposition by representing actions/events/states in 
which the reader is able to be or do both. Through this combination of naming, hypothesising and 
representing actions/events/states, the writers incorporate words and ideas („feminine‟, posing for 
Playboy) that might usually be seen as non-feminist into the meaning of „feminist‟. 
 
6.2.3.5 ‘A feminist is/has X’ 
„A feminist‟ fulfils the role of carrier in just 10 of the 145 relational processes. This in itself suggests 
that articles devote less space to defining what a feminist is than they do to categorisations of who is 
(not) a feminist (see the discussion of media portrayals of feminism in section 2.2.2). In five of the 10 
„a feminist is/has X‟ structures, the phrasal verb „look like‟ expresses the representation of a state. 
This suggests a focus on feminists‟ physical appearance, something that Mendes (2011b, p. 491) 
argues is used to highlight differences and similarities between feminists and „normal‟ women. 
However, as with the other structures analysed in section 6.2.3, there is evidence of articles arguing 
against stereotypical definitions and connotations of „feminist‟. 
 Table 6.9 comprises the 10 occurrences of „a feminist is/has‟: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 07a I wear a T-shirt with the slogan „This is what a feminist looks like‟ because I don't 
fit the stereotypes 
Guardian 07a Even if a feminist was angry and hairy, then so what? 
Independent 07a Why not simply wear a T-shirt saying: „A feminist is a person who admires other 
feminists‟, or one saying „This is what a decent person looks like‟? 
Independent 07a All of which conspires to suggest that a feminist doesn‟t look very much like me 
Independent 07a That estimable campaigning group The Fawcett Society has challenged “well-
known public figures” to don its “infamous” T-shirts saying: „This is what a feminist 
looks like‟ [...] 
Independent 07a We know what a feminist looks like 
Independent 07a The thriller writer Sarah Waters, who has also been co-opted into this great 
struggle to ascertain that a feminist has no defining physical characteristics, takes 
the knotty problem of feminist identification one step further 
Mail 09b He was portrayed, Superman fashion, ripping off his shirt and tie to reveal a 
costume that said: „This is what a feminist looks like‟ 
Times 01a To quote Margaret Forster [...] : “A feminist [...] is a man or a woman who strives 
to secure a society in which neither sex finds gender alone a handicap to 
progress” 
Times 08a I thought the protesters looked a bit silly, a bit like a stereotypical idea of what a 
feminist should be 
 
Table 6.9: Occurrences of „a feminist is/has‟ 
 
Three of the five „a feminist looks like X‟ structures (Guardian 07a, Independent 07a, Mail 09b) are 
citations of the „This is what a feminist looks like‟ T-shirt slogan used by the feminist organisation the 
Fawcett Society. The remaining two occurrences also appear in discussion of the T-shirt in 
Independent 07a. Three other occurrences of the „a feminist is/has X‟ structure focus on feminists‟ 
appearances; however, textual-conceptual functions work to subvert expectations: in Times 06b, a 
circumstance of time historicises an idea of what a feminist looks like - “in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
image of a feminist was someone whose boiler suit, cropped hair and absence of makeup repudiated 
centuries of obligation to pander to men”; in Independent 07a, syntactic negation – “a feminist has no 
defining characteristics” - subverts the idea that feminists can be identified by their looks, and in 
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Guardian 07a a conditional structure makes it clear that a feminist‟s appearance is unimportant: “even 
if a feminist was angry and hairy, then so what?” Although ideas about feminists‟ appearance are 
discussed in the data, there is little evidence among these examples that writers resort to stereotypes.  
 
6.2.4 „Feminist‟ with detailed modification 
Figure 6.1 shows that 164 of the 410 occurrences of „feminist‟ in the feminist dataset are modified 
through detailed modification – premodifying adjectives, postmodifying prepositional phrases and 
relative clauses and appositive noun phrases. This equates to 40% of occurrences of „feminist‟, a 
relatively high proportion compared to the 23% of occurrences of „feminism‟ with detailed modification 
(figure 6.1). This suggests that more description is packaged into the naming of individuals who 
represent the movement than into the naming of the movement itself. 
The analysis of the „feminist dataset concludes by focusing on the 64 occurrences of 
appositive noun phrases that co-occur with „feminist‟, and the 165 adjectives that are used in the 
premodification of „feminist‟. Occurrences of apposition that explicitly discuss „feminist‟ show that 
„feminist‟ and derived forms are contested in the articles, and that the „feminist‟ label is used to add 
weight to arguments concerning gender relations. The overview of adjectives shows that previous 
studies‟ (for example Dean, 2010; Lind & Salo, 2002; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) assumptions about 
newspapers‟ use of qualifiers to present feminists in a negative light are overly pessimistic.  
 
6.2.4.1 ‘Feminist’ with appositive noun phrases 
There are 64 occurrences of apposition in which „feminist‟ is the head of an appositive noun phrase. 
In 50 instances, apposition is used to provide what Biber et al. (1999) term “background information 
about people” (p. 639); in the remaining 14, there is metalinguistic discussion of the lexeme „feminist‟ 
itself. Occurrences of the former have the effect of implying the significance of particular feminist 
figures, while the latter demonstrate the contestation of the meaning of feminist terms in the data. 
Apposition in which an individual is glossed as a feminist - for example “time for men to hit 
back says Lessing the arch feminist” (Mail 01c) - not only provides background information, but also 
underlines the significance of what the referent is saying or doing. As referents are usually picked out 
by a single noun phrase, the provision of extra information flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), 
leaving the reader to infer that the individual‟s feminist credentials are of particular pertinence to the 
action, event or state expressed in the proposition. In the Mail 01c example, the verbiage attributed to 
the writer Doris Lessing – which expresses a pro-men, anti-feminist attitude – is made more emphatic 
by the use of apposition: if a feminist is saying that men are hard done by, then it must be true. A 
similar sense of endorsement is expressed in other examples, such as Sun 08a: “arch-feminist Julie 
Burchill, who once lived with a woman, says why she believes females must continue to take their kit 
off”. This example, from an article defending The Sun‟s continuing publication of pictures of topless 
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models, packages up the idea of Burchill‟s feminism in order to enhance the supportive sentiments 
expressed in the verbiage: if an arch-feminist supports Page 3, then Page 3 must be OK. By 
emphasising the feminist credentials of someone offering their views on a matter to do with gender 
relations in this way, articles present the idea of particular feminist figures standing for feminists 
generally (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; North, 2009). 
 The remaining 14 occurrences of „feminist‟ in apposition provide definitions of „feminist‟ or 
other types of discussion of it. Table 6.10 comprises five occurrences from Guardian 02c (entitled The 
Gender Agenda‟), which provides a glossary of terminology related to “The Gender Wars”: 
 
Sentence 
FEMINIST, FEMININE: One who advocates the equality of women, while reserving the right to be 
cutely unable to pick up heavy things or complex ideas (see Ally McBeal) 
FEMINIST: One who advocates women‟s rights on the grounds of sexual equality 
FEMINIST, NEW: One who advocates women‟s rights, but precedes each advocation with the 
phrase, 'I‟m not a bra-burner or anything' 
FEMINIST, OLD-SCHOOL: One who used to be a feminist, but now feels too irked by young post-
feminists (see below) to really give a shit (see Fay Weldon) 
FEMINIST, POST: One who uses the hard-won equality of the feminist to advocate a woman‟s right 
to wear lippy and always be on a diet, yet not be called an airhead 
 
Table 6.10: Occurrences of „feminist‟ with appositive noun phrases in Guardian 02c 
 
In these examples, apposition provides a gloss of „feminist‟ and related derivational and premodified 
forms. The fact that there are five separate entries for „feminist‟ could cause confusion for readers, a 
possibility that the article recognises: “confused? You should be – the terrain is more crowded, more 
densely defined, than ever before”. The definition of „feminist‟ is close to the OED (2015) definition 
(“an advocate or supporter of the rights and equality of women”): this emphasises the mocking tone of 
the other entries, each of which is formed using the kinds of qualifiers observed in previous studies of 
feminism in the media (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 
2012) relating to age/generation, femininity and the passing of feminism. The irreverent tone of these 
definitions is constructed through concessive oppositions. In each, the first clause is contrasted with a 
clause that subverts the expectations attached to the first (Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745), for example in 
the description of “FEMINIST, NEW” as someone who advocates women‟s rights but also 
precedes each advocation with the phrase, “I‟m not a bra-burner or anything”. This glossary 
creates the impression of „feminist‟ as splitting into different types: a prototypical „feminist‟ and then 
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other types which share characteristics, but which differ in crucial respects. These respects resemble 
breakings of the „rules‟ discussed in section 6.2.3: for example, you know that someone is a „feminine 
feminist‟, rather than simply a „feminist‟, because they wish to maintain “the right to be cutely unable 
to pick up heavy things or complex ideas”. 
 The remaining nine examples of „feminist‟ in apposition use the appositive noun phrases “the 
word”, “the term” and “the phrase” to indicate that it is the lexeme itself, rather than an individual, that 
is being discussed: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 09a […] the word feminist is too linked to images of women burning their bras […] 
Express 09a […] we need to know what we mean by the word feminist […] 
Guardian 03a […] I was aware of my mother using the word „feminist‟ […] 
Guardian 06c I‟m interested in how the phrase „pro-feminist‟ is used […] 
Independent 06a […] the term feminist appears to have lost its lustre 
Mail 03a My maternal grandmother was a pre-feminist […] recognised, since the term 
„feminist‟ didn‟t exist in her day, as „a strong woman‟ […] 
Mail 03a The word „feminist‟ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution […] 
Mail 07a It even eschews the term feminist in some cases […] 
Times 09a […] the loss of the word feminist is appalling 
 
Table 6.11: Remaining occurrences of „feminist‟ with appositive noun phrases 
 
These examples demonstrate that the meaning of „feminist‟ is contested, and that writers recognise 
this. For example, the what-clause in Express 09a is a relational intensive process, but does not 
provide a definition of what „feminist‟ means, while the how-clause in Guardian 06c observes that the 
phrase „pro-feminist‟ can be used in different ways, or with different purposes. Other examples 
discuss connotations of „feminist‟ or its (lack of) fashionableness, with the representation of actions 
and states presenting it in a certain light. For example, the relational process in Express 09a puts 
„feminist‟ in the context of bra-burners, with the intensifier “too” emphasising that the strength of this 
connotation is too great for the word to be seen positively, while the relational possessive process in 
Mail 03a attributes something positive to „feminist‟ – “the exciting smack of revolution” – but places 
this in the past through the circumstance of time “in those days”. Independent 06a and Mail 07a are 
both material action processes in which „feminist‟ is rejected somehow: in the former it is the goal in a 
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process of eschewing and in the latter it is the actor in a process of losing “its lustre”. Each of these 
presents „feminist‟ as a word that is sometimes rejected or has become pejorative. Times 09a uses a 
nominalisation – “the loss of the word feminist” – to reify the idea of „feminist‟ becoming redundant, 
the nominalised verb “loss” presenting „feminist‟ as something that can be mislaid by accident. The 
attribute, “appalling”, presents this loss as something concrete but negative. 
 
6.2.4.2 ‘Feminist’ with premodifying adjectives 
132 of the 410 occurrences of „feminist‟ are premodified by one or more adjectives. The range of 
adjectives used demonstrates that different types of feminist are discussed in the data. The analysis 
here looks at the types of adjectives used and discusses occurrences of „radical feminist‟, which 
previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Marling, 2010) argue 
demonstrates a “link between feminism and aggression” (Marling, 2010, p. 13), but which does not 
have a negative textual meaning in the feminist dataset. 
 Figure 6.6 provides an overview of the adjectives that premodify „feminist‟, distinguished 
according to the semantic groupings defined by Biber et al. (1999, pp. 508-509) and discussed in 
section 4.3.1.1: 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify „feminist‟ 
 
Figure 6.6 shows that a greater number of descriptors (94, or 60.65%) than classifiers (61, or 39.35%) 
are used in the premodification of „feminist‟. The extent of the difference is questionable, but it is 
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interesting that this is a reverse of the pattern in premodification of „feminism‟, for which 45% of 
premodifying adjectives are descriptors and 55% classifiers (see section 5.4.2). This difference 
suggests that there is an emphasis on describing categories of feminism and qualities of feminists. 
The majority of descriptors (63 of 94) are miscellaneous descriptors which describe particular 
feminists according to personal characteristics such as „shy‟, „feisty‟ and „reluctant‟. Other 
miscellaneous descriptors emphasise the idea of „feminist‟ as something that can apply to an 
individual to a greater or lesser extent: „strident‟, „ardent‟ and „staunch‟ all carry a sense of degree of 
commitment, emphasising the idea that one feminist can be more or less committed to the cause of 
feminism than another. 
 The majority of classifiers (36 of 61) are topical/other classifiers, including „radical‟ (11 
occurrences), „militant‟ (2) and „bra-burning‟ (2). „Radical‟ is the premodifying adjective that occurs 
most frequently in the feminist dataset, supporting Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012, p. 410) 
finding that „radical‟ is the most common adjective that collocates with „feminist‟ in the Bank of English 
corpus and a common collocate of „feminist‟ in UK newspapers. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) 
argue that „radical‟ has “distinctly negative connotations” (p. 413) and that its collocation with „feminist‟ 
presents feminists as being involved in “rather threatening and aggressive activism” (p. 412). 
However, they make their classification of „radical feminist‟ as a “negative collocational pattern” 
(Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 418) without providing analysis of any concordances. The 
occurrences of „radical feminist‟ in the feminist dataset in table 6.12, below, contradict the assumption 
that it has negative connotations: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 01c I raised my daughter to be a radical feminist and then she became a housewife 
Guardian 00a Rowbotham was always radical, but never a radical feminist 
Guardian 01b […] the radical feminist who looks like a beauty queen […]: when she gave birth, 
things got ugly 
Guardian 01b Pregnancy, birth and motherhood […] have made me a more radical feminist […] 
Guardian 04a […] she describes herself as a radical feminist 
Guardian 05b The radical feminist talks to Julie Bindel 
Guardian 06a She studied with radical French feminist Monique Wittig […] 
Mail 01a […] Wendy Robertson […] turned into a radical feminist […] 
Telegraph 05a Radical feminist who condemned pornography and dismissed men as moral cretins 
Telegraph 05a Andrea Dworkin, the American radical feminist […] campaigned ferociously against 
pornography […] 
Times 06a […] the radical feminist Andrea Dworkin died last year virtually unmourned […] 
  
Table 6.12: Occurrences of „radical feminist‟ 
 
The textual meaning of „radical feminist‟ does not have “threatening and aggressive” connotations. 
The closest thing to this sort of depiction of radical feminists is in Telegraph 05a, which discusses the 
American feminist Andrea Dworkin: Dworkin is the actor in the representation of actions of 
condemning and dismissing, and her campaigning is described as ferocious. There is little other 
evidence that „radical feminist‟ has negative connotations, although in several occurrences contrasting 
presents the idea of people transitioning into being radical feminists. Instances of transitional 
opposition in Mail 01a – “Wendy Robertson […] turned into a radical feminist” – and Guardian 01b 
– “pregnancy, birth and motherhood […] have made me [into] a more radical feminist” – present 
radicalisation as a process whereby an individual either becomes a radical feminist or becomes 
“more” of a radical feminist. In these constructed oppositions there is no sense of radical feminist 
aligning with a negative superordinate: in fact, the parallelism in Express 01c suggests that it is better 
to be a radical feminist than a housewife, as the former is presented as the intended consequence 
of a material action process of raising a daughter, with the concessive clause indicating that the 
daughter‟s becoming a housewife was surprising and undesirable. While these occurrences 
differentiate „regular‟ women from „radical feminists‟ – a woman can go from being one to the other, 
but cannot be both – analysis of the wider context of occurrences of „radical feminist‟ suggests that 
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there is little evidence to support Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) claim that the collocation of 
„radical‟ and „feminist‟ presents feminists as “threatening and aggressive” (p. 412).  
 
6.3 The feminists dataset 
The remainder of the analysis in the present chapter discusses the feminists dataset. Previous 
corpus-critical studies (for example Beaton-Thome, 2013; Mautner, 2007) have observed that texts 
referring to groups of individuals can dehumanise the individuals involved, while studies of feminism 
in the media have argued that groups of feminists tend to be presented as aggressive and involved in 
subversive activities (for example Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Lind & Salo, 2002; Rhode, 1995). 
The analysis here looks at the textual meaning of „feminists‟ in the dataset and how the textual-
conceptual functions construct meanings of „feminists‟, finding that political types of feminist are 
placed in the past, new feminists are treated with suspicion, and generic groups of feminists are 
presented as threatening. 
 
6.3.1 Unmodified „feminists‟ 
„Feminists‟ is unmodified in 185 of the 435 occurrences in the feminists dataset. This means that 42% 
of occurrences of „feminists‟ refer to feminists as a single, homogenous group. The analysis here 
focuses on the 12 occurrences of „feminists‟ that appear as the carrier in a relational process, and 
where the use of generic reference (Biber et al., 1999, p. 265) means that feminists as a whole are 
being defined. These processes provide evidence of the attribution of negative meanings to 
„feminists‟. However, analysis of presenting others‟ speech and thought, implying and contrasting 
shows that the meanings of „feminists‟ are contested in these examples, with writers arguing against 
negative perceptions. 
Table 6.13 comprises the 12 occurrences of unmodified 'feminists' as a carrier in a relational 
intensive process: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 00c Feminists were, in fact, divided on Mrs Thatcher‟s ascendancy 
Guardian 07a Feminists are angry […] 
Independent 03a Feminists in this regard are martyrs among us […] 
Independent 07a […] feminists looked like men in dungarees who hadn‟t had a wash […] 
Independent 07a They are what feminists look like 
Mail 01b […] feminists can, surprise, surprise, be sexy and beautiful 
Mail 03b Feminists, let me remind you, are all man-hating, humourless warthogs 
Mail 07a […] feminists became political […] 
Mail 07b Feminists were wrong, however, in trying to reverse […] gender roles 
Sun 08b Who are feminists anyway? 
Telegraph 01b So why are feminists now so discredited in the eyes of some women? 
Times 00c Feminists might have been too idealistic about female solidarity […] 
 
Table 6.13: Occurrences of unmodified „feminists‟ as carriers in relational intensive processes 
 
The qualities attributed to 'feminists' in these representations of states are familiar from previous 
studies of feminism in the media (for example Callaghan et al., 1999; Buschman & Lenart, 1996; 
Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) which find that feminists are portrayed as unfeminine – for example 
as “like men in dungarees" (Independent 07a), "angry" (Guardian 07a), "humourless" (Mail 03b) - and 
overtly political, e.g. as "martyrs" (Independent 03a), "political" (Mail 07a) and "too idealistic" (Times 
00c)). However, analysis of the wider context shows that negative perceptions about feminists are 
contested. 
Four of the 12 occurrences are part of the verbiage in the presentation of others‟ speech 
(Guardian 07a, Independent 07a, Mail 07a, Sun 08b) and do not, therefore, necessarily represent the 
views of the writer. In Mail 07a, Doris Lessing attributes the quality of being “political” to feminists (a 
word that takes on a negative meaning in the context of the coordinated verbs “turned on” and “failed 
to achieve”), while in Sun 08b Julia Morley, chair of the Miss World organisation, asks the hypothetical 
question “Who are feminists anyway?” before providing the answer “they are lesbians who want to be 
men”. Feminist writer Kat Banyard‟s suggestion that “feminists are angry” (Guardian 07a) comes in 
response to the question “what are the clichés about feminism?”, meaning that it is presented as 
equivalent to “the clichés about feminism”, while in Independent 07a the attribution of 'looking like 
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men' to feminists is the verbiage in a verbalisation process in which “conventional wisdom” is the 
sayer. The clauses from Independent 03a and Mail 03b also represent the views of people: in the 
former, the following circumstance - detailing how feminists have been “caricatured as being childless 
or sexless” – makes it clear that this proposition represents the views of others, i.e. feminists are 
martyrs according to the caricatures of others; in the latter, the writer flouts the maxim of quality 
(Grice, 1975), saying the opposite of what they mean in order to imply that feminists are not man-
hating, humourless or warthogs – it is only that others think this is the case. This intention is evident 
from the preceding sentence, a passivized mental perception process in which “feminism is seen as 
outdated”. 
 Mail 07b and Times 00c attribute ideas of incorrectness and over-idealism to „feminists‟, but 
also use contrasting to make more positive observations. In the former, the concessive opposition 
trigger “however” places the clause in opposition with the preceding sentence, which notes that “the 
feminist movement was right to fight for female sexuality”: the criticism here concerns the extremity of 
some feminists‟ actions, rather than the actions of all feminists. Times 00c also uses concessive 
opposition to balance out a negative view of feminists, with the trigger “but” preceding the observation 
that “it rings hollow to reclaim bitchiness as a manifestation of girl power”: even if idealism is a 
negative aspect of feminists, it does not mean that “bitchiness” is a good alternative to feminism. 
These examples again demonstrate that while negative qualities are attributed to „feminist/s/ism‟, the 
wider context often shows that articles argue with or question negative perceptions of feminism and 
feminists. 
 
6.3.2 „Feminists‟ with minimal modification 
69 of the 435 occurrences of „feminists‟ are minimally modified through determiners and/or 
predeterminers. These include 11 instances of „the feminists‟. While the analysis of „radical feminist‟ in 
section 6.2.4.2 suggests that previous studies (for example Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) may be 
overly pessimistic in their view of how feminists are portrayed, the representation of actions, events 
and states that „the feminists‟ are involved in is more negative and provides evidence of the sort of 
associations of aggressive behaviour observed by Lind and Salo (2002). I argue here that the use of 
the definite determiner – which assumes that the referent is “known to the speaker and the 
addressee” (Biber et al., 1999. P. 263) - creates a particular, threatening textual meaning for 
„feminists‟. 
Table 6.14 comprises the 11 instances of 'the feminists' in the feminists dataset: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 06c If so, say the feminists, blame Scary, Posh, Sporty, Ginger and Baby […] 
Guardian 06a As Sam Baker […] says, “the feminists were the cool ones” 
Independent 00a Did you expect the feminists to be as angry with you as they were? 
Mail 00c But hang on - the feminists say - is there any proof that men rape in order to 
disseminate their genes?  
Sun 05a The feminists told us we shouldn‟t rely on men for status or money 
Telegraph 01b […] the feminists got a good 15 years out of the personal versus political 
Telegraph 04b The feminists never called or emailed to ask what had become of me 
Telegraph 07a But it was the feminists who really hated the idea of women‟s fiction […] 
Telegraph 09b […] the feminists, as far as I‟m concerned, went way over the top 
Times 00a The feminists want to forget you exist 
Times 00a As far as the feminists are concerned, if the choices that people freely make end 
up producing unequal outcomes in the workplace, then their free choices must be 
overridden 
 
Table 6.14: Occurrences of „the feminists‟ 
 
Whereas only one of 11 occurrences of „radical feminist‟ is an active agent in a process (see section 
6.2.4.2), „the feminists‟ is the actor, carrier, senser or sayer in each of the processes in which it 
occurs. Further, the states and actions they are involved in present feminists negatively, with the 
exception of the positively evaluative attribute “the cool ones” (Guardian 06a). In the other relational 
intensive process in which „the feminists‟ is the carrier, they are attributed the quality of being angry. 
Where „the feminists‟ is an actor in a material action process, the activities that are associated with 
„feminists‟ either evoke the idea of excessiveness (Telegraph 01b and 09b) or are negated (Telegraph 
04b). The latter is an example of a negated proposition flouting the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), 
as it is less informative to tell a reader what someone “never” did than what they did do (Leech, 1983): 
in this instance, the implied meaning is that the feminists should have called or emailed. 
„The feminists‟ is a senser in three mental processes, in spite of the fact that it is difficult to 
have access to the thoughts of a group of people (see the discussion in section 6.4 below for further 
discussion of mental processes in the feminist and feminists datasets). Feminists “want to forget you 
exist” (Times 00a) and “hate the idea of women‟s fiction” (Telegraph 07a), with the choices of verb 
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portraying feminists as inconsiderate and resentful. In Times 00a, the feminists believe that people‟s 
“free choices must be overridden”, presenting feminists as having oppressive views. In the three 
verbalisation processes, feminists are presented as bossy and judgemental, telling people what they 
should or should not do (Sun 05a), blaming the Spice Girls for young women‟s apparent faults 
(Express 06c) and challenging others‟ convictions about sexual assault (Mail 00c). The negative way 
in which „the feminists‟ are represented in actions, events and states – and the way in which they are 
presented as interacting with others – provides evidence for Lind and Salo‟s (2002) argument that 
feminists are portrayed as being involved in different activities to others and as being aggressive. 
Biber et al. (1999) suggest that, in fiction and other genres, people are “frequently presented 
to the reader as if familiar” (p. 265): using the definite article implies that the group being referred to is 
somehow typical of what readers or listeners would expect of that particular group. This appears to be 
true in the uses of 'the feminists': using an existential presupposition to present the idea of the 
feminists as a single mass portrays them in a more threatening way than would be possible with, for 
example, 'some feminists'. This relates to Baker et al.‟s (2013) findings relating to the use of definite 
references to refer to „the Muslim world‟ and „the Muslim community‟ in British newspaper articles, 
which they suggest serve to group a large number of people together, presenting them as “distinct, 
reasonably homogenous entities” (p. 275). There are also similarities here with, for example, the way 
sports commentators refer to a nation's players as 'the Germans' rather than 'Germany', making them 
sound inherently more menacing. 
 
6.3.3 „Feminists‟ with detailed modification 
181 occurrences of „feminists‟ have detailed modification. The analysis here focuses on adjectives, 
using Biber et al.‟s (1999, pp. 508-509) semantic groupings of descriptors and classifiers to look at 
what sort of information about feminists is packaged up into the naming of feminists and whether this 
differs from how individuals are named. The interaction of naming and representing 
actions/events/states shows that there is evidence for previous studies‟ (e.g. Dean, 2010; Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) convictions that the media discusses radical feminists as 
something from the past and that lines are drawn between „old‟ and „new‟ feminists (Mendes, 2011a, 
p. 561). 
 The analysis of premodifying adjectives in the feminist dataset showed that they consist of 
60.65% descriptors and 39.35% classifiers (see section 6.2.4.2). While the difference in percentages 
is not huge, this was the reverse of the statistics for premodifying adjectives in the feminism dataset, 
which are made up of 55% classifiers and 45% determiners (see section 5.4.2). This difference 
suggests that individual feminists are described according to personal characteristics („shy‟, „feisty‟, 
„reluctant‟, etc.), whereas the premodification of the movement itself plays a classifying role, 
presenting „feminism‟ as something that is divided into different categories („French‟, „militant‟, „third-
wave‟, etc.). Figure 6.7 suggests that the naming of „feminists‟ has more in common with that of 
„feminism‟ than „feminist‟: 
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Figure 6.7: Semantic groupings of adjectives that premodify „feminists‟ 
 
Of the total of 149 adjectives that premodify „feminists‟, 88 are classifiers (60.4%) and 59 are 
determiners (39.6%). While the difference in percentages is not great, this suggests that – like in the 
feminism dataset - there is a greater emphasis on classification than on description. This impression 
is strengthened by the fact that while miscellaneous descriptors such as „humourless‟, „lousy‟ and 
„saucy‟ account for 40.65% of the adjectives that premodify „feminist‟, they only account for 15.44% of 
adjectives that premodify „feminists‟. The remainder of section 6.3 looks in greater detail at the 
classifiers and descriptors that premodify „feminists‟, finding that premodifying adjectives are used to 
separate out different types of feminist according to time period and extent of political beliefs, with 
contrasting and representations of actions allowing writers to further define splits between different 
groups. 
 
6.3.3.1 ‘Feminists’ with topical classifiers 
Of the semantic groupings of classifiers, topical classifiers premodify „feminists‟ most frequently (42, 
or 28.19% of all adjectives that premodify „feminists‟). Topical classifiers – such as „education‟, „man-
loving‟ and „militant‟ – provide a “subject area” (Biber et al., 1999, p. 509) or show the relationship of 
„feminists‟ to a noun. They include adjectives that present the meaning of „feminists‟ as political. This 
political type of feminist is, in Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) term, “historicised” (p. 415) 
through the use of the past tense. Of the total of 42 topical classifiers, those that occur most 
frequently are „radical‟ (seven occurrences), „militant‟ (five), „liberal‟ (four) and „bra-burning‟ (three). 
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The frequent packaging up of these adjectives with „feminists‟ reflects Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s 
(2012) finding that common collocates of „feminism‟ frame it as “a political movement closely 
associated with radicalism, militancy, and leftist ideology” (p. 413). In particular, previous studies (for 
example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Marling, 2010) have pointed out the 
frequency with which „radical‟ collocates with „feminism‟, with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) 
arguing that the adjective has “distinctly negative connotations” (p. 413). The analysis of „radical 
feminist‟ in section 6.2.4.2 contends that there is little evidence that it has negative connotations in the 
feminist dataset. The analysis here looks at whether the same is true of occurrences of 'radical 
feminists', 'militant feminists', 'liberal feminists' and 'bra-burning feminists', finding that political types of 
feminist tend to be "historicised" (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 415) and contrasted with less 
radical types of feminist. 
Table 6.15 comprises the seven occurrences of 'radical feminists': 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00c We […] are interrupted a couple of times: first by her husband […] then by his 
mother, Michele Landsberg, one of Canada‟s foremost radical feminists […] 
Guardian 05b Although many of the more radical feminists agreed, most went wild at being told 
they were “counter-revolutionary” 
Guardian 05b While many of her generation of radical feminists have given up fighting, Jeffreys‟ 
passion has not abated 
Independent 00b Radical feminists later responded to the „Underneath they're all loveable‟ poster 
campaign for the eponymous brand of bras by replacing the adjective with „angry‟ 
Independent 00c […] the radical British feminists Lorraine Kelly and Jill Radford claim that the law‟s 
distinction between rape and sex is problematic […]  
Independent 08b Lanzmann was roundly booed by radical feminists […]  
Telegraph 06b But within a short time, with the emergence of radical feminists fixated on such 
issues as lesbianism, the myth of the vaginal orgasm and warfare with men, 
NOW became bedevilled by power struggles and ideological differences 
 
Table 6.15: Occurrences of „radical feminists‟ 
 
Occurrences of „radical feminists‟ are similar to occurrences of „the feminists‟ (discussed in section 
6.3.2) in that they are the active agents in clauses. „Radical feminists‟ are presented as actors in 
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material action processes of interrupting (Guardian 00c), giving up (Guardian 05b) and responding 
(Independent 00b); sayers in verbalisation processes of claiming (Independent 00b) and booing 
(Independent 08b), and sensers in a mental process of agreeing (Guardian 05b). In the remaining 
example (Telegraph 06b), they are part of the circumstance in a process of becoming bedevilled and 
presented in a relational process in a postmodifying relative clause as being “fixated”. Some of these 
processes – interrupting, booing, being fixated - reflect the findings in section 6.3.2, which show that 
„the feminists‟ are presented as aggressive and threatening.  
Concessive opposition in the two Guardian 05b examples also presents the idea of „radical 
feminists‟ splitting into further groupings – many of the more radical feminists versus most 
[feminists], and many of [Sheila Jeffreys‟] generation of radical feminists versus [Sheila] 
Jeffreys. These constructed oppositions present different radical feminists agreeing or disagreeing 
and giving up or carrying on fighting. Guardian 05b is also an example of how „radical feminists‟ are 
“historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 413) through references to the past: the fighting 
done by many radical feminists is a thing of the past. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 411) 
base their claims concerning historicisation on the frequent occurrence of collocates such as „1970s‟ 
and „post-‟; the examples from the feminists dataset show that historicisation is also the result of the 
use of the past tense (the two examples from Guardian 05b, Independent 00b and 08b, Telegraph 
06b), with the wider context showing that the radical feminists concerned are discussing a feminist 
pamphlet in 1979 (Guardian 05b), responding to a bra advert in the 1960s (Independent 00b), booing 
at Simone de Beauvoir‟s funeral in 1986 (Independent 08b), and emerging around the time of the 
inception of the National Organisation for Women (NOW) in the 1960s. 
Occurrences of „militant feminists‟ demonstrate the importance of taking into account how the 
textual-conceptual functions interact to construct textual meaning. In this instance, interactions 
between naming, representing states and representing time demonstrate how a certain type of 
feminist is “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417):  
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Publication Sentence 
Express 03b […] they both remained militant feminists throughout their lives […] 
Mirror 03b We met three descendants of Britain‟s first militant feminists […] 
Mirror 05a Turkey trots: militant feminists 
Telegraph 06a I suppose this new feminism can be seen as part of a continuum that began with the 
militant feminists of the 1970s […] and progressed to the 'lipstick feminism' of 
Natasha Walter 
Telegraph 09b […] boys and men are, whatever the most militant feminists say, different from girls 
and women […] 
 
Table 6.16: Occurrences of „militant feminists‟ 
 
Tense in Express 03b and Mirror 05a places militant feminists in the past: the former discusses 
Emmeline and Christabel Pankhurst, who died in 1928 and 1958 respectively, while the referents of 
the latter are described as being responsible for “the sort of ludicrous feminist nonsense that went out 
of fashion in the real world in the 70s”, with the circumstance “in the 70s” reinforcing the 
historicisation. In Mirror 03b and Telegraph 06a, naming places militant feminists in the past: the 
former refers to “descendants of Britain‟s first militant feminists”, emphasising that they have been 
superseded by future generations, while the latter uses a postmodifying prepositional phrase to refer 
to militant feminists “of the 1970s”. The idea of „militant feminists‟ having been replaced by other types 
of „feminists‟ is strengthened through contrasting in the transitional opposition “a continuum that 
began with the militant feminists of the 1970s […] and progressed to the „lipstick feminism‟ of 
Natasha Walter”. Here, naming further stresses the idea of political and apolitical types of „feminists‟ 
and „feminism‟: the previous generation of feminists are militant while the more recent brand of 
feminism is lipstick. This example in particular provides evidence for Mendes‟ (2011a) conviction that 
newspapers emphasise the “„lifestyling‟ of feminism” (p. 11) and a move away from collective action 
towards a focus on personal identity. 
 The sense of „feminists‟ being able to refer to different, opposing groups is also evident in the 
way „liberal feminists‟ are presented. Guardian 05b uses a material action process to describe a 
conflict between liberal feminists (the actor) and earlier feminists (the goal) – “„liberal feminists and 
postmodernists‟ challenge the early feminist critique of beauty practices” – while in Telegraph 05a 
liberal feminists are the actor in a material action process of irritating the goal, “the American radical 
feminist” Andrea Dworkin: “she was irritated by liberal feminists such as Naomi Wolf”. The 
combination of naming and the representation of actions in these examples creates the impression of 
different types of „feminists‟ who are actively opposed to each other. 
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 It is surprising that there are so few (three) instances of „bra-burning feminists‟ in the data, 
given the perception of previous studies (for example Hinds & Stacey, 2001) that this continues to be 
a common stereotype in newspaper coverage of feminism. In the three instances in which „bra-
burning‟ is used, there is again a sense of this type of feminist belonging to the past. In Express 00b, 
a proposition concerning Germaine Greer‟s book The Female Eunuch contextualises it in the past 
through a circumstance of time and the past tense – “in the middle of a trans-Atlantic war between 
bra-burning separatist feminists and an intellectual elite of feminist theorists, Greer‟s book was 
different” – while Express 05a uses naming to package up not only the idea of feminists being bra-
burners, but also the idea of them belonging to a previous decade: “I‟m deserting the Seventies bra-
burning feminists”. The remaining example reflects Hinds and Stacey‟s (2001) argument that bra-
burning feminists are a myth – a group from the past that did not actually exist – with the use of scare 
quotes distancing the writer from this perception of feminists: “it has also acquired this bad name in 
the media which is all about „bra-burning feminists‟” (Independent 06a). 
 
6.3.3.2 ‘Feminists’ with relational classifiers 
The 35 relational classifiers in the feminists dataset place particular groups of feminists in relation to 
others. 26 imbue „feminists‟ with the quality of representing people from a particular period of time: 
 
Relational qualifier No. of 
occurrences 
1970s/seventies 6 
Older, second-wave 4 
Old-school 3 
Younger 2 
Earlier, first-wave, latter-day, new-fangled, 
original, previous, third-wave 
1 
 
Table 6.17: Relational classifiers relating to time that premodify „feminists‟ 
 
The relational classifiers of time provide evidence for Dean‟s (2010) claim that feminism tends to be 
“temporally situated in the past” (p. 401): 21 out of 26 of these classifiers place those referred to by 
„feminists‟ in the past. Further, instances of contrasting reflect Dean's (2010) observation that the 
feminism of the past is contrasted with more contemporary forms: each constructed opposition 
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presents the idea of opposition among groups that can be described as „feminists‟ or between 
feminists and other groups of women. In each instance, the opposed groups contrast along lines of 
time. 
 Table 6.18 comprises occurrences of „feminists‟ with classifiers of time in conrtasts: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00a A new generation of feminist historians and academics talk of her work with 
respect, but younger media feminists tend to ignore rather than dismiss her […] 
Telegraph 05b […] she seems not to mind those with a small „f‟; only first-wave, capital-letter 
Feminists grate […] 
Times 08a […] given the polarising of opinion between old-school feminists and modern 
young women engaged with popular culture […] there is much room for judgment 
Times 09b If old-school feminists protest against this pornification, we are accused of being 
anti-sex 
 
Table 6.18: Occurrences of „feminists‟ with classifiers of time in contrasts 
 
Times 08a and 09b use explicit opposition to present contrasts between „feminists‟ and young 
women. In the former, a „between X and Y‟ frame contrasts old-school feminists with modern 
young women engaged in popular culture, while Times 09b opposes old-school feminists and 
this pornification, with the latter element referring to young women‟s use of words such as „slut‟ to 
describe themselves: not only are old feminists and young women opposed to each other, but the 
explicit opposition trigger “protest against” presents this opposition as taking an active form, in a 
material action process in which old feminists are the actor and the actions of young women are the 
goal. These oppositions evoke previous findings of oppositions between „serious‟ and „frivolous‟ forms 
of „feminism‟, with the former presented as “critically engaged” (Dean, 2010, p. 399) and the latter as 
less politically aware and more concerned with popular culture (Mendes, 2011a, p. 136). 
Telegraph 05b and Guardian 00a use concessive oppositions to present „feminists‟ as 
splitting into different varieties that represent different generations. Telegraph 05b discusses novelist 
Margaret Atwood‟s views on feminists, contrasting the acceptable - those with a small „f‟ - with the 
unacceptable - first-wave, capital-letter Feminists. The distinction between uppercase „Feminists‟ 
and lowercase „feminists‟ reflects Dean‟s (2010) observation of an opposition between radical 
feminists from the past and moderate feminists in the present: those from the past took the label 
„Feminists‟ more seriously, whereas those from later waves are more relaxed about the term (and, as 
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a result, cause Margaret Atwood less aggravation). Guardian 00a complicates the meaning of 
„feminists‟ further, drawing a distinction between a new generation of feminist historians and 
academics and younger media feminists. Both elements are described as “new”/“young”: instead of 
drawing a contrast based on age or generation, this opposition contrasts feminists who are academics 
with feminists who work in the media, presenting the idea of „feminists‟ as referring to different 
contemporary groups, one of which continues to embrace old feminist ideas and icons and another 
which draws away from them, reflecting the differing interpretations of 'post-feminist' discussed in 
section 2.1.1. 
The representation of actions, events and states also draws lines between older and newer 
feminists and women. In the examples in table 6.19, referents corresponding to feminists and other 
women fulfil different roles in material action, verbalisation and mental processes: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 05a I‟m deserting the Seventies bra-burning feminists 
Guardian 07a Second wave feminists tell me I‟m a bad feminist 
Guardian 09c A judgemental cohort of older feminists beating up their daughters 
Independent 03a Older feminists […] stare at sexually aggressive young women today with 
simple despair 
Telegraph 09a We older feminists did our younger sisters a disservice 
 
Table 6.19: Occurrences of „feminists‟ with classifiers of time and other groups of women 
 
Material action processes present feminists and other women performing actions that affect others 
negatively: older feminists (actor) do younger feminists (recipient) a disservice (goal) (Telegraph 09a), 
older feminists (actor) beat up their daughters (goal) (Guardian 09c), and an article‟s writer (actor) 
deserts Seventies feminists (goal) (Express 05a). The sense of „feminists‟ as denoting people who are 
involved in conflict is also emphasised in a verbalisation process of second-wave feminists (sayer) 
telling an article‟s writer (receiver) that they are a bad feminist (Guardian 07a) and a mental process 
in which older feminists (senser) stare at younger sisters (phenomenon) and despair of them 
(Independent 03a). These examples show how the articles not only use naming to draw distinctions 
between different types of feminists according to time and generation, but also use transitivity 
processes to represent actions of conflict between them. 
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6.3.3.3 ‘Feminists’ with time descriptors 
The analysis of relational classifiers above demonstrates that premodifying adjectives divide 
„feminists‟ into different types and draw comparisons between them based on time. Time is also a 
facet of descriptors that are used in the premodification of „feminists‟, with time descriptors the most 
common type (26 of 59). Whereas the majority of relational classifiers place „feminists‟ in the past, the 
descriptors note the existence of more contemporary feminists while also presenting feminists as 
occasionally „over the top‟ in their political convictions and activities. There is also evidence of what 
Dean (2010) calls “anxiety” (p. 396) about modern-day feminists, with writers uncertain of who they 
are, or whether they exist in the first place. Table 6.20 shows which types of feminists time descriptors 
focus on: 
 
Time descriptor No. of occurrences 
Young 12 
New 8 
Early, modern 2 
Long-established, old 1 
 
Table 6.20: Descriptors of time that premodify „feminists‟ 
 
Time descriptors focus on contemporary feminists (22 descriptors) over feminists from the past (four). 
However, the sense of feminists as being something from the past is reinforced in many of these 
examples. This reflects a trend noted by Mendes (2011a, p. 158), whereby articles question what 
contemporary feminism is and who modern feminists are. This is demonstrated by the representation 
of „new/young/modern feminists‟ in states: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 01a The new feminists are not anti-male […] 
Guardian 03b Young feminists are involved in „subvertising‟, making cut-and-paste „zines‟ railing 
at sexism, organising the Ladyfest feminist music festivals 
Guardian 06a The new feminists are the old feminists 
Guardian 06a […] who are the new feminists? 
Guardian 06b We wanted to show that young feminists aren‟t crazy or mean, but cool 
Independent 07a We know what modern feminists look like, but do we know what they now 
believe? 
 
Table 6.21: Occurrences of „new/young/modern feminists‟ in relational processes 
 
Two of the occurrences here pose questions about „new/young/modern feminists‟ and demonstrate 
uncertainty about who exactly they are and what they believe: “who are the new feminists?” (Guardian 
06a), “do we know what [modern feminists] now believe?” (Independent 07a). The contrasting of what 
modern feminists look like with what modern feminists believe through concessive opposition 
also reflects the concern that contemporary forms of feminism are more concerned with “appearance, 
style, or personal qualities” (Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 217): the first what-clause is the phenomenon in a 
mental process of knowing – an epistemically confident verb – whereas the second is phrased as an 
interrogative. In two other occurrences – Express 01a and Guardian 06b – negating and contrasting 
highlight writers‟ awareness of negative perceptions of new and young feminists: Express 01a 
negates the relational process attributing being “anti-male” to new feminists, while the concessive 
opposition in Guardian 06b negates the attribution of the qualities of being “crazy or mean” and 
contrasts them with the quality of being “cool”. In the remaining examples, Guardian 06a uses a 
relational intensive process to observe a relationship of equivalence between “the new feminists” and 
“the old feminists”, thereby presenting both types as the same, while the relational circumstantial 
process in Guardian 03b presents young feminists as being involved in activities that do not look 
dissimilar to traditional feminist activities, such as “railing against sexism”. These examples suggest 
that while naming in the articles picks out different types of „feminists‟, the interaction of other textual-
conceptual functions plays down differences between them, demonstrating how a consideration of 
these different aspects of how texts create meaning can help provide a more thorough understanding 
of the meanings attributed to „feminist/s/ism‟. 
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6.3.3.4 ‘Feminists’ with miscellaneous descriptors 
There are 23 miscellaneous descriptors in the feminists dataset. Whereas many of the miscellaneous 
descriptors used in the naming of individual feminists focus on aspects of personality and appearance 
(see section 6.2.4.2), those that premodify „feminists‟ as groups emphasise either their degree of 
commitment to feminism or their state of mind: 
 
Miscellaneous descriptor No. of occurrences 
Strident 3 
Self-described/proclaimed, serious 2 
Aggressive, articulate, baying, chronically offended, demented, 
fainthearted, formidable, hairy-armed, hard-line, odd, politically active, 
rabid, radical, raving, sabre-toothed 
1 
 
Table 6.22: Miscellaneous descriptors that premodify „feminists‟ 
 
Some of these descriptors – „self-proclaimed‟, „serious‟ – simply express the notion of feminists as 
committed and determined. However, „odd‟, „raving‟, „aggressive‟ and „hard-line‟ go beyond this, 
carrying negative connotations to do with individuals or groups being committed to something beyond 
an extent that is sensible (see the discussion of „the feminists‟ in section 6.3.2). What is important 
here is that the reader is not given the opportunity to question the association of these qualities with 
„feminists‟ – the adjectives describing groups of feminists are packaged up into noun phrases, rather 
than used as complements in propositions which can be argued against. 
 
6.4 Material action and mental processes in the feminist and 
feminists datasets 
This chapter concludes with a more detailed analysis of the observations made in section 6.1 
concerning how „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ are represented in actions, events and states. The statistical 
overviews of representing actions/events/states (figures 6.3 and 6.4) show that a higher proportion of 
occurrences of „feminists‟ (37%) than „feminist‟ (18%) occur in material action processes, and that the 
same is true for mental processes – 14.76% of occurrences of „feminists‟ and 8.66% of occurrences 
of „feminist‟. The analysis below looks at the significance of these results, beginning with a further 
breakdown of the roles that „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ play in material action and mental processes. 
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 While the statistical overviews of representing actions/events/states show that „feminists‟ is 
more likely to occur in material action processes than „feminist‟, this does not necessarily mean that 
„feminists‟ is presented as more active than „feminist‟, as an overview of process types alone does not 
take into account the roles that the plural and singular forms fulfil. Figure 6.8 provides a more detailed 
overview of the roles that „feminist‟ fulfils in material action processes: 
 
 
Figure 6.8: The role of „feminist‟ in material action processes 
 
„Feminist‟ occurs as an actor in just under half (45.83%) of material action processes, while 
appearances as a goal or recipient account for just over a quarter (27.78% combined) of occurrences. 
However, figure 6.9 shows that „feminists‟ is much more likely to be the actor in a process (70.7% of 
occurrences), and also that it is less likely to be the goal or recipient (16.56% combined): 
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Figure 6.9: The role of „feminists‟ in material action processes 
 
These overviews suggest that groups of feminists are more likely to be portrayed as active. This 
strengthens the impression given by the present chapter‟s findings concerning „the feminists‟ 
(discussed in section 6.3.2) and „radical feminists‟ (section 6.3.3.1). 
There is an even more striking difference in the roles that „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ perform in 
mental processes. Figures 6.10 and 6.11 show that whereas the majority of occurrences of „feminist‟ 
appear in circumstances (64.7%), the majority of occurrences of „feminists‟ fulfil the role of senser 
(70.15%): 
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Figure 6.10: The role of „feminist‟ in mental processes 
 
 
Figure 6.11: The role of „feminists‟ in mental processes 
 
These findings support the initial impression provided by the overview of representing 
actions/events/states: groups of feminists are portrayed as more active than individual feminists. 
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 also suggest, counter-intuitively, that the articles are more likely to discuss the 
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thoughts of groups of feminists than of individual feminists (who could more easily be consulted for 
their thoughts).  
Figures 6.10 and 6.11 demonstrate differences in the ways that individual feminists and 
groups of feminists are focused on grammatically. However, it is worth looking in greater detail at 
„feminist‟ and „feminists‟ in mental processes. In some instances where „feminist‟ occurs as part of a 
circumstance in a mental process, it serves an adverbial role that contextualises the proposition, e.g. 
“like every good feminist, she didn‟t see why she should do all the cleaning” (Mail 09c), “as a staunch 
feminist, Hillary always previously disdained the fluffy vote” (Express 08b). However, in the majority of 
occurrences (17 of 22), „feminist‟ is a circumstance describing how the phenomenon is, or ought to 
be, perceived. Examples such as “I consider myself a feminist” (Express 02c) and “she was, and still 
is, seen as an extreme, man-hating feminist” (Guardian 05b) demonstrate discussion of individuals‟ 
feminist credentials. In some cases – „see‟, „think of‟ – the mental process verbs are modal, 
expressing doubt over whether a particular individual is a feminist. Even in instances where the 
mental process verb is not conventionally seen as modal, the fact that a mental process is being used 
instead of a relational process/categorical assertion („I am a feminist‟) presents the individual‟s 
feminism as contentious, for example in “I consider myself a card-carrying feminist” (Express 08a), “I 
would identify myself as a feminist” (Mirror 03b).  
 It is also important to note that – as with occurrences of „feminists‟ generally (see figure 6.2) – 
in instances where „feminists‟ is a senser, the noun often carries either minimal or detailed 
modification (28 of 46 occurrences). This means that the writers are only making assumptions about 
what a particular subset of feminists thinks, as when quantifiers such as „some‟ and „many‟ are used, 
e.g. “sleeping around was considered by some feminists as almost a revolutionary duty” (Times 04b), 
“those feminists may have feared that a focus on motherhood risked driving women back into full-time 
domesticity” (Independent 01a). While no clear, overriding patterns emerge in the data as to the types 
of things feminists do or do not think or believe, the fact that the thoughts of a large and mixed group 
are presented in this way is significant. 
 
6.5 Summary 
The analysis of textual meanings of „feminist‟ and „feminists‟, like the analysis of „feminism‟ in chapter 
5, has shown that the people who represent feminism are portrayed in a variety of ways. Critical 
stylistic analysis demonstrates that different meanings of „feminist(s)‟ arise from the use of naming to 
refer to particular types of feminist, the use of contrasting to compare different types, and uses of 
metalanguage that address perceptions of the lexemes „feminist‟ and „feminists‟ themselves. 
 The findings in this chapter expand on previous research into media portrayals of feminists. 
Some initial findings suggested that there is evidence that feminists are presented negatively in the 
articles. For example, the „a feminist looks like‟ structure suggested that there is an emphasis on 
feminists‟ appearances – as observed in Mendes‟ (2011b) study - while the overviews of premodifying 
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adjectives demonstrated the prominence of premodifiers that denote political action, reflecting 
previous studies‟ observations concerning portrayals of feminists as politically active (for example 
Lind & Salo, 2002). Analysis of the wider context of „a feminist looks like‟ demonstrated that 
occurrences either referred to a pro-feminist T-shirt slogan or exemplified writers‟ interrogation of 
stereotypes about feminists; more in-depth analysis of the textual meaning of, for example, „radical 
feminist(s)‟ demonstrated that political types of feminists are not portrayed in a uniformly negative 
light, instead simply being portrayed as actively involved in political activities. However, the analysis of 
„the feminists‟ did provide evidence of less favourable treatment of feminists: the combination of 
naming (generic reference through the definite determiner) and the representation of actions („the 
feminists‟ as the actor in material action processes) showed that where feminists are referred to as a 
mass group in this way, they are portrayed as being engaged in subversive actions. 
 The feminist and feminists datasets again showed that more political types of feminism and 
feminist are “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417), in particular through the use of 
time deixis and contrasts which place political feminists in opposition to more contemporary types, 
reflecting Dean‟s (2010) observation of “domestication” (p. 392) in articles from the 2000s. „New‟ 
feminists, in turn, are presented as ambiguous, with writers questioning what it means to be a 
„feminist‟ today. Occurrences of metalinguistic discussion of „feminist‟ in the data also indicated 
articles‟ engagement with the status of „feminist‟ itself: in many instances, writers observe the 
negative meanings attributed to „feminist‟ by others, but contest these meanings with their own, more 
positive, interpretations. Occurrences of „I‟m not a feminist‟ also showed how findings that might at 
first appear negative – the frequent presentation of people‟s denial of their feminism – in fact highlight 
writers‟ critiques of negative perceptions of „feminist/s/ism‟: in this case, writers present others‟ speech 
and thoughts in order to argue against them, in the process contesting others‟ more narrow definitions 
of to whom „feminist‟ can apply. 
 Related to the „I‟m not a feminist‟ findings are those that concern rules associated with 
„feminist‟. The analysis of the representation of states in the feminist dataset showed that articles 
frequently acknowledge supposed aspects of the meaning of „feminist‟ – for example, that if someone 
is a „feminist‟, then by definition they cannot be „sexy‟, or must abide by an established set of beliefs. 
Again, analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions showed that these limiting ideas about 
the meaning of „feminist‟ are argued against, for example through the use of negating at a higher 
clausal level („you don‟t have to pass a test to be a feminist‟), or contrasts that defease the idea that 
„feminist‟ shares a relation of antonymy with other words like „model‟ or „leg wax‟. Although the 
analysis demonstrates that negative portrayals of „feminist(s)‟ are present in the data, it also 
demonstrates that these portrayals are contested by writers.  
 Chapter 7 completes the analysis of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data by analysing the use of adjectival 
„feminist‟. 
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Chapter 7: The adjectives dataset 
This chapter analyses the 673 occurrences of „feminist‟ in the adjectives dataset. Previous studies of 
feminism in the media have focused on the way that the movement of feminism is portrayed (for 
example Chaudhuri, 2000; Mendes, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Rhode, 1995) with others also looking at the 
people involved (for example Hinds & Stacey, 2001; North, 2009; Riley, 2001). However, there has 
been little discussion of whom and what are described as being feminist, and how. The statistical 
overview of word class (see section 4.2.2) shows that adjectival „feminist‟ accounts for over a quarter 
of the 2,539 occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟, and so it is important to consider its use.  
 Among previous studies, Lind and Salo‟s (2002) study of US news media texts pays the most 
attention to the ways in which adjectival „feminist‟ is used. Their study uses the search terms „feminist‟ 
and „feminism‟, meaning that adjectival uses are included in their results. Lind and Salo (2002) argue, 
for example, that the common occurrence of word pairs featuring adjectival „feminist‟ alongside 
„agenda‟, „revolution‟ and „sisterhood‟ demonstrates the close linking of feminism and “a concern for 
improving general conditions for women, and for the women‟s movement in general” (p. 220). 
However, their analysis does not provide an account of textual meaning, with the different forms of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ bunched together to support their argument for the presence of different frames in the 
data (the examples above constitute part of a “goals frame” to do with “civil rights, workplace rights, 
reproductive rights, preventing violence toward women, and improving general conditions for women” 
(Lind & Salo, 2002, p. 220)). The other previous corpus linguistic study of feminism in the media, 
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012), focuses on the search term „feminism‟, meaning that 
occurrences of the adjectival form are neglected. The present chapter provides a thorough 
investigation of adjectival „feminist‟ and its textual meanings. 
Adjectival „feminist‟ is also of interest to the present study for similar reasons to the 
unmodified forms of the nouns „feminism‟ and „feminist(s)‟. Because adjectives tend not to be modified 
by other words, and are therefore “assumed to be understood without further explanation” (Jeffries & 
Walker, 2012, p. 221), adjectival „feminist‟ imbues the subjects and head nouns it modifies with the 
quality of being feminist in a universal sense (although note the discussion of the prominence of 
derivational forms of adjectival „feminist‟ in section 4.2.2). 
The analysis proceeds from a statistical overview of the grammatical role that adjectival 
„feminist‟ plays and its appearance in representations of actions/events/states. I then investigate 
patterns in the textual meanings of „feminist‟ in attributive position, where it premodifies a head noun 
(section 7.2), before turning to those occurrences that take up the other possible syntactic position – 
predicative occurrences that complement a subject (section 7.3). The analysis concludes with 
analyses focusing on derivational forms of „feminist‟ (section 7.4) and occurrences of „feminist‟ that 
appear in lists with other adjectives (section 7.5). 
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7.1 Statistical overview of the adjectives dataset 
Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the way adjectival „feminist‟ is used. The overview of naming here 
is different to that for noun forms, as adjectives are not pre- or postmodified in the same way 
(although section 7.5 discusses other adjectives that occur in lists with adjectival „feminist‟). Figure 7.1 
divides adjective occurrences according to whether they occur in attributive position („the feminist 
writer‟) or predicative position („the writer is feminist‟): 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Statistical overview of the grammatical function of adjectival „feminist‟ 
 
The vast majority of occurrences of adjectival „feminist‟ appear within a nominal, rather than occurring 
as clausal complements. This indicates that the feminist nature of someone or something tends to be 
packaged up and assumed („the feminist writer‟) instead of being the subject of a proposition („the 
writer is feminist‟). Chapter 7 analyses each of these grammatical uses of „feminist‟, looking at the 
types of head noun that „feminist‟ premodifies (section 7.2) and the types of subject that it 
complements (section 7.3. 
Figure 7.2 shows the division of transitivity process types in the adjectives dataset: 
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Figure 7.2: Statistical overview of transitivity processes in the adjectives dataset 
 
Material action processes account for a higher proportion of the adjectives dataset than of the 
feminism dataset (see section 5.1) or the feminist and feminists datasets (section 6.1). This suggests 
a stronger link between people and things that are described as feminist and action of some sort. 
 The analysis below begins by looking at attributive „feminist‟ (section 7.2), which account for 
the majority of occurrences. In particular, it looks at how individuals and entities described as feminist 
are represented in actions and states. The representation of states is also the focus of section 7.3, 
due to the grammatical role that predicative „feminist‟ plays, with the analysis looking at who is 
explicitly described as (not) being feminist. Section 7.4 focuses specifically on derivational forms of 
„feminist‟, again making use of the analysis of representations of states to look at how people and 
things are classified according to how they relate to „feminist‟ in terms of time („pre-feminist‟, „post-
feminist‟) and their non-compatibility with feminism („un-feminist‟, „non-feminist‟, „pseudo-feminist‟, 
„anti-feminist‟). Section 7.5 concludes the analysis with an investigation of how else the people and 
things labelled as „feminist‟ are described, i.e. through adjectives that occur in lists with „feminist‟, and 
how they are described through representations of states and presented as interacting with each 
other in representations of actions. 
 
7.2 Attributive ‘feminist’ 
The analysis in this section focuses on the 631 occurrences of adjectival „feminist‟ that occur within a 
noun phrase, premodifying a head noun or nouns. These occurrences package up a referent‟s 
feminist quality into the noun phrase, meaning that the connection between a referent and their 
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feminism is presented as incontrovertible. Some occurrences of attributive „feminist‟ modify more than 
one head noun, for example, “history” and “literature” in “my boss at Nuts […] knew her feminist 
history and literature” (Times 09c). This results in a total of 641 head nouns, 197 of which occur on 
just one occasion. The large number of singular occurrences are excluded from the analysis here, 
which focuses on those that occur two or more times (a full version of table 7.1, accounting for 
singular occurrences, is included in appendix 2). 
Table 7.1 lists those head nouns that are premodified by „feminist‟ on more than one 
occasion: 
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Head noun No. of 
occurrences 
Movement(s) 41 
Icon(s) 27 
Writer(s) 24 
Issue(s) 18 
Magazine(s) 13 
Art 12 
Activism 11 
Group(s), revolution 10 
Blog(s), mother(s)/mums 9 
Agenda, idea(s) 8 
Author(s), organisation(s), principle(s), theory/ies 7 
Artist(s), cause(s), heroine(s), message 6 
Argument(s), book(s), era, literature, thought 5 
Academic(s), ideal(s), ideology, Intellectual Heritage, meeting(s), novel(s), politics, 
thinker(s), work(s) 
4 
Barbie, campaign(s), card, columnist, critics, historian(s), men, network(s), role 
model, slogan(s), symbol(s), theology, values, women, world 
3 
Act, activist(s), age, attitudes, backlash, banner, battle(s), belief(s), celebrity, 
commentators, criticism, critique, demands, establishment, fantasy, fascist(i), 
feminist, festival, fight, figure, fire, friend(s), generation, history, label, language, 
media, men‟s groups, narrative, polemic, press, publisher, rebel, rhetoric, 
scholar(s), society, terms, texts, theme(s), theorists, viewpoint(s), views, writing(s) 
2 
 
Table 7.1: Head nouns premodified by adjectival „feminist‟ 
 
The head nouns provide evidence that supports previous studies‟ findings. Some of the most 
frequently occurring nouns in the adjectives dataset - including „movement‟, „agenda‟, „belief(s)‟ and 
„revolution‟ – also appear in the „goals frame‟ that Lind and Salo (2002) identify in their study of 
American news texts, providing evidence of how articles are “concerned with improving general 
conditions for women” (pp. 219-220). While Lind and Salo‟s (2002) classification of words into frames 
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is impressionistic (see discussion in section 2.2.2), the fact that „feminist‟ frequently modifies these 
and other nouns such as „issue(s)‟, „activism‟, „idea(s)‟, „principle(s)‟, „theory/ies‟, „cause(s)‟, „message‟ 
and „argument(s)‟ demonstrates that the quality of being feminist is closely associated with ideas of 
activism and political aims. Other head nouns provide evidence for Mendes‟ (2011a, pp. 135-136) 
observation that newspaper articles about feminism focus on connections between feminism and 
popular culture, for example „magazine(s)‟, „art‟, „blog(s)‟, „book(s)‟ and „literature‟. 
 The remainder of the analysis in this section focuses on the three head nouns that are 
premodified by „feminist‟ 20 or more times. This cut-off point narrows the focus of the analysis, but 
also allows me to investigate those referents with which „feminist‟ is most frequently associated. The 
analysis demonstrates how writers use the presentation of others‟ speech to argue with negative 
perceptions of feminism, how the idea of the „feminist icon‟ is used to observe the possibility of 
different types of feminist, and how the thoughts of feminist writers are used to discuss uncertainty 
about feminism and oppositions in which feminism is involved.  
 
7.2.1 „Feminist movement(s)‟ 
The analysis of „feminism‟ showed that it frequently occurs in material action processes (42% of 
occurrences - see figure 5.2). The same is true for „feminist movement(s)‟, with material action 
processes accounting for 53.5% of the transitivity processes in which it appears. This suggests that 
„feminist movement(s)‟ is often represented as being involved in some sort of action. The analysis 
here focuses on the 10 occurrences of „feminist movement(s)‟ that are actors in material action 
processes, showing that apparently negative portrayals of the movement are part of the presentation 
of speech, and that assumptions about the death of feminism are contested. 
Table 7.2 comprises the ten occurrences of „feminist movement‟ as the actor in a material 
action process: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 02c The character-as-syndrome was adopted first […] by right-wingers, to mean 
tragic figure of female solitude […] sold out by the feminist movement […] 
Guardian 03a The feminist movement has done so much that I think she felt able to move on 
to human rights work 
Guardian 03b Others say the feminist movement has died 
Guardian 06b The feminist movement has always produced plenty of meaty writing and lively 
debate [...] 
Mail 05b The Bill Clinton she depicts is a crude, foulmouthed, arrogant „liberal 
misogynist‟ [...] Yet America‟s ferocious feminist movement turned a blind eye 
Mirror 06c The Vatican said the feminist movement had “reinforced the individualistic 
image of man and woman” and by doing so was “surpassing the family”] 
Sun 01a Erin [...] said [...] “The feminist movement have expunged men out of the 
family” 
Telegraph 00a Doris Lessing vehemently denies that she is, or ever was, a feminist: “[...] I 
don‟t think the feminist movement has done very well for itself” 
Telegraph 00b [...] she says “[…] one minute we are saying we want complete independence 
- a view that has been pounded into them by the feminist movement - and the 
next we‟re saying we are tired and screaming for help” 
Times 05a The feminist movement is waning because we are too busy waxing our legs, 
our hardwood floors, our top lips and our silly pink Smart cars 
 
Table 7.2: Occurrences of „feminist movement(s)‟ as actor in a material action process 
  
Two of the processes (Guardian 03b, Times 05a) provide further evidence of the link between 
feminism and death in the „feminist/s/ism‟ dataset. However, similar to the examples of „feminism is 
dead‟ (see section 5.2.2.2), examples of „the feminist movement is dead‟ do not simply make a 
negative assessment of feminism‟s health. Times 05a represents the feminist movement in a state of 
“waning”, but the reasons provided by the because-clause – “we are too busy waxing our legs”, etc. – 
imply that the writer is not happy with this state of affairs. The reasons provided are all stereotypically 
non-feminist, and so the reader is able to infer that the writer is breaking the maxim of relation (Grice, 
1975) in order to imply that feminism would not be dying if “we” (note the use of proximal person 
deixis to involve the reader) acted differently. The sentence from Guardian 03b is contrasted with the 
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previous sentence – “Some say the feminist fight has been won” - through parallel „X says Y‟ 
structures, drawing attention to the fact that the health of feminism is contested. The has died/fight 
has been won contrast also evokes the different perceptions of what it means to adopt a „post-
feminist‟ view, i.e. whether it means taking a hostile view of feminism, or simply believing that it is no 
longer necessary (Mendes, 2011a, p. 8). As with examples of „feminism is dead‟, the writer cites the 
arguments of others – that the feminist movement has died – before going on to assert their own, 
more positive take, in this instance that “feminism exists, as it always has done”. 
 Other material action processes in which „feminist movement‟ is the actor in negatively 
evaluative processes also demonstrate how negative ideas about feminism are presented as part of 
others‟ speech. In cases where the material action verbs have connotations of violence – „expunging‟ 
(Sun 01a), „pounding into‟ (Telegraph 00b) – the writers are presenting the speech of others (women‟s 
refuge founder Erin Pizzey and divorce lawyer Vanessa Lloyd Platt, respectively). Similarly, the 
notions that the feminist movement has „surpassed‟ the family unit and that it has not done well are 
attributed to the Vatican (Mirror 06c) and writer Doris Lessing (Telegraph 00a) through the 
presentation of speech, while Guardian 02c attributes the view that the feminist movement has “sold 
out” a specific type of woman to “right-wingers” through the circumstance of the main clause – 
“adopted [...] to mean”. The only explicitly negative portrayal of feminists on the part of the writers is 
Mail 05b, which uses concessive „X, yet Y‟ opposition frame to emphasise the outrageousness of the 
feminist movement‟s turning of a blind eye to Bill Clinton‟s poor behaviour. Here, the negative 
perception of the movement is underlined through its naming as “America‟s ferocious feminist 
movement”. Elsewhere, in Guardian 03a and Guardian 06b, the movement is presented as having 
“done so much” and “produced plenty of meaty writing and lively debate”, actions that are positively 
evaluated through the use of the amplifier + pronoun “so much” and the adjectives “meaty” and 
“lively”, which have connotations of substance and vivacity. Occurrences of „feminist movement‟ in 
material action processes demonstrate a range of portrayals: while some articles (for example Sun 
01a, Telegraph 00a) use feminist spokespeople to present „feminist‟ as associated with violent or anti-
male behaviour (Mendes, 2011b, p. 492), others are more positive or recognise contrasting 
perceptions of the movement. 
 
7.2.2 „Feminist icon(s)‟ 
The frequent occurrence of „feminist icon(s)‟ suggests an emphasis on particular individuals who are 
taken to stand for all feminists, or who at least are treated as particularly strong examples of feminists 
(Baumgardner & Richards, 2001, p. 79). 17 of the 27 processes are relational intensive processes, 
suggesting that there is an emphasis on defining who these individuals are and reflecting Mendes‟ 
(2011a, p. 132) observation that articles devote attention to discussions of who can be a feminist. 
Analysis of these occurrences demonstrates that those defined as representative of feminism in this 
way are “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). 
 Table 7.3 comprises the 17 occurrences of „feminist icon(s)‟ in relational intensive process: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 06b Tina is a post-modern feminist icon […] 
Guardian 01c [...] in the age of communication and modern media, our feminist icons are 
likely to be successful women raised to celebrity status by the power of 
publicity 
Guardian 01c The great feminist icons of the past were intellectuals before they were 
celebrities 
Guardian 01c From Mary Wollstonecraft to Oprah Winfrey, a few women in every generation 
have become feminist icons 
Guardian 01c Senator Clinton, Oprah Winfrey and Princess Diana are different sorts of 
feminist icon from those who came before, but they are powerful figures 
nonetheless 
Independent 08b She [Simone de Beauvoir] was the feminist icon who seduced her female 
students before passing them on to her male lover 
Mail 01c Miss Lessing [...] became a feminist icon […] 
Mail 08a Alice Walker is the feminist icon who wrote The Colour Purple 
Mail 08b Bond girls are feminist icons! 
Mirror 01a […] she [Doris Lessing] is a feminist icon 
Mirror 04b Is Jordan a feminist icon? 
Mirror 05c A feminist icon for sure, but many younger readers may be unaware of her 
[Germaine Greer‟s] substantial achievements 
Sun 04a Why shouldn‟t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons? 
Sun 04a Jordan‟s the feminist icon of 2004 
Times 01a In the age of mass communication and modern media, our feminist icons are 
more likely to be successful women raised to celebrity status by the power of 
publicity - real or representational First Ladies 
Times 01c The great feminist icons were anything but saints […] 
Times 05b She may be a feminist icon, but has Kahlo‟s halo started to slip […] 
 
Table 7.3: Occurrences of „feminist icon(s)‟ in relational intensive processes 
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Similar to the occurrences of „X is/becomes a feminist‟ discussed in section 6.2.3.2, these 
representations of states show that not only recognised feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir 
(Independent 08b), Doris Lessing (Mail 01c) and Germaine Greer (Mirror 05c) are identified as 
significant feminists, but also less obvious figures such as the model Jordan (Mirror 04b, Sun 04a) 
and Bond girls (Mail 08b). The analysis below shows that writers distinguish between different types 
of feminist icon in a variety of ways, in particular observing differences in to whom „feminist‟ can be 
applied in different time periods. 
 The idea that „feminist icon‟ has different meanings in the 2000s to those in the past is made 
explicit in Guardian 01c, in which Bill Clinton, Oprah Winfrey and Princess Diana are attributed the 
quality of being “different sorts of feminist icon to those who came before”. While the writer makes a 
distinction between Clinton et al. and previous icons, they use a contrast – triggered by “but” – to 
observe that both old and new types of icon are “powerful figures”: the use of concessive opposition, 
which distinguishes the information in the second clause as surprising in light of the first (Quirk et al., 
1972, p. 745), recognises the assumption that the more modern type might tend to be taken less 
seriously than the older type. Guardian 01c also evokes this idea of an opposition between more 
serious and more trivial feminists in instances of implying. These arise through flouts of the maxim of 
quantity (Grice, 1975). In one instance, the writer states that “the great feminist icons of the past were 
intellectuals before they were celebrities”: the use of naming to specify icons from a particular era – 
“the past” – produces an implicature that the proposition does not hold for more contemporary 
feminists, who presumably become celebrities without first of all being intellectuals. The other 
instance (which also appears in edited form in Times 01a) also evokes this intellectual/celebrity 
distinction, using naming - the pinpointing of “our feminist icons” – and the time adverbial “in the age 
of communication and modern media” to limit the scope of the proposition equating feminist icons and 
celebrity women to contemporary icons, thereby implying that previous icons perhaps became so by 
other means. 
 Contrasting presents feminist iconicity as something that one can attain, and also as 
something that one can lose. Transitional „X becomes Y‟ oppositions in Guardian 01c and Mail 01c 
present processes whereby women including Mary Wollstonecraft, Oprah Winfrey and Doris Lessing 
become feminists. Mirror 05c and Times 05b, on the other hand, present the idea that someone can 
lose their iconicity. The former defines Germaine Greer as a feminist icon, but the concessive 
opposition triggered by “but” observes that this status may not be recognised by younger Mirror 
writers, while the latter defines artist Frida Kahlo as an icon, but again uses a concessive „X, but Y‟ 
opposition to question whether she may be in danger of losing this status. The precariousness of icon 
status is further emphasised by the use of hypothesising in both examples, with the relational process 
in Mirror 05c modalised by “for sure” and the one in Times 05b by the modal auxiliary verb “may”. In 
other articles, interrogatives are used to question the icon status of less likely feminists, namely the 
model Jordan and other Page 3 models. Mirror 04b is cautious, asking “Is Jordan a feminist icon?”, 
while Sun 04a adopts a more confident tone, using a deontically modal form to question “Why 
shouldn‟t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?” This hypothetical question implies that the 
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“Page 3 stunners” can be feminist icons by flouting the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), while the use 
of naming to specify “modern feminist icons” produces a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975): 
nothing is said about non-modern types, and so the implied meaning is that „feminist‟ and “Page 3 
stunner” could not both have applied to the same referent in previous times. These examples again 
demonstrate the presence of debate in the data about who is and who is not, and who can and who 
cannot be, a feminist. 
 
7.2.3 „Feminist writer(s)‟ 
There are 24 occurrences of „feminist writer(s)‟, which appear in a total of 22 transitivity processes. 
These occurrences appear most frequently in verbalisation processes, and demonstrate how articles 
in the „feminist/s/ism‟ dataset bring in feminist “spokeswomen” (North, 2009, p. 743) to provide their 
opinion on feminist matters and matters affecting women. 
The ten examples of „feminist writer(s)‟ in verbalisation processes are compiled in table 7.4:  
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 08a [...] feminist writer Rebecca Traister says: “Palin‟s femininity is one that is 
recognisable to most women: she's the kind of broad who speaks on behalf of 
other broads but appears not to like them very much... It‟s like some dystopian 
future... feminism without any feminists” 
Independent 01a […] every new young feminist writer - from Natasha Walter to Naomi Wolf - 
has been greeted with cruel derision by the established sisterhood […] 
Independent 01a […] every new young feminist writer has been greeted with cruel derision by 
the established sisterhood […] 
Independent 05b The feminist writer Beatrix Campbell described her as “quixotic, anarchic, 
impressive, surprising, game, witty and up for a laugh” 
Independent 09a […] I asked the feminist writer Ariel Levy, below, why so many women my age 
have the “I‟m not a feminist but...” attitude 
Independent 09c “It is not clear what the feminist agenda now is”, said the feminist writer Alison 
Wolf of King‟s College London 
Mirror 02a Feminist writer Germaine Greer has confirmed she will run for the rectorship of 
St Andrews University 
Telegraph 02b “The assumption that men can be fooled by false passivity is insulting to both 
men and women”, says American feminist writer Anne Roiphe 
Times 03c Erica Jong, the feminist writer who extolled the virtues of the „zipless f***‟ in the 
1970s, says she is “so ignorant” 
Times 07b She seems to fit what the “post-post-feminist” writer, Laura Kipnis, describes in 
her latest book, The Female Thing, as a product of the “feminine-industrial 
complex” - a woman trying to balance the independence that feminism has 
won with the idea that female weakness is a virtue 
 
Table 7.4: Occurrences of „feminist writer(s)‟ in verbalisation processes 
 
These examples, like the instances of „feminist‟ in appositive noun phrases discussed in section 
6.4.2.1, show how naming and representing actions/events/states interact to produce an implicature: 
that what is expressed in the verbiage is significant in light of the fact that it is a feminist saying it. In 
the occurrences in table 7.4, feminist writers express their uncertainty about feminism and observe 
different perspectives on feminist matters, while other examples observe divisions between feminists. 
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Feminists‟ statements concerning their own uncertainty about feminism are exemplified by 
feminist writer Alison Wolf‟s comments in Independent 09c, in which she admits that “It is not clear 
what the feminist agenda now is”. Here, negating – “It is not clear” – and the representation of time 
“what the feminist agenda now is” – combine to present contemporary feminism as something 
uncertain; by restricting this uncertainty to feminism in the present, Wolf also implies – through a flout 
of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) - that the feminist agenda was clear in the past. In Guardian 
08a, Telegraph 02b and Times 07b, presentations of speech depict feminist writers observing 
contradictions relating to feminism and femininity. In Guardian 08a, writer Rebecca Traister uses the 
representation of a state to equate the kind of femininity associated with Sarah Palin with the idea of 
“feminism without any feminists”, constructing the counterintuitive idea of a variety of „feminism‟ that 
exists without advocates. The Times 07b and Telegraph 02b examples both concern conflict between 
feminism and femininity. Times 07b observes writer Laura Kipnis‟s recognition of a “feminine-
industrial complex”, which the article glosses through apposition as “a woman trying to balance the 
independence that feminism has won with the idea that female weakness is a virtue”: here, a 
contrast between the independence granted by feminism and female weakness is constructed 
through an explicit „balance X with Y‟ opposition frame. In Telegraph 02b, writer Anne Roiphe, 
glossed as a „feminist writer‟ through apposition, is quoted on her thoughts on the idea of female 
weakness, or “female passivity” as she calls it – an idea that she deems “insulting” to both men and 
women. 
Other examples of the presentations of feminists‟ speech observe contrasts between different 
women. In Times 03c, feminist writer Erica Jong is quoted on her thoughts on fellow writer Danielle 
Crittenden, describing her in negatively evaluative terms as “so ignorant”. In Independent 01a, 
feminist writers are the target of other feminists‟ ire: “every new young feminist writer” is the recipient 
in a material action process of being “greeted with cruel derision”, with “the established sisterhood” as 
the actor. Although an opposition frame is not used here, the use of near antonyms in the naming of 
those at either end of the unfriendly greeting – “new” feminist writers and the “established sisterhood” 
– helps to emphasise the idea of a bitter division between older and newer feminists. 
 
7.3 Predicative ‘feminist’ 
The analysis in this section looks at the 42 occurrences of predicative „feminist‟ that function as a 
clausal complement. These occurrences make up a small portion of the adjectives dataset, with the 
majority of occurrences – 631 of 673 – discussed above in the analysis of attributive occurrences. 
However, predicative occurrences are of interest as they represent instances where someone or 
something‟s possession of (or lack of) a „feminist‟ quality is the proposition of the sentence. Rather 
than packaging up a referent‟s feminist qualities into a noun phrase, these occurrences explicitly 
address who (or what) does or does not possess the quality of being feminist.  
 The referents that appear as subjects where „feminist‟ is a complement are varied. They 
include activities – “[female bonding]‟s not exactly radical, or even necessarily feminist” (Independent 
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03b) – and thoughts, for example “what, unfortunately, remains feminist […] is the assumption that all 
lone parents are female” (Independent 04a). Some of these referents demonstrate Mendes‟ (2010a) 
argument that newspapers have a preoccupation with “the relationship between feminism and popular 
culture” (p. 136), for example books (“No Logo has been leapt upon by some commentators who […] 
see it as anti-feminist” (Guardian 00c)), films (“Barbara Broccoli never claimed […] the movies were 
feminist” (Mail 08b) and other cultural phenomena (“to call the Tab Totties‟ exhibitionism „post-
feminist‟ is in no way to suggest that it is a symptom of feminism” (Telegraph 09a). The individuals 
and groups who appear as subjects are also often public figures. The analysis below focuses on the 
14 occurrences of „an individual is feminist‟ and the 14 occurrences of „a group is feminist‟. Each of 
these patterns shows articles‟ discussion of the complexity of „feminist‟ and who can use it. 
 
7.3.1 „An individual is feminist‟ 
Occurrences of „an individual is feminist‟ demonstrate writers‟ and others‟ (perceived) uncertainty 
about who can be labelled „feminist‟. In some instances, „feminist‟ is also used as a gradable 
adjective, presenting it as a word that can apply to an individual to a greater or lesser extent. It is also 
discussed as a label that may not apply to someone even though they want it to. 
Table 7.5 comprises the 14 occurrences of „an individual is feminist‟:  
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 03a At 18 or 19, I would proudly have proclaimed myself either pro-feminist or 
feminist. Now, though, I think it‟s a joke for a man to describe himself as a 
feminist 
Guardian 06c And given that, what man wouldn‟t want to call himself pro-feminist? 
Guardian 08a […] why spend so much time framing Palin as feminist if we‟re all just a bunch 
of hairy man-haters? 
Independent 08c This may seem like a funny set of ideas for a woman so ardently feminist that 
she‟s nicknamed Harriet Harperson to subscribe to 
Mail 01b Feminine vs. feminist. She‟s the beautiful, trendy feminist […] But what exactly 
does author Naomi Wolf believe in? 
Mail 03a Feminist? Oh yeah! Let me wear those suffragette colours […] 
Mail 06b I don‟t see how you can be a woman and not be feminist 
Mirror 09a Dalai „Feminist‟ 
Sun 06b […] “I‟m fat, lesbian and blatantly feminist”, [Beth Ditto] proclaims […] 
Times 02c Christie Ann Hefner runs the business side of the Playboy empire […] 
Feminist? I don‟t think so 
Times 08c […] I cannot [...] declare that I am exactly as feminist as I would like to be 
Times 09a I‟m literally pro-„feminist‟  
Times 09b […] I was fretting myself into borderline paralysis about whether I was being 
anti-feminist 
 
Table 7.5: Occurrences of „an individual is feminist‟ 
 
Writers express doubts about whether they themselves are „feminist‟ in Guardian 03a, Times 08c and 
Times 09b. These examples present the applicability of „feminist‟ as something complex and difficult 
to ascertain: „feminist‟ is a label that can apply at some stages of one‟s life but not at others, is a label 
that one can want to use but not feel able to, and, in its negated form, is a label that people wish to 
avoid. Guardian 03a presents the idea of „feminist‟ being a label that someone sheds: „feminist‟ is the 
verbiage in a verbalisation process of proclaiming in which the writer is the target. However, this 
proclamation is placed in the past through the use of past tense and the time adverbial “At 18 or 19”, 
and the concessive opposition triggered by the proximal deictic marker of time “Now” contrasts the 
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applicability of „feminist‟ then with its non-applicability in the present. Times 08c and Times 09b 
express a greater level of concern about whether „feminist‟ or „anti-feminist‟ apply to the writer. In the 
former, the writer uses „feminist‟ as a gradable adjective – one is not simply feminist or not feminist, 
but can be feminist to different degrees. This gradable quality arises from the comparative “I am 
exactly as feminist as I would like to be” structure, and the presupposition that arises from it, i.e. that 
there is a desirable level of feminism – “as I would like to be” – that the writer has not attained. This 
clause is in turn subordinate to a negated verbalisation process of declaring – someone may wish to 
use the „feminist‟ label to describe themselves, but still not be able to use it. A similar anxiety is 
present in Times 09b, in which the representation of a state that labels the writer as “anti-feminist” is 
the cause of the writer‟s “fretting”: not only can someone not be able to declare oneself „feminist‟ even 
if they want to (Times 08c), but it is possible to worry about whether one is the opposite of „feminist‟. 
The other examples of a writer attributing the „feminist‟ label to themselves are more 
confident, but still demonstrate anxiety about the applicability of „feminist‟. Like the comparative 
structure in Times 08c, modification through adverbs presents „feminist‟ as a gradable adjective that 
can apply to a referent to a greater or lesser extent: singer Beth Ditto describes herself as “blatantly 
feminist” (Sun 06c), while another writer describes themselves as “literally „pro-feminist‟” (Times 09a). 
Although these adverbs express a high level of confidence about the subjects‟ feminist qualities, the 
fact that the writers hedge in this way, rather than using straightforward categorical assertions to 
declare their own feminism (i.e. „I am feminist‟) demonstrates an awareness of the trickiness of 
„feminist‟. This caution is emphasised by the fact that Times 09a uses the derivational form “pro-
feminist”, rather than simply „feminist‟: the writer is not bold enough to claim to be „feminist‟, merely 
claiming themselves to be in favour of those who are. 
 Other examples observe the contested nature of „feminist‟ by establishing the presence of an 
imagined interlocutor (Dean, 2010, p. 397). This effect is achieved through the use of rhetorical 
questions and questions that are presented as the free direct speech or thought of others. Guardian 
06c and Guardian 08a are examples of the former: in Guardian 06c, the writer uses a rhetorical 
question to ask why men would not apply „feminist‟ to themselves, while Guardian 08a uses the same 
technique to question why politicians apply „feminist‟ to the then Republican leadership candidate 
Sarah Palin if they view feminists as “hairy man-haters”. In both instances, a writer flouts the maxim of 
manner (Grice, 1975), using an interrogative structure to imply, rather than state categorically, that 
men ought to apply „feminist‟ to themselves and, more negatively, that „feminist‟ does not apply to 
Palin. This indirect way of describing the applicability of „feminist‟ demonstrates the writers‟ 
awareness of uncertainty about to whom „feminist‟ can apply. Mail 03a and Times 02c are similar in 
this respect, although in these instances it is simply the word „feminist‟ itself to which an interrogative 
is applied; the fact that the writer provides an answer in each instance provides the impression that 
these questions are supposed to be interpreted as presentations of the speech or thought of a 
hypothetical reader (the lack of a reporting clause in each instance means they must be free forms, 
and also makes it hard to tell if this is the writers‟ intention). In Mail 03a, the question concerns 
whether the writer themselves is feminist, and they provide an affirmative answer (“Oh yeah!”), while 
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in Times 02c the question concerns Playboy chairman Chistine Ann Hefner, with a negative answer 
provided. The use of this rhetorical strategy shows how writers assume readers‟ own uncertainty 
about the meaning and applicability of „feminist‟.  
 
7.3.2 „A group is feminist‟ 
Table 7.6 comprises the 14 occurrences of „a group is feminist‟. The analysis focuses on how writers 
present „feminist‟ and derivational forms as having complex meanings, and the emphasis on women‟s 
perceived lack of feminism: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Express 09a If women want to be both feminine and feminist it‟s not a problem 
Guardian 03a I‟ve been out with other people who weren‟t actively feminist […] 
Guardian 03a […] women of my own generation don‟t typically define themselves as feminist 
Guardian 05a […] that‟s when it dawned on me: all those people who looked down on 
knitting - and housework, and housewives - were not being feminist at all 
Guardian 05a […] they were being anti-feminist […] 
Guardian 07a […] if people want to call us feminist that‟s fine by me 
Independent 06a Only one British female in four calls herself feminist 
Independent 07b […] they say young women are not feminist, but it is not true […] 
Mail 03b Yet many women don‟t identify themselves as feminist […] 
Mail 04a “My generation is not interested in being called feminist”, she says 
Telegraph 01b This generation is truly post-feminist: they don‟t politicise their marriages and 
when you look at the issues women are consumed with day to day, they‟re 
very much removed from the political realm 
Telegraph 01b […] you have highly conservative bodies, like the army or the navy, who are as 
radically feminist as you can probably be 
Times 08a Funky, fun and feminist […] the women who are rebranding the f word 
Times 08a I don‟t know if we‟re third-wave or post-feminist […]  
 
Table 7.6: Occurrences of „a group is feminist‟ 
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In the „a group is feminist‟ structures, negating is used to deny the feminism of certain parties: in some 
instances, a writer or speaker labels others not feminist, while others provide evidence for previous 
studies‟ conviction that articles present the idea of others rejecting the „feminist‟ label (Redfern & 
Aune, 2010; Walby, 2011). Guardian 03a and Guardian 05a deny the feminism of others, but in a way 
that recognises the difficulty of deciding who „feminist‟ applies to. Guardian 03a uses naming to 
identify “other people who weren‟t actively feminist”, negating the representation of a state to deny a 
group‟s feminism: however, the iterative trigger “other” presupposes that some people were feminist, 
and the premodifier “actively” produces an implicature (through a flout of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 
1975)) that these people may have been feminist in a non-active way, again suggesting that „feminist‟ 
can apply to an individual to different degrees. The two examples from Guardian 05a refer to the 
same group of people who disapprove of knitting and other „feminine‟ activities, and whose feminism 
is denied through the negation of the representation of a state of being feminist. This negated clause 
is also part of a constructed opposition which emphasises their lack of feminism by observing that that 
they were “anti-feminist”. This example demonstrates how the meaning of „feminist‟ is contested: the 
use of contrasting reflects the debate around femininity and feminism, and whether they are “mutually 
exclusive” (Scharff, 2011, p. 460) – in this instance, a writer is arguing against this constructed 
opposition, and therefore for a more inclusive definition of „feminist‟. 
 Other occurrences of feminist denial appear in the presentation of others‟ (lack of) speech. In 
Guardian 03a and Mail 03b, “women of my own generation” and “many women” are the sayers in 
verbalisation processes of defining or identifying themselves as feminists: the negation of these 
processes backs up the conviction that women, in particular young women, are portrayed as rejecting 
feminism in newspapers (Redfern & Aune, 2010; Walby, 2011). Independent 06a does not use 
negating, observing that “one British female in four” does use „feminist‟ of themselves: however, the 
use of the quantifier “only” in the naming of British women presents this as a disappointing tally. 
Similarly, “My generation” is presented in a negated state of being “interested in being called feminist” 
in Mail 04a. However, there is also evidence of an awareness of this trend to focus on young women‟s 
lack of feminism: in Independent 07b, the writer uses the distal marker of person deixis “they” to 
observe what others say about this lack, and uses a concessive opposition – “but it is not true” – to 
cancel out this view. 
 The „a group is feminist‟ structures also demonstrate uncertainty about the meaning of 
„feminist‟, and the complexity of „feminist‟ and related terms. Express 09a, like the Guardian 05a 
examples above, takes issue with the femininity/feminism opposition through a hypothetical „if...then‟ 
structure which assures the reader that „feminine‟ and „feminist‟ are not antonyms – the representation 
of a state equates being both with not “being a problem”. In Times 08a, it is the writer themselves who 
is uncertain about the meaning of different „feminist‟ terms: they present an explicit opposition 
between “third-wave” feminist and “post-feminist” in a „X or Y‟ structure, which in turn is the 
phenomenon in a negated mental process of knowing, demonstrating uncertainty about the meaning 
of different types of „feminist‟. 
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7.4 Derivational forms of ‘feminist’ 
82 of the 673 occurrences in the adjectives dataset (12.18%) are derivational forms such as „anarcho-
feminist‟, „post-feminist‟ and „uber-feminist‟. Derivational forms occur for a much larger percentage of 
adjectives than for nouns (see section 4.2.2). The most common derivational form among adjectives 
is „post-feminist‟ (or „post-post-feminist‟), which occurs 35 times, while at the opposite end of the 
spectrum there are five occurrences of „pre-feminist‟. Of the remaining 42 occurrences, 21 involve a 
form of morphological negation - „anti-feminist‟, „non-feminist‟, „pseudo-feminist‟ or „un-feminist‟.  
The analysis here focuses on „(post-)post-feminist‟ (section 7.4.1), „pre-feminist‟ (section 
7.4.1) and the negated forms „anti-feminist‟. „non-feminist‟, „pseudo-feminist‟ and „un-feminist‟ section 
7.4.3. The discussion of each demonstrates the drawing of divisions between people and things that 
are „feminist‟ and those that are not. It also provides evidence of how articles not only contest the 
meaning of „feminist‟, but express uncertainty about how the label can be used in the present day 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 145). 
 
7.4.1 „Post-feminist‟ 
The derivational form „post-feminist‟ has received attention in previous studies of feminism in the 
media (Baumgardner & Richards, 2000; Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a). 
Discussion of the meaning of „post-feminist‟ emphasises the connotations it has for „feminism‟ itself – 
that as a movement or idea it is „dead‟ or „over‟. For example, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) 
find that „feminism‟ is frequently modified by „post-‟, and argue that it is used to imply that “feminism is 
historical and no longer current” (p. 411). Other studies, however, note that the word can have 
positive connotations, demonstrating the ambiguity of „feminism‟ generally: Mendes (2011a) argues 
that the term can denote not only “those who avidly disavow feminism, arguing that it is unnecessary 
or redundant”, but also “those who embrace the feminist identity but want to separate themselves 
from the Second Wave” (p. 8). The frequent use of „post-feminist‟ as an adjective (35 occurrences in 
the adjectives dataset) suggests that the possibility of something beyond feminism – in one sense or 
another – exists. Together with „pre-feminist‟, it also suggests a desire to split time into periods before, 
during and after feminism. 
 The head nouns that are premodified or complemented by „post-feminist‟ reinforce the idea of 
it as an adjective that denotes a period of time subsequent to „feminism‟ or a generation of people that 
follows „feminism‟: 
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Head noun No. of occurrences 
Generation 4 
Era 3 
Age, movement, women 2 
24 year-old, America, audiences, confectionery, delusion, drama, 
exhibitionism, family life, feminist, heroine, ideology, men, nothing, power 
woman, raunch culture, rebel, society, symbol, unit, wives, world, writer 
1 
 
Table 7.7: Head nouns premodified or complemented by „post-feminist‟ 
 
The sense of „post-feminist‟ as being used to describe a period of time subsequent to the „feminist‟ 
age is reinforced by nouns that denote periods of time, such as „era‟ and „age‟. Its use as a 
premodifier of nouns that denote people - „movement‟, „women‟, ‟24 year-old‟, „audiences‟, „feminist‟, 
„heroine‟, „men‟, „power woman‟, „rebel‟, „wives‟, „writer‟ – evokes the idea of „post-feminist‟ as a word 
that draws a line between generations, while „generation‟ evokes both senses. The analysis here 
focuses on two features of occurrences of adjectival „post-feminist‟: the use of scare quotes to 
express uncertainty about the validity of „post-feminist‟ as a label, and the use of contrasting to 
present oppositions between people and things that are either „feminist‟ or „post‟feminist‟ and to deny 
the validity of „post-feminist‟ interpretations of people and things. 
 Table 7.8 comprises the five occurrences of „post-feminist‟ in scare quotes: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 03a Women‟s Liberation‟s most obnoxious critics always talk about a „post-feminist 
era‟, meaning they desperately want it to be over 
Express 07b There are people who like to talk about the „post-feminist era‟. That is a very 
clever term. It means women have got what they want so they should now hold 
their collective tongues and return to the kitchen from whence they came 
Express 09b Some politicians talk about this „post-feminist era‟, meaning they want us to 
believe it is over, that we have all gone away 
Independent 06a Only 29 per cent said they would call themselves feminists, while 68 per cent 
rejected the label and 3 per cent remained undecided. The findings could be 
indicative of a „post-feminist‟ generation of younger women who consider the 
term to carry too much stigma 
Times 07b [Diana Spencer] seems to fit what the „post-post feminist‟ writer, Laura Kipnis, 
describes in her latest book, The Female Thing, as a product of the „feminine-
industrial complex‟ 
 
Table 7.8: Occurrences of adjectival „post-feminist‟ in scare quotes 
 
Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012, p. 416) note that „feminism‟ is often placed in scare quotes in 
newspaper articles. They observe that this is particularly the case for the collocation „new feminism‟, 
arguing that this demonstrates that it is treated in an ironic way or is presented as not actually existing 
(Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 416). Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) also suggest that the 
frequent occurrence of the prefix „post-‟ in and of itself presents feminism as “finished” (p. 417). 
However, the examples in table 7.8 suggest that in some cases it is „post-feminist‟, rather than 
„feminist‟, that is treated as though it were suspicious, in turn presenting ordinary „feminism‟ in a more 
positive light. Rather than questioning whether feminism exists, these occurrences instead emphasise 
that it does still exist, and question instead whether something „post-feminist‟ exists. 
In the Express examples, scepticism about „post-feminist‟ is the result of the use of speech 
presentation. “„Post-feminist‟ era” is part of the verbiage in a verbalisation process in each example. 
Further, they each use indirect speech presentation to present what critics, people or politicians have 
said, with the subordinating conjunction “about” indicating that this is a summary of what was said, 
rather than a verbatim report (Leech & Short, 1981, p. 319). This means that the reported speech is 
not a faithful account of what was said, but the use of quotation marks around „post-feminist era‟ in 
each example suggests that these words were used. Each instance is also an example of 
metalanguage, with the writer making their cynicism about „post-feminist era‟ clear through a relational 
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intensive process of meaning, with „post-feminist era‟ denoting that “they [Women‟s Liberation‟s most 
obnoxious critics] desperately want it to be over” (Express 03a), that “women have got what they want 
so they should now hold their collective tongues and return to the kitchen from whence they came”, 
(Express 07b) and that “they [some politicians] want us to believe it is over, that we have all gone 
away” (Express 09b). Each article regards „post-feminist‟ in the more negative sense observed by 
Mendes (2011a), as denoting “those who avidly disavow feminism” (p. 8), and uses indirect speech 
presentation to sum up others‟ use of the term in a way that allows them to attack it.  
 Independent 06a also uses „post-feminist‟ to explicitly address the meaning of „feminist‟. 
Reporting on a survey of young women‟s attitudes to feminism, it notes that the majority of 
respondents did not take a favourable view of „feminist‟. The modal auxiliary “could” attached to the 
following relational process expresses a degree of uncertainty about what the findings mean, but the 
interpretation – that young women‟s rejection of „feminist‟ could indicate that they are „post-feminist‟ 
and view „feminist‟ negatively – again evokes Mendes‟ (2011a, p. 8) definition of „post-feminist‟ as 
denoting a disavowal of feminism. In Times 07b, the meaning of “post-post-feminist” is ambiguous. 
The lack of explanation, its placement in scare quotes, and its use in the naming of a writer suggest 
that this may be a label that the writer Laura Kipnis uses of herself. The other use of „post-post-
feminist‟ appears in a relational circumstance process - “today's post-post-feminist ideology comes 
from „chick lit‟” (Express 02a) – that also places its origins in writers‟ work. The meaning of „post-post-
feminist‟ in these examples presents the idea of „feminist‟ having a further layer of possible 
complexity, with a further movement away from feminism. 
The idea of „post-feminist‟ denoting a period of time and a generation subsequent to feminism 
is also evoked through the use of contrasting: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
220 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 01a […] they show a striking progression - from the apparently free and post-
feminist 24-year-old to […] the re-politicised woman in her mid-thirties 
Independent 04c Far from being some post-feminist power-woman, Michelle‟s odd behaviour 
comes from a desperate need to believe Her Man is smiling on her 
Mail 03a My mother was one of the first bone fide feminists who marched in the 
Sixties to campaign for equal rights. Which leaves me, I guess, a post-
feminist feminist in less well-defined territory 
Mail 04b Ladette culture is NOT a sassy, sexy post-feminist movement, it‟s just a 
show of adolescent vulgarity 
Times 02b We are living in a post-feminist society - after a women‟s movement 
Times 07b Instead of seeing her as a post-feminist rebel against the stuffed-shirt 
royal establishment, [Germaine Greer] says that Diana undermined the 
whole idea of womanhood because of the way she behaved after she had 
split up with the Prince of Wales 
Times 08a I don‟t know if we‟re third-wave or post-feminist, but we definitely want to be 
all things and don‟t feel like we can‟t be 
 
Table 7.9: Occurrences of adjectival „post-feminist‟ in constructed oppositions 
 
The contrasts in table 7.9 emphasise the transition from „feminist‟ to „post-feminist‟, and also 
emphasise the idea of a distinction between the „political‟ nature of the feminist era and the relatively 
non-political nature of more recent times, as recognised in Dean‟s (2010, p. 393) concept of 
domestication. The transition between „feminist‟ and „post-feminist‟ is portrayed in Times 02b, in which 
the preposition “after” gives rise to a parallelism between living in a post-feminist society and living 
in a women‟s movement. This constructs the idea of two distinct periods, with the placing of a post-
feminist society in the present tense emphasising the idea that a women‟s movement (presumably 
synonymous with „feminism‟) only existed in the past. The parallel relational intensive processes in 
Mail 03a present a similar shift from a feminist era - “My mother was one of the first bona fide 
feminists” - to a post-feminist era, in which the writer is “a post-feminist feminist in less well-
defined territory”. As noted in the sample analysis (section 3.2.4), this contrast presents 
feminist/post-feminist as being aligned with superodinates relating to realness (“bona fide”) and 
vagueness (“less well-defined”), respectively. „Post-feminist‟ is also presented as having a vague 
meaning in Times 08a (discussed above in section 7.3.2): here, the writer contrasts third-wave and 
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post-feminist, explicitly stating their own uncertainty about whether it applies to them. In Mail 03a 
and Times 08a, the writers themselves are uncertain what is meant by derivational forms of „feminist‟.  
The transitional opposition in Guardian 01a suggests that the transition from feminism to post-
feminism comes with the age of an individual, rather than changing eras. Here, the „from X to Y‟ 
opposition aligns „post-feminist‟ attitudes with women in their mid-twenties, and re-politicised 
(presumably in terms of „feminist‟) attitudes with women in their mid-thirties. Again, an interest in 
politics is attributed to the feminist, and not the post-feminist, side of the opposition. Further, the 
transition in this case goes from „post-feminist‟ to „feminist‟, in a reversal of the expected movement 
from one to the other. The remaining examples are similar to the occurrences in scare quotes 
discussed above, but use contrasting instead of speech presentation to reject an interpretation of 
something as being „post-feminist‟ and positive. In Independent 04c, Mail 04b and Times 07b, „post-
feminist‟ is part of the premodification in a positively evaluative noun phrase: however, in each case a 
constructed opposition is used to contrast this positive, post-feminist interpretation with a more 
damning interpretation. In Independent 04c, a concessive opposition constructed with the „far from X, 
Y‟ frame rejects the interpretation of Big Brother contestant Michelle Bass‟s behaviour as that of 
some post-feminist power-women in favour of an interpretation that sees it as a desperate need to 
believe Her Man is smiling on her: Bass‟s behaviour is not „post-feminist‟ in an empowering way, 
but instead shows her dependence on men. A concessive opposition is also used in Times 07b to 
present Germaine Greer‟s opinion of Diana Spencer: the former considers the latter to have 
undermined the whole idea of womanhood, rather than to have been a post-feminist rebel, 
emphasising the idea of post-feminism as individualist rather than collectivist. This negative view of 
the idea of post-feminism is also evident in the representation of a state in Mail 04b, which uses a 
negated opposition to attribute to “Laddette culture” the quality of being a show of adolescent 
vulgarity, rather than a sassy, sexy post-feminist movement. By using contrasting to deny the 
veracity of post-feminist interpretations of women and their behaviour, these examples question the 
validity of the „post-feminist‟ label. 
The use of „post-feminist‟ in the adjectives dataset presents it as having a vague meaning. 
Like with the examples of „new feminism‟ and „third-wave feminism‟ discussed in section 5.4.2, the 
idea of something „feminist‟ that exists subsequent to the readily recognised feminism of the second 
wave causes trouble. In particular, the examples of „post-feminist‟ that occur in scare quotes, and the 
instances of contrasting where a „post-feminist‟ interpretation of a person or thing is negated, suggest 
that writers themselves find „post-feminist‟ at best vague, and at worst meaningless. 
 
7.4.2 „Pre-feminist‟ 
The discussion in section 7.4.1 above shows that „post-feminist‟, and the possibility that we are now 
living in a world in which feminism no longer applies, is treated with suspicion. The five occurrences of 
„pre-feminist‟ demonstrate the articles‟ discussion of a time prior to feminism. The analysis shows that 
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„pre-feminist‟ is used to refer to the idea of a way of being a woman that existed before feminism, and 
that writers issue warnings that a return to this period is possible. 
 Table 7.10 comprises the five occurrences of „pre-feminist‟: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Telegraph 01c […] sending out strong messages roughly in accordance with what is perceived to 
be the feminist agenda is what courts have been doing in many jurisdictions for 
years now. Yet in doing so, they have served to subvert female autonomy, 
recreating a pre-feminist victim-womanhood which must be vigorously protected by 
the institutions of the state 
Telegraph 02b Surrendering control means going back to pre-feminist ideas of womanhood [...] 
single women should smile at every man they meet, always wear form-fitting clothes 
and make-up, and give “sincere thanks or a compliment to at least one male a day” 
Telegraph 03a […] the submissiveness of the other wives in Stepford drenches the suburb in a hot 
coating of male-fantasy sexuality: how luscious the pre-feminist male dream of 
domestic womanhood was as it was being threatened 
Times 00c Out went the bitchy, backbiting, competitive world of pre-feminist girlhood. In came 
ideas of sisterhood, solidarity, female friendship and „girls‟ nights out‟ 
Times 03c Crittenden‟s heroine believes that staying at home is the right thing to do and in real 
life the author celebrates the role of the stay-at-home mum [...] it may sound like a 
return to the pre-feminist 1950s but it is hard to write Crittenden off as old-fashioned 
 
Table 7.10: Occurrences of adjectival „pre-feminist‟ 
 
In four of the noun phrases in which „pre-feminist‟ occurs, it premodifies „womanhood‟ or „girlhood‟. 
These noun phrases, and the wider clausal context, present these pre-feminist ideas of femininity as 
old-fashioned and oppressive. Telegraph 01c refers to a “pre-feminist victim-womanhood”, while 
Telegraph 02b postmodifies “pre-feminist ideas of womanhood” with oppressive ideas of how women 
ought to behave in relation to men, such as smiling at them and dressing for their pleasure. Telegraph 
03a also emphasises the powerful position of men before feminism, referring to “the pre-feminist male 
dream of domestic womanhood” and thereby presupposing the existence of a male ideal of women as 
subservient to men, while Times 03c equates the idea of “a return to the pre-feminist 1950s” with 
writer Danielle Crittenden‟s beliefs concerning the importance of “the stay-at-home mum” through the 
representation of a state (“sound like”). Naming in Times 00c, on the other hand, focuses on 
competition between women themselves, rather than between men and women, with the “competitive 
223 
 
world of pre-feminist girlhood” premodified by the negatively evaluative adjectives “bitchy” and 
“backbiting”. The transition between the pre-feminist age and the feminist era is made explicit here 
through a contrast created by a parallelism between the “Out” and “In” clauses, with competitive pre-
feminism replaced by the more positive “ideas of sisterhood, solidarity, female friendship and „girls‟ 
nights out‟”. 
 Times 00c presents the idea of a transition from pre-feminism to feminism, but the other 
occurrences - like the Guardian 01a example of a transition from post-feminism to feminism discussed 
in section 7.4.1 above - stress the possibility that this transition could be reversed. In Telegraph 01c, 
“pre-feminist victim-womanhood” is presented as the goal in a material action process of being re-
created, with the “re-” prefix presupposing the prior existence of this type of womanhood, and 
emphasising the possibility that court rules could bring about a return to it. Times 03c and Telegraph 
02b also present the possibility of a return: Times 03c does this through the nominalisation “a return 
to the pre-feminist 1950s”, while Telegraph 02b uses a relational intensive process to equate the non-
finite clauses “Surrendering control” and “going back to pre-feminist ideas of womanhood”. The 
textual construction of „pre-feminist‟ – as denoting an era that was oppressive for women, but could 
exist again – enables the writers to underline the progress that feminism enabled for women. 
 
7.4.3 Negated forms of „feminist‟ 
Where „feminist‟ is modified through morphological negation, there are 13 occurrences of „anti-
feminist‟, three of „non-feminist‟, three of „un-feminist‟ and two of „pseudo-feminist‟. These different 
forms demonstrate the range of meaning that is possible through the use of different negating 
prefixes. While each serves to indicate that “the attribute designated in the base word does not apply 
in the situation that is the focus of the discourse” (Nahajec, 2012, p. 139), the different prefixes have 
subtly different meanings: „un-‟ and „non-‟ suggest a lack, „pseudo-‟ evokes the quality of being fake, 
and „anti-‟ provides a sense of opposition. In the analysis that follows, I first of all look at forms 
denoting a lack (section 7.4.3.1), before turning to forms denoting a fake quality (section 7.4.3.2), and 
finally forms denoting opposition (section 7.4.3.3). The analysis shows how writers construct 
oppositions between what is „feminist‟ and what is not in order to contest the meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism‟, to argue against negative perceptions and to discuss the complexity of 
„feminist/s/ism‟. 
 
7.4.3.1 ‘Un-feminist’ and ‘non-feminist’ 
Table 7.11 comprises the three occurrences of „un-feminist‟ and the three occurrences of „non-
feminist‟, all of which suggest the lack of the quality of being „feminist‟: 
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Publication Sentence 
Express 09a You can wear what you want […] The only unfeminist thing about an outfit is 
judging another woman for wearing it 
Independent 02a […] Mr Blunkett‟s most recent pronouncements on one particular (and non-
feminist) alternative lifestyle tend to suggest that there is something in this 
Sun 00a It was even dubbed „Porn Chic‟ by French feminists. Although it must be 
difficult to tell a non-feminist French woman from a feminist one 
Telegraph 08a Though she would specialise in women's and children's issues, Hillary‟s public 
statements have often betrayed an ambivalence about women who chose a 
non-feminist path 
Times 08a Jordan may have fashioned herself as a caricature of male fantasy, but she is 
also an extremely rich and successful working mother - and what is unfeminist 
about that? 
Times 08a It wouldn‟t be healthy to say, “you shouldn't be wearing make-up”, as that is 
unfeminist in a way 
 
Table 7.11: Head nouns premodified or complemented by „un-/non-feminist‟ 
 
The use of „un-feminist‟ and „non-feminist‟ is similar to that of occurrences of the noun „feminist‟ that 
appear in „to be/being/become a feminist‟ (see section 6.2.3.3) and „you are/become a feminist‟ (see 
section 6.2.3.4). These structures observe the idea of conditions that must be in place for the use of 
„feminist‟ to be valid, but then argue against these rules. Each occurrence of „un-feminist‟ appears in 
the representation of a state. In Express 09a, „un-feminist‟ is equated with judging someone for 
wearing an outfit, and in Times 08a with telling someone they should not wear make-up. Both the 
wearing of certain outfits and make-up are generally perceived as un-feminist habits, a perception 
acknowledged and argued against in Express 09a: “if women want to be both feminine and feminist 
it‟s not a problem”. The representation of „un-feminist‟ in states that equate it with the use of rules to 
judge someone or to tell them off results in their subversion: it is not the wearing of certain outfits or 
make-up that is un-feminist, but rather the rules about not wearing them. These uses of „un-feminist‟ 
thereby provide evidence for Hinds and Stacey‟s (2001) observation that more recent portrayals of 
feminism in newspapers emphasise the “potential compatibility between the previously polarised 
categories of feminism and femininity” (p. 153). 
„Non-feminist‟ is also used to express the view that certain lifestyle choices should not be 
judged. In Telegraph 08a, a concessive opposition triggered by “though” draws a contrast between 
then Democrat leadership candidate Hilary Clinton‟s interest in issues affecting women and children 
on the one hand, and her statements about “women who chose a non-feminist path” on the other. 
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Here, the concessive opposition presents this second proposition as surprising in light of the first 
(Quirk et al., 1972, p. 745): if Clinton cares about “women‟s and children‟s issues”, then it is surprising 
that she is not more positive about women to whom „non-feminist‟ might apply. This suggests that it is 
unimportant whether a woman chooses a „feminist‟ or a „non-feminist‟ path. Independent 02a also 
concerns the views of a politician, in this instance the then UK Home Secretary David Blunkett. Here, 
„non-feminist‟ premodifies “alternative lifestyle”, which itself postmodifies “Mr Blunkett‟s most recent 
pronouncements”. The meaning of this sentence is vague, with the deictic marker of discourse “this” 
not having a clear reference in the wider context. However, the interrogative structure of the following 
sentence asks why parenting issues that affect Muslim families are “addressed so critically and so 
personally”, giving the impression that Blunkett‟s pronouncements concerned these issues. The use 
of a rhetorical question flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975): the reader is not being told 
something clearly, and the implied meaning is that „non-feminist‟ parenting issues should not be 
commented on, regardless of the social group involved. 
 
7.4.3.2 ‘Pseudo-feminist’ 
The occurrences of „pseudo-feminist‟ are interesting in that they present the matter of whether 
something is „feminist‟ or not as more complex than would be the case if they simply stated „X is not 
feminist‟. It is not simply a matter of whether something is feminist or not feminist, there is also a 
question of realness - something can appear to be feminist without actually being so: 
 
Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00c So, on the one hand, you‟re politically totally disempowered, and on the other all 
the imagery is pseudo-feminist, Benetton is an anti-racism organisation, 
Starbucks does this third-world-chic thing 
Guardian 05c […] in a world where even having Botox is claimed as some kind of pseudo-
feminist act, she was the real thing 
 
Table 7.12: Head nouns premodified or complemented by „pseudo-feminist‟ 
 
These occurrences are similar to those of „un-feminist‟ and „non-feminist‟ in that they suggest that 
others‟ perceptions of what is or is not „feminist‟ are incorrect. Guardian 05c uses the presentation of 
speech to construct the idea of people labelling facial surgery as somehow „feminist‟. The fact that no 
sayer is provided in the reporting clause allows the writer to construct a vague interlocutor, and to 
contrast their pseudo-feminist ideas with Andrea Dworkin, who is attributed the quality of being “the 
real thing” through the representation of a state. Guardian 00c is part of a discussion of the opposition 
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between “advertising and branding” and the “alternative politics and culture” to which feminism 
belongs, the former having apparently co-opted the latter. The explicit „on the one hand… on the other 
hand‟ opposition frame here emphasises this cooption, an effect that depends on implicature: the 
negative idea of political disempowerment is contrasted with the idea of pseudo-feminist imagery and 
corporations doing apparently liberal things – being anti-racist and doing “this third-world-chic thing”. 
However, the context makes it clear that the writer‟s tone is sarcastic – the idea of Benetton and 
Starbucks being genuinely politically alternative is being subverted through a flout of the maxim of 
quality (Grice, 1975). This serves to make both sides of the constructed opposition negative, 
emphasising the negativity of things that are „pseudo-feminist‟. 
 
7.4.3.3 ‘Anti-feminist’ 
„Un-feminist‟, „non-feminist‟ and „pseudo-feminist‟ all present the idea that certain things and views are 
not feminist, even though other people may claim that they are. The 13 examples of „anti-feminist‟ 
differ in that they place the emphasis on how things can be deliberately opposed to feminism. They 
also demonstrate articles‟ discussion of the difficulties of “attempting to define what feminism is and 
who can appropriate this label” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132). 
 Table 7.13 comprises the 13 occurrences of „anti-feminist‟: 
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00c No Logo has been leapt upon by some commentators who are thrilled by 
Naomi Klein's rejection of the identity politics of her youth, and so see it as 
anti-feminist 
Guardian 05a […] all those people who looked down on knitting […] were not being feminist 
at all. In fact, they were being antifeminist […] 
Guardian 08a And despite the talk about being the party of change […] propping up anti-
feminist women as trailblazers is typical of the Republicans 
Guardian 08a […] it's not Palin's anti-feminist bona fides alone that matter 
Independent 00a She [Camille Paglia] has been described as […] An anti-feminist feminist […] 
Independent 03a Anti-feminist propaganda is widespread and still manages to characterise 
feminists as sex-starved, childless man-haters […] 
Independent 04c A populist anti-feminist backlash is brewing, not just in the Big Brother house 
but in the wider culture 
Mail 08b But is that [every Bond girl being ravished by James Bond] really anti-feminist? 
Sun 05c You may think this [the writer‟s opinion on how to promote a healthy sexual 
attitude and maintain childhood innocence] is anti-feminist. But feminism is not 
about telling a woman what she can and can‟t do 
Telegraph 02c Judging from the attention his anti-feminist thesis has received, he seems to 
have struck a chord […] 
Times 06a I am surprised, all the same, by the persistence of the ideological blind spot 
that has led women […] to make transparent excuses for the behaviour of 
some of the world's most anti-feminist regimes 
Times 06a […] I could never have imagined that many of the same crowd I hung out with 
then would today be standing shoulder-to-shoulder with militantly anti-feminist 
Islamic fundamentalist groups […] 
Times 09a […] I was fretting myself into borderline paralysis about whether I was being 
anti-feminist 
 
Table 7.13: Head nouns premodified or complemented by „anti-feminist‟ 
 
Notably, the one instance in which a writer uses „anti-feminist‟ to label themselves is complex. In 
Times 09a, the clause “I was being anti-feminist” occurs at a low level of the clause structure as part 
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of the postmodification of the “borderline paralysis” which the writer is suffering. This example 
demonstrates writers‟ uncertainty about what „feminist‟ means and whether it applies to them: it is a 
sufficiently slippery word that someone might worry that they are in fact anti-feminist (i.e. they do not 
want to be, but think they might be). The complexity of „feminist‟ is also underlined in Independent 
00a, which uses the presentation of speech to observe how an unnamed party has labelled the writer 
Camille Paglia as “an anti-feminist feminist”. The use of an adjective that denotes beliefs that are 
opposed to feminism to premodify „feminist‟ is counterintuitive: if even a feminist can be anti-feminist, 
then the meaning of „feminist‟ must be complex. The other examples in table 7.13 show how articles 
contest the meaning of „feminist‟ and portray things that are anti-feminist in a negative light, as 
threatening. 
 The negated opposition in Guardian 05a (discussed in section 7.3.1) above constructs a 
contrast between feminist/anti-feminist through a „not X, but Y‟ frame. These labels are both 
attributed to the carrier of a relational intensive process – “all those people who looked down on 
knitting” – with the writer preferring the „anti-feminist‟ description. This example demonstrates how 
contrasting is used to powerful effect: writers not only say whether something is feminist or not, but 
assert that if it is not feminist, then it must be the precise opposite. Similarly, Sun 05c uses contrasting 
- and hypothesising and implying – to contest the feminist/anti-feminist status of particular attitudes 
towards sex. The notion that these beliefs are anti-feminist is modalised at a higher clause level 
through the lexical verb “think”, contrasting with the second clause in the concessive opposition 
triggered by “But” – a categorical assertion that states as a matter of fact that “feminism is not about 
telling a woman what she can and can‟t do”. There is a flout of the maxim of relation (Grice, 1975) 
here, as the second clause does not clearly relate to the first: one is to do with whether an attitude is 
feminist or not, the other is to do with what feminism is about. This flout produces an implicature that 
although the opinion may seem anti-feminist, it is in fact not, as this definition of feminism precludes it 
from being so. Mail 08b also uses implying to contest whether something is feminist/anti-feminist: the 
attribution of “anti-feminist” to the James Bond films is phrased as a hypothetical question, flouting the 
maxim of manner (Grice, 1975) (the proposition could be made more clearly, and the reader is unable 
to provide an answer) to imply that the Bond films are, in fact, feminist. Each of these examples 
demonstrates that not only do the articles debate what can be „feminist‟, but also divide things into 
two, opposed groupings: feminist and anti-feminist. 
 The sense of anti-feminism as negative and threatening is present in Independent 03a and 
Independent 04c. In Independent 03a, “Anti-feminist propaganda” has a role in two transitivity 
processes, being presented in a state of being “widespread” and as the actor in a material action 
process of characterising feminists in a negative light, as “sex-starved, childless man-haters”. The 
sense of this propaganda as a threat is enhanced by the logical presupposition trigger “still”, which 
emphasises that propaganda has made these characterisations of feminists previously. Independent 
03a is a good example of how writers discuss feminism from a defensive position (Mendes, 2011a, p. 
10): although the sentiments are pro-feminist, there is an emphasis on the negative perceptions of 
others (“sex-starved, childless man-haters”). Independent 04c also portrays anti-feminism as 
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threatening by representing an inanimate, anti-feminist actor – “A populist anti-feminist backlash” - in 
a material action process, in this case a process of “brewing”. Again, the use of the present tense 
serves to make this threat appear close at hand, and the concessive opposition in the circumstantial 
adverbial – “not just in the Big Brother house, but in the wider culture” – emphasises it: here, the 
ability of concessive opposition to present something as surprising emphasises the fact that although 
it may seem that anti-feminism is restricted to the cast of a television programme, it is in fact more 
widespread. 
 
7.5 ‘Feminist’ in lists 
Adjectival „feminist‟ occurs in lists of adjectives that premodify a head noun – for example “a sassy, 
sexy, post-feminist movement” (Mail 04b) - or complement a subject, e.g. “I‟m fat, lesbian and 
blatantly feminist” (Sun 06b). The adjectives with which „feminist‟ is listed provide a similar sort of 
detail to the pre- and postmodifying elements discussed in chapters 5 and 6, as the presentation of 
collections of linguistic items in lists suggests some sort of connection between them (Jeffries, 2007, 
p. 120). 
Table 7.14 uses Biber et al.‟s (1999, pp. 508-509) typology of semantic categories of 
adjectives to categorise the 184 adjectives that appear with „feminist‟ in lists. It is worth noting that 
„feminist‟ itself is a topical classifier, placing the head noun into a category (feminist/not feminist) and 
being (prototypically) non-gradable (although note occurrences such as “a woman so ardently feminist 
that she's nicknamed Harriet Harperson” (Independent 08c)): 
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Descriptors 
5 x size/ 
quantity/ extent 
11-year, big, burgeoning, deepest, fat 
27 x time Early (x 3), eight year-old, long-standing, new (x 11), old(e) (x 5), young (x 6) 
18 x evaluative  
emotive 
Bad, better, classic (x 2), correct, crude, false, glamorous (x 2), good, great (x 
3), hottest, important (x 2), seminal, wicked 
52 x 
miscellaneous/ 
descriptive 
34DD, approaching, bra-less, burning, controversial, counter-intuitive, famed, 
famous (x 2), feisty, ferocious, forward-thinking, free, fully-fledged, fun, funky, 
good-for-society, hard, hard-hitting, hysterical, implacable, independent-
minded, influential (x 3), key, ludicrous, mischievous, online, outspoken, 
paranoid, populist, positive, profound, public, sassy, self-important, self-styled, 
serious (x 2), sexy, single, so-called, sometimes-called, strident, strong, 
successful (x 2), sustained, vocal, well-trodden, wild 
Classifiers 
40 x relational/ 
classificational/ 
restrictive 
1970s, 70s and 80s, 19
th
 century, alternative, basic, best-known, best-selling, 
earlier, leading (x 6), modern (x 3), nearest, newly-founded, normal, official, 
old-school, original (x3), outdated, particular, post-modern, precedent, 
prominent, second-wave (x3), Sixties, standard, strongest, third-wave, typical, 
ultimate (x 2) 
13 x affiliative American/US (x 4), British/Brit-born (x 3), international, Irish, Ladyfest, London 
(x 2), Lothian 
29 x topical/ 
other 
Anti-apartheid, Bourgeois, celebrity, cultural, fashion, feminine (x 2), feminist 
(x 2), intellectual, left-wing, lesbian, mainstream, not feminist, politically 
correct, post-lapsarian, pro-feminist, radical (x 6), socialist (x 4), state-funded, 
traditional 
(Adapted from Biber et al., 1999, pp. 508-509) 
Table 7.14: Semantic groupings of adjectives that occur in lists with „feminist‟ 
 
Table 7.14 shows that miscellaneous descriptors (52 adjectives) and relational classifiers (40 
adjectives) occur most often in lists with „feminist‟ (52 adjectives). The frequent occurrence of 
„feminist‟ alongside miscellaneous descriptors such as „funky‟, „paranoid‟ and „self-important‟ suggests 
that people and things described as feminist are also frequently described in terms of individual 
characteristics. Time descriptors are the second most common category of descriptors, suggesting an 
emphasis on time period and age, as noted in previous studies (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & 
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Krishnamurthy, 2012; Mendes, 2011a, 2012). The most common varieties of classifiers are relational 
classifiers and topical classifiers, which suggests that feminist people and things are often further 
classified according to their position within this grouping and in terms of other means of classification. 
 An overview of the adjectives which occur most frequently with „feminist‟ backs up the 
impression that time is an important feature when describing people and things as feminist: 
 
Adjective No. of occurrences 
New 11 
Leading, young, old(e)(-school) 6 
Early/ier, radical, socialist 4 
American, British/Brit-born, great, modern, 
original, second-wave, influential 
3 
 
Table 7.15: Adjectives that occur in lists with „feminist‟ 
 
This overview of adjectives that occur in lists with adjectival „feminist‟, like that of adjectives that 
premodify „feminism‟ (see section 5.4.2), suggests a concentration on specifically Anglo-American 
types of feminism, as noted in Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) study of UK newspapers: both 
„American‟ and „British‟/„Brit-born‟ appear in spite of the fact that affiliative classifiers account for a 
relatively small percentage of the coordinates. The relational classifier „leading‟ and miscellaneous 
descriptor „influential‟ hint at a sense of hierarchy within the world of feminists and feminism, while the 
topical classifiers „radical‟ and „socialist‟ narrow down the type of feminism being discussed to a 
politicised variety (this is in keeping with the findings regarding premodifiers in chapters 5 and 6). The 
remainder emphasise aspects of age and time period. These results fit with what previous studies 
have noted about the media‟s apparent desire to divide feminism into new and old varieties (Mendes, 
2012, p. 561) and to focus particularly on “a new and „glamorous‟ feminism” (Dean, 2010, p. 394). The 
analysis below focuses on time descriptors and the relational classifiers „modern‟ and „original‟. It finds 
that co-occurrences of „new‟ and „feminist‟ assume the existence of a new feminism, and that 
oppositions and hostilities are drawn between old and new feminisms. 
 
7.5.1 „New/young/modern‟ and „feminist‟ 
A total of 20 occurrences of „new‟, „young‟ and „modern‟ occur in lists with „feminist‟ in the 
premodification of nouns. The packaging up of „feminist‟ with „new/young/modern‟ allows writers to 
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presuppose the existence of new varieties of feminism, while implying and representations of actions 
and states posit differences between new and old feminisms. 
Occurrences of „new/young/modern‟ and „feminist‟ are compiled in table 7.16:  
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Publication Sentence 
Express 02c […] my young, feminist heart boiled with rage and resentment 
Guardian 00a The first review of A Century of Women that came in was by Naomi Wolf, then 
the hottest young feminist writer around […] 
Guardian 00b She […] is scathing about figures like Naomi Wolf and about the new feminist 
conservatism 
Guardian 01a Two of us arrived, armed with our copies of New Feminist Criticism […] 
Guardian 01c […] the modern feminist heroine cannot deny fame or flee from it […] 
Guardian 03b The young feminist webzine The F Word attracts 25,000 hits a month 
Guardian 03b […] I‟m up for a good - old, new, sustained, whatever - feminist fracas 
Guardian 07c This resurgence in feminist activism of all kinds has been mirrored online, with 
a constant stream of new British feminist blogs being created […] 
Guardian 07c […] there‟s a groundswell of new feminist magazines […] 
Guardian 08b […] there are stirrings of a new feminist movement […] 
Independent 01a […] every new young feminist writer has been greeted with cruel derision by 
the established sisterhood 
Independent 01a […] every new young feminist writer - from Natasha Walter to Naomi Wolf - 
has been greeted with cruel derision by the established sisterhood […] 
Independent 02b […] much of the media is paying lip-service to the new feminist-inspired 
orthodoxies 
Independent 08b The celebrated first sentence of the second part […] is regarded as one of the 
starting points of modern, radical, feminist thought 
Independent 09b […] hundreds of women each month are joining new feminist networks […] 
Independent 09b Catherine Redfern, who conducted the survey for Reclaiming the F Word: The 
New Feminist Movement, which she is co-writing with Kristin Aune, said: “we 
want to tell people that feminism is still here […]” 
Sun 04a Why shouldn‟t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons? 
Times 09b […] even a young feminist author who I interviewed said that she‟d never swim 
if her legs weren‟t smooth 
 
Table 7.16: Adjectives that occur in lists with „feminist‟ – „new‟, „young‟ and „modern‟ 
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The existence of people and things that are both new and feminist is emphasised through existential 
presuppositions and existential transitivity processes. Definite noun phrases presuppose the 
existence of ideas, reflecting the „outlook‟ element of Kelly‟s (1982, p. 67) definition of „feminism‟: “the 
new feminist conservatism” (Guardian 00b), “the new feminist-inspired orthodoxies” (Independent 
02b) and “the starting points of modern, radical, feminist thought” (Independent 08b). These 
existential presuppositions contest the idea that feminism is an old idea that does not change: ways of 
thinking can be both feminist and new. Other existential presuppositions and existential processes 
presuppose the existence of an archetype – “the modern feminist heroine” (Guardian 01c) – and 
publications – “The young feminist webzine” (Guardian 03b), “there‟s a groundswell of new feminist 
magazines” (Guardian 07c). The idea of the feminist movement as something that can be renewed is 
also emphasised in “The New Feminist Movement” (Independent 09b) and “there are stirrings of a 
new feminist movement” (Guardian 08b). The head nouns for which „new‟ and „feminist‟ form part of 
the postmodifcation in the existential processes go further: “groundswell” (Guardian 07c) and 
“stirrings” (Guardian 08b) suggest that these new feminisms are only just beginning to come into 
existence. 
 While the articles present the idea of new and imminent feminisms, they also present new 
and old feminisms as divided. This is clearest in the verbalisation process in Independent 01a, in 
which “every new young feminist” is the target of the welcome from the sayer, “the established 
sisterhood”. This greeting is modified by the adverbial “with cruel derision”, making clear the hostility 
that the older feminism holds toward the newer feminism, and which is emphasised by the near 
antonyms “new” and “established” in the premodifcation of each party. Guardian 00b observes a 
similar division between an old feminism – represented by feminist Susan Brownmiller – and the new 
feminism represented by Naomi Wolf. In this instance, a relational intensive process is used to 
describe Brownmiller as “scathing”, with the relative clauses in the postmodification - “about figures 
like Naomi Wolf and about the new feminist conservatism” - making the causes of the older feminist‟s 
vitriol clear. “The new feminist conservatism” evokes the radical/moderate binary observed by Dean 
(2010, p. 402), and instances of implying elsewhere in the examples also carry this sense of 
observing differences between the feminisms, as well as oppositions. By singling out “the modern 
feminist heroine”, Guardian 01c flouts the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975), implying that what is true 
for new feminist heroines – that they “cannot deny fame or flee from it” – might not be true for older 
feminist heroines. In this instance, the writer associates new feminism with celebrity (“fame”), leaving 
the reader to infer that this was not something that affected older feminisms. The use of an adjective 
that denotes newness alongside „feminist‟ in Sun 04a also creates an implicature about the 
differences between new and old feminisms: in this example (discussed in the analysis of „feminist 
icon(s)‟ in section 7.2.2 above), the writer flouts the maxim of manner (Grice, 1975) by asking a 
rhetorical question – “Why shouldn‟t our Page 3 stunners be modern feminist icons?” The implied 
answer here is that there is no reason why modern feminism and topless modelling should not go 
hand in hand. The restriction of this proposition to modern feminism means that there is also a flout of 
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quantity (Grice, 1975), as the writer says nothing about the relationship between older feminisms and 
topless modelling. While not explicitly drawing a divide between old and new feminisms, Sun 04a 
nonetheless implies that while old feminism was not compatible with Page 3, new feminism is different 
in this respect, evoking the idea of a new, more sexualised feminism observed in previous studies (for 
example Mendes, 2012, p. 561). 
 
7.5.2 „Early/old/original‟ and „feminist‟ 
A total of 13 occurrences of „early‟/„earlier‟, „old(e)(-school)‟ and „original‟ occur in lists with „feminist‟ in 
the premodification of nouns. These occurrences provide further evidence of how representations of 
states make distinctions between different feminist ages, which are presented as antagonistic to each 
other. 
Occurrences of „early/oldoriginal‟ and „feminist‟ are compiled in table 7.17:  
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Publication Sentence 
Guardian 00a In her own recent memoir of early feminist activism in the United States, Susan 
Brownmiller records the intense pressures on these early stars 
Guardian 00a No one was less a part of the old feminist establishment 
Guardian 01a Natasha Walter has advised us to do away with the old feminist adage – „the 
personal is political‟ 
Guardian 03b […] I‟m up for a good - old, new, sustained, whatever - feminist fracas 
Guardian 04a The popularity of The Vagina Monologues can be read as a depressing revelation 
of how little earlier feminist works had achieved 
Guardian 05b The book is one she has wanted to write for years, as “liberal feminists and 
postmodernists” challenge the early feminist critique of beauty practices 
Guardian 06c The original pro-feminist men‟s movement […] grew out of the progressive left‟s 
frustration […] 
Guardian 08c Just as the play laughs at gender politics […] it can also laugh at some old-school 
feminist dogma 
Mail 03a […] that puritanically bossy period of feminism only now exists in Ye Olde 
Feminist Folkloric Ghetto […] 
Mail 08c The original 19th-century feminist pioneers, who fought for women‟s rights in a 
society where they really were second-class citizens, would surely have been 
appalled without measure had they been able to see into the future 
Telegraph 02c […] Prof Tooley traces the malaise back to the early feminist writings of Betty 
Friedan, Germaine Greer and Gloria Steinem 
Times 05c […] it‟s impossible for a woman to write about anything - sex, love, the 
menopause, even politics - without the old feminist mantra that „the personal is 
political‟ being reversed and hung round her neck 
Times 08a Subscribing to the original feminist theories of equality […] they [a new breed of 
feminist] pick the fights that mean something to them, ignoring the elements of 
feminist politics they find irrelevant 
 
Table 7.17: Adjectives that occur in lists with „feminist‟ – „early‟, „old‟ and „original‟ 
 
Similar to the examples of „new/young/modern‟ and „feminist‟ discussed above, examples of 
„early/old/original‟ and „feminist‟ oppose old and new feminisms through how they interact in 
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representations of interactions and states. However, the examples analysed here reverse the 
direction of antagonism, with things that are „new/young/modern‟ and „feminist‟ presented as showing 
hostility towards things that are „early/old/original‟ and „feminist‟. This is most clearly the case in 
Guardian 08c, in which the contemporary play The Female of the Species is the sayer in a 
verbalisation process of laughing at the target, “some old-school feminist dogma”. The division is also 
evident in material action processes, which present contemporary feminists as actors who perform 
hostile actions on the goal - ideas associated with older feminisms represented by the head nouns 
“critique”, “adage” and “theories”: in Guardian 05b, “the early feminist critique of beauty practices” is 
challenged by “liberal feminists and postmodernists”, while contemporary feminist writer Natasha 
Walter is presented as advising people to “do away with” the feminist slogan „the personal is political‟ 
in Guardian 01a. Each of these actions presents the idea of feminism as complex, dividing into 
different types, and also presents one type as critical of the other in a way that reflects Scharff‟s 
(2011) definition of third wave feminism as “young women‟s critical and diverse engagements with 
second-wave feminism” (p. 463). This idea of a new feminism that has shed some of the ideas and 
meanings associated with old feminism is demonstrated neatly by the three material action processes 
attributed to “a new breed of feminist” in Times 08a: “Subscribing to the original feminist theories of 
equality”, but “ignoring the elements of feminist politics they find irrelevant” in order to “pick the fights 
that mean something to them”. The premodifiers “new” and “original” and the verbs “Subscribing” and 
“ignoring” emphasise divisions within feminism and the fact that new feminists are able to adapt the 
meaning of „feminism‟ according to their will. 
 Representations of actions, events and states also present things that are both 
„early/old/original‟ and „feminist‟ as being the cause of problems, archaic and unimpressive in terms of 
their accomplishments. In the material action process in Telegraph 02c, the academic James Tooley 
is the actor in a process of tracing a malaise; the adverbial – “to the early feminist writings of Betty 
Friedan, Gemaine Greer and Gloria Steinem” – presents something „early/old/original‟ and feminist as 
the root of problems. In Mail 03a and Guardian 04a, an existential process and tense, respectively, 
demonstrate how this type of feminism is “historicised” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). 
The adverbial “in Ye Olde Feminist Folkloric Ghetto” in Mail 03a contextualises where “that 
puritanically bossy period of feminism” exists, with the distal deictic marker of space “that” and 
negative connotations associated with “Ghetto” and “bossy” emphasising the undesirability of old 
feminism, while the past perfect tense in the how-clause “how little earlier feminist works had 
achieved” in Guardian 04a presents old feminism as something from the past, and as something “that 
did not achieve much” (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). 
 This analysis of adjectives that denote time and „feminist‟ reinforces the idea that „feminist‟ 
can be used to describe different people in different periods of time. Contrary to the discussion of 
different ages of feminism in section 5.4.2, however, the evidence here suggests that having the 
qualities of being „early/old/original‟ and „feminist‟ is negative, whereas having the qualities of being 
„new/young/modern‟ and „feminist‟ is positive. 
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7.6 Summary 
The analysis of textual meanings of „feminist‟ has again demonstrated that the meanings of 
„feminist/s/ism are contested. Some of the examples discussed, such as the various uses of negated 
derivational forms of „feminist‟ and instances where „feminist‟ is used as a gradable adjective, 
demonstrate the complexity of the lexemes: writers use these forms to divide the world into things that 
are feminist and things that are not, and to present the idea of different levels of feminism. 
 The overview of adjectives with which „feminist‟ occurs in lists, like that of adjectives that 
premodify „feminism‟ in chapter 5, demonstrated that although there are only a small number of 
affiliative classifiers referring to place, they are – in keeping with Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s 
(2012) findings - consistently associated with the west. Indeed, the fact that there are only a small 
number may reflect writers‟ assumptions about feminism‟s geographical placement. The overview 
also indicated that things and people that are feminist are divided into new and old varieties. As in the 
analysis of „feminism‟ and „feminist(s)‟, there was evidence here that writers locate political varieties of 
feminism in the past, with newer varieties presented as less attached to a particular way of being 
feminist, reflecting Dean‟s (2010) observation of “domestication” (p. 392) in articles about 21
st
-century 
feminism. Analysis using the model of transitivity to look at how articles present interactions between 
different varieties of feminist was helpful here, demonstrating that newer feminist people and groups 
are presented in actions of reacting to older feminist people and ideas. 
 The analysis of adjectival „feminist‟ again indicates that „feminist/s/ism‟ has complex meanings 
in the data. A simple way of demonstrating this was through the overview of people to whom „feminist 
icon(s)‟ can refer, covering figures ranging from the conventional (Germaine Greer, Doris Lessing) to 
the less obvious (Page 3 models, Bond girls). Although the use of textual-conceptual functions such 
as implying and hypothesising indicated that some of the claims made for less likely feminist icons are 
somewhat tongue in cheek, the presence of these occurrences demonstrates that the meaning of 
„feminist‟ is contested in the data. The analysis of derivational forms also demonstrates contestation: 
for example, writers use contrasting to argue whether the status of a person or activity is „feminist‟ or 
its opposite, while the frequent use of „post-feminist‟ suggests the need to question where feminism 
ends and something else begins. However, it is notable that things that the articles deem „anti-
feminist‟ are seen as a threat, rather than something positive, and that positive ideas about the 
meaning of „post-feminist‟ are attributed to others through the presentation of speech, providing 
writers with a position to argue against in order to provide a positive view of feminism. Not only was 
the idea of post-feminism questioned in this way, but analysis of implying and speech and thought 
presentation indicated that the view that things that are feminist are dead is contested in the data. 
This chapter completes the analysis of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data. Chapter 8 concludes the 
thesis by relating the findings of chapters 5-7 to the three research questions stated and discussing 
limitations of the study and possible avenues for future research. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
This chapter summarises the findings of the critical stylistic analysis reported on in this thesis. The 
investigation consisted of the annotation and analysis of a dataset of occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ in 
UK national newspapers. The initial annotation stage analysed all 2,539 occurrences of 
„feminist/s/ism‟ for the range of textual-conceptual functions identified by Jeffries (2010a), and 
provided an overview of the data, which I then used to identify entry points for the analysis stage. This 
second stage again utilised the full range of textual-conceptual functions to provide as full as possible 
an account of how textual and contested meanings of „feminists/s/ism‟ are constructed. This approach 
built on previous work in critical stylistics by Evans and Jeffries (2015) and Evans and Schuller (2015) 
that annotate smaller datasets for a narrower range of textual-conceptual functions: using the 
annotation of the full range of textual-conceptual functions provided a more complete overview of how 
a set of texts construct the meanings of a set of lexemes. It also represents a more focused analysis 
of the construction of meaning in texts than that of Coffey (2013) and Tabbert (2015), each of which 
uses corpus methods to provide an initial overview of the data. By using critical stylistic analysis in 
both stages of the investigation, I was able to focus throughout on the different ways in which texts 
create meaning, and to gain a greater familiarity with the data. 
In the discussion below I first of all restate the research questions set out in chapter 1. I 
answer each research question by summarising the findings of the analysis in chapters 5-7, drawing 
conclusions on the contents of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data and the methodological approach used to 
analyse it (section 8.1). I then discuss the limitations of the study and suggest areas for future critical 
stylistic research (section 8.2) before providing concluding remarks (section 8.3). 
 
8.1 Research questions 
The analysis conducted in this thesis answers three research questions: 
 
1. What are the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the context of UK national newspapers, 
2000-2009? 
2. How is the meaning of „feminism‟ contested in UK national newspapers, 2000-2009? 
3. How is critical stylistics a suitable methodology for the analysis of a large dataset? 
 
These questions address the content of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data and the methodological approach I 
used to analyse it. Questions 1 and 2 relate to how meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are constructed in the 
data: the different ways in which its meanings are textually constructed, and how meanings are 
contested in the context of UK national newspapers. I address these questions by summarising the 
findings reported in chapters 5-7. Question 3 relates to the manual critical stylistic method of analysis 
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that I used to answer these questions, and considers the ways in which this is a useful method for the 
analysis of a large dataset. 
 
8.1.1 The textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ in UK national newspapers 
This section discusses the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ found through the analysis in chapters 
5-7. It relates the findings to the five frames of media portrayals of feminism observed in section 2.3. 
The discussion argues that textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are not as negative as previous 
studies (see section 2.2) indicate. It also observes that „feminist/s/ism‟ refers to a western 
phenomenon with both new and old varieties, with the existence of these and other varieties 
presenting „feminist/s/ism‟ as referring to a complex set of ideas, people and things. „Feminist/s/ism‟ is 
also shown to have undergone changes in meaning, with some of the ideas and people represented 
by the lexemes presented as opposed to each other. Portrayals of the meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are 
themselves also shown to be complex, with articles favouring some meanings over others, supporting 
feminism from a defensive position and arguing against the perceptions of others. 
 
8.1.1.1 Positive/negative portrayals 
Previous research (see section 2.2) finds that feminism and feminists have been “misrepresented, 
distorted or constructed as deviant” (Mendes, 2012, p. 556). Studies that focus on twenty-first century 
newspaper articles (Dean, 2010; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) have been more optimistic, although the 
linguistic study most similar to the thesis in terms of data used and focus on the lexemes finds that 
„feminism‟ has a negative discourse prosody (Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 417). My 
investigation of „feminist/s/ism‟ finds that while the textual meanings constructed in UK national 
newspapers in the 2000s are often negative, the overall picture is more nuanced. This can be seen in 
the way textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ relate to some of the key points made by previous studies 
about negative coverage of feminism. 
 One of the most pertinent findings to come out of the study concerns the often observed 
connection (for example in Callaghan et al., 1998; Christie, 1998; Rhode, 1995) between feminism 
and death. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy (2012) argue that the co-occurrence of „feminism‟ and „dead‟ 
presents feminism as “finished” (p. 417). While my analysis of each of the lexemes showed that 
„feminist/s/ism‟ and „dead‟ frequently co-occur (for example in the „feminism is [adjective phrase]‟ 
structure discussed in section 5.2.2.2), closer analysis demonstrated that the articles frequently 
contest the idea of feminism‟s death, e.g. through the use of negating to reverse propositions about 
feminism‟s death or presentations of speech and thought which acknowledge this perception of 
feminism, before arguing against it. While Lind and Salo (2002, p. 217) note that such instances 
nonetheless produce a strong association between feminism and death, this aspect of the meaning of 
„feminism‟ – that it refers to a defunct movement – is contested in the articles. Analysis of evidence of 
stereotyping in the data – for example, the idea that „feminist‟ denotes someone who is “radical, 
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unbalanced” (Callaghan et al., 1999, p. 164) or “unfeminine” (Danner & Walsh, 1999, p. 72) – found a 
similar story. Adjectives denoting a political nature are packaged up into the naming of feminism and 
feminists: however, although they mark contrasts between feminists and other women – for example 
through the presentation of transitional oppositions through which a woman becomes a radical 
feminist (see section 6.2.4.2) – there was little evidence that politically active feminisms or feminists 
were presented in a negative light. 
 The analysis also found evidence of people‟s rejection of feminism, for example in 
occurrences of the „I‟m not a feminist‟ structure observed by studies including Walby (2011, p. 3) (see 
analysis in section 6.2.3.1). However, while the use of speech presentation to attribute this sentiment 
to others gives „feminist‟ a negative textual meaning of undesirability, writers use this to argue that 
those who share it can actually be referred to as „feminist‟, even though they feel its meaning 
precludes them. There was also evidence of how articles use quotes from famous feminists to 
“reinforce the movement‟s downfall” (Mendes, 2011b, p. 492) (see section 6.2.4.1), although these 
quotes are used more to emphasises the idea of the failings of more recent types of feminism than to 
dismiss feminism as a whole. The data shows that while articles acknowledge negative textual 
meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟, they also debate them. 
 
8.1.1.2 Geographical and temporal placement 
Previous studies of feminism in the media observe that feminism is located geographically in the west 
(Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012) and temporally in the past (Dean, 2010; Jaworska & 
Krishnamurthy, 2012). Dean (2010) suggests that this temporal placement has an ideological basis, 
allowing writers to present „feminism‟ as referring to something that is now “largely irrelevant and no 
longer necessary” (p. 400). The analysis of how „feminist/s/ism‟ is named demonstrated that, where 
affiliative classifiers are used to tie feminism to a particular location, „feminism‟ denotes a western 
movement (see, for example, section 5.4.2). Likewise, the feminists deemed to be representative of 
the movement – for example those attributed the status of „feminist icon‟ (see section 7.2.2) – are 
from the west. 
 The temporal placement of „feminist/s/ism‟ is more complicated. The first and second waves 
are placed in the past through a variety of means (see section 5.4.2.1), for example through naming 
(“The second wave feminism of the late 1960s” (Telegraph 08a)) and representations of time 
(“Second wave feminism didn‟t risk focusing on childbirth” (Independent 01a)). However, analysis of 
the same textual-conceptual functions demonstrated that the third wave is deemed still to exist (see 
section 5.4.2.1), and the denials of feminism‟s death (discussed in section 8.1.1.1 above) present 
„feminism‟ as denoting a movement that is still alive. As Jaworksa and Krishnamurthy (2012) observe, 
there is also an emphasis on the idea of new varieties of feminism, suggesting that feminism not only 
still exists, but that it is “in flux” (p. 416) and has changing meanings. This was most clearly noticeable 
in the overviews of premodifying adjectives and adjectives with which „feminist‟ appears in lists, in 
which „new‟, „modern‟ and „contemporary‟ were common (see section 7.5). The articles also use a 
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variety of means to draw comparisons between new and old varieties of feminism, emphasising the 
perception of „feminism‟ as “fragmented” (Mendes, 2011b, p. 484). In particular, there is evidence to 
back up Dean‟s (2010, p. 401) assertion that radical types of feminism are located in the past, with 
„new‟ feminism presented as more moderate, for example through the use of contrasting to construct 
the idea of transitions from political to non-political feminists (see section 6.3.3.1). 
 
8.1.1.3 Universality/complexity 
Previous studies of feminism in the media are split between those that find that feminism is portrayed 
as a single, universal movement whose advocates are “all alike” (Douglas, 1991, p. 274), and those 
that deem portrayals to be “nuanced and fragmented” (Mendes, 2011b, p. 484). The analysis of 
textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ found some evidence for the former position: for example, a large 
percentage of occurrences of „feminism‟ are unmodified (see section 5.1), suggesting that the lexeme 
refers to a single, recognisable referent, while analysis of naming and speech presentation (see, for 
example, the analysis of „feminist writer(s)‟ in section 7.2.3) provides evidence for North‟s (2009) 
observation that “„superstar‟ media spokeswomen” (p. 743) are used to represent feminism as a 
whole. Further, many of the definitions of „feminism‟ constructed by representations of states – for 
example “Feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal” (Mail 03a) – closely correspond to 
the OED (2015) definitions of „feminist/s/ism‟ cited at the beginning of the investigation (see section 
1.1). 
However, the overall impression given by the data is that „feminism‟ has a complex meaning. 
This can be seen in the types of things and ideas that are presented as equivalent with feminism in 
relational intensive processes. For example, the various attributes in „feminism is [prepositional 
phrase]‟ structures (see section 5.2.2.3) showed that feminism is perceived as both individualist (for 
example “feminism is about sisterhood” (Guardian 06b)) and collectivist (e.g. “feminism is about being 
the best you can be for you” (Mail 09a)). Complexity is also demonstrated by the fact that even 
unmodified occurrences of „feminism‟ are presented as variable (see section 5.2), for example 
through representations of states that attribute to it qualities such as meaning “a lot of things to a lot of 
people” (Mail 06b)) and as applying only to particular times or groups, e.g. through adverbials like 
“What feminism means to them” (Express 02a). Similarly, the analysis of representations of states in 
the feminist dataset (see section 6.2.3.2) showed that the noun „feminist‟ is applied to a wide variety 
of figures: not only famous advocates such as Germaine Greer or Doris Lessing, but also less 
obvious choices such as topless models and Bond girls. As Dean (2010) observes, there are also 
“distinctions between different manifestations of feminism” (p. 392), particularly along the lines of old 
and new, and political and non-political, varieties (see section 8.1.1.4 below). This variation is itself 
the focus of some articles, such as „The Gender Agenda‟ (Guardian 02c), which provides a dictionary-
style guide to different types of feminist including “old-school” feminists and “feminine” feminists. 
 Other patterns in the data demonstrate the elusiveness of clear definitions of the lexemes. 
The interaction of representing actions/events/states and negating provides definitions of what 
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feminism is not (Marling, 2010) (see, for example, section 5.2.3), while writers also express their own 
uncertainty about the kind of people that „feminist‟ denotes (Mendes, 2011a, p. 132), particularly in the 
discussion of new and modern feminists (see section 6.3.3.3). These difficulties are illustrated by uses 
of derivational forms of adjectival „feminist‟, for example in the use of contrasting in Mail 03a to draw 
distinctions between those who were pre-feminist, those who were feminist, and those who are post-
feminist (see section 7.4.1). 
 
8.1.1.4 Changes and oppositions 
Previous studies observe that articles present feminism as something that has changed over time, in 
particular through transitions between „waves‟ of feminism (Dean, 2010; Hinds & Stacey, 2001; 
Mendes, 2011a). In the „feminist/s/ism‟ data, the fact that the second wave has passed is made clear 
through naming and the representation of time, which present it as “historical and no longer current” 
(Jaworska & Krishnamurthy, 2012, p. 411), for example in references to “the second-wave feminism 
of the late 1960s” (Telegraph 08a) and “second-wave feminism didn‟t risk focusing on childbirth and 
motherhood” (Independent 01a). This contrasts with the third wave, which is presented as existing in 
the present and is attributed the quality of being different from previous incarnations, for example in 
“third-wave feminism differs from its precursors” (Guardian 05a). In these ways, a line is drawn 
between the second and third waves. The data also contains evidence of the shift from feminism to 
post-feminism, for example where the lexemes „feminist/s/ism‟ and „post-feminist/s/ism‟ appear in 
contrasts such as “We are living in a post-feminist society – after a women‟s movement” (Times 
02b).  
Other uses of contrasting observe transitions from feminism to other phenomena. These tend 
to reflect the type of a change in feminism‟s focus observed by Taylor (2003) from individualist to 
collectivist ideas. For example, the analysis of „feminism becomes X‟ structures (see section 5.2.4) 
showed that feminism is the thing transitioned from in oppositions with phenomena such as a career 
option. Individual varieties of feminism, as well as feminism as a whole, can also change: the 
analysis of „feminism‟ with minimal modification (section 5.3) demonstrates that individual varieties of 
feminism are presented as actors in processes of mellowing, evolving and becoming physical as 
opposed to intellectual. Again, these transitions suggest a process by which „feminism‟ loses some of 
its more political meanings, becoming more closely associated with “softer” (Mendes, 2011a, p. 560) 
issues. 
The analysis also demonstrated that not only are there different varieties of feminism and 
feminists that are distinguished by time or their (non-)political nature, but also oppositions between 
these varieties. In particular, there is evidence of divisions between old and political feminists on one 
hand, and new and non-political feminists on the other. In some cases, explicit divisions are 
presented between old and new feminists in contrasts such as “the polarising of opinion between old-
school feminists and modern young women engaged with popular culture” (Times 08a), where 
the use of naming within a contrast allows a writer to provide detail that emphasises divisions. In other 
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cases, representations of actions enable writers to present the idea of feminists interacting with each 
other in hostile ways: older feminists are presented as aggressive (“a judgemental cohort of older 
feminists beating up their daughters” (Guardian 09c)), while newer feminists interrogate older feminist 
ideas (“liberal feminists and postmodernists challenge the early feminist critique of beauty practices” 
(Guardian 05b). These oppositions between generations demonstrate articles‟ awareness of the 
perception of more recent waves of feminism as a critical response to the ideas of earlier waves 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 557). 
 
8.1.1.5 Complexity of portrayals 
Analysis using the textual-conceptual functions was also able to make some revealing findings about 
the nature of portrayals of feminism. In particular, it found evidence for observations made by 
previous studies of the same genre and time period (Dean, 2010; Mendes, 2011a, 2012) concerning 
how newspaper articles discuss feminism. 
 The crux of Dean‟s (2010) study of The Guardian and The Times is his notion of 
domestication. His investigation finds evidence that there is “a bold affirmation of feminism, on the 
one hand, and a disavowal of some of its (perceived) less palatable dimensions” (Dean, 2010, p. 
397). The analysis found evidence that articles do indeed present some varieties as favourable over 
others, but this evidence also counters Dean‟s (2010) suggestion that radical forms of feminism are 
repudiated in favour of “a more acceptable form of feminism in the present” (p. 399). The analysis of 
contrasts in which old and new feminism are presented as opposites provided linguistic evidence of 
how articles present what Dean (2010) calls “binary oppositions” (p. 402), but these oppositions 
demonstrate the favouring of old feminism over new. This preference was particular clear in contrasts 
such as “We don‟t need a new feminism that gives us equality at work and leaves our private 
selves in crisis. We need the old feminism back” (Guardian 01a), where naming is used to 
construct the idea of an old, clear feminism (“the old feminism”) and a vague, new feminism with 
limitations (“a new feminism that gives us equality at work and leaves our private selves in crisis”). 
 The analysis also found evidence of how articles support feminism from a “defensive position” 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 10) and are “cast against an imagined interlocutor” (Dean, 2010, p. 397). One of 
the ways in which this is realised is in writers‟ attempts to define what feminism is (see section 5.2.2). 
Often, positive textual meanings are attributed to feminism, but through definitions of what it is not, 
rather than what it is (Marling, 2010, p. 15). This was particularly noticeable in denials of feminism‟s 
death that arise through implying (discussed above in section 8.1.1.1), for example in the flout of the 
maxims of quantity/relation/manner (Grice, 1975) in “Feminism isn‟t dead” (Independent 08a). In other 
instances, this defensive approach to discussing feminism was extended through contrasting, putting 
forward alternative perceptions as in “Feminism isn‟t dead [...] it‟s thriving” (Guardian 07c). Similarly, 
writers use imagined interlocutors (Dean, 2010, p. 397) to give them a position to argue against: 
negative textual meanings of „feminism‟ are often part of the presentation of someone‟s speech or 
thought – for example in “Conventional wisdom decreed that feminists looked like men in dungarees” 
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(Independent 07a) – and give writers a springboard from which to provide more positive textual 
meanings. 
 
8.1.2 The contested meaning of „feminism‟ in UK national newspapers 
The textual meanings discussed in section 8.1.1 above demonstrate how „feminism‟ has no one, 
consistent meaning: it can be both positive and negative and consists of different varieties 
corresponding to particular times and individuals, some of which are opposed to each other and some 
of which demonstrate changes that the movement has gone through. In addition to the variety of 
textual meanings attributed to „feminist/s/ism‟, there is also evidence of how the meanings of the 
lexemes are explicitly contested in articles. The discussion below focuses on three key aspects of 
how meanings are contested: examples of metalanguage, the discussion of „rules‟ attached to use of 
„feminist‟, and uses of adjectival „feminist‟ and derivational forms that contest how it can be used and 
to what extent it applies to particular referents. 
 The analysis of occurrences of metalanguage demonstrated that writers show an awareness 
of important issues to do with the lexemes‟ meanings. In many cases, the analysis showed that those 
things deemed equivalent to „feminism‟ – for example “knowing the sexes are equal” (Mail 03a), 
“having the balls to confront the stereotypes” (Guardian 07a) – correspond to the OED (2015) 
definition of feminism, emphasising the importance of gender equality. However, it is also common for 
the attributes in these relational processes to observe the variety of interpretations that are possible: 
definitions acknowledge that the meaning of „feminism‟ varies depending on the person doing the 
defining – for example in “Feminism can mean a lot of things to a lot of people” (Mail 06b) – and the 
period of time concerned, e.g. “Feminism means something different to women now” (Mail 06b). Other 
instances, such as the „what feminism means‟ structures analysed in section 5.2.1, demonstrate that 
this potential for multiplicity of meaning results in uncertainty: interrogatives – “What did we mean by 
feminism?” (Independent 08a) - and combinations of negating and hypothesising – “I‟m just not sure 
what feminism means now” (Mail 06b) – are used to express uncertainty about what „feminism‟ 
means, and are notable for the way this uncertainty is attached to the here and now through proximal 
markers of person (“we”) and time (“now”). Some articles are explicit attempts to deal with the 
difficulty of defining „feminist/s/ism‟: for example, „The Gender Agenda‟ (Guardian 02c) provides a 
glossary-style account of the meanings of various forms of „feminist‟, such as „post-feminist‟, „feminine 
feminist‟ and „old-school feminist‟. 
 Other occurrences of metalanguage present „feminism‟ as a lexeme that can undergo 
changes in connotative meaning, with writers defending the lexeme against negative perceptions. 
Instances of contrasting show how perceptions of the lexeme have changed over time, through 
transitional opposition frames that observe how “feminism has become a dirty word” (Express 04a) 
and contrasts that place positive connotations in the past and negative connotations in the present, 
for example “The word „feminist‟ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution; now, I‟m 
afraid, the very word makes most of us yawn” (Mail 03a). These observations of negative 
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connotative meanings are backed up by representations of actions in which people respond 
negatively to „feminism‟, such as the negated mental reaction process in “Most women my age don‟t 
like the word feminism” (Independent 09a). However, other writers occupy the “defensive position” 
(Mendes, 2011a, p. 10) discussed in section 8.1.1.5 above when observing negative perceptions of 
„feminism‟, and use it to put forward more positive ideas. For example, Independent 03a contrasts 
observations concerning the undesirability of the “political and provocative meanings” of „feminism‟ 
with a positive definition by writer Marilyn French, while Times 09a observes the possibility that 
„feminism‟ has developed negative meanings, and uses a hypothesising „if...then‟ structure to posit 
that if „feminist‟ is now derogatory, then the writer “would like to purposefully start using it for its shock 
value”. Still other examples support feminism by arguing that the lexeme itself is unimportant, and that 
it is the underlying meanings that are important, for example in Mirror 03a‟s argument that “I don‟t 
care what we call [...] Feminism [...] but we still need some word that says that women don‟t always 
get an even deal”. 
 The analysis of the feminist dataset showed that the meanings of „feminist‟ are contested 
through the discussion of „rules‟. Where occurrences of „a feminist‟ appear in representations of states 
(see section 6.2.3), it is often in non-finite clauses such as „to be a feminist‟, which are used to 
express the idea of conditions attached to „feminist‟, such as “to be a feminist you shouldn‟t wear 
make-up” (Times 02c) or “being a feminist means hating men” (Guardian 07b). These rules limit the 
scope of the sense of „feminist‟: if someone wears make-up, then they cannot be a referent of 
„feminist‟; if someone does not hate men, then they cannot be a „feminist‟. However, these rule 
structures are striking for the way they contest these narrow meanings of „feminist‟ through a variety 
of linguistic means: in some cases, this is through negating – for example “Being a feminist does not 
mean you hate men” (Express 09b) – and in other cases through the contextualisation of particular 
meanings of „feminist‟ in a certain time, e.g. “In the past, you had to subscribe to a whole set of beliefs 
to be a feminist” (Times 08s). In particular, these rules evoke the idea of a “potential compatibility 
between the previously polarised categories of feminism and femininity” (Hinds & Stacey, 2001, p. 
153), using concessive oppositions to emphasise that “you can be a strong, sexy woman and still be 
a feminist” (Guardian 06a) and “be feminine and yet be a feminist” (Independent 09c). These 
examples demonstrate taht articles do not portray „feminism‟ and „femininity‟ as antonyms, as argued 
by previous studies (Scharff, 2011; Taylor, 2003). 
 The analysis of the adjectives dataset demonstrated both that the sense of „feminist‟ can be 
used to label a wide variety of referents, and that there are certain difficulties attached to the lexeme. 
For example, the overview of the figures attributed the quality of being „feminist icon(s)‟ (see section 
7.2.1) demonstrated that the „feminist‟ label can be used not only to label recognisable feminist figures 
such as Germaine Greer and Doris Lessing, but also less likely referents such as Bond girls and 
glamour models. In some cases, writers provide arguments for their use of „feminist icon(s)‟, 
demonstrating their awareness that they are contesting the meaning of „feminist‟. This contestation is 
achieved through implying, for example flouts of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975) that leave the 
reader to infer that other types of „feminist‟ individual are possible – “in the age of mass 
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communication, our feminist icons are likely to be successful women” (Guardian 01c) – and of the 
maxim of manner (Grice, 1975), in hypothetical questions such as “Why shouldn‟t our Page 3 
stunners be modern feminist icons?” (Sun 04a) that argue for the „feminist‟ status of particular groups. 
Other adjectival occurrences present „feminist‟ as a gradable adjective, or contest the idea that certain 
things are „feminist‟ through derivational forms. For example, one writer in Times 08c notes that “I 
cannot [...] declare that I am exactly as feminist as I would like to be”: here, the comparative „as X as 
Y‟ structure presents „feminist‟ as a gradable adjective – it is possible to be more or less feminist – 
and the use of negating emphasises the idea that „feminist‟ does not apply to someone just because 
they want it to. Attributions of the quality of being „pseudo-feminist‟ to “imagery” (Guardian 00c) and 
“having Botox” (Guardian 05c) also demonstrate that it is possible to contest others‟ definitions of 
what is „feminist‟ and what is not. 
 
8.1.3 Critical stylistics as a suitable methodology for dataset analysis 
The analysis of the „feminist/s/ism‟ data has demonstrated that critical stylistics is a suitable 
methodology for analysing a dataset. It shows that it is possible to rigorously annotate a dataset in 
order to provide a richly detailed overview of occurrences of a set of lexemes, to navigate that dataset 
using statistical overviews of particular features of language, and to analyse it according to the range 
of ways in which texts construct meaning, thereby answering research questions concerning textual 
and contested meanings of lexemes. 
 The annotation stage described in chapter 4 showed that the textual-conceptual functions can 
be used to annotate a dataset. While the focus on the particular sentences in which occurrences 
appear means that decisions have to be made as to the level of annotation that is possible and 
desirable, these decisions can be described in a way that makes the process clear. For example, the 
annotation of transitivity processes necessitates decisions about what to analyse: whether to account 
for multiple levels of clause structure, or just the immediate clausal context of an occurrence. The 
annotation showed that it is possible both to be clear about what is and is not being analysed, and to 
use other textual-conceptual functions to help account for information that the annotation of a function 
misses: for example, the annotation of prioritising identifies where „feminism‟ occurs at a lower level of 
the clause structure, drawing the analyst‟s attention to occurrences that may need to be considered in 
greater detail. The nature of some textual-conceptual functions, such as contrasting and assuming 
and implying, also required an annotation that looked beyond the sentential context in which 
„feminist/s/ism‟ occurs. Again, explanation of the process ensured that the process taken was clear 
and repeatable, or could be developed in future research. The use of a dataset that is relatively small 
compared to the bodies of data used in corpus linguistic studies also meant that it was both possible 
to go back to the original data files to account, for example, for instances of contrasting that occur 
across sentences, and to do this for the entirety of the data without the process becoming too time-
consuming. 
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 The investigation‟s focus on an amount of data suitable for manual annotation also ensured 
that it was possible to “explore in-depth how particular lexical items are used in a particular discourse 
type” (Evans & Jeffries, 2015, p. 773). This approach made possible a level of detail that cannot yet 
be achieved through corpus methods. For example, the annotation of naming (and subsequent 
overviews of adjectives that premodify, or occur in lists with, „feminist/s/ism‟) not only provided similar 
information to the overviews of collocates provided by corpus methods, but also a greater level of 
detail – not only how frequently words co-occur, but also how they occur. The annotation of a textual-
conceptual function such as assuming and implying also made it possible to gain a more thorough 
overview of textual meanings: annotation that showed where flouts of the maxim of quality (Grice, 
1975) occurred, for instance, highlighted that some occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ had textual 
meanings at odds with those that they might, at first sight, be deemed to possess. 
 The annotation of the dataset also helped provide means of navigating the data. The 
annotation itself showed up occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ that appear in scare quotes or which 
appear in apposition with noun phrases such as „the word‟ and „the term‟. These occurrences of 
metalanguage provided particularly pertinent data for the investigation of textual and contested 
meanings, while the annotation of representing actions/events/states made it possible to quickly 
identify occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ that are the carriers in relational intensive processes, and 
therefore of particular interest for the study of definitions of feminism, feminists and the lexemes that 
represent them. The statistical overviews of two of the textual-conceptual functions – naming and 
representing actions/events/states – also showed how it is possible to use critical stylistic annotation 
to provide entry points based on how lexemes are treated in a dataset. These overviews indicated 
patterns in how the lexemes are treated in noun phrases and clauses, producing immediately 
interesting findings, for example that „feminism‟ tends to be an unmodified noun, and that the noun 
„feminist‟ occurs most frequently in representations of states, rather than actions. The overviews also 
identified sections of the data that, while relatively infrequent in occurrence, were interesting in terms 
of their grammatical unusualness. For example, although only 2% of occurrences of the noun 
„feminist‟ are unmodified (see section 6.1) – an unsurprising finding considering that „feminist‟ is a 
count noun that usually requires premodification through a determiner – analysis showed that these 
occurrences were instances of metalanguage, and therefore of particular interest to the study of 
textual and contested meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. 
 Having identified areas for investigation, analysis using the full range of textual-conceptual 
functions provided a detailed linguistic account of how textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are 
constructed. This enabled me to test the impressions of textual meaning provided by the annotation. 
For instance, the statistical overviews of „feminism‟ indicated that it tends to be unmodified and to 
appear in representations of states: the crossover point between these two findings allowed me to 
investigate parts of the data where feminism as a whole is defined, and to look at the relevant 
lexicogrammatical structures, such as „feminism is [adjective phrase]‟. An overview of adjective 
phrases that occur as attributes in these relational processes suggested that feminism is often 
presented as „dead‟: however, detailed analysis showed that this connection is often made within 
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speech or thought presentation, or is an instance of a flout of the maxim of quality (Grice, 1975) – 
analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions was therefore able to demonstrate that this 
impression of the textual meaning of feminism as „dead‟ was misleading. In other instances, analysis 
using the range of textual-conceptual functions made it possible to identify different aspects of textual 
meaning attached to a particular occurrence. For instance, the analysis of representations of states in 
which minimally modified occurrences of „feminism‟ are defined showed that not only are particular 
individuals‟ types of feminism defined, but textual meanings of other types of feminism are also 
implied through flouts of the maxim of quantity (Grice, 1975). 
 Analysis using the range of textual-conceptual functions also makes it possible to test the 
findings of both corpus-critical and non-linguistic studies. Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) study 
of „feminism‟ in the same genre and a similar time period found that the lexeme frequently collocates 
with the prefix „post-‟, leading the researchers to suggest that it indicates that “feminism is often 
framed as a thing of the past” (p. 417). However, analysis of occurrences of „post-feminist‟ through 
naming, speech presentation and other textual-conceptual functions indicated that the lexeme itself, 
and the ideas that it refers to, are often treated with suspicion by writers, rather than being used to 
argue that feminism no longer exists. The analysis was also able to corroborate and call into question 
the findings of non-linguistic studies. Analysis using the textual-conceptual function of contrasting 
provided more rigorous, linguistic evidence for Dean‟s (2010) observation that coverage of feminism 
is often based on “binary oppositions” (p. 402), while interactions between contrasting and other 
textual-conceptual functions such as naming and representing actions/events/states countered his 
claim that old, political forms of feminism are rejected in favour of newer, non-political forms (p. 391): 
although older forms are defined as more political, they tend to be favoured over newer forms, which 
are deemed to be vague. Analysis using a variety of textual-conceptual functions also provided 
evidence for claims made by previous studies of the same genre and time period that would otherwise 
be difficult to test, for example that feminism is supported from a “defensive position” (Mendes, 2011a, 
p. 10) and that “articles are cast against an imagined interlocutor” (Dean, 2010, p. 397): the use of 
negated relational intensive processes to define what feminism is according to what it is not, and the 
attribution of negative textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ to others through speech and thought 
presentation, indicated that these claims have a linguistic basis. 
 
8.2 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
I used a critical stylistic approach for both the annotation and analysis stages of the study. While this 
approach was in keeping with my aim of focusing on textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ throughout 
the investigation, it has limitations. The manual approach taken makes it difficult to make claims for 
the statistical significance of my findings or to provide a thorough account of the textual meaning of 
each and every occurrence, and also makes a degree of researcher bias unavoidable. The findings 
are also restricted to a particular genre and time period. 
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There was a practical limit to the size of the dataset that I could analyse using this method of 
manual analysis, which means that although my annotation of the data produces statistical overviews 
of two of the textual-conceptual functions (i.e. naming and representing actions/events/states), it was 
not possible to make claims about the statistical significance (or otherwise) of my findings. The 2,539 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ in the dataset, and my use of the full range of textual-conceptual 
functions in their analysis, provided me with enough data to produce evidenced findings concerning 
the textual meanings of the lexemes and to test previous corpus- and non-linguistic studies‟ findings 
concerning media portrayals of feminism (for example Dean, 2010; Jaworska & Krishnmaurthy, 2012; 
Mendes, 2011a, 2012). However, the dataset is small in comparison to the corpora used in corpus 
linguistic studies. For example, while my study analyses a total of 240 articles containing 
„feminist/s/ism‟, Jaworska and Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) corpus linguistic study of „feminism‟ and 
„feminist(s)‟ in the same genre and time period is based on 1,275 articles. The analysis of textual 
meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ has allowed me to test the statistics-based findings of Jaworska and 
Krishnamurthy‟s (2012) study, for example, calling into question their argument that feminism is 
portrayed as “a movement [...] which is finished” (p. 417): more detailed analysis demonstrated that 
articles question this view of feminism (see section 8.1.1.1 above). However, an approach that 
embraced corpus linguistic and critical stylistic methods would be able to provide both quantitative 
and qualitative evidence for its claims. A corpus-critical approach would also make it possible to test 
some of my findings against a larger data set. For example, my finding that „the feminists‟ are 
presented as threatening through their positioning as actors in representations of actions is based on 
a relatively small number of examples: a collocation such as „the‟ + „feminists‟ would be easily 
searchable in a large corpus, producing a greater amount of data against which to test my findings. 
Developments in corpus programmes could also enable a method of research into textual meaning 
that has a more rigorous statistical underpinning. For example, developments allowing a researcher to 
use a corpus programme to tag instances of negating or opposition triggers could help make the 
analysis of these textual-conceptual functions across larger amounts of data a possibility. 
 The annotation of occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ provides a thorough overview of the dataset, 
which could be utilised by other studies that wished to test my findings or investigate different entry 
points or analytical methods. However, although the „feminist/s/ism‟ dataset is small in comparison to 
corpora used in corpus linguistic studies, it was nonetheless not possible to analyse every occurrence 
of „feminist/s/ism‟. As a result, the dataset may contain textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ that were 
not uncovered by my analysis. A future research project might be better served if it focused on a 
smaller range of textual-conceptual functions, or interactions between particular functions: this might 
provide a more thorough account of particular aspects of how meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ are 
textually constructed. For example, the finding that naming is used to package up speakers‟ feminism 
in presentations of speech could be tested more thoroughly through an investigation that focused on 
occurrences of „feminist/s/ism‟ involved in speech presentation, and could look in greater detail at how 
„feminist/s/ism‟ is used in this way to lend a certain significance („if a feminist says this, then…‟) - to 
the views that are presented. Another possible means of analysis would be the type of qualitative 
analysis presented in the sample analysis in section 3.2. A smaller amount of data would enable a 
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researcher to maintain a focus on the full range of textual-conceptual functions, and also to look at 
entire articles in more detail. Whereas my analysis focuses on the sentences in which „feminist/s/ism‟ 
occurs, an analysis of a smaller amount of data could look beyond the sentential context to look at 
how the wider context constructs meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ – in particular, this could account for 
occurrences not accounted for by my approach, i.e. those where „feminist/s/ism‟ is referred to 
anaphorically or cataphorically through pronouns. Comparisons could also be made between articles 
from different publications, as in Dean‟s (2010) study of The Guardian and The Times: for example, a 
study focusing on contrasting could test his convictions about the presence of “binaries such as 
reasonable versus radical feminism” (p. 394) in newspapers. 
 My findings are based on a qualitative annotation and analysis of „feminist/s/ism‟. The 
investigation is founded on an approach – critical stylistics – that attempts to provide as full as 
possible a picture of how textual meaning is constructed, and the method and limits of the annotation 
process are thoroughly explained (see chapter 4). However, the analysis itself is qualitative in nature, 
and the interpretation of how meanings are textually constructed involves a degree of researcher bias: 
another researcher, depending on their orientation towards the subject matter or views of the 
publications included in the data, might uncover different textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. As 
noted above, the incorporation of corpus methods could help to shore up findings relating to textual 
meanings. Another possibility is to use respondent testing to see if readers observe similar meanings 
to those identified through critical stylistic analysis. This sort of study could build on that of Callaghan 
et al. (1999), which uses questionnaires to compare respondents‟ reports concerning their own 
feminist identification with their responses to questionnaires concerned with “gender-related issues” 
(p. 165). For example, respondents could first of all be asked for their opinions on feminism, before 
reading an article or set of articles identified as of interest for the textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟ 
that they contain: respondents could then be consulted on whether or not they get the impression of 
„feminism‟ as having a universal or complex meaning, or whether they recognise the types of 
oppositions identified through the analysis of contrasting. It may be particularly enlightening to test 
respondents‟ views on reports of the same story in different publications, or responses to an article 
such as „Is Feminism Dead?‟ (see section 3.2) which presents contrasting views of feminism. The 
testing of perceived textual meanings through this type of analysis could challenge and perhaps refine 
the critical stylistic account of how textual meaning is created. 
 The findings of the present study are also based on a single genre and time period. Despite 
declining print sales figures, newspapers – particularly in their online incarnations (Conboy, 2010) - 
remain an important and influential part of the media (Baker et al., 2013, p. 257). However, critical 
stylistic analysis of other genres such as online blogs, or of publications from different time periods, 
could provide interesting points of comparison, answering research questions relating to whether 
different genres or time periods construct different textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism‟. Analysis of 
online articles and their corresponding comments sections, such as those in the „Comment Is Free‟ 
section of The Guardian‟s website, could also shed light on how textual meanings of „feminist/s/ism 
are contested in writers‟ responses to each other. 
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8.3 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to investigate the textual meanings of a set of related 
lexemes through the critical stylistic analysis of a large dataset. It has shown that a manual approach 
to the analysis of textual meaning can uncover evidence that a particular group of lexemes has 
differing meanings, which are contested in the data. 
The thesis has also attempted to show that it is important to test perceptions of how a 
movement and its advocates are presented in the media. Analysis through textual-conceptual 
functions can provide an account of the range of ways in which the meanings of a set of lexemes are 
constructed textually, and also allows the researcher to test previous, non-linguistic arguments about 
a concept such as feminism. Annotation and analysis of a dataset using the range of textual 
meanings can provide a thorough overview of how textual meanings are constructed. 
 I have contributed to research on feminism in the media by questioning the assumption that 
the media presents feminism and feminists in a negative way in the media. Basing the analysis of 
media texts on a defined set of linguistic tools of analysis, I have found that the picture is more 
nuanced, and that while the contestation of „feminism‟, „feminist(s)‟ and „feminist‟ may cause 
confusion for readers, the fact that „feminism‟ is not presented as having a single, universal meaning 
opens up the opportunity for readers to consider the lexemes‟ meanings for themselves. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
The text below is one of the three Daily Mail articles in the „feminist/s/ism‟ dataset from 2003. This 
article is used for the sample analysis in section 3.2. 
 
Is feminism dead? 
Yes 
Ann Leslie, the Daily Mail‟s award-winning chief foreign correspondent, is married with a 
daughter. She says: 
The feisty and fearless writer Rebecca West declared crossly that “people call me a „feminist‟ 
whenever I express sentiments that differentiate me from a doormat or a prostitute”. But that was in 
1913 and she wasn‟t even allowed to vote. 
The word „feminist‟ in those days had the exciting smack of revolution; now, I‟m afraid, the 
very word makes most of us yawn. 
Every woman is a feminist these days, according to the author of The New Feminism, a 
dreary book I had to review not long ago, which tried to breathe life into the dead corpse of feminism 
as an ideology.  
But, the author discovered to her shock, many of these women who are feminists, don‟t 
actually think they are! She condescendingly put them right, informing young women that they 
shouldn‟t feel they‟re not feminists just because they like men and push-up bras - unlike her own 
feminist mother who believes that even depilatories are ideological. 
Surely, however, that puritanically bossy period of feminism only now exists in Ye Olde 
Feminist Folkloric Ghetto, „personed‟ by covens of ageing Speculum Sisters who still believe that 
shaving one‟s armpits is a betrayal of the Revolution. 
No wonder the Equal Opportunities Commission study discovered that we think of the 
ideological feminism of the past as „old-fashioned‟ and „man-hating‟ because, frankly, it is and very 
often was. Yes, of course there are still problems over childcare, unequal pay and „work-life balance‟ 
issues. 
But somehow to declare yourself to be a „feminist‟ is, in effect, to declare that „I‟m a folkloric 
ghetto-dwelling, self-pitying, self-righteous bore‟. 
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Yes 
Anna Stothard, 19, is the daughter of former Times editor Sir Peter and novelist Sally Emerson. 
Currently on her gap year, she will be going to Oxford University to study English Literature 
soon. She says: 
There are subtle anomalies in the way men and women are viewed, but 21st-century feminism no 
longer has much to fight about. I‟ve never tried to climb the corporate ladder, so have never come 
close to the „glass ceiling‟, but I did go to a boy‟s school for the sixth form. 
The girls often acted like Christmas decorations, bubbling around the common room in knee-
high boots and simpering over their lipstick before class, yet they did better in exams and could 
generally argue their male counterparts into the ground. 
The poor boys seemed justifiably confused as to their role in this new „comfortable feminism‟, 
not knowing whether they should open the door for a girl and risk having it knocked back in their 
faces. 
Some of my female friends want to devote their lives to having children and bringing up a 
family, some want to be high-powered lawyers. Feminism should not be about the pressure to have 
everything at once, but about the freedom to choose what you want. 
Feminism doesn‟t mean so much to my generation, not because we don‟t think it‟s important, 
but because our equality - at least in this country - has already been established. 
 
Yes 
Lynda Lee-Potter is a star columnist for the Daily Mail and an author in her own right. She 
says: 
We‟re surely now in the happy position of having the best of feminism, but with the sense to have 
discarded the daft bits. 
I never felt any need to prove that women are as good as men because it seemed self-
evident. 
All the influences in my early career were remarkable women - from my mother to the female 
boss who gave me my first chance in journalism. 
The most aggressive feminists, I suspect, came from families where there was a domineering 
father and a disappointed, defeated mother. As writer Marilyn French says: “Feminism is a belief that 
women matter as much as men do”. In many instances, I‟d say we matter more. 
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No 
Author Kathy Lette, 42, is married and lives in London with her two children. She says: 
When I was growing up in the sexist Seventies, women were seen as little more than a life support 
system to an ovary. 
We were human handbags, something attractive for men to drape over their arms at parties. 
And then along came Germaine Greer. She was a Femocet missile, targeting misogynistic 
men then nuking them. 
Admittedly, we younger girls got her message a little wrong at first. We thought that „sexual 
liberation‟ gave us the freedom to behave like blokes. 
The men were laughing all the way to the sperm bank. Of course, they believed in „free love‟ - 
they didn‟t have to pay for it. 
In Australia, „Greer‟ is now rhyming slang for „beer‟, and men are claiming that feminism has 
passed its amuse-by date. 
Well, if so, then why are women still getting concussion hitting our heads on the glass ceiling - 
and being paid less an hour than men to clean it? 
Why are women also still doing the bulk of the childcare and most of the housework? 
Statistics show that British men have increased their contribution to housework, on average, by 3.6 
minutes a week. 
In other words, any woman who calls herself a „post-feminist‟ has kept her wonder bra and 
burnt her brains. 
 
No 
Journalist and radio presenter Jenni Murray, 50, lives with her partner in North London, and 
has two grownup sons. She says: 
Is it really so surprising, that young women today are reluctant to use the f-word? Those of us who are 
proud to admit we are feminists are invariably characterised as ball-breaking man-haters who go 
around in dungarees and don‟t like makeup. 
For the record, I adore my partner and my sons, wouldn‟t be seen dead in dungarees and 
never leave the house without eyeliner, mascara, blusher and an immaculate manicure. 
But for 30 years I‟ve been hearing women say: „I‟m not a feminist, but didn‟t like it when they 
sacked me when I was pregnant‟, or „I earn so much less than the guys in my office‟, or „I hate it when 
the blokes at work have Britney in her undies as a screensaver‟, or „I‟m really worried about my 
pension because I took time out to look after the kids‟. 
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The young today see themselves as having equal opportunities in education and work, and 
it‟s only when the babies come along - and their career hits the buffers - that they discover the 
realities of the unequal world. 
The older and wiser among us can only wait for the day when they‟re finally forced to say, 
„Yes. I am a feminist. And proud of it‟. 
 
Yes 
Writer Chrissy Iley is married and lives in London and Los Angeles. She says: 
Feminism sounds more like a medical condition than cause. 
I think it was invented by men who wanted us to split the cost of dinner and still get sex - we 
lose out both ways. 
But feminism created its own glass ceiling - women who are not supportive of each other and 
are much more competitive than men. 
Men cleverly carried on using typically „male‟ characteristics to succeed: bullying, brute force 
and the old boys‟ club. These simply didn‟t translate for women. My experience is that men and 
women both abuse power, but women abuse it more on other women. 
Feminism has also taught us that not having it all makes us feel guilty, and trying to „have it 
all‟ gives us at best a headache and at worst a breakdown. 
Of course, in the beginning there was a point to the women‟s rights movement - because we 
had no rights. Now I think that positive discrimination creates victims and a compromise that is 
uncomfortable: as restricting as a corset but not as pretty. 
New research says that more women want to have partners and children much younger and 
put their careers on hold as the biological clock is less easy to adjust - but then they‟ll go and rule the 
world. 
Perhaps this is a better form of matriarchy. 
 
No 
Writer and journalist Samantha Norman, 40, is the daughter of film critic Barry Norman. She is 
divorced and lives in West London with her two young sons. She says: 
I am from a long line of feminists. 
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My maternal grandmother was a pre-feminist: a single mother in the Forties, recognised, 
since the term „feminist‟ didn‟t exist in her day, as „a strong woman‟ who raised three children and 
dominated her community. 
My mother was one of the first bone fide feminists who marched in the Sixties to campaign for 
equal rights. 
Which leaves me, I guess, a post-feminist feminist in less well-defined territory. 
There‟s no doubt that conditions for women have improved immeasurably since their time. 
Yet it remains an irrefutable fact that while all people are deemed equal these days, men tend 
to be just that little bit more equal than others. 
I see the continuing struggle for emancipation everywhere. I got divorced recently and learnt 
first-hand how little the legal system respects the role of homemaker and child-raiser. 
I see friends struggling in their relationships- both men and women - to embrace the tenets of 
feminism and still conform to the conventions of marriage. 
There are still glass ceilings, unequal pay and unequal treatment. 
The struggle continues, and long may it. 
 
No 
Cristina Odone, 42, deputy editor of the New Statesman, lives with her partner in London. She 
says: 
Your male boss won‟t pat your bottom lest you sue him for sexual harassment; he won‟t crack jokes 
about your „time of the month‟ affecting your productivity lest you sue him for sexual discrimination; 
and he won‟t hire someone to replace you while you‟re off on maternity leave lest you take him to the 
industrial tribunal. 
So don‟t start singing a requiem for feminism quite yet: it‟s alive, and reining in the basic 
instincts of every would-be misogynist But you may have noticed that we are talking „male‟ boss here: 
for, despite all the feminist triumphs, your boss is still likely to be a man. Women have come far - but 
still have a long way to go. 
This explains why so many of us reject the extremist, fist-clenching, man-hating champions of 
feminism: their wrongheaded priorities - wanting to call a manhole a personhole - risk distracting us 
from fighting the on-going important battles at hand, namely for equal pay for equal work, and greater 
access to the top posts. 
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Yes 
Marcelle D‟Argy Smith, a former editor of Cosmopolitan, is single and lives in West London. 
She says: 
Of course nobody cares about „feminism‟ now. They haven‟t cared about it for years. Too many British 
women have a horror of doing anything to jeopardise male approval, believing that if you‟re pro-
women you‟re seen as anti-man. 
If young women today are happily preoccupied with celebrities, navel piercing, text messaging 
and have no interest in politics, so be it. Who can blame them in the current climate? But the rest of 
us aren‟t fighting for them. 
Things have improved dramatically for women in the past 30 years - and yet we still get paid 
only about 80 per cent of what men do in the workplace. 
All the surveys show that women are still doing the bulk of the housework and bringing up the 
children. 
Only 18 per cent of MPs are women. 
Only about 10 per cent of women are QCs. 
Childcare was more easily available during World War II than it is now. Men‟s secretaries and 
PAs are tax-deductible; childcare isn‟t. 
There are inequalities wherever you look. But women today don‟t give a damn. Feminism 
here is dead. But I grieve in silence. 
 
No 
Novelist and journalist Bel Mooney, 56, is married to Jonathan Dimbleby. She lives in Bath and 
has a son and a daughter. She says: 
Years ago a newspaper editor asked me: “You‟re not a feminist, you?” with such distaste in his voice 
you‟d have thought he was accusing me of child abuse. I replied: “Don‟t know what else to be”. To 
me, feminism means simply knowing the sexes are equal, that men and women have to work together 
in mutual respect to create a better world. And we‟re not there yet. Women are as much in need of 
liberation as ever. 
What sort of world is it when many teenage girls define themselves solely in terms of their 
ability to be sexy, and when truly shocking numbers of them deliberately get pregnant because baby 
will give them some kudos, not to mention benefits? 
Violence against women is on the increase. The pernicious spread of pornography on the 
internet panders to the worst abusive male fantasies and it is truly astonishing how many young 
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women (not „professionals‟) collude in their own degradation. If we don‟t respect ourselves how can 
we expect men to? 
Feminist? Oh yeah! Let me wear those suffragette colours, let me stand at the barricades, as 
we start all over again. 
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Appendix 2 
The table below details each of the head nouns that is premodified by adjectival „feminist‟ in the 
adjectives dataset. This table appears in section 7.2 (table 7.1). 
 
Head noun No. of 
occurrences 
Movement(s) 41 
Icon(s) 27 
Writer(s) 24 
Issue(s) 18 
Magazine(s) 13 
Art 12 
Activism 11 
Group(s), revolution 10 
Blog(s), mother(s)/mums 9 
Agenda, idea(s) 8 
Author(s), organisation(s), principle(s), theory/ies 7 
Artist(s), cause(s), heroine(s), message 6 
Argument(s), book(s), era, literature, thought 5 
Academic(s), ideal(s), ideology, Intellectual Heritage, meeting(s), novel(s), politics, 
thinker(s), work(s) 
4 
Barbie, campaign(s), card, columnist, critics, historian(s), men, network(s), role 
model, slogan(s), symbol(s), theology, values, women, world 
3 
Act, activist(s), age, attitudes, backlash, banner, battle(s), belief(s), celebrity, 
commentators, criticism, critique, demands, establishment, fantasy, fascist(i), 
feminist, festival, fight, figure, fire, friend(s), generation, history, label, language, 
media, men‟s groups, narrative, polemic, press, publisher, rebel, rhetoric, 
scholar(s), society, terms, texts, theme(s), theorists, viewpoint(s), views, writing(s) 
2 
1950s, 24 year-old, academic circles, action fighters, adage, advances, agitation, 
aims, altar, alternative, America, analysis, anthem, apparatchiks, application, 
1 
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approach, art critics, aspiration, assassins, assertion, audiences, austerity, badges, 
bestseller, bloggers, blogosphere, bona fides, brigade, campaigner, campaigning, 
canon, caricature, carnival, challenges, champion, cheerleading, choices, claptrap, 
claque, cliché, collective, colossus, concepts, confectionery, conference, 
consciousness, conservatism, contemporaries, context, conviction, corner, 
credentials, credo, creed, crowd, cultural heritage, culture, death syndrome, 
delusion, demonstration, devotees, dilemma, dirge, discussion, doctrines, dogma, 
drama, dream, Eaves Housing, education, emotion, equality agenda, eye, family 
life, fanatics, farce, fashion zine, finger-wagging, folkloric ghetto, foremothers, 
fortune, fracas, freedom, French woman, future, girlhood, grand panjandrums, 
grounds, gynaecologist, hair theory, heart, heyday, high priestess, identification, 
induction centre, initiatives, insights, intellectual, interpretations, inventions, Islamic 
fundamentalist, journalist, kind of sex, legend, lessons, literary criticism, male 
dream, man, mantra, martyrs, matters, men‟s movement, mentality, militant, 
mistress-plan, mode, morality tale, movers and shakers, music festivals, 
musicologist, myth, nonsense, nothing, offering, old guard, one, opinions, 
orthodoxies, outburst, outrage, path, pendulum, perspective, philosopher, 
philosophy, pioneers, pit-holes, policies, political agenda, political stances, 
pornography, power-woman, pressure, professor, project, propaganda, protagonist, 
protests, psychobabble, publication, publishing drought, punches, punk movement, 
raunch culture, reading, regimes, Republican women, response, resurgence, 
review, schooling, selfishness, sensibilities, settlement, shape, shoes, slant, 
solutions, speech, stance, status, stereotypes, students, successes, supporters, 
tag, teachers, thesis, thing, thinking, tome, trauma, triumphs, tropes, troupe, truth 
squad, TV pundit, unit, veil-burner, victimhood, victim-womanhood, vim, vote, 
webzine, witch, wives, zeitgeist 
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